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I argue for a performative reading of the Summa theologiae in relation to Thomas Aquinas’s 
coordination of the trinitarian processions with the trinitarian image and the process of 
teaching and learning. Specifically, I argue that the Summa is skillfully arranged in order 
to initiate the student into the graced process of conceiving words about the Triune God 
that burst forth into love—the very processions by which we are ad imaginem Dei and 
become more like God. Learning to speak truly and love rightly prepares students to 
preach about God within their culture, just as Thomas’s own efforts to preach the 
trinitarian mystery indicate. My argument takes into account Thomas’s life as a 
Dominican preacher and teacher in thirteenth-century Europe as well as his theology of 
the mixed life of contemplation and action. With respect to the latter, Thomas 
maintained that the Dominican must draw in contemplation what he will pour out later on in 
preaching (contemplata aliis tradere). Thomas wrote the Summa theologiae with this pastoral 
orientation in mind. In light of this historical context, I argue that the Summa is a 
performative text and transformative encounter with sacra doctrina written to prepare 
Dominican students to hand on the fruits of their contemplation. This interpretation of 
the Summa theologiae and Thomas’s trinitarian theology enriches standard contemporary 
interpretations of the psychological analogy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
In this project, I work to retrieve Thomas’s trinitarian theology and relate it to his trinitarian 
anthropology (the imago Trinitatis) and his theology of the mixed life of teaching and preaching. 
The Summa theologiae represents Thomas Aquinas’s mature and most expansive trinitarian 
theology.1 Therein, Thomas advances Augustine’s psychological analogy, proposing that what he 
(Thomas) calls the “intellectual emanations” of word and love in us are analogous to the divine 
processions of Word and Love in God, respectively. It is central to my project to note that 
Thomas began writing the Summa for his Dominican students at Santa Sabina. He did so both to 
counter the pedagogical deficiencies he found in other texts and to prepare these Dominicans to 
become teachers, who in turn would prepare Dominican preachers. Based on my retrieval of 
Thomas’s trinitarian theology, his trinitarian anthropology, and his theology of the mixed life, I 
argue that the Summa theologiae is a performative text and transformative encounter with sacra 
doctrina through which the student can come to know and love the Trinity more deeply, and 
therefore become more and more like the triune God. Following Frederick E. Crowe, I call this 
process of assimilation “trinification.”2 Recovering Thomas’s trinitarian theology and retrieving 
the Summa as a text written to promote a transformative encounter intended to prepare 
Dominican students for their ministry demonstrates that the psychological analogy continues to 
be both intelligible and worthwhile for trinitarian theology and for supporting the Christian’s 
spiritual journey. 
                                                
1 Thomas’s most concise, yet mature, trinitarian theology is found in the Compendium theologiae, trans. Cyril 
Vollert, S.J. (St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book Co., 1947). Henceforth Comp. theol. 
2 Crowe uses this term to “stress the fact that the only God there is a triune God, he communicates himself 
to us as triune, and therefore the deification of the human world is really its ‘trinification’” (Frederick E. 
Crowe, The Most Holy Doctrine of the Trinity, ed. Leo Serroul (Toronto: Regis College, 1970), 178). 
 Introduction – Page xvi 
 Alongside a retrieval of Thomas’s psychological analogy for the Trinity in the Summa, I 
also draw upon recent historical scholarship in order to recover Thomas as a preacher and 
teacher within the Order of Preachers. Specifically, I focus upon the mixed life Dominicans lead 
in which they hand on the fruits of their contemplation to others for the sake of their neighbors’ 
souls (contemplata aliis tradere). Within this context, I will also demonstrate that for Thomas, a deep 
connection existed between speculative theology, as practiced in the Summa, and the Dominican 
ministry of preaching and teaching. To do so, I turn to some of Thomas’s own sermons and his 
commentary on the Gospel of John. In the former, we find a striking example of Thomas’s own 
efforts to preach the fruits of the psychological analogy—but without the technical jargon of the 
analogy—to a group of lay persons during Lent. In the latter, we encounter Thomas’s theology of 
contemplation and teaching within the context of the divine missions of the Son and the Spirit. 
We also find in his prologue to this commentary that he considered John the Evangelist one of the 
supreme contemplatives of the Christian tradition and an example of a person was able to hand 
on “the deep things of God” to others precisely because of his contemplation.3 Therein, Thomas 
also proposes that friendship is central to divine self-revelation and to Jesus’ own teaching 
ministry. Friendship is at once the context of coming to know what Jesus has been sent to teach as 
well as the goal to which his teaching is oriented. In friendship, we discover one another’s secrets 
(deep things) and become more and more of one mind and heart. Conversation, as one of the 
primary activities of friendship, cultivates this union of mind and heart.4 The conversations of 
friendship are intimately connected to Thomas’s understanding of trinitarian theology and 
trinitarian anthropology because each of these three centers on the operations of knowing and 
                                                
3 See Thomas Aquinas, Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. and Daniel 
Keating, Html-ed. Joseph Kenny, O.P., http://dhspriory.org/thomas/SS1Cor.htm#22, c. 2, lect. 2, n. 
102, accessed August 17, 2017. Henceforth, In 1 Cor. 
4 See Summa Theologiae, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas, Volumes 13-20, trans. Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province, eds. The Aquinas Institute (Lander: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of 
Sacred Doctrine, 2012), Ia-IIae, q. 28, a. 1 ad 2. Henceforth, ST.  
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loving, and more specifically, the processions of word and love. With Augustine, Thomas 
maintains that the human person becomes more like the triune God when God is the object of the 
human person’s knowing and loving.5 As I will explain, friendship and conversation with God is 
the divinely ordained context in which this assimilation takes place. 
 My consideration of the psychological analogy and the imago Trinitatis is aimed at 
exploring their relevance for Dominican preaching and teaching in their cultures. Drawing out 
the connection between trinitarian theology and the mixed life in Thomas’s theological work, and 
in his own preaching and teaching, supports my efforts to retrieve the psychological analogy for 
contemporary trinitarian theology and its concern for the transformative possibilities of belief in 
the Trinity. Given this goal, I concentrate my presentation of the analogy and the image upon 
their shared conversational elements of speaking and listening, and the significance of the verbum 
therein. In focusing on conversation, I offer a creative retrieval of Thomas’s trinitarian theology. 
In addition, I emphasize Thomas’s mature coordination of the divine processions with the 
creation of the human person ad imaginem Trinitatis.6 I argue that the very same operations (the 
intellectual emanations of word and love) and terms (the presence of the known in the knower and 
the beloved in the lover) provide (1) the analogical conception of the divine processions; (2) the 
explanation of the mode of divine indwelling and the assimilation of the imago to its trinitarian 
exemplar; and (3) the explanation of the process by which teaching and learning occur, both 
naturally and in the supernatural context of the divine missions. This threefold process, in the 
context of sacra doctrina, is itself embedded within assimilation to the Trinity and is central to 
understanding the human teacher’s participation in the pedagogical aspect of the divine missions. 
I argue that the process of becoming more like God and the process of becoming a 
preacher/teacher are closely linked because they entail the same operations and terms and 
                                                
5 See ST Ia, q. 93, a. 8c.  
6 See ST 1a, q. 93, esp. aa. 4, 7, and 8. 
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because both processes take place in the context of friendship with God. These are, in fact, the 
same operations by which any Christian is assimilated to the triune God. However, for Thomas, 
the preacher and teacher have a special role in the divine economy for the sake of the common 
good.7 For example, Thomas observes that “if one man surpassed another in knowledge and 
virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, 
according to 1 Pt. 4:10, ‘As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to 
another.’”8 Furthermore, to help others to know and love God, one must first be knowing and 
loving God, himself. Or to put it in terms of friendship, fostering one’s own friendship with God 
through a contemplative knowing and loving of God helps one encourage others in their 
friendship with God. 
 The first two parts of this process (the ones pertaining to the psychological analogy and 
the imago) have been argued in some combination by, for example, Bernard Lonergan, D. Juvenal 
Merriell, and Jeremy Wilkins. The third part of the process (the one pertaining to the mixed life) 
will be the topic of the final chapter (Chapter 6), and serves as my own contribution to the 
retrieval of Thomas’s trinitarian theology. I argue that we can further appreciate the deeply 
trinitarian elements of Thomas’s theology and in particular, the way trinitarian doctrine 
permeates the entire Summa, in both its content and form, by uncovering the trinitarian features of 
his pedagogy and theology of the mixed life. Thus, not only do the spiritual processions of word 
and love connect Thomas’s trinitarian theology and his theological anthropology, but they also 
link those topics to his theology of the mixed life of preaching and teaching. 
 In light of the foregoing, I can expand upon my argument: the Summa theologiae is a 
contemplative study supporting the Dominican student’s trinification and friendship with God. 
                                                
7 ST II-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c. See also ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 2. The persons to whom one preaches or whom 
one teaches may not be able to devote their time to contemplative study on account of the roles they, in 
turn, have within divine providence and the divine economy, and other commitments they have, for 
example, as lay persons. 
8 ST Ia, q. 96, a. 4c. 
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The more the student of the Summa comes to know and love his friend, God, the more he becomes 
like God. Consequently, the better able he is to help others develop their friendship with God by 
speaking to them about the God he has come to know and love as a friend through his 
contemplative study. The Summa, then, is an effort to cultivate friendship between God and the 
human person, as well as among human persons. Friendship requires work, especially the work of 
conversation by which we come to know and love our friends more deeply and according to 
which we develop a deeper and deeper communion of mind and heart.  
 Furthermore, I endeavor to accentuate the trinitarian dynamism and trinitarian telos of 
the Summa theologiae. By “trinitarian dynamism” I mean that the Summa is an ongoing 
transformative encounter with the triune God, with oneself as created ad imaginem Dei, and with all 
of creation insofar as the triune God is its beginning and end. That is, the mystery of the Trinity 
animates the entire text; the Trinity is not an afterthought in Thomas’s theology. The Trinity 
animates the content of the Summa; it is not restricted to, e.g., to Questions 27-43. Rather, once 
the missions are introduced in Question 43, they are gradually unfolded throughout the 
remainder of the text. The Trinity animates the form of the text insofar as Thomas organizes the 
text to promote understanding and love of God. By “trinitarian telos” I mean that those who travel 
the path (ductus) of the Summa—and who are practiced in the life of charity—arrive at the Summa’s 
goal (skopos), trinification. Yet, this goal is not about the student’s personal holiness. Rather, 
assimilation to the Trinity and friendship with the triune God are for the sake of helping other 
wanderers on the journey to salvation. 
 In the conclusion to this project, I illustrate how the Summa, in each of its parts, supports 
trinification and friendship for the sake of preparing students to speak about God to others. This 
illustration brings us full circle to one of the major efforts of this project, which has been to argue 
that the form and content of the Summa belong together. When kept together, traveling the wisely 
ordered path of the Summa can be a transformative encounter with sacra doctrina. Keeping form 
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and content together also discloses the centrality of trinitarian theology to the unfolding of the 
Summa as well as the trinitarian telos animating it. In order to appreciate the importance of this 
project, I turn to the state of the question surrounding Thomas’s trinitarian theology. 
2. The State of the Question 
20th century Catholic systematic theology saw a renaissance in Trinitarian theology. During this 
renaissance, it became customary to introduce a fundamental distinction between ‘Greek’ (or 
‘East’) and Latin’ (or ‘West’) conceptions of the Trinity: the East starts with the divine persons 
whereas the West starts with the unity of divine nature. This assumption is not value-neutral: 20th 
and 21st century theologians predominantly opted for the East’s trinitarian theology. In this 
paradigm, the contributions of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas are seriously questioned because 
they are perceived as representative of ‘Latin essentialism’ and its preoccupation with 
metaphysical speculation about the Trinity. This renaissance thus ushered in a dispute over the 
role—if any—the psychological analogy should play in the renewal of Trinitarian theology. The 
presumed fundamental divergence between the East and the West framed the debate, thus 
presenting only two options: personalism and salvation history (the East) or essentialism and 
metaphysics (the West).9 When expressed in these terms, it becomes routine and almost obligatory 
to opt for the latter, and to do so apart from devoting serious attention to the West’s trinitarian 
theology. The result is that the psychological analogy has been left out of the valuable 
                                                
9 To mention a few who seem to disregard the Augustinian-Thomist tradition: Colin E. Gunton, The Promise 
of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991); Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. 
Matthew J. O’Connell (New York: Crossroad, 1984); Catherine M. LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and 
Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper, 1991); Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, trans. M. 
Kohl (San Francisco: Harper, 1981); ibid., The Crucified God, trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (New 
York: Harper, 1974); John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, 
NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary, 1985). For explicit rejections of the psychological analogy, see Karl Barth, 
Church Dogmatics 1/1 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936); Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 295, 375; Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: 
Crossroad, 1997); Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone: The Way of Revelation (London: Burns & Oates, 
1968); ibid., Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990); ibid., The Glory of the 
Lord: A Theological Aesthetics 1: Seeing the Form (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1982). 
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contemporary conversation about the Trinity as an “ultimately practical doctrine with radical 
consequences for Christian life.”10 Catherine Mowry LaCugna here draws attention to the 
possibility that the doctrine of the Trinity revolutionizes not only how we think about God and 
about what it means to be human but that it also drastically transforms the political and social 
forms of life appropriate to God’s economy. The doctrine of the Trinity is nothing short of a 
doctrine demanding social transformation and the liberation of oppressed peoples. The East’s 
trinitarian theology seems better equipped to substantiate the claim that God is relational, which 
is the basis of turning to the doctrine of the Trinity as a transformative and liberating doctrine. 
While the psychological analogy cannot be affirmed or denied on the basis of its practicality, it 
merits question whether or not the analogy can augment contemporary endeavors to develop the 
doctrine of the Trinity as a doctrine with radical consequences for Christian living.11  
2.1 The Historical Issue: De Regnon’s Paradigm  
There are three major interrelated issues associated with this East/West paradigm in the 
contemporary disputation over the psychological analogy. One is historical, another 
methodological, and the final exegetical and systematic. The first issue concerns the historical 
narrative, itself, which shapes the reception of the past in the present milieu. Michele René Barnes 
has problematized this narrative by disclosing that the existence of this East/West (or 
Greek/Latin) paradigm is a unique property of modern Trinitarian theology.12 He traces this 
                                                
10 LaCugna, God for Us, 1. While I would temper the notion that the Trinity is ultimately a practical doctrine 
or the separation of (rather than distinction between) the speculative and practical, contemplative and 
active, I do maintain with LaCugna that this doctrine is one that has radical consequences for Christian 
life. 
11 The analogy must first be evaluated as to its intelligibility and fruitfulness for illuminating the mystery of 
faith. If it is affirmed to be intelligible, its value can then be engaged, which ought to include the fact that 
it is intelligible. 
12 See Michele René Barnes, “Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology,” Theological Studies 56, no. 
2 (1995). For other scholars who question this paradigm, see Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, trans. 
David Smith (New York: Crossroad Pub. Co, 1997); Andre de Halleux, “Personnalisme ou essentialisme 
trinitaire chez les Peres cappadociens?” in idem, Patrologie et Oecumenisme. Recueil d’estudes (Louvain: Leuven 
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paradigm back to its source, a 19th century study on the Trinity by Theodore de Régnon.13 
Barnes shows how 20th century systematic theologians organize their work around this paradigm, 
but without showing self-awareness that the paradigm needs to be demonstrated or that it has a 
history.14 Additionally, these theologians generally misrepresent de Régnon’s actual paradigm and 
its nuances, developing it instead into a caricature of both Greek and Latin trinitarian theologies. 
Barnes’s conclusion is that the popular judgments of Augustine and the “Latins” are too burdened 
by the unreflective use of a questionable paradigm to be regarded as established or even likely.15 
Historically, the labels “essentialist” and “personalist” do not accurately reflect the theologians to 
whom they are ascribed, nor do they reflect what was actually going forward in trinitarian 
theology in the Greek and Latin speaking worlds. A return to the texts themselves is needed.16  
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 1990); Edmund Hill, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise De Trinitate 
and St. Augustine,’” Augustinian Studies, 2 (1971). 
13 Theodore de Régnon, Etudes de théologie positive sur la sainte Trinité. 4 vols. (Paris: Victor Retaux, 1892-98). 
14 In fact, Barnes draws attention to the oddity that often in English-language scholarship, de Régnon’s 
paradigm is promulgated without crediting or acknowledging him. See Michele René Barnes, “De 
Régnon Reconsidered,” Augustinian Studies 26, no. 2 (1995). In this article, Barnes highlights the 
differences between de Régnon’s paradigm and the caricatures that follow. De Régnon, himself, is not 
necessarily aligned with those who appropriate his work, consciously or not. For another scholar who 
endeavors to distinguish de Régnon from those who use his work, see Kristin Hennessy, “An Answer to 
de Régnon’s Accusers: Why We Should Not Speak of ‘His’ Paradigm,” Harvard Theological Review 100, no. 
2 (2007). For theologians who follow de Régnon’s paradigm either without acknowledging it or without 
the awareness that needs to be demonstrated or that it has a history, see, for example, Colin E. Gunton, 
“Augustine, The Trinity, and the Theological Crisis of the West,” Scottish Journal of Theology 43, no.1 
(1990); LaCugna, God for Us; Rahner, The Trinity. 
15 These historical questions have largely been raised and settled. They will figure into my project as part of 
the argument, but will not constitute my primary concern as I find many scholars have addressed the 
historical locus of the contemporary rejection of the psychological analogy as the analogy of the 
essentialist and metaphysical ‘West.’ For other scholars contributing to this discussion, many of whom 
build on Barnes’s work, see Sarah Coakley, “Disputed Questions in Patristic Trinitarianism,” Harvard 
Theological Review 100, no. 2 (2007); Gilles Emery, “Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in 
St. Thomas Aquinas?” trans. Matthew Levering, The Thomist 64 (2000): 521-63; Jeremy Wilkins, 
“Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology: Karl Rahner’s Critique of the ‘Psychological’ 
Approach,” The Thomist 74.3 (2010). 
16 For Augustine, see especially Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of 
Trinitarian Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011); Lewis Ayers, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An 
Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Luigi Gioa, 
The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). For 
Aquinas, see especially Gilles Emery The Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Collected Works of 
Bernard Lonergan, Volume 2, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: Toronto 
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2.2 The Methodological Issue: The Ordo Disciplinae  
The second issue is methodological and it pertains to Thomas’s two so-called treatises, De Deo Uno 
and De Deo Trino.17 Many theologians in the 20th and 21st centuries—including Karl Rahner and 
Catherine Mowry LaCugna—assume Thomas’s division crystallizes the West’s “preference” for 
the divine essence. For them, the sequence of questions in Thomas’ Summa theologiae represents a 
theological judgment about the priority of divine essence over persons. It also indicates a 
‘substance ontology.’ This prioritization isolates the Trinity from the rest of theology and 
ultimately from the lives of believers. It is therefore the reason why Rahner accuses Thomas of 
“locking the Trinity in itself.”18 In fact, Thomas’s perceived preference for the divine essence is 
one of the primary reasons why “Christians are, in their practical life, almost mere 
‘monotheists.’”19 Other theologians, such as Gilles Emery and Bernard Lonergan disagree, 
maintaining that the sequence is methodological, governed by pedagogical considerations. More 
generally, scholars as such as Mark D. Jordan and Vivian Boland have rightly argued that to 
misunderstand Thomas’s pedagogical concerns is to misunderstand the nature of his thought.20 
Historical research corroborates these conclusions. For example, Leonard Boyle and M. Michèle 
Mulchahey have brought attention to the fact that the novelty of the Summa belongs as much to its 
structure as it does to the content of its teaching. There is also exegetical evidence for Thomas’s 
pedagogical-mindedness. As Boland writes, “These pedagogical concerns are clear from two 
things: the introductions and prologues in which Aquinas presents his works, and the structures, at 
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 1997) (henceforth, Verbum, CWL 2); Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: 
Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 
17 Interestingly, most theologians who critique Thomas’s ordering neglect the fact that the Prima Pars 
actually includes three—not two—sets of questions. The first considers the divine essence, the next the 
distinction of persons, and the final the procession of creatures from God. He sets this structure forth in 
his prologue to the second question, Ia, q. 2, prol. 
18 Rahner, The Trinity, 15-18. 
19 Ibid., 10. 
20 See Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after his Readers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) and Vivian 
Boland, O.P., St. Thomas Aquinas (London: Continuum, 2007). 
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times traditional and at times experimental, by which he constructs his works.”21 Recent 
rhetorical studies such as those conducted by Mary Carruthers are also now bearing upon 
Thomist scholarship, continuing to challenge us to read ancient and medieval texts like the Summa 
more responsibly and perhaps with even more wonder.22 Similar to the consequences of 
recognizing that the East/West paradigm has a history, distinguishing between the form and 
content of the Summa meets a number of the accusations leveled against Thomas’s trinitarian 
theology. This distinction discloses that the order of questions in the Summa is not an order of 
importance but rather an order of a pedagogy seeking explanations of the matter at hand.  
 While many Thomists are engaging not only the Summa but Thomas’s entire corpus—
especially his commentaries on scripture and his sermons—in the light of these exciting 
developments in historical and rhetorical scholarship, other Aquinas scholars (as well as 
theologians and philosophers at large) continue to read Thomas as if he were an essentialist, a 
“mere” philosopher or metaphysician, or a dogmatist and not the pastorally- and pedagogically-
minded Dominican he was. Yet, historians have more recently begun to accentuate Thomas’s life 
as a Dominican, arguing that the Dominican educational institutions—not Paris and its 
university—were the focus of Thomas’s intellectual labors. This change in emphasis is significant 
because the goals of Dominican education were distinctively evangelical and pastoral. As a 
preaching friar, Thomas’s life was “a life wholly given over to the care of souls through handing 
on the fruits of contemplation by the preaching of the gospel.”23 Thomas ought to be read in this 
                                                
21 Boland, St. Thomas Aquinas, 89. 
22 For the rhetorical features of both ancient and medieval thought, see Mary Carruthers, The Book of 
Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1990); ibid. The 
Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). For an example of Thomas scholarship making use of her discoveries, see for example, Peter 
Candler, Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction, or Reading Scripture Together on the Path to God (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006); Gilles Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom: The Spiritual Pedagogy of the 
Summa theologiae (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 2015); Frederick Christian 
Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas: Faith, Reason, and Following Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
23 See Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, ix. 
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Dominican context and its distinct goals. Yet, the work of scholars such as Boyle, Mulchahey, and 
Carruthers is only beginning to influence how philosophers and theologians read Thomas. Thus, 
my first chapter attends to the history and meaning of Thomas’s life as a Dominican friar trained 
to teach and preach. It thereby sets the stag for Chapter 2, which engages Thomas’s pedagogy in 
the Summa, arguing that pedagogical concerns govern the organization of the text. Importantly, 
other contemporary Thomists such as Frederick Bauerschmidt, Gilles Mongeau, and Anastasia 
Wendlinder are already drawing out the implications of what it means to read Thomas in light of 
his distinctively Dominican formation and goals. I hope to add to the conversation by specifically 
elaborating the implications of this reading for his trinitarian theology.24 
2.3 The Exegetical and Systematic Issue: The Psychological Analogy  
The third issue pertains to the psychological analogy, itself, and is a matter of exegesis and 
systematic theology. The psychological underpinnings of the analogy are often the main source of 
the dispute. This is especially true among theologians who prefer a social analogy and presume 
the psychological basis of the analogy makes it de facto solipsistic (because it requires introspection), 
contending that Augustine is the first “Cartesian.”25 Rahner raises two objections to the 
                                                
24 Ibid.; Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom; Anastasia Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister 
Eckhart: Beyond Analogy (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2014). 
25 See Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology. This caricature of Augustine as the first Cartesian is equally 
a caricature of Descartes, and thus unhelpful for understanding either of them. 
 The psychological analogy is not solipsistic for two reasons. One, it is an analogy that obtains most 
perfectly at the level of authentic human conversation. This is a level at which mind and heart are one. 
Consequently, it is also the level upon which we can conceive words in love, which thence break forth 
into love. Such words are trustworthy words that open people outward toward one another.  
 Two, it is true that the analogy draws us inward to draw us upward. However, the interiority proper to 
the analogy is also outwardly directed insofar as an authentic interior life and loving interpersonal 
relationships are mutually mediating. Trustworthy words conceived in love are again central here. 
Conceiving words in fear dispose us to manipulate and suspect one another, and create social structures 
to mirror our manipulative and suspicious dispositions. In speaking of “trustworthy words conceived in 
love,” I am making an advance on both Augustine’s and Thomas’s presentation of the psychological 
analogy. However, I am doing so by building on critical element they share in common, namely, that the 
divinely proceeding word is not just any kind of word, but a particular kind of word. Thomas speaks of it 
as the word “who breathes forth love” and Augustine says “the Word we speak of is knowledge with 
love.” See ST  Ia, q. 43, a. 5, rep. ad. 2 and Saint Augustine, The Trinity, intro., trans., notes Edmund 
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psychological analogy. One, he objects to its hypothetical character. Two, he laments its 
metaphysical speculation, for example, about whether the processions are processio [per modum] 
operati or processio operationis. He believes that in all its metaphysical speculation, the psychological 
analogy has forgotten about the economic Trinity, which is why Thomas’s trinitarian theology is 
responsible for the “monotheist” crisis among contemporary Christians and why he argues for a 
return to God as experienced in salvation history. Similarly, LaCugna finds the introspection of 
the psychological analogy to be opposed to and forgetful of interpersonal relations. 
 These objections, especially the first, can be responded to in part by revisiting questions of 
theological method. However, they must also be addressed by way of the analogy, itself, because 
careful appropriation of the analogy can disclose the link between it and the soteriological 
experience Christians have of God’s economy. This same appropriation can challenge the claim 
that the introspection of the psychological analogy is opposed to interpersonal relations. The two 
are actually intimately and mutually related. In fact, introspection as both self-appropriation and 
self-examination done specifically in the context of trinitarian doctrine cultivates a converted 
interior life, which in turn promotes authentic interpersonal relations, which are themselves 
indispensable to a just and charitable world intolerant of oppression and revenge. Thus, where 
Rahner and LaCugna find the psychological analogy, both in its metaphysical speculation and 
introspection, forgetful of the divine economy and interpersonal relations, respectively, I suggest 
that appropriating the analogy supports a rich theology of the economy and calls Christians to 
more authentic relationships.  
                                                                                                                                            
Hill, O.P., ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Hyde Park: New City Press, 1991), 279. Henceforth, Augustine, 
De trinitate, 9.10.15 (Hill, 279). In Thomas’s reply to this question on the divine missions, Thomas quotes 
Augustine with respect to the unicity of this word.  
 For a third reason the psychological analogy is not solipsistic, see Neil Ormerod, “Augustine and the 
Trinity: Whose Crisis?” Pacifica 16 (2003), 30-31. For example, “[W]e can see that for Augustine the 
mind is inherently relational. The process of introspection is not withdrawal from the world. Rather, the 
mind is discovered precisely in its relationships with the objects of the world,” 31.  
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 In their challenges to the psychological analogy, most theologians fail to grasp what the 
relevant psychological analogy actually is, for there are multiple psychological options within 
human interiority, but not all of them are suitable analogies. Further, many theologians presume 
the analogy pertains to three analogues for the three divine persons, when it actually pertains to 
two natural analogues for the two divine processions—a hard-won insight for Thomas as he came 
to terms with Augustine’s preferred analogy.26 Specifically, as Lonergan contends, most 
theologians, in their own self-knowledge, overlook the significance of the procession of the inner 
word (verbum) from the act of understanding, which thus obfuscates the analogy for divine 
processions.27 This procession is what Thomas names an “emanatio intelligibilis” (intellectual 
emanation).28 Not only Thomas’s critics, but also Thomists often fail to take note of the relevant 
psychological analogue. Even when adverting to the inner word, scholars consider its procession 
so quickly and without much explanation that it is questionable whether the analogical and 
explanatory weight of the intellectual emanation of the inner word is actually grasped, let alone 
the import of both Augustine and Thomas insisting that not only is it exclusively the inner word 
that is relevant, but also a particular kind of inner word—one that breaks forth into love.29 The 
problem is compounded because this emanation yields explanatory significance not only for 
                                                
26 See D. Juvenal Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas’s Teaching (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1990). 
27 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2; ibid., The Triune God: Systematics, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 
Volume 12, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 
(henceforth The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12). 
 The significance of the procession can only really be grasped when one adverts to her own acts of 
understanding, for only then can one distinguish between the variety of psychological processions in 
human consciousness and which of these is actually relevant for the Trinitarian processions. This is why 
self-appropriation is required for the psychological analogy. Not any interior procession will suffice. 
28 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1. 
29 For example, see Gilles Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 57-61. Emery spends a considerably short amount of time considering the procession of the 
‘word of the heart.’ Granted, the book is intended to treat Thomas’s trinitarian as a whole. However, 
Emery does not articulate the analogy with the level of astuteness it requires. Moreover, I would argue 
that the psychological analogy is the centerpiece of the whole of Thomas’s trinitarian theology, so 
grasping its details by way of subtle self-appropriation is crucial for understanding all that follows, both 
with respect to the intratrinitarian life and the missions. 
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Question 27 in the Prima Pars in which Thomas considers the emanatio intelligibilis explicitly; it is 
central for the remaining trinitarian questions (28-43) and for the consideration of the divine 
missions, which Thomas unfolds throughout the remainder of the Summa. It is also the key to the 
analogy’s potential to contribute to the elaboration of the doctrine of the Trinity as a 
transformative and liberating doctrine with radical consequences for Christian living. Given the 
host of interpretive issues that arise with respect to the analogy, the entire middle section of this 
project (Chapters 3-5) is dedicated to retrieving the natural analogues for the divine processions 
and expanding upon the trinitarian theology of Questions 27-43 and Question 93 of the Summa 
theologiae.  
3. Statement of Goals 
Contemporary theology is rightly concerned with the doctrine of the Trinity as a transformative 
and liberating doctrine.30 For this reason, I aim to continue the conversation about the plan of the 
Summa that M.D. Chenu began in 1939 by attending to its trinitarian elements in relation to the 
ordo disciplinae, which Thomas uses in the service of faith seeking understanding. Attending to the 
intersection of Thomas’s trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology in the context of 
pedagogy and the mixed life supports retrieving the Summa as a transformative encounter with 
sacra doctrina. Overall, I argue that Thomas facilitates the reader’s transforming encounter with the 
Christian message of salvation not only by the material he presents, but also through the 
dynamics of the form in which he presents it. Structurally, the Summa is a set of questions 
deliberately and skillfully arranged in order to initiate the student into the ongoing and dynamic 
                                                
30 However, it is important to recognize that the truth and value of a speculative engagement with 
trinitarian theology—like the psychological analogy—is not to be found immediately in its practicality 
(e.g., its usefulness for directing the actions of the human person, see ST Ia, q. 1, a. 4.). Rather, its truth 
and value are first located in its intelligibility, it the psychological analogy as a possibly relevant way of 
understanding what Catholics believe about God, namely, that the Son proceeds from the Father, and 
the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and that are three are equally God. It helps them 
understand how it is intelligible that God is at once perfectly simple and at the same time, procession is 
found in God. 
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process of knowing and loving the triune God so he can better direct his life to God, and as a 
Dominican, so he can better “speak about God” to others. In other words, the structure of the 
Summa is isomorphic with the restructuring of human experience by way of grace. Further, since 
the apex of that transformation is the deification—or, better, trinification—31of the human person 
according to which she is not only assimilated to God but actually participates in the divine life, 
the material on the Trinity takes central place in the architecture of Thomas’s mature theological 
text. That is, not only is the trinitarian mystery present throughout the Summa by way of content, 
but this mystery is also ever-present in the very dynamics of the student’s intentional acts insofar 
as these acts are engaged in actually knowing and loving the triune God, who is the subject of this 
scientia, sacra doctrina.32 
 Given the importance of the issues contemporary trinitarian theology raises, and in 
response to the state of the question regarding Thomas’s trinitarian theology, I have two goals in 
                                                
31 Trinification is a way of expressing Thomas’s position that by the gift of the Holy Spirit, the human 
person’s intelligible emanations of word and love are made to participate in the divine processions of 
Word and Love, themselves, such that she freely knows God truly and loves God rightly (Ia, q. 38, a. 1). 
Herein, Thomas refers both to the participation of the human person in the very divine processions, 
themselves (rather than limiting deification to a relatively impersonal participation in the divine nature) 
and to the way in which this graced participation actually changes the human person. Trinification is the 
point of contact between appropriating Thomas’s trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology and 
advancing them in the contemporary theological context. I aim to express how the psychological analogy 
is related to trinification, and how in turn trinification is related to the radical consequences of the 
doctrine of the Trinity for Christian living. To do so, I focus on the relationship of one’s interior life of 
knowing and loving to one’s interpersonal relationships. See Trinification of the World: a Festschrift in Honour 
of Frederick E. Crowe in Celebration of His 60 Birthday, ed. Thomas A. Dunne and Jean-Marc Laporte 
(Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978). For more on deification in Thomas Aquinas, see Daria Spezzano, 
The Glory of God's Grace: Deification According to St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2015); Fáinche Ryan, Formation in Holiness: Thomas Aquinas on Sacra doctrina 
(Dudley: Peeters Press, 2007); A.N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
32 See ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 3 in which Thomas explains, in no uncertain terms, that the revelation of the 
trinitarian mystery (which must be revealed, as it is inaccessible by the light of natural reason alone) 
makes possible a correct understanding of both creation and salvation. As Joseph Wawrykow writes, “For 
a Christian theologian, creation and salvation are not trivial or incidental matters, but will stand at the 
heart of theological work. Trinity, according to Aquinas, is needed for the perceptive handling of these 
central themes; the subsequent inquiries in the Summa will have, then, a Trinitarian cast.” See Joseph 
Wawrykow, “Franciscan and Dominican Trinitarian Theology (Thirteenth Century): Bonaventure and 
Aquinas,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, ed. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011): 182-196, at 183. 
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this project. One, I pursue history and systematic theology in order to engage recent Thomist 
scholarship on the spiritual pedagogy of the Summa (Chapters 1 and 2). Specifically, vis-à-vis the 
Summa’s pedagogy and form, I aim to bring into relief the texts particularly trinitarian features. 
This contribution also retrieves Thomas as a deeply trinitarian theologian and as a Dominican 
committed to his students’ intellectual, spiritual, and pastoral formation. Historically, I turn to 
recent scholarship on the rise of the Dominican order in thirteenth-century Europe and its unique 
features. More specifically, I explore Thomas’s role within the Order of Preachers, and how his 
vocational decision illuminates his theology. In terms of systematic theology, I focus on the 
psychological analogy in order to demonstrate that it is an extraordinary contribution to 
trinitarian theology and one that can and should be pursued today. I aim to recover Thomas’s 
rendition of the psychological analogy in the Summa theologiae by exploring the meaning of 
intellectual emanations (Chapters 3 and 4). However, this recovery also involves returning to the 
source of the analogy—Augustine’s De Trinitate—and Thomas’s own engagement with 
Augustine’s text (Chapter 5). For this return, I make use of D. Juvenal Merriell’s work on 
Thomas’s intellectual development with respect to trinitarian theology. Merriell demonstrates 
how Thomas’s ongoing re-reading of De trinitate continued to transform Thomas’s understanding 
of the Trinity and the imago, reaching its apex in the Summa theologaie. This recovery also involves 
turning to Bernard Lonergan’s interpretation of the psychological analogy in Thomas’s work. In 
doing so, I turn to Lonergan both as a thorough guide to Thomas’s trinitarian theology while at 
the same time guiding the reader through Lonergan’s thought and contributions to trinitarian 
theology. In each instance, my goal is to clarify the meaning of “emanatio intelligibilis” (intellectual 
emanation), which in turn clarifies the psychological analogy and makes room for its 
advancement into the phenomenologically and existentially rich terms of “conversation.” 
 Two, based on my historical and systematic work, I argue for a creative retrieval of the 
psychological analogy in terms of the conversational activities of speaking and listening (Chapter 
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6). I advance this retrieval in the context of Thomas’s idiom, contemplata aliis tradere. I recover the 
idiom, itself, by exploring Thomas’s understanding of the role of the mixed life in the divine 
economy, and the relation of both the mixed life and the divine economy to friendship. I argue 
that contemplata aliis tradere is best understood as an activity of friendship and that it is also one way 
in which the process of trinification can occur, both for those handing on their fruits and for those 
receiving them. In this way, contemplata aliis tradere is a participation in the divine plan for salvation. 
Furthermore, the process of a teacher or preacher handing on the fruits of their contemplation is 
“triniform” insofar as it is based in acts of true speaking and holy listening. In arguing for this 
creative retrieval of the psychological analogy and connecting it to the mixed life, I aim to 
demonstrate that this analogy continues to be relevant to contemporary trinitarian theology and 
its emphasis communicating the radical consequences of belief in the triune God. Both of these 
goals, then, are aimed at eventually recovering Thomas’s trinitarian theology for the 21st century.  
4. The Centrality of the Verbum to this Project  
Throughout this project, the thread that holds my exegetical and constructive work together is the 
notion of the verbum (inner word). While many Thomist scholars have come to the defense of 
Thomas’s trinitarian theology, few have explored the depth of meaning of the verbum in Thomas’s 
Summa. Though Lonergan devoted years of research and writing to the verbum within Thomas’s 
trinitarian theology, his work is still largely overlooked in Thomist and trinitarian scholarship.33 
For example, Gilles Emery ignores Lonergan in his works on Thomas’s trinitarian theology, never 
                                                
33 I aim to combine Lonergan’s incisive analysis of the meaning and significance of the verbum with more 
recent scholarship on Thomas’s pedagogical concerns, pastoral-mindedness, and rhetorical tools. For 
example, pedagogically, the verbum is central to the complex act of human knowing and as such, is 
formative of Thomas’s own pedagogical goals and methods. Pastorally, historical research underscores 
the Dominican concern to find “the right consoling word” in their preaching and hearing of confessions. 
Questions arise about how to train people to be able to find such a word and what makes a word 
consoling. The verbum is significant for such questions. Rhetorically, Thomas treats the verbum in 
ongoing depth throughout the Summa, making use of the repetition. The verbum, then, is important for 
understanding Thomas’s methods, goals, and theology—his trinitarian theology, his trinitarian 
anthropology, and his christology. 
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referencing or citing Lonergan’s scholarship. I will build upon Lonergan’s consideration of the 
intellectual emanation of the inner word by thinking through the meaning of the verbum in 
Thomas’s trinitarian theology, trinitarian anthropology, and theology of the mixed life of 
contemplation and action. I will complement this exegetical and systematic exploration of the 
verbum with historical scholarship on early Dominicans as preachers and confessors formed to 
speak about God. I will also complement Lonergan’s work by rhetorical scholarship on the 
presence and repetition of verbum throughout the Summa.34 That is, I aim to combine Lonergan’s 
incisive analysis of the meaning and significance of the verbum with more recent scholarship on 
Thomas’s pedagogical concerns, pastoral-mindedness, and rhetorical tools. For example, 
pedagogically, the verbum is central to the complex act of human knowing and as such, is formative 
of Thomas’s own pedagogical goals and methods. Pastorally, historical research underscores the 
Dominican concern to speak meaningfully about God and to find “the right consoling word” in 
their preaching and hearing of confessions. Rhetorically, Thomas treats the verbum in ongoing 
depth throughout the Summa, making use of the rhetorical tool, repetition. For example, while he 
does not raise specifically trinitarian questions until Question 27 of the Prima Pars, numerous 
references to the Trinity—and especially the verbum—are laced throughout the sed contrae of prior 
questions, many of which are quotations from Augustine’s De trinitate or John’s gospel, the two 
primary sources for Thomas’s reflections upon the divine Word. Thus, the verbum is important for 
understanding Thomas’s methods, goals, and his theological content (including his trinitarian 
theology, his trinitarian anthropology, and his theology of the mixed life). 
 The verbum, itself, has a threefold meaning in the Summa. There is the intellectual 
emanation of the verbum in the human person, which is the basis for the psychological analogy, 
                                                
34 For example, I will look at the sed contrae (which are themselves illuminated by familiarity with Thomas’s 
rhetorical expertise), which reference the verbum prior to either Thomas’s epistemological, trinitarian, or 
christological questions. For this rhetorical approach, see Gilles Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom. 
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informs Thomas’s pedagogy, and illuminates his theology of teaching and preaching as activities 
of the mixed life, that is, as activities related to both contemplation and action. Then there is the 
divine Verbum, both the eternal Verbum and the incarnate Verbum. The verbum as the natural human 
analogue, as the eternal Word, and as the incarnate Word receives ongoing elaboration and 
deepening consideration from the first part of the Summa—even before the trinitarian questions—
through to Tertia Pars. As I will argue in Chapter 6, the Summa specifically as a contemplative study 
endeavors to help the student move from the incarnate Word to the eternal Word. This 
movement is, according to Thomas, the same project John undertook in his gospel, which was the 
fruit of John’s contemplation of the eternal Word.35 
 The centrality of the aforementioned particular kind of inner word (the word bursting 
forth into love) in the Augustinian-Thomist tradition of the psychological analogy is the 
touchstone of my efforts to advance the analogy, as I explore the possibility that just as the eternal 
verbum and the incarnate verbum are a very particular kind of verbum, so too must the intellectual 
emanation of the verbum in us be a particular kind of verbum in order for the psychological analogy 
to fruitfully obtain and in order for trinification to become a lived reality in history. It is in the 
context of the graced effort to conform our verbum to God’s that the psychological analogy 
contributes to the doctrine of the Trinity as a socially transformative and liberating doctrine.  
 The most fruitful and fitting way we can become attentive to the different ways in which 
we conceive inner words is by attending to their conception in the context of our conversations.36 
Here, I propose a creative retrieval of Thomas’s trinitarian theology. Advancing the psychological 
analogy in terms of conversation is in keeping with Thomas’s own rather revolutionary way of 
                                                
35 See Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapters 1-5, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. and 
James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), prol., n. 1, 7, 
10. Henceforth In Ioan.  
36 See Frederick G. Lawrence, “Grace and Friendship: Postmodern Political Theology and God as 
Conversational,” in Frederick G. Lawrence, The Fragility of Consciousness: Faith, Reason, and the Human Good, 
Eds. Randall S. Rosenberg and Kevin M. Vander Schel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016). 
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conceiving charity in terms of Aristotelian friendship.37 In order to explain how the mutual love 
constitutive of friendship (“since friendship is between a friend and a friend”) obtains in divine-
human friendship, Thomas argues that there is communication between the human person and 
God, in which God communicates God’s happiness to us. The love based upon this 
communication is charity, that is, friendship. Further, Thomas addresses the objection that God 
and the human person cannot be friends because friends dwell together. It is in this context that 
Thomas adverts to conversation. With respect to the human person’s outward life there is no 
communication or conversation between the human person and God. However, with respect to 
the human person’s interior life—“the spiritual life in respect of the mind”—there is conversation 
(conversatio) between the human person and God.38 Further, with this gift of sanctifying grace, the 
whole Trinity dwells in the human person.39 
 To conclude, the  analogy requires subtle self-appropriation, but it also requires honest 
and authentic self-examination, best done in the context of our conversations, human and divine. 
Do I conceive my words in love? Do I conceive trustworthy words, words that are true? Do my 
words cultivate loving responses? If not, what keeps me from doing so and what are the 
consequences of my words? Do I listen with openness to the words others speak, including God? 
Ultimately, these questions about our words, our love, our conversations are questions about 
ourselves—what kind of person am I? Jesus not only speaks words conceived in love; he is the Word 
conceived in Love. This self-appropriation and self-examination promotes the awareness that not 
only am I responsible for who I become, but that I am a subject of history—meaning I am an 
agent of history; history is what it is because of human subjects. Similarly, salvation history is what 
it is because two divine subjects have entered into it. As human persons, our being is becoming 
                                                
37 For Aristotle, friendship was among equals, so to characterize the relationship between God and human 
persons in terms of Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship amounted to quite a proposition. 
38 ST IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 1c; rep. ad 1. 
39 See ST Ia, q. 38, a. 1; q. 43, a. 3. 
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and our becoming is conversational.40 And the conversations we are constitute the movement of 
history. In other words, my interior life has real and tangible consequences for my interpersonal, 
social, and historical life, similar to how the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity.  
                                                
40 See Lonergan, “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” in Collection, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 
4, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993), 223 
(Henceforth Collection, CWL 4); See also Jeremy D. Wilkins, “‘Our Conversation is in Heaven’: 
Conversion and/as Conversation in the Thought of Frederick Lawrence,” in Grace and Friendship: 
Theological Essays in Honor of Fred Lawrence, from His Grateful Students, eds. M. Shawn Copeland and  Jeremy 
D. Wilkins (Milwuakee: Marquette University Press, 2016), 320. 
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                             
FRIAR THOMAS AQUINAS, A PASTORALLY-MINDED 
THEOLOGIAN 
1. Introduction 
IN 1220, ONLY A FEW years after Dominic and his companions began preaching in Toulouse, the 
members of this young order gathered to establish a set of formal constitutions: “Our order is 
recognized as having been especially instituted from the beginning for preaching and the salvation 
of souls, and our study should be principally and ardently directed to this end with the greatest 
industry, so that we can be useful to the souls of our neighbors.”1 The Dominicans began literally 
as an order of preachers. Their entire lives were structured around their vocation as preachers.2 
Moreover, they envisioned their preaching as a learned ministry—one to which study was 
indispensable—and shaped their constitutions accordingly. They studied because they were 
committed to being useful to the souls of others in their preaching. This commitment was over 
and above their pursuit of personal holiness and salvation. Their dedication to outwardly directed 
missions was the source of what set the Order of Preachers apart from their contemporaries.3 
Specifically, these Preachers needed to learn how to speak about God. Speaking about God was 
their craft as a guild of preachers.4  
  Thomas Aquinas entered this Order of Preachers despite familial resistance.5 Recently, 
historical research has contributed to the development of a more nuanced interpretation of 
Thomas’s decision to join the Dominicans and of the early Dominican order, itself. Three 
                                                
1 “The Primitive Constitutions of the Order of Friars Preachers,” prologue, Order of Preachers, accessed 
August 15, 2015, 
http://www.op.org/sites/www.op.org/files/public/documents/fichier/primitive_consti_en.pdf. 
2 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 173. 
3 John Van Engen, “Dominic and the Brothers: Vitae as Life-forming exempla in the Order of Preachers,” in 
Christ among the Medieval Dominicans: Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers, eds. 
Kent Emery and Joseph Peter Wawrykow (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 8. 
4 Ibid., 18. 
5 See below, §4.1 Thomas’s Dominican Life, p. 20.  
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interrelated elements of this research especially enrich one’s reading of Thomas’s theology: his 
vocational decision, what set the Dominicans apart as a religious order, and the role of 
Dominican schools for the formation of Preachers. Scholars have rethought Thomas’s vocational 
decision in light of a deeper understanding of the unique character of the Dominican order’s 
mission, on the one hand, and the relationship between the Dominican order and the universities, 
on the other.  
 Together, these three elements present a new way of understanding Thomas, and 
consequently, enriching possibilities for interpreting his texts. Thomas was a person whose life was 
first and foremost the life of a Dominican, that is “a preaching friar—a life wholly given over to 
the care of souls through handing on the fruits of contemplation by the preaching of the gospel.”6 
Further, not only was Thomas himself a member of the Order of Preachers, but he was also one 
of its most prized teachers and he was appointed a preacher-general. In the latter role, he 
coordinated all preaching activity in the entire geographical region of Naples from 1260 until his 
death in 1274.7 The role of the university within Thomas’s life is re-contextualized in this light 
because it becomes apparent that Paris was a means to the end of caring for souls. As 
Bauerschmidt contends, “Dominican educational institutions were the primary framework for 
Thomas’s intellectual activity, even when he was teaching at a university.”8 With this focus, a 
relatively new picture of Thomas begins to emerge, one that is only beginning to influence how 
philosophers and theologians are reading Thomas. Much work remains to be done in this vein. 
For example, even historically sensitive Thomist scholarship like Chenu’s overlooks the 
significance of Dominican institutions in Naples, Viterbo, and Rome in Thomas life, 
                                                
6 Bauderschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 9. 
7 See Nicholas Ayo, introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Sermon-Conferences of St. Thomas Aquinas on the 
Apostles’ Creed, trans. Nicholas Ayo (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1998), 1-16, at 2. A preacher-
general was a permanently licensed preacher. To become one, the Dominican needs three years of 
theological instruction. 
8 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 9. 
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characterizing them as “merely episodes in his intellectual development and in his career.”9 With 
Leonard Boyle, Frederick Bauerschmidt, M. Michèle Mulchahey, Anastasia Wendlinder and 
other recent historians and Thomist scholars, I maintain that Dominican educational institutions 
were not merely episodes, but rather the focus of Thomas’s labors.10 As Bauerschmidt writes, 
“Though the line between the university and the Dominican studium was not always sharply 
drawn, particularly in a place like Paris, the goals of Dominican education remained distinctively 
evangelical and pastoral, and it is in light of those goals that Thomas ought to be read.”11 
 This chapter sets the stage for exploring the evangelical and pastoral purpose of Thomas’s 
trinitarian theology, as well as the ways in which his trinitarian theology enriches in turn his 
understanding of the Dominican mission to care for souls through teaching and preaching. It is 
also concerned to enrich the reader’s appreciation of Thomas as a pedagogue and preacher. 
Ultimately, I argue that Thomas’s self-understanding with respect to these vocations was enriched 
by his trinitarian theology and theological anthropology because for Thomas, these two topics—
related, as we will see, by his understanding of the spiritual processions of word and love—
informed his understanding of what it meant to prepare for and participate in the teaching and 
preaching initiated by the divine trinitarian missions. With these ends in mind, I offer a history of 
the early years of the Order of Preachers, focusing specifically on their pedagogy and preaching, 
which set them apart from other religious orders, in order to develop a deeper engagement with 
Thomas’s specifically Dominican life. Uniquely, Dominican pedagogy was study through 
                                                
9 M.D. Chenu, Aquinas and His Role in Theology, trans. P. Philibert (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2002), 18-
19. 
10 See Leonard Boyle, “The Setting of the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas,” reprinted in Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae: Critical Essays, ed. Brian Davies (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006); 
Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas; M. Michèle Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’: Dominican Education 
before 1350 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1998); Wendlinder, Speaking of God in 
Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart. 
11 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, x. 
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contemplation, and their preaching doctrinal.12 This history must be situated within the 
intellectual developments and religious movements of the early and central Middle Ages out of 
which the Order arose. Seismic shifts that began in the eleventh and twelfth centuries converged 
into institutional structures during the thirteenth century, specifically the university and the 
mendicant religious orders.  
2. Intellectual Life in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries Middle Ages 
The most recent scholarship on Thomas Aquinas includes an emphasis on two historical 
developments in the centuries preceding his work: the intellectual and religious movements of the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries.13 These movements are best understood in connection to the 
transition from the rural monastery to the urban school, from monasticism to scholasticism, from 
the monastic collatio to the scholastic quaestio, from monastic cenobitic life to mendicant itinerant 
life, and from the communal vita apostolica to the evangelical vita apostolica. The rise of the 
Dominicans in the thirteenth century participated in and influenced these movements. 
Intellectually, “[T]he friars’ schools represent an important part of the development of the 
structures of learning in the thirteenth century, a century in which medieval intellectual 
endeavour is seen by many to have reached its high-water mark.”14 As part of the evangelical 
religious movement, every component of Dominican spirituality had an apostolic quality: “The 
all-absorbing ambition of the friars was to be ‘useful to the souls of others.’ Their own spiritual 
                                                
12 Mulchahey treats the Dominican unique pedagogy of study as contemplation from an historical 
perspective. Wendlinder, building upon Mulchahey’s historical work, systematically and theologically 
explores study as contemplation by way of Thomas’s use of religious language. 
13 For example, see Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas. Also see Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom. I am indebted to 
both these scholars for alerting me to the most relevant historical research for this section of Chapter 1, as 
well as for ways to frame the historical background informing Thomas’s theology. 
14 Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’, x-xi. 
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exercises were designed to make them better preachers, and their own spiritual progress was not 
sought as a goal in its own right, but rather as a kind of spin-off from their service of others.”15 
 Established historians and Aquinas scholars such as M.D. Chenu and Simon Tugwell 
have written extensively on these intellectual and religious developments.16 They chronicle the vita 
apostolica and the place of the Dominicans within this movement. Chenu also brings the 
humanism of the twelfth century and the scholasticism of the medieval university to life, while 
Tugwell paints a picture of the preacher and the spirituality of both the early Dominicans and 
Thomas. Contemporary historians, especially Mulchahey, deepen our understanding of the 
intellectual life and pedagogy the Dominicans developed in order to achieve their practical and 
pastoral concerns. In light of this historical work, recent Thomist scholarship has begun to 
accentuate the significance of Thomas’s Dominican life and his contributions to his brothers’ 
religious and intellectual formation, which includes reading the Summa as a personally 
transformative text.17  
 I begin with the intellectual and religious movements that arose at the end of the eleventh 
and the beginning of the twelfth centuries before turning to the thirteenth century consolidations 
and early Dominican history. There were critical social, economic, and political shifts occurring 
that affected both the intellectual and religious lives of people during this period known as the 
central or high Middle Ages. These gave rise to changes in the location of education centers, a 
                                                
15 Simon Tugwell, O.P., “Introduction,” Early Dominicans: Selected Writings, ed. Simon Tugwell, O.P. (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1982), 4. 
16 M.D. Chenu, O.P., Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968). Also see Simon Tugwell, O.P., introduction to Early 
Dominican Writings. The contributions of these Dominican experts and Thomist scholars are supported by 
and expanded upon by historians of the central Middle Ages, such as John Baldwin, Jacques Le Goff, 
David Nichols, and R.W. Southern. See John W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and Merchants: The Social Views 
of Peter the Chanter and his Circle, Volume 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Jacques Le Goff, 
ed. Medieval Callings, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990); David 
Nicholas, The Evolution of the Medieval World: Society, Government and Thought in Europe, 312-1500 (New York: 
Longman Publishing, 1992); R. W. Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, Volume 1 
(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997). 
17 See Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom; Ryan, Formation in Holiness; and Williams, The Ground of Union. 
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new demographic of teachers and learners, the development of pedagogical methods, and the 
introduction of new texts both by way of translation and innovation. These shifts also inspired the 
rise of an evangelical spirit, which took a variety of forms and instigated diverse responses.  
2.1 Intellectual Life: Social, Economic, and Political Changes: The City, its 
Magistri, and their Quaestiones 
One of the most significant shifts, both in itself and for the intellectual and spiritual lives of 
Europeans, was the emergence of the city and the development of urban life. It was closely related 
to a sharp rise in population, the development of international trade made possible by the new 
capital economy, and increased political stability. Historian David Nicholas assesses that the 
population at least tripled between 1000 and the late thirteenth century.18 Further, “Prior to 
1150, most of the population increase had occurred in the agrarian sector. Between 1100 and 
1300, the suburban populations (towns) quadrupled.”19 This shift had far-reaching intellectual, 
social, and moral consequences.20  
 Intellectually, the demographic shift affected the type of person teaching and learning as 
well as the location of education. With respect to the type of student, according to Nicholas, “Most 
of the pupils were sons of merchants who were preparing for a secular career, not holy orders.”21 
This change occurred largely because by the year 1300 anyone who hoped to rise above a purely 
menial occupation had to learn to read.22 The basic curriculum of Latin literacy taught to these 
students in and cathedral schools was the seven liberal arts, that is, the trivium—grammar, 
rhetoric, and dialectic—and the quadrivium—arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy. These 
                                                
18 Nicholas, The Evolution of the Medieval World, 283. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Le Goff, “Introduction,” 17. See also Jacques Rossiaud, “The City-Dweller and Life in Cities and 
Towns,” in Medieval Callings, ed. Jacques Le Goff, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), 128-180. 
21 Nicholas, The Evolution of the Medieval World, 322. 
22 Ibid., 340. 
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schools were not primarily schools for theology.23 Further, intellectual life had now begun its 
passage from the monastic rural schools to the urban cathedral and municipal schools.24 This 
passage was one of the most important developments of the central Middle Ages. By the 
thirteenth century, a ready contrast was perceivable between the relative freedom and movement 
of the university and the enclosure and immobility of the monastery.  
  During this transition from rural to urban education, Paris began its intellectual 
ascendancy as a theological center. One of the many reasons was because students were able to 
pursue theological studies because the canons regular of St. Victor were near by (whereas the 
cathedral schools focused on the liberal arts).25 This is illustrative of the fact that alongside the 
urban schools that made a liberal arts education more available, there was also a development in 
specifically theological education. Paris was home to renowned teachers in theology such as Peter 
Abelard. This bustling intellectual environment attracted a new rising generation in the twelfth 
century: young men traveled from city to city to hear the masters (magistri). These masters were a 
new social category that was “in nearly every case without ties to the monasteries which until that 
time had been the chief promoters of culture and education.”26 They were the emerging scholars, 
bringing the wave of the intellectual activity known as “scholasticism” to medieval education. As 
Chenu writes of this transition of pupil and place: 
From the old monastic schools we pass with these people to the new city schools where 
the clerical teachers, under episcopal control, were fulfilling the needs and aspirations of 
students of their own kind, a clientele that could not have been assimilated intellectually 
any more than socially into the monasteries. These were no longer men of the cloister 
(claustrales) but scholastics, scholars (scholastici, scholares).27  
 These magistri partially constitute the appearance of a new kind of person upon the 
medieval stage, what Brocchieri calls “the intellectual.” The intellectual was someone who worked 
                                                
23 See Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 2. 
24 See Richard C. Dale, The Intellectual Life of Western Europe in the Middle Ages (Boston: Brill, 1992),147-48. 
25 The canons regular were clergy affiliated with a cathedral.  
26 Chenu, Nature, Society, and Man in the Twelfth Century, 273. 
27 Ibid. 
  Chapter 1 – Page 8 
with words and the mind, rather than with the hands. While the medievals would not have 
recognized the term “intellectual” as applied to a person, “they nevertheless knew the magister 
(master), doctor (doctor), philosophus (philosopher), litteratus (an educated man and, in particular, one 
with knowledge of Latin)—people who worked with words and the mind.”28 With the rise of the 
intellectual and his labor, theology began embracing speculative and scientific aspirations.29 
Intellectual labor was significant for Thomas’s theology and for his ministry, especially for his 
reflections on the contemplative and active lives. As Brocchieri writes, “For Thomas, who 
operated within the Dominican order to which he belonged, ‘working with one’s intelligence’ was 
above all ‘teaching and preaching.’”30 Thomas echoes this new kind of work when he speaks of 
teaching as a spiritual work of mercy.31 
 The magistri were becoming a new interpretive authority alongside the Church Fathers, 
though not with the same definitiveness. As these new urban schools became organized and 
regulated, men were given a license to teach (licentia docendi), which in turn bestowed the title of 
“master” upon them. This license also made the master a theologian. Now there was a new 
teacher of the faith quite distinct from the traditional teacher, the bishop.32 As Bauerschmidt 
explains, “[they] were neither monks, who studied the liberal arts and theology in the context of 
reflection on scripture as a text for prayer, nor were they bishops, who did theology in the context 
of pastoral care.”33 Though distinct, the magistri were still under the bishop’s or the diocesan 
chancellor’s administrative supervision. It was in part the masters’ efforts to emancipate 
                                                
28 Le Goff, “Introduction,” 19-20. 
29 Speculation was not new to Christianity, but its development into the science of sacred doctrine was. 
30 Mariateresa Fumagalli Beonio Brocchieri, “The Intellectual,” in Medieval Callings, 191. 
31 See Thomas Aquinas, Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem. Trans. John Procter (London: Sands & 
Co., 1902). Updated and corrected by Joseph Kenny, 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraImpugnantes.htm. Accessed August 17, 2015. Henceforth, Contra 
Impugnantes. 
32 See Chenu, Nature, Society, and Man in the Twelfth Century, 274-76. 
33 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 3. 
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themselves from the episcopal administration that led to the formation of guilds of masters, which 
gave birth to the university in the thirteenth century. 
 Not only had a new kind of teacher entered the scene, but these teachers also began to 
introduce new tools and methods into their subject matter, including theology. The key 
developments of this “professionalization of theology” took place in the twelfth century. Their 
techniques reached perfection in the thirteenth century where “faith was being fashioned into a 
science.”34 That is, as intellectual activity began to take place in urban schools rather than 
monasteries, how this activity was conducted also changed.35 The scholastics continued to employ 
the ancient practice of lectio—commenting on an authoritative text—but their development of this 
pedagogical method also ushered in a unique contribution of the medieval schools, namely, the 
quaestio.36 The quaestio was a method of raising questions in response textual difficulties. According 
to Chenu, “This [Aristotelian] method was brought into lively activity by the new kind of biblical 
lectio, in which interpretation opened with a ‘statement of the question’ concerning elements of the 
text under study. The question (quaestio) was the characteristic act as well as the literary form 
assumed by scholastic theology.”37  
 While the theological practice of raising questions in response to textual difficulties 
certainly predated the scholasticism of the high Middle Ages, what was previously spontaneous 
became systematic in the twelfth century because questions were now posed technically and 
methodically. Chenu credits this technical development to the burgeoning curiosity of faith 
combined with the widespread use of the dialectic of the trivium. (Dialectics pertained to the ability 
to resolve contradictions, for “dialectic” was “the art of true speech.”) The quaestio is one of the 
                                                
34 See Chenu, Nature, Society, and Man in the Twelfth Century, 279-80. 
35 See Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 3. 
36 These terms, i.e., lectio, quaestio, and dialectic, will be expanded upon below. See §4.2 The Rise of Urban 
Guilds and the Birth of the University, p. 30 
37 Chenu, Nature, Society, and Man in the Twelfth Century, 291. I will attend more closely to lectio, quaestio, and 
disputatio in the following chapter on the ordo disciplinae. 
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key constituents of the new intellectual activity that emerged in twelfth century, and it is closely 
related to the rise of scholastic humanism, to which we now turn. 
2.2 Intellectual Life: The Renaissance of Humanism 
Alongside the demographic changes occurring was the rise of scholastic humanism, or what 
Chenu terms the “renaissance of the twelfth century.”38 Scholastic humanism was the rebirth of 
confidence in the human ability to grasp nature and act accordingly.39 This confidence was 
accompanied by a growing awareness on the part of Christians that by directing their interest 
upon the world, they were “fulfilling at least some part of their destiny, on the supposition that 
man is a being consecrated to the world and that in coming to know the world he comes to know 
himself as well.”40 Thus developed the notion of the human person as a microcosm, in which she 
stands at the “paradoxical borderline” of matter and spirit, unifying the two, participating in the 
divine reality and raising all below her to participation, too.41 The twelfth century can be 
characterized above all by this rebirth of confidence. Furthermore, scholastic humanism “did not 
reject the supernatural but looked on it as the final, however imperfectly knowable, end and goal 
                                                
38 Ibid., 1-48. This renaissance began at Chartres. Chenu explains that the men at Chartres—William of 
Conches and John of Salisbury, for example—“were bent upon a search for the causes of things—the 
most keen and arduous as well as the most typical of the activities of reason when, confronting nature, 
men discovered both its fecundity and the chains of necessity by which it is bound; an activity proper to 
science and one which clashed violently with religious consciousness, which when it was yet 
inexperienced and immature, was willing to engage in its characteristic activity of looking immediately to 
the Supreme Cause, at the expense of disregarding secondary causes. St. Thomas would react firmly 
against this dissociation of religion from natural science: ‘To slight the perfection of created things is to 
slight the perfection of divine power” (Ibid., 11. Chenu is citing . Summa Contra Gentiles 3, c. 69, §15. See 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. Volume 3, Providence. Trans. Vernon J. Bourke. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. Henceforth SCG). 
39 See Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, vol. 1, 17-133.  
40 Chenu, Nature, Society, and Man in the 12th Century, 33. Chenu cites an example from the Summa theologiae, Ia, 
q. 96, a. 2 
41 For the significance of the microcosm in Thomas’s thought, see W. Norris Clarke, S.J., The One and the 
Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 118. ibid., 
“Living on the Edge: The Human Person as ‘Frontier’ Being and Microcosm,” International Philosophical 
Quarterly 36 (1996). 
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of all intellectual inquiry.”42 In fact, it required the supernatural as a necessary and 
complementary completion of the natural world, adding a further, positive dimension to the 
complexities of human life and nature. 
 Southern distinguishes four characteristic features of scholastic humanism, all of which 
are based on the shared confidence in the capacity of human persons to understand nature and to 
guide their action accordingly. Scholastic humanism emphasized the dignity of human nature, 
introspection as an instrument of inquiry, the cultivation of friendship (human and divine), and 
systematic intelligibility. Each of these features is relevant for recognizing the novelty in which 
Thomas’s theology participates, and the specific contributions he made both to the emerging 
vision of the human person as microcosm and to realizing scholastic humanism’s goals by 
contributing to humanity’s actual understanding of itself and its universe. His contemporaries and 
immediate predecessors shared this milieu, and Thomas built upon their successes as he 
committed himself to the vast task of “thinking out the Christian universe” by integrating and 
sublating traditions as diverse as the Neo-Platonism of Pseudo-Dionysius and Aristotle.43 
 The anthropology of the Middle Ages continued to emphasize the Fall. In the 
immediately preceding century, “the conception of the inherent dignity—that is to say, the 
intelligibility and rational plan—of nature, whether human or cosmic, had scarcely existed in the 
period of stress from which western Europe was just emerging in the second half of the eleventh 
century.”44 Previous centuries had sought dignity elsewhere. For example, they associated the 
dignified in human life with miracles and the supernatural, with symbolism and ritual. Thus, “It 
was only in wearing symbolic garments and performing sacramental acts, in touching the earthly 
                                                
42 Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, vol. 1, 22. 
43 For “thinking through the Christian universe,” see Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St 
Thomas Aquinas, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 1, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert 
M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), esp. 66-93, at. 82 (henceforth, Grace and Freedom, 
CWL 1). For the challenge of integrating these diverse traditions, see Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the 
Twelfth Century, 24. I will address the Christian universe in greater detail in section 4.2 below. 
44 Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, vol. 1, 25. 
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remains of those who already belonged to the world of eternity, that any great enlargement for 
humanity could be hoped for.”45 The twelfth-century schools took a different approach to human 
dignity. They attempted to restore, as far as possible, the knowledge that had been forfeited at the 
Fall. They understood the universe as divinely created, and the human person as a microcosm of 
this universe.46 The goal of their studies was nothing short of systematic knowledge of all that was 
intelligible. Grace’s perfection of nature began to take the place of a more magical 
supernaturalism.  
 Alongside this emphasis on the value of human intelligence was an “increasingly serious 
search for knowledge of the human mind itself.”47 Here, scholasticism drew significant inspiration 
from eleventh-century monastic developments, during which the search for God within the soul 
became one of the monastery’s principal innovations. This turn to the soul was another profound 
novelty that marked the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. As Southern writes, “Here 
then…we find an appreciation of the self at the root of a new programme of spiritual growth, 
beginning with human nature in its most unpromising aspect of self-love, and ending in the most 
refined forms of love of others and ultimately of God.” 48  
 To understand God by understanding oneself is associated with the third features of 
scholastic humanism, again monastic in origin but scholastic in expansion: friendship, both 
human and divine. Southern relates this to two features: “If self-knowledge is the first step in the 
rehabilitation of mankind, friendship—which is the sharing of this knowledge with someone 
else—is an important auxiliary, for through sharing, self-knowledge is more than doubled.”49 
Again, friendship between God and the human person represented another emerging novelty of 
scholastic humanism. Though it may seem a commonplace theme now, in the early Middle Ages, 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 22. 
47 Ibid., 26. 
48 Ibid., 27. 
49 Ibid., 28. 
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God was a Creator, Judge, and Savior; God was not a friend but someone whose anger must be 
appeased by material and financial penances. Similar to the aforementioned supernaturalism, 
God was someone only to be approached through the saints. Something fresh took root in the 
central Middle Ages. Friendship between God and humanity appeared, “and it lifted a great 
weight from human lives.”50 Closely related to this development was the newfound recourse to the 
humanity of Christ the Redeemer. He began to appear as an expression of God’s fellowship with 
humanity. The humanity of Christ became a strong emphasis from the eleventh to thirteenth 
centuries because of the religious movements and the humanist confidence in human nature. 
 Finally, these three features are supported by and oriented toward the fourth—the efforts 
toward systematic intelligibility, toward restoring the knowledge humankind forfeited at the Fall: 
The dignity of human and cosmic nature is the foundation of scholastic humanism; the 
intelligibility of nature is its symptom; and the friendship between God and Man is an 
expression of this theme on the very boundary between reason and sentiment. And since 
God is the creator and upholder of both human and cosmic nature, a similar intelligibility 
and sentiment must (so far as human limitations permit understanding) characterize the 
nature of God and His relationship with creation. The elaboration of this intelligibility 
was central to the whole program of the schools.51 
 Looking ahead, the first two features are related in Thomas’s trinitarian theology, for the 
source of human dignity is found in the belief that the human person is made to the image of 
God. In turn, when seeking an analogy for the Trinity, Thomas turns to foundation of the image, 
the human person’s interior processions of word and love. The third feature is also represented in 
Thomas’s trinitarian theology, for mutual knowing and loving constitutes friendship. Further, 
Thomas’s explains the indwelling of the Trinity in terms of the new interpersonal established by 
the gift of gratia gratum faciens (the grace that makes one pleasing), or in other words, friendship. 
Lastly, the fourth feature characterizes Thomas’s theological project as a whole, into which he 
integrates his trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology. In fact, in thinking out the 
                                                
50 Ibid., 29. 
51 Ibid., 30. 
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Christian universe, Thomas sets forth—in a systematic and scientific fashion—just how close the 
Trinity is to our interior lives and to our friendships.  
2.3 Intellectual Life: New Translations, New Texts 
Finally, related to these developments in scholastic pedagogy and humanism, was the translation 
of ancient texts into Latin and the composition of new texts, including the new genre of the 
summa. In the following chapter, I will attend in detail to the development of new texts in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries in order to situate Thomas’s use of the ordo disciplinae in his Summa 
theologiae.52 Presently, it is worthwhile to become familiar with the influx of texts, as this influx 
contributes significantly to the changing intellectual scene: 
Though Rome had drawn much of its culture from Greece, the Romans did not seem to 
have much taste for Greek philosophy or science, and thus few of these texts were ever 
translated into Latin…Up until the twelfth century, therefore, the great philosophical 
figures and texts of antiquity were known mainly by reputation, if at all. This all began to 
change around 1140, when a torrent of Latin translations of ancient works began to flow 
through the West.53 
Initially, many of Aristotle’s texts were translated from Arabic rather than the original Greek. 
Eventually, scholastics such as Thomas were able to work with Latin translations from the Greek 
representative of all aspects of Aristotle’s diverse corpus.54 Many challenging questions about the 
relationship of philosophy and theology arose with the introduction of Aristotle into the Latin 
corpus. 
                                                
52 This will include situating Thomas’s Summa theologiae in relation to Abelard’s Sic et Non and Lombard’s 
Sentences. 
53 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 4. 
54 See Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, vol. 1, 36-38. Boethius played an important 
bridging role in the gap that persisted from the early centuries of Christianity to the Middle Ages. He 
recognized the loss of connection that was occurring between the Greek-speaking East and the Latin-
speaking West, and devoted himself to translating Greek philosophical texts into Latin before his 
untimely imprisonment and execution. See Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 4; Southern, Scholastic 
Humanism and the Unification of Europe, vol. 1, 36-37. 
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3. Spiritual Life in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries: The Religious Movement of 
the Vita Apostolica 
These shifting intellectual currents and the transition to urban centers, driven themselves by the 
socio-economic, political, and technological changes, also provoked religious movements in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. Desire for reform abounded from within and from without the 
institutional forms of Christianity. Christians were troubled by the institutional Church’s abuses, 
monastic wealth, clerical immorality, and clerical ignorance. In response, monastic communities 
had begun evaluating their ways of life. At the same time, a whole new class of Christians was on 
the rise, with their own pastoral concerns. They were encountering a changing society and urban 
development, in which they had to discern how to live. Like the burgeoning theologians, they met 
the perennial problems of nature and grace, of the world and gospel. What ought the encounter 
between the gospel and the world be like?  
 As we have seen, a rebirth of confidence in human nature and knowledge was occurring 
in the intellectual world. Similarly, religious movements experienced a rebirth of their own, that 
of the vita apostolica (apostolic life). It was a desire to live the apostolic life, which had been a 
cornerstone of monastic and religious spirituality in the ancient Church. The twelfth-century 
rebirth of vita apostolica grew from the Gregorian reform of the eleventh century, which had 
stressed the early Christian community of the Acts of Apostle, proposing it as the model the 
Church should strive to emulate. Hinnebusch recounts this renaissance’s history in relation to the 
desire for reform: “It returned to the Scriptures and apostolic times as the source of its inspiration 
and for the answers to the great abuses, particularly among a clergy who were often ignorant, 
incontinent, without zeal, and who seldom preached.”55 This endeavor to live like Christ and his 
apostles was the religious ideal that all spheres of the Church were taking up in response to the 
cultural shifts and the questions they posed about the encounter between the gospel and the 
                                                
55 William A. Hinnebusch, The Dominicans: A Short History (New York: Alba House, 1975), 1-2. 
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world. Each sphere, however, lived their own unique interpretation of what it meant to imitate 
the apostles and how the gospel and the world ought to encounter one another. 
 The history of the Dominicans must be understood in relation to this religious movement 
and the variety of forms it assumed. While Dominic was indebted to the wisdom of monasticism, 
the evangelical approach to the vita apostolica was especially formative for Dominic’s foundation of 
the Order of Preachers.56 Thomas’s own decision to pursue the Preachers’ evangelical model of 
the vita apostolica over the monks’ cloistered communal model re-contextualizes his theological 
project by highlighting its outwardly directed mission. Additionally, the vita apostolica was a 
religious movement that generated theological insights for Thomas and his contemporaries 
because of its lived engagement with the encounter between nature and grace, the gospel and the 
world. As Chenu writes, “Throughout [the twelfth] century, the return to the primitive life of the 
church, to the life of the apostles, the vita apostolica, by inspiring new states of life, inspired as well a 
new awareness of the ways that grace could take root in nature.”57 
3.1 The Vita Apostolica: Monks, Canons Regular, and the Laity 
While the central Middle Ages was unified in embracing the vita apostolica as their response to the 
encounter between the gospel and this new world, exactly how people and communities 
understood this vita varied greatly. During the eleventh century, monks, canons regular (clergy 
affiliated with a cathedral), and the laity all gave birth to religious movements that sought the 
renaissance of the vita apostolica in their own distinctive ways. 
 There were two general emphases that people embraced as the genuine return to the vita 
apostolica, namely, the communal model or the evangelical model.58  Those who stressed the 
communal model embraced the apostolic modus vivendi (mode of living), while those more 
                                                
56 Ibid. 
57 Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, 203. 
58 See Tugwell, The Way of the Preacher, 111-16. 
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evangelically-minded sought to imitate the apostolate of the apostles. Monastic communities 
perceived the first apostles as monks, and so they understood the vita apostolica to be an exhortation 
to return to their monastic roots. Other sectors of the church felt a strong call to the evangelical 
spirit of the first apostles who went out into the world two by two. Those embracing the 
communal model were inspired by Acts 4:32, the classic description of the first community of 
Christians, whereas those living the evangelical model took Luke 10:1-12 to heart, which narrated 
the poverty and mission of the seventy Christ appointed.  
 The monks and canons regular tended to emphasize the communal life of the apostles, 
while the laity had a more evangelical spirit and committed themselves to poverty and preaching. 
The monks embraced the vita apostolica by returning to the communis vita because they understood 
these two lives as equivalent. They had already begun equating the two in the eleventh century as 
the remedy to clerical decadence, which is why controversy erupted when clerics also began 
embracing the same vita apostolica. Monks such as the Abbot Rupert of Deutz argued that 
monastic life was the realization of apostolic life; monks were the authentic successors to the 
apostles; the first apostles were monks; the rule of the monks was equal to the gospel of the 
apostles.59 In fact, “the ideal Christian, or more simply the Christian, was the monk, a Christian 
dead to the world.”60 This equation of the monastic cenobitic life and the apostolic communal life 
was not new in the history of monasticism. However, as C.H. Lawrence observes, “what is new in 
the twelfth century is not the myth [of the vita apostolica] but the apologetic use made of it by both 
defenders and critics of established practice.”61  
 For these monastic communities, the primary concern was the personal holiness of the 
monk. Thus, in Rupert’s estimation of the vita apostolica, we find virtually nothing of the 
                                                
59 See Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, 205-06. 
60 Ibid., 212. 
61 C. H. Lawrence, Medieval World: Medieval Monasticism: Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle 
Ages, 4th Edition (London and New York: Taylor and Francis, 2015), 135. 
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apostolate, that is, of preaching. Rather, the apostolic life concerns the internal life of the first 
Christian communities, as narrated in Acts 4:32, “Now the company of those who believed were 
of one heart and soul, and no one said that any of the things which he possessed was his own, but 
they had everything in common.” Chenu uses the confrontation between the gospel and the 
world to characterize these three main efforts to embrace the vita apostolica.62 With respect to 
monasticism’s appropriation of this life, he writes, “[T]he institution [of monasticism] seemed, 
because of its very triumph, to rest comfortably on the Christianity it had built; and the people of 
God had only to enjoy this triumph. It its final realization, this vita apostolica left out of its 
consideration that confrontation of the world which the gospel demanded.”63 The monastic 
reforms ultimately distanced the monasteries from the expanding world of education and 
preaching, without seriously considering the encounter of the gospel and world.  
 The canons regular can be difficult to categorize because they embraced the communis vita 
like the monastics while also recognizing the significance of the apostolate—especially preaching 
and baptizing—for the lives of the apostles.64 Tugwell chronicles the passage from and the tension 
between the monastic and canonical adaptations of the vita apostolica: 
[T]he significance attached to this appeal to the apostolic norm varies. At first it is the 
monks who claim to be the heirs of the apostles, and the essential element in this claim is 
their common life without private property. In the eleventh century, in the wake of the 
                                                
62 That is, the efforts of monks, canons regular, and the laity.  
63 Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, 213. 
64 Canons regular were in existence prior to the twelfth century. However, it was during this period that 
they began to gather together to live an austere common life because of their devotion to the reform-
minded return to the vita apostolica. Nicholas clarifies their relationship to the monks: “The orders of 
canons regular have occasioned some confusion. The monks were the spiritual leaders of Christendom in 
the early Middle Ages, and the notion spread during the eleventh century that the apostles had really 
been monks. Hence some priests began living a monastic life under a rule, and houses of canons regular 
appeared in northern Italy and southern France from the mid eleventh century and spread, often under 
the influence of reforming bishops. Most large church had chapters of canons attached to them to chant 
the offices. The ‘Rule of St Augustine’ became standard for the canons regular” (Nicholas, The Evolution of 
the Medieval World, 372.) Soon, there were many distinct communities of these canons regular (“regular” 
because they followed the regula—rule—of Augustine), for example, the canons of St. Victor in Paris. 
They resembled the monks and their monastic communities and similarly emphasized the common life as 
the essential feature of the first apostles.  However, as time progressed, they began to include the 
obligation of pastoral work. 
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Gregorian reform, the emphasis shifts slightly. It is now the canons who claim to be the 
exponents of the vita apostolica, and their charter is the Rule of St. Augustine. The ideal 
envisaged by the canons is explicitly clerical and pastoral, so that an element of apostolic 
work is now attached to the concept of apostolic life. Thus…unlike the monks, ‘who are 
responsible only for their own souls,’ the canons ‘will have to answer for themselves and 
for the people as a whole.’65 
The monks emphasized the contemplative life and personal virtue and holiness, while the canons 
stressed the active life. Nevertheless, while the canons did acknowledge their responsibility for the 
care of souls, the canons, like the monks, appealed to the vita apostolica primarily in terms of their 
living together in community. As Tugwell explains, “Even where an apostolate is formally 
envisaged, the specifically apostolic element in their life is not sought there.”66 Thus, for both the 
monks and the canons, the apostolic life is essentially a particular modus vivendi, which carries a 
certain ascetic pattern and moral pursuit; it is not essentially an apostolate. However, these 
differences in appeal alongside their shared desire to return to communal life led to controversies 
between the monks and the canons regular over the authenticity their respective vita apostolica.  
 This eleventh century renaissance met with something much more radically new in the 
twelfth century, namely, the evangelical preaching movements.67 Preaching assumed primacy of 
place in the vita apostolica. Voluntary poverty and penance also became integral to the attempt to 
imitate the apostles. This evangelical movement—certainly more than the monastic form of the 
vita, but also more than the canons’ form—indicated a new encounter between the gospel and the 
world, for these people moved outward into the world and championed the active life. For them, the 
scriptures were meant to be read for personal sanctity and shared. 
 According to Chenu, in the twelfth century, it was the lay persons who were “the most 
effective promoters of the vita apostolica, the ideals and needs of which were far from being 
                                                
65 Tugwell, The Way of the Preacher, 111. 
66 Ibid., 112. 
67 Ibid., 113. 
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exhausted by the reform of the regular canons.”68 They were better able than the institutionally-
bound clerics to devote themselves to the return to the gospel’s emphasis on witnessing to the 
faith, fraternal love, poverty, and the beatitudes. Their preaching was moral preaching, generally 
an exhortation to penance. Some of these movements pushed poverty and asceticism to the 
extreme (often coupled with a form of dualism), such as the Waldensians and Albigensians. 
 As the centrality of the laity in the Christian apostolate rose, the encounter between the 
gospel and the world came to be understood differently. The evangelical ideal expanded beyond 
the inherited institutions. These Christians rejected the ‘rules’ (regulae) and traditional conformity 
of religious life in favor of a singular reliance upon the gospel, which ultimately meant that the 
gospel could make regulares out of any believers. Instead: 
[I]t followed that the definition of Christian life, far from being shaped by the monastic 
life as in Rupert of Deutz, on the contrary came to be formulated in its own terms, 
independent of the peculiarities of this or that state. The monastery could no longer be 
considered ‘the city of God’ to which one would lead society. Society existed and 
Christians lived in it; to do so was their calling.69  
The twelfth century was a turning point in the history of western Christian spirituality. A new 
consciousness of what it meant to be a Christian began to materialize. Each state in the secular 
life was considered an essential aspect of God’s providence. The fifth master-general of the 
Dominicans, Humbert of Romans, even collected sermons for the variety states that existed. 
Furthermore, in these evangelical movements of the twelfth century, there was a recognition of 
God’s presence in the world and an acknowledgment that the lay Christian was a complete 
Christian actively participating in God’s work—a far cry from the earlier monastic insistence that 
the ideal Christian was a monk, dead to the world.70  
                                                
68 Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, 219. 
69 Ibid., 221-22. 
70 Ibid., 212 and 227-28. 
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 Again, Chenu proposes understanding the three primary appropriations of the vita 
apostolica in the twelfth century—monastic, canonical, and evangelical/lay—in terms of the 
encounter between the gospel and the world, between grace and nature. He assesses this 
encounter in the twelfth century as follows: 
Whereas the monastic view of God tended to reduce the truth and the causality inherent in 
things to little more than symbols or occasions of grace, and hence to reduce the use and 
enjoyment of things to a concession, the evangelical outlook allowed, and more than that 
encouraged, the discovery of the laws of nature, an awareness of the demands of reason, 
and the value of social structures—all within the realm of grace. The evangelical outlook 
regarded grace as having a unique dominion, but a dominion in which nature, reason, 
and society as always served faith and grace all the better for not being under some 
infantile tutelage but autonomous in their methods of operation.71 
Both the intellectual and spiritual lives of twelfth century persons shared a rebirth of confidence in 
human nature and in the human ability to know and love. These in turn supported both the 
thirteenth-century theological advances with respect to the complex but harmonious relationship 
between nature and grace, and the emergence of a new form of religious life that embraced the 
encounter of the gospel and the world. We now turn to the thirteenth century institutionalization 
of these intellectual and spiritual developments, both of which are interconnected in Thomas’s 
historical context and in his own life.  
4. The Thirteenth Century: The University and the Itinerant, Learned Preachers 
The great intellectual transformations of the eleventh and especially twelfth centuries coalesced in 
the thirteenth century, as the shift from monastic to urban education climbed to its peak in the 
establishment of the university. The cathedral and urban schools also produced other educational 
institutions, such as those found in the intricate academic structure of the Order of Preachers. 
Unlike monastics, Dominicans embraced the urban environments as centers of education and as 
occasions for the vita apostolica.  
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 The religious movements we have explored gave creative life to the mendicant orders of 
the Order of Preachers and the Franciscans. The universities, the Dominican educational 
institutions, and the Dominican apostolate must all bear on our encounter with Thomas’s 
theology, for the medieval university and Thomas’s Dominican life are interdependent 
backgrounds.72 However, which of these we emphasize affects our understanding of Thomas’s 
theology. Where previous scholarship gave precedence to Thomas’s university life, more recent 
scholarship convincingly argues that Thomas’s Dominican life was the real focus of his intellectual 
labors.  
 With the interrelated contexts of Thomas’s life as a master in theology and as a 
Dominican in mind, I proceed to first recount a few moments of Thomas’s life and then continue 
to highlight some relevant features of the origin of the university and its pedagogy before engaging 
what I consider the most influential factors of Thomas’s theological life—his Dominican roots and 
commitments. When studying the Order of Preachers, I emphasize their mission as a religious 
order of priests preaching and hearing confessions, along with the preparatory academic and 
practical formation the friars received.    
4.1 Thomas’s Dominican Life 
Thomas was born in 1224 or 1225 in Roccasecca, Italy. His birth came during an age of many 
new beginnings. Chenu accentuates the new encounters with other religious traditions and 
philosophies that were taking place during this era of Christianity’s history.73 These encounters 
affected the Christian consciousness and also shaped in many ways Thomas’s own theological 
method and goals, as he set himself to the tremendous task of thinking out the Christian universe 
in light of this complex and newly emerging diverse whole. 
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73 Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 11. 
  Chapter 1 – Page 23 
 His father, a feudal lord, presented Thomas as an oblate at the powerful Benedictine 
abbey of Monte Cassino in 1230, when Thomas was still a very young boy. There he received a 
rural monastic education and religious formation. Due to resumed conflicts between the Pope and 
the Emperor, Thomas was forced to leave the abbey and study at the schools of Naples in 1239. 
In so doing, Thomas transitioned from a monastic to urban education, experiencing in Naples 
university instruction. Significantly, at that time, Naples (unlike Paris) taught Aristotelian 
philosophy. Further, it was in Naples that Thomas first encountered the Order of Preachers and 
their radical way of embracing the vita apostolica. Interestingly, as Bauerschmidt explains, “In 
moving from Monte Cassino to Naples, Thomas in a way reproduced in his own life the shift that 
occurs in the twelfth century with regard to both intellectual and religious life…Thomas would 
spend five years in Naples, having passed from the monastic world to the scholastic and 
mendicant worlds.”74 It was during this time that Thomas decided to become a mendicant 
Dominican rather than a monk. Thomas’s family did not take well to his decision. They 
entrapped him for one or two years in their castle, using both overt and subtle methods to 
persuade him to change his mind. Having recognized the futility of their efforts, they released him 
and he returned to the Dominicans. Thomas’s transition from the Benedictine monastic life to the 
Dominican mendicant life cannot be underestimated. Why did Thomas become a Dominican, 
despite such pressures and risks? 
 The Dominican schools in which Thomas was educated and taught had a practical and 
pastoral orientation because the overriding concern of medieval Dominican education was to 
prepare men as preachers and confessors ready to serve others. This outwardly directed mission is 
what set them apart from their contemporaries, for example, monastics and seculars. It was also 
the basis of their pedagogical decisions. For example, even Dominicans sent to the universities to 
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study theology were typically not there for academic careers or even to complete degrees. Rather, 
they were sent there to study in order to become teachers for the basic Dominican conventual 
schools.  
 Conventual schools (scholae) were the most elementary tier of Dominican education. It was 
these schools that were the primary locus for training friars for their apostolate, not the order’s 
advanced provincial or university studia. Further, even the most academic Dominicans were not 
simply pursuing their own intellectual interests. Rather, they were above all pedagogues, expected 
to educate other Dominicans. The pedagogical orientation of even these most exceptional 
Dominicans (such as Thomas Aquinas) is evidenced by the fact that most of their writings were 
inspired by what their students and fellow Christians needed.75 In fact, Mulchahey has found that 
some of the most famous Dominican manuals and summa were meant to be used at the conventual 
schools. They were written specifically with the Dominican schools and pedagogy, and not the 
university, in mind.76 For these reasons, historians now emphasize that the texts that are the most 
authentic expression of medieval Dominican achievement were not university texts, but the texts 
written for and within the context of the Dominican educational system.77 Thomas Aquinas’s 
Summa theologiae was one such text. He composed the Summa at Santa Sabina specifically for his 
Dominican students in response to the pedagogical deficiencies in the texts to hand. Many of 
these students would go on to become lectors at the conventual schools after their training at 
Santa Sabina with Thomas.78  
 Previously, it was assumed that Thomas joined the Dominicans for intellectual reasons 
and out of academic ambition, choosing them because of their emphasis on study and their 
                                                
75 Tugwell, “Introduction,” Early Dominican Writings, 25. 
76 Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’, 131. 
77 See Ibid., 130. 
78 However, even though Thomas may have intended the Summa theologiae to become a textbook for training 
Dominicans in theology, it was ultimately rejected as a text for the schola (conventual school) and the 
emerging provincial theology programs. See Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study,’ 331. 
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university connections.79 This point of view is especially prevalent among those who consider 
Thomas’s achievements as primarily philosophical. However, based on historical research, as well 
as the increasing significance given not only to Thomas’s scripture commentaries, but also to his 
sermons, scholars now believe the apostolate of the Dominicans was the primary motivation of 
Thomas’s vocational decision, not their intellectual life and connection to the university. For 
example, historical research into Dominican education demonstrates that the Dominicans’ study 
focused on scripture, not Aristotle and other philosophical texts. Further, it was not likely that a 
Dominican’s life would keep him long at the university, as his responsibilities were elsewhere. 
Thomas is really the exception that proves the rule. It was his own talents—scholarly and 
pedagogical—along with the demands of his era that brought him twice to Paris—as a magister—
and that led to his expansive commentaries on Aristotle.  
 Given the structure and orientation of Dominican education, if Thomas’s primary 
interest was Aristotelian philosophy or if he had desired an academic career, he would have been 
better served to become a secular master in the Faculty of Arts at a university rather than a 
Dominican.80 The life of a friar preacher was not the life of a university master or of a 
philosopher. 81So then, why did Thomas become a Dominican, despite familial opposition? 
Bauerschmidt rightly suggests that it is because  
Thomas wanted to do what Dominicans were in fact founded to do: to preach the Gospel 
of Jesus Christ and to care for souls, primarily through hearing confessions…Thomas, as 
                                                
79 At the time Thomas entered, the Dominicans had only one studium, St-Jacques of the University of Paris. 
It was not until 1248 that they officially expanded, creating studia generalia at four other universities. 
80 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 175. 
81 There is a school of interpretation, prevalent since the mid-nineteenth century, that perceives Thomas 
Aquinas as a philosopher—as a theologian whose achievement was essentially philosophical—and that 
Thomas understood his project as fundamentally philosophical. For example, F. Van Steenberghen, The 
Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1955). For a brief history 
of this interpretation, see Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 41-82. For twentieth-century attempts to correct 
this misinterpretation, see Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans. A.H.C. Downes (London: 
Sheed & Ward, 1950) and Josef Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays (South Bend: St. Augustine’s 
Press, 1999) and Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy, trans. R. and C. Winston 
(South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001). 
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a preaching friar, is oriented primarily toward communicating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in 
such a way that his hearers are disposed to the inner movement of grace. This is what he 
aims at in all his intellectual work, whether preaching to a lay audience in the vernacular, 
or teaching his Dominican brothers, or even writing an Aristotelian commentary.82 
This perspective on Thomas as a communicator—as a preacher speaking about God based upon 
his contemplative knowledge—should bear significantly any reading of his trinitarian theology.  
4.1.1 Thomas the Pastorally-Minded Theologian  
Once his family released him and he returned to the Dominicans, Thomas headed for Paris in 
1245, where he first met his teacher, Albert the Great. They spent three years in Paris together 
(1245–1248). Thomas then accompanied Albert to the studium generale at Cologne (1248–1252), 
where he studied for another three years before returning to Paris (1252–1256). Thomas ascended 
the academic ladder to becoming a master in theology at a rapid pace, bypassing the age and 
curriculum restrictions placed on becoming a baccalarius (bachelor) and a magister.83 Teaching was 
an integral component of scholastic formation, at which Thomas also excelled. He became a 
biblical bachelor at Cologne, where he taught cursorie (cursory lectures) on Jeremiah, 
Lamentations, and part of Isaiah.84 The last of these lectures bears a series of collationes or 
marginal annotations. These collationes are notes about the spiritual or pastoral expansions of his 
literal commentary on Isaiah.85 What is significant about this early moment of Thomas’s teaching 
and pastoral career is that he reflects upon the Word of God to develop the practical orientation 
theology can assume. Commenting on this collation, Jean-Pierre Torrell writes: 
This last collation is a highly structured meditation on the place of the Word of God in 
theology and preaching. From the outset, [the Word] is a light for the intelligence. But 
                                                
82 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 175. 
83 For example, Thomas was likely allowed to begin theology while still finishing his philosophical 
formation. See Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work, vol. 1, 24. 
84 See Ibid., 27. James Weisheipl suggests this teaching regimen. 
85 Thomas always gave preference to the literal sense of scripture when commenting. 
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affectivity also finds a place there: to meditate on the Word is joy…We see in this 
development the practical goal that Thomas assigns to theology.86 
Thomas’s comments upon the Word of God also reflect his commitment to preaching and some 
early indications of his philosophy of teaching, both of which are integrally connected to what 
Thomas later calls, in his commentary on the second article of Apostle’s Creed “attentive listening 
to the Word of God” (diligens verbi divini auditio).87 This commentary is actually a series of Lenten 
vernacular sermons Thomas gave. These sermons represent some of Thomas’s preaching near 
the end of his life. As we will see below and in more detail in Chapter 6, in these sermons, 
Thomas makes use of the psychological analogy to illuminate the Trinity for those to whom he is 
preaching. The fact that he explicitly draws upon his mature, systematic trinitarian theology in his 
preaching is significant because it discloses the close link Thomas perceived between scientific 
sacra doctrina and his apostolate to care for the souls of others. Here, we can observe Thomas 
attempting to hand on the fruits of his contemplation for the sake of others. The fruitfulness of the 
Word of God for theological reflection and practice becomes a constant thread throughout 
Thomas’s Dominican life.  
4.1.2 Thomas the Public Theologian 
The University of Paris was the site of animated controversies in which Thomas was called upon 
to participate. When he had returned to Paris in 1252, the controversy between the seculars and 
the religious was in full force. The seculars’ resentment was fueled by the fact they were losing 
theology chairs to mendicants, both the Dominicans and Franciscans.88  The threat was so great 
                                                
86 Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, vol. 1,  31. 
87 Ibid., 32. Also see Thomas’s commentary on the second article of the Creed: “Therefore, if the Word of 
God is the Son of God and all the words of God bear a certain likeness of this Word, then we ought to 
hear the Word of God gladly; for such is a sign that we love God.” See Thomas Aquinas, The Sermon-
Conferences of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Apostles’ Creed, trans. from Leonine Edition, ed. and into. Nicohlas 
Ayo, C.S.C. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 51. 
88 See Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work, vol. 1, 76-79, esp. 76. 
  Chapter 1 – Page 28 
that Thomas had to give his inaugural lecture under the protection of royal archers.89 During this 
controversy, Thomas wrote Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem as a Dominican response to 
William of St. Amour, who argued that the religious should return to their monasteries and 
perform manual labor.90 As Torrell explains, the wave of opposition represented by William 
encompassed more than the university. At its core, the opposition questioned “the very legitimacy 
of the ministry of the mendicants, who claimed to be devoted to study and teaching, and to live, 
not by labor, but by alms.”91 
  This work was the first of three polemical texts Thomas wrote in response to secular 
university masters. It is a text of Dominican self-understanding, correcting the puerile 
misunderstandings William set forth in his refutation of the mendicants. Throughout Contra 
impugnantes, Thomas articulates the mutually supportive relationship between contemplation, 
study, teaching, and ministry. He argues that contemplation—attained in study, as practiced by 
the Dominicans—prepares one to teach.92 Further, Thomas expresses the essential place of study 
and teaching to the Dominican life and apostolate, as both study and teaching bring spiritual 
consolation to souls.93 He also maintains that both study and a holy life are necessary for those 
who, like the Dominicans, minister to the souls of others. Finally, he presents preaching and 
teaching theology as a spiritual work of mercy, thereby defending the legitimacy of the Order of 
Preachers despite their novelty in engaging in these particular works as their primary ministry.94 
                                                
89 See Ibid., 79. 
90 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 27. As Torrell explains, William of St. Amour misunderstood the 
mendicants. He did not understand that the mendicants were not monks, nor did he comprehend the 
extent to which the Order of Preachers was defined by study and preaching. See Torrell, Saint Thomas 
Aquinas: The Person and his Work, vol. 1, 79-80. 
91 Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work, vol. 1, 79. 
92 For Thomas, all religious have contemplation as their perfection and end, but there are differences in 
how they attain contemplation. Monastics seek contemplation by way of lectio, where the Dominicans 
seek contemplation by way of study. Contra impugnantes, c. 1. Also see Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 109. 
93 See Contra impugnantes, prol. 
94 See Contra impugnantes, cc.1, 2, 66-68. I am indebted to Mongeau’s work, Embracing Wisdom, for drawing 
my attention to this work and its significance for enriching one’s understanding of Thomas.  
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As Mongeau suggest, this work in particular is a model of public theological reflection and 
demonstrative of Thomas’s understanding of his own mission in theological education as a 
Dominican.95 Further, we can observe in this and other polemical works, traces of Thomas’s own 
battle to join the Dominicans and the more passionate side of his personality. As Torrell writes, 
“In these polemical writings defending the religious life, Thomas commits and manifests himself 
personally in a more open way than in other works; we feel him touched here in that which he 
holds most dear: the vocation for which he struggled in his youth.”96  
 Thomas was recalled to Paris in 1268 because his assistance was needed in the face of 
another controversy that had broken out at the University. This time, the struggle was not only 
about corporate rights but also about doctrine “because the place of Aristotelianism had provoked 
an intellectual and moral crisis that was becoming daily more acute.”97 He stayed in Paris until 
1272, at which point he moved to the University of Naples as the head of the theology faculty, 
where he remained until his death in 1274.  
4.1.3 Thomas the Dominican Teacher and Preacher 
In addition to his scholastic duties as a master of theology, Thomas was also a celebrated 
Dominican teacher and preacher. He was included in important pedagogical revisions at chapter 
meetings. In 1265, he was enjoined to establish the first, and experimental, Dominican provincial 
theology studium. It was held in Rome at Santa Sabina. He was given full authority over his 
students. They were sent from all over the province to study with him.98 Precipitated by the 
pedagogical and ministerial needs of these students, Thomas began to write the Summa theologiae. 
                                                
95 See Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 108. 
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 At Paris, Thomas became a bachelor and teacher of the Sentences at age 27, even though 
bachelors were supposed to be 29.99 Now a baccalarius formatus (fully formed bachelor), Thomas 
had only to complete the third and final step to become a master in theology: assist his master in 
disputes. He accomplished this final task and became a magister in sacra pagina in 1256. He taught 
at Paris until 1259. As part of the ceremony of becoming a master, Thomas gave an inaugural 
lecture on Psalm 103:13, “Watering the earth from his things above, the earth will be filled from 
the fruit of your work.” Together with Question 10 of De veritate, “On the Teacher,” it represents 
his initial reflections upon theological education, especially as a ministry, as a service for others, 
not oneself. When he returned to Paris for his second regency, he wrote two other pieces on the 
role of studying and teaching with respect to pastoral ministry—questions from the first and third 
quodlibets.100 In these pedagogical reflections, Thomas sets forth his understanding of teaching as a 
participation in God’s instruction in which the teacher is a secondary cause. James Collins 
explains the unique role theological education played in this participatory understanding of 
teaching, which reflects the scholastic humanist mentality: 
As a theologian, St. Thomas regarded sacred doctrine as the supreme instance of the 
teaching office. Every human effort at communicating new knowledge to others shares, in 
some manner, in the central aim of education: the humanistic and religious aim of 
perfecting man’s grasp of truth and thereby his participation in the knowledge and life of 
God himself.101 
 Frequently, as we will see, Thomas expresses the teacher’s role by way of analogy with a 
doctor—both accomplish their end not as the principal agent, but rather, in cooperation with the 
student’s/patient’s own nature.102 The analogy is noteworthy because in addition to explaining 
                                                
99 See Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work, vol. 1, 36. 
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  Chapter 1 – Page 31 
the particular kind of agent the teacher is, it also expresses that the teacher, like the doctor, can 
heal. This is significant for our understanding of the verbum (inner word), which can be a source of 
healing, of consolation, in a person’s life. While only God can teach and heal interiorly, the 
doctrinal preacher can be the occasion of the word that “breaks forth” into love, that is, of the 
word by which God touches a person. For reasons such as these, the teacher must be 
contemplative in addition to being active, so as to listen to the word, which he is called to share 
charitably with others. In Chapter 2, we will study Thomas’s role as a teacher within the 
Dominican order in more detail when we turn to his time at Santa Sabina, where he began to 
write the Summa theologiae. 
 In 1260, Thomas was appointed the preacher-general of Naples, coordinating all 
preaching activity for that region. He held this post until his death in 1274. Thomas preached 
academic sermons in Latin as a regent master and vernacular sermons as a Dominican. In both 
capacities, he generally followed the model of the sermo modernus (modern sermon), though his 
vernacular sermons do depart somewhat from that model to focus on the more “practical” goal of 
moving the wills of his hearers.103 One of Thomas’s academic sermons given during the 
mendicant controversy echoes the Dominican understanding of the relationship between 
contemplation, study, and preaching, which I will consider below. Reflecting on Luke 8, Thomas 
says 
‘A sower went out’…It remains now to speak about the sower’s third way of going, that is, 
preaching, because a preacher ought to go out from hidden contemplation, for a preacher 
ought to draw in contemplation what he will pour out later in preaching. Hence it says in Is 12:3-4: 
‘With joy you shall water,’ that is, with the joy of contemplation, ‘from the fountains of 
the Savior,’—that is, from divine wisdom [see Wis. 1:5]…This going out is very similar to 
the Savior’s going out from the secret dwelling place of the Father to the public area of 
what is visible…104 
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The more we attend to Dominican education and preaching in general, and Thomas’s teaching 
and preaching in particular, the more we can appreciate the symbiotic relationship between 
speculation and praxis, between the contemplative and active lives, between systematic theology 
and the communication of saving truth to the minds and hearts of believers.  
 It was in the context of his responsibility as preacher-general that Thomas gave a Lenten 
series of vernacular collationes or “sermon-conferences” on the Apostle’s Creed. According to 
Nicholas Ayo, they were “rather longish and patterned more on the thirty-minute retreat 
conference of our own day than on the Sunday homily.”105 Further, “These are catechetical 
instructions for adults, and typically they were not simplistic, short, or question-and-answer 
format. Quite likely they were given in the evenings, when more time could be devoted to a 
leisurely sermon-conference.”106 Thomas preached these daily in 1273 to lay Catholics at the 
church of San Domenico Maggiore in Naples. He challenged his audience intellectually and 
enjoined their freedom as beings made to the image of God. While Thomas’s sermon-conferences 
were intellectually challenging, Torrell notes that generally, when compared to his 
contemporaries, “Thomas distinguishes himself by his simplicity and his sobriety, the absence of 
scholastic subtleties and technical terms.”107 Notice that there is a distinction in Thomas’s sermons 
between challenging his audience intellectually and using scholastic and systematic language. 
Thomas is also concerned to avoid “oratorical flights,” such as those found in the exempla (little 
stories) used by many of his contemporaries, which Thomas found frivolous. Mongeau suggests 
that these collationes represent Thomas as a preacher, pastor, and catechist while also giving us 
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insight into how Thomas approached lay formation. Torrell insists that if we wish to know 
Thomas better, we must familiarize ourselves with this part of his literary accomplishments.108  
 One sermon-conference is especially noteworthy for the trinitarian orientation of this 
project. When preaching on the second article of faith, Thomas explains that we know the Trinity 
now by faith, but we will know it with perfect vision once we pass from this life. However, he 
speaks of the Trinity in this life for our consolation and edification: “But for our consolation and 
edification, let us say something further about [these beliefs].”109 He then proceeds to actually 
walk his listeners through the first moment of the psychological analogy, the procession of the 
inner word, as the best analogy for the generation of the Son, the Word of God. It is exceedingly 
significant that Thomas chooses to make use of the psychological analogy in his preaching, 
though without the technical terminology and scholastic distinctions to be found, for example, in 
question 27 of the Prima pars.110 He challenges the retreatants intellectually and then proceeds to 
enjoin them to make the following commitments to the Word of God, now analogically 
illuminated by way of an accessible interior experience: (1) to willingly hear God’s words; (2) to 
believe God’s words—for then God’s Word dwells in us; (3) to mediate upon this Word (which 
guards against sin); (4) to manifest this Word to others and; (5) to be doers of the Word. When 
considering the manifestation of the Word, Thomas’s Dominican orientation comes to the fore: 
“When one’s heart is full of the word of God, then it ought to overflow in preaching, counseling, 
and enkindling others.”111 In these five commitments to the Word of God, we see echoes of both 
the praise of the Word of God we saw in Thomas’s collationes in his commentary on Isaiah and his 
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aforementioned sermon about the relationship between contemplation and preaching. 
Specifically, we witness the pastoral relevance of the psychological analogy in Thomas’s own 
preaching ministry. I will return to this theme in Chapter 6. Now, I will highlight a few elements 
of university pedagogy in relation to Thomas’s position as a regent master 
4.2 The Rise of Urban Guilds and the Birth of the University  
Not too long after Abelard’s time in Paris, the magistri there began to consider themselves as 
forming a guild—a universitas—and did so very much in response to pressing social needs 
materializing in their urban centers.112 While the word “universitas” did not assume its present 
meaning as “university” until rather late in the Middle Ages, a medieval university could always 
be recognized by the fact that it had a guild of masters, “a privileged corporation which controlled 
its own membership, and these guilds were frequently hostile to outside attempts to infringe on 
their rights.”113 As a guild, these masters acted as a body pursuing a common interest and 
developing a certain craft.114 Ideally, a university had a faculty of Arts, as well as one of the three 
higher faculties, law (civil or canon), medicine, and theology. Paris was the most renowned of the 
universities for its theology program. 
 The master in theology had three university tasks, legere, disputare, and praedicare. Legere 
means “to read,” and in the specifically theological context of the Middle Ages, it meant to read 
the Bible and comment on it verse by verse. This teaching by lecturing (lectio) included both 
textual analysis and the formation of the aforementioned quaestiones regarding the text. The 
literary genre that resulted from the lectio was the commentary or gloss.115 During the thirteenth 
century, Lombard’s Sentences became an important text in the university faculty of theology upon 
which people commented. At first, masters lectured on these Sentences, but eventually it became 
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the task of bachelors. As part of their degree, these baccalarii Sententiarii lectured on the Sentences, 
thereby producing their own commentary. Only masters, however, could lecture on the Bible. 
Thomas’s commentaries on Paul’s letter to the Romans and the reportationes (recorded by a 
secretary while Thomas taught) on the Gospels are examples of the fruits of this form of 
teaching.116 While the Sentences assumed a lasting place in the medieval theological curriculum, the 
Bible held ongoing significance throughout the Middle Ages as the basic text of theology. The 
same was true for Thomas in particular. As Torrell notes, “Though long overlooked in favor of 
the Sentences or the Summa, this kind of biblical teaching was nevertheless Thomas’s ordinary 
labor.”117   
 The content of lectures changed significantly in the thirteenth century as Aristotle’s work 
began filing into the schools. There was controversy, especially at Paris, over Aristotle’s teaching, 
and in particular the Metaphysics and his natural philosophy. According to Bauerschmidt, “Part of 
the disruptive effect of the introduction of Aristotle was the difficulty of deciding where his works 
should be taught.”118 For example, the Metaphysics did not fit into any of the seven liberal arts. The 
result of the eventual acceptance of the entire Aristotelian corpus at Paris in 1255 is the 
transformation of the faculty of arts itself. Thus, the arts faculty of the seven liberal arts became de 
facto a faculty of philosophy. Aristotle’s introduction into both the curriculum of the university 
and the intellectual life of Christianity brought both controversy and a tremendous intellectual 
challenge.  
 Thomas participated in the controversy by defending the use of Aristotle at both the 
university and within the Dominican educational system. He answered the intellectual challenge 
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by his effort to, as Lonergan expresses it, “think out the Christian universe.”119 This thinking out 
was Thomas’s broader context for dealing with questions of grace. For Thomas, grace is one 
particular instance of God’s providence. To “think out the Christian universe” is to grapple with 
the structured yet dynamic order of the entire world order. It is thus similar to Aristotle’s 
philosophical achievement, but with the higher viewpoint afforded by divine revelation, including 
the affirmations that the universe and its order are created and that God is providential. That is, 
Thomas seeks to understand the universe in relation to God, as revealed in Christianity. He seeks 
to understand how the divine transcendent mystery, which lies beyond human knowing, makes 
itself known in the very activity and order of the created universe. He seeks to understand how all 
the mysteries of faith are intelligibly related to one another.120 He aspires, in other words, to a 
synthesis—not a static explanation of everything, but a dynamic perspective from which we can 
continually integrate our diverse experiences according to a wisdom wide enough and deep 
enough to generously contain all things.  Herein, Thomas demonstrates the compatibility and 
universality of God’s providential activity, including grace, with the entire created universe, 
including freedom and contingency. The Dominican teacher and preacher is a secondary—but 
free and important—cause and participant in God’s providential care of creation. We also see 
here the echoes of twelfth-century humanism, now making waves in the thirteenth century 
universities. 
 Masters taught under another form in addition to the lectio, namely, the active pedagogy 
of the disputation. The disputatio was a dialectical form of teaching in which discussion assumed 
center stage. These academic exercises assumed the form of the quaestio, enlivening the quaestio 
now as a pedagogical tool. The disputatio first appeared during the twelfth century and was fully 
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autonomous by the early years of the thirteenth century.121 As Bauerschmidt explains, the 
disputatio followed a development similar to that of the quaestio. Where in the twelfth century the 
quaestio had become detached from the text of scripture in order to address a subject beyond direct 
commentary, the disputatio now became detached from the lecture as its own independent 
exercise, based upon a topic—not a text—and following its own fixed structure.122 Theologically, 
this detachment represents a development in the scientia of sacra doctrina in the Middle Ages. As 
Bernardo C. Bazàn has demonstrated: “The passage from the quaestio to the disputatio, 
characterized by a progressive detachment with regard to the text, was a natural process owing to 
the maturity of the scientific spirit medieval and greater mastery of dialectic method.”123 The text 
is no longer present, hence the autonomy of the disputatio. The quaestio and the disputatio represent 
the setting free of human inquiry, which was the engine of the thirteenth-century scientific spirit 
and the source of Thomas’s efforts to develop a theological method adequate to the times.  
 These disputations were especially concerned with conflicts among authorities. There 
were ordinary and quodlibetal disputations. The former were private, the latter public. Ordinary 
disputes addressed a question set by the master while quodlibetal disputes addressed any topic 
proposed by the audience (other magistri, students, and generally anyone interested in joining the 
discussion). Thomas’s De veritate and De potentia are examples of the fruits of ordinary disputation. 
His Questiones quodlibetales originate from the quodlibetal disputations. 
 The master’s last task was preaching, a central component of the developing apostolica vita. 
According to Peter the Chanter of Paris, preaching was “the roof and final adornment of the 
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theological edifice.”124 The master-preacher was expected to preach sermons in Latin within the 
university setting, but he was also to preach in the city churches. Sermons and preaching were 
essential to the religious, intellectual, and institutional life of the medieval university.125 Many 
masters who were trained in theology were notable preachers and dedicated to Lateran IV’s 
reform efforts, such as refuting heresy and confirming and strengthening the Catholic faith. 
According to Roberts, “They were interested in the reinvigoration of Christian teaching and 
therefore attached great significance to popular preaching.”126 There was an extraordinary level 
of involvement and commitment between the university and the medieval city with respect to the 
preaching of these masters. Their sermons generally addressed the pastoral issues that were 
emerging as a result of the expanding urban centers: “Into the milieu of the medieval city, the 
preacher brought a message of social morality as well as denunciations of ill-gotten gain, usury, 
and fraud.”127  
 The preaching masters of the medieval schools and universities represented a further 
development of the ars praedicandi (preaching art), which we saw earlier in the context of the vita 
apostolica. Most prior medieval preaching had been distinguished by the fact that it was preached 
in Latin and by clerics to clerics. However, during the second half of the twelfth century, with the 
rise of the evangelical spirit now enlivening the vita apostolica, sermons entered into another 
distinctive phase as popular preaching in newly expanding cities became widespread. Another 
change occurred in the thirteenth century with university preaching: 
By the early decades of the thirteenth century, however, there emerged a whole new 
rhetoric of preaching with close ties to the schools and universities where preaching, 
sermon-making, and the study of Scripture had long been linked. From these elements 
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emerged the thematic sermon, a creation of the medieval university and often called the 
university-style sermon.128 
 Importantly, these master-preachers were at the forefront of making scripture more 
accessible to audiences of both clergy and laity through their development of the thematic or 
modern sermon and the composition of preaching aids.129 They also often rounded off their lectio 
with a sermon so their students could learn how to make the transition from what they studied in 
lectio to their praedicatio. Additionally, these masters knew how to use their own scholarship for 
their preaching. However, while preaching was a task of the master in theology, it was not an 
active element of his threefold pedagogy (lectio, disputatio, and repitione). Nevertheless, a more 
sophisticated grasp of theology masters as participating in the preaching of the Church helps us 
understand the close relationship between theology and ministry, between a theologian’s study 
and his practical and pastoral work. This third task, then, discloses a vital piece of information: 
“The people of the Middle Ages saw no opposition between the scientific teaching of theology 
and its pastoral application. On the contrary, the first was seen as the normal preparation for the 
second.”130 The same harmony is true for Thomas, both as a master and as a Dominican.  
4.3 Mendicants 
As the intellectual developments of the eleventh and twelfth centuries coalesced into the 
universities of the thirteenth century, so too did the religious movements assume a novel shape in 
the thirteenth century, namely, mendicancy. The mendicant orders were set apart from the 
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monastic orders because they were supported by freely given gifts, and not by income-generating 
property.131  
 The mendicant movement represented a development of the vita apostolica. It was unlike 
the monastic and canonical forms because of their voluntary poverty and begging, but also 
because the communis vita was not the primary focus of the mendicants. It was unlike the lay 
evangelical forms because it was an evangelical movement of professed religious persons, though a 
completely new style of religious —neither monk nor canon regular, but a friar.132 Both of the 
great thirteenth-century mendicant orders— the Dominicans and Franciscans—embraced 
voluntary poverty. They also preached. However, the Franciscans preached penance like the lay 
preachers, while the Dominicans also preached doctrine.133 Further, they related preaching and 
poverty differently, which led to frequent disputes among them. As Hinnebusch writes, “[The] 
Dominicans imitate Christ the Preacher who was poor, while Franciscans follow Christ the Poor 
Man who preached the Good News…”134 Similarly, in Tugwell’s estimation, the early 
Dominicans were more drawn to the apostolica—preaching—while the Franciscans were more 
drawn to the vita—imitating Christ’s life. Similarly, while both orders based their vita apostolica on 
Luke 10:1-12 (the monastics and canons regular had chosen Acts 4:32), “[t]he Dominicans 
rapidly los[t] interest in the details of Luke 10, concentrating their claim to be apostolic on the 
claim that they are doing the job of the apostles. The rest is reduced to the simple formula of 
‘preaching in poverty,’ and this poverty is seen largely in function of the job…The Franciscans, by 
contrast, remain[ed] fascinated by all the details [of Luke 10].”135 
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Nevertheless, both mendicant orders shared much in common. They were pioneers and 
indispensable to the life of a Church in need of relating to the evangelical spirit of its lay members 
and responding to their changing pastoral needs.   
 While an analogy can be drawn between the intellectual developments and the university, 
on the one hand, and the religious movements and the mendicant orders, on the other hand, 
there is also an illuminating parallel between the universities and the Dominicans. Van Engen 
suggests that the Dominicans’ innovative schema of governance can be grasped by way of an 
analogy with the university guilds: 
What guildsmen attempted to achieve as laymen operating within a new commercial 
environment, the followers of Dominic sought to realize as clerics operating within a new 
religious environment. Both presupposed the social consequences of urbanization, and 
both sought to distance themselves from the inherited routines of the rural village (farm or 
church) and to claim a relative freedom over against inherited authorities (prince or 
bishop).136 
Like guilds, the Dominicans were organized for the sake of a particular end, namely, preaching, 
or what Van Engen calls their “craft.” This craft of preaching, like the crafts of other guilds, 
defined the Dominicans; it was their identity. As other scholars have noted, Pope Innocent III’s 
original papal document sanctioning Dominic’s order of preachers bears a significant visible 
alternation: from “preaching in Toulouse” (predicantibus in Tolosa) to “preachers in Toulouse” 
(predicatoribus in Tolosa).” From this evidence, Van Engen concludes that this document indicates 
the novelty of what was occurring with Dominic and his brothers. The privilege accorded them in 
1217 was so unique that it “had to be hand-corrected to identify its recipients not as clerics 
licensed to preach but as a new type called simply ‘preachers.’”137 To preach was their essential 
task—their craft—and this identified and defined them.138 I now turn to what further 
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differentiates the Dominicans from their contemporaries, especially from the long-reigning 
monastic interpretation of the aim of religious life.  
5. A Unique Order: The Apostolate of the Vita Apostolica in the Dominican Origins 
Tracing the outlines of the unique contours of the Order of Preachers assists us in composing a 
more accurate picture of Thomas and his work. The starting point for this endeavor is the 
Dominicans’ identity as preachers, for a straight line can be drawn from preaching to everything 
else concerning these friars. There was a great need for preaching in thirteenth-century 
Christianity, and it was to become one of the primary ways of educating most Christians.139 Prior 
to the Dominicans, no religious order existed that was adequately fitted to the particular demands 
of a preaching ministry, especially doctrinal preaching. Though monks were called upon, they 
continually failed to be successful at preaching. 
 Thus, Dominic rendered a great service to the faithful when sought to establish an order 
of “preachers.” According to Hinnebusch, this service is clear when we note the little preaching 
that was done and the sparse amount of preaching material produced during the centuries that 
stretch from the age of the great Fathers to the days of Dominic. The Church hierarchy had 
already begun to recognize this need: “A revival of preaching was a recognized need in the 
church in the early thirteenth century. The bishops, who were the official ministers of the word of 
God, were all too frequently ‘dumb dogs who will not bark,’ as Innocent III complained.”140 The 
Fourth Lateran Council—at which Dominic was present—called for auxiliary preachers to help 
the bishops. Dominic’s vision, however, was much more expansive. He envisaged his preachers 
going throughout the world in pairs, as Christ directed the apostles to do. Pope Honorius III 
approved the order in 1216. With this approval, they were not confined to a diocese nor were 
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they dependent on any bishop for the mandate to preach.141 A new moment was thus beginning 
in the Church’s pastoral ministry. I now outline four defining features of the Preachers’ 
contribution to this ministry, all of which take their lead from preaching.  
5.1 Dominic’s Fratres Praedicatores 
First, their poverty is instrumental to their preaching, supporting its efficacy. In 1201, Dominic and 
Diego, while journeying through southern France, encountered the dualistic evangelical heretical 
group, the Albigensians (Cathars), as well as the Cistercian abbots sent to preach against them. 
The former encounter stoked the fire of Dominic’s desire to preach.142 The latter meeting taught 
Dominic and Diego that if they wanted to succeed in their preaching, they had to embrace 
poverty like the Albigensian preachers, for the Cistercians’ preaching clothed in the wealth of the 
monastery was failing. Dominic recognized that “[o]nly someone who genuinely shared the 
evangelical aspirations of those who were disaffected with the official church could have hoped to 
make much impression on them.”143 This poverty is instrumental, for they adopt personal and 
community poverty because it gave them the freedom they required to preach.144 
 Second, related to their poverty was their itinerancy, both of which were features of their 
mendicancy. Like the Franciscans, their itinerancy was interpreted negatively by many of the 
monastic communities who viewed this constant movement as a sign of corruption, as if they were 
chasing illicit desires or oblivious to their own interior restlessness. Yet, both mendicant orders 
saw itinerancy as an imitation of Christ. As with poverty, the Dominicans understood itinerancy 
as of instrumental value to their preaching. It is also thereby related, as will be addressed below, 
to their desire to be useful to those outside of their community. 
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 Third, Dominic was determined to preach doctrine. Though the Dominicans were 
concerned with the conversion of heretics, they were also equally engaged with instructing the 
faithful in the knowledge necessary for salvation. Their doctrinal preaching set them apart from 
other religious communities engaged in preaching, as well as from their lay counterparts. It was 
also unprecedented, for in preaching doctrine, Dominic and his companions were preaching what 
only bishops and approved preachers had henceforth been permitted to preach.145 When Bishop 
Fulk of Toulouse commissioned Dominic and his companions to preach doctrine, his official 
sanction set Dominic’s friars apart—more than anything else—from most other contemporary 
preachers.146 Approved lay groups were only permitted to preach moral exhortation and were 
explicitly excluded from teaching doctrine. Bauerschmidt expresses the uniqueness of the kind of 
preaching the Dominicans sought: 
[T]he order that Dominic had in mind was something quite unprecedented: an order 
dedicated not to prayer and contemplation, as the Benedictines and Cistercians were, nor 
to the preaching of moral exhortation and penance, as the various evangelical movements 
of the twelfth century had been and as the Franciscans would be, but rather to the 
preaching of Christian doctrine, a task traditionally associated not with religious but with 
the order of bishop.147 
 Fourth—and intrinsically connected to the Dominican mission to preach doctrine—was 
the unprecedented value they placed upon education and study. Dominic intended his preachers to 
be “orthodox and theologically-informed evangelists.”148 Theological study was insisted upon 
from the beginning, and philosophical study eventually became an official part of the Order’s 
study. Theirs was a learned preaching in which a novel and essential partnership was formed 
between study and preaching.149 As Bauerschmidt writes, “Study as preparation for preaching 
was from the outset a hallmark of the Dominicans and almost from the very inception of the order 
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Dominic had his friars studying in Paris.”150 Further, preaching and education are so linked in the 
origins of the Dominican tradition that Mulchahey argues that in order to understand their 
preaching, one must understand their schools, curricula, pedagogical techniques, and mental 
habits.151 This intellectual work replaced the traditional monastic manual labor.152 Likewise, they 
gave contemplation a radically new orientation by seeking contemplation as study, which in turn 
gave rise to their unique pedagogy of study through contemplation.153 Contemplative study was 
for the sake of preaching to others, for the sake of their souls. This serious study of sacred teaching 
transformed the monastic lectio divina.154  
 All four of these features are not only related to preaching, but to one another. For 
example, while the practice of granting dispensations from regular observances to members of 
religious orders had a history, the Dominicans were the first order to sketch “a system of 
dispensations to be made available not for reasons of health as had been the case in other orders, 
but for reasons of study.”155 In fact, study became one of the basic components of the Dominican 
religious observance.156 For example, their recitation of the choral Office was to be brisk and 
succinct, lest their study of sacred truth be hindered.157 Similarly, their poverty was not to inhibit 
their procurement of books. Nothing was to interfere with preaching (their apostolate), and 
studying was the indispensable preparation for this craft. According to Mulchahey, “This new 
emphasis on the importance of study and the needs of the apostolate in relation to other aspects of 
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the community’s life can be seen as the Dominican order’s single most characteristic 
innovation.”158  
 While preaching is the common thread running through the Dominican’s impoverished 
but doctrinally educated and itinerant lifestyle, something more foundational supports the 
preaching, itself. As Van Engen suggests, what truly sets the Dominicans apart in the thirteenth 
century is that their mission was not personal holiness, but rather, the outwardly directed mission 
of preaching and hearing confessions in order to take care of souls and lead them to God. Tugwell 
aptly calls their outward orientation a “generosity of self-giving,” which is the cornerstone of 
Dominican obedience rather than meticulous observance of rules.159 
 Earlier, I referred to the 1220 Dominican constitution. This constitution illuminates these 
interrelated ways in which the Dominicans were unique, but also points to the fundamental 
purpose for which Dominic founded the Order of Preachers. Again, “Our order is recognized as 
having been especially instituted from the beginning for preaching and the salvation of souls, and 
our study should be principally and ardently directed to this end with the greatest industry, so that 
we can be useful to the souls of our neighbors.”160 Humbert of Romans comments on this 
constitution. He explains that the order has two ends, preaching and salus animarum (the salvation 
of souls). However, while preaching is the immediate aim of the order, it is subordinate to its 
ultimate aim, the salvation of souls. He then links the work of saving souls to serious study, for that 
is what will make the Dominicans serviceable.161 As Humbert writes, “Study is not the purpose of 
the order, but it is exceedingly necessary if we are to achieve the aforementioned ends, namely 
preaching and the saving of souls, for without study we can do neither.”162 Further, as 
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Wendlinder comments, “Dominic discerned that this end could be better achieved through 
‘learned preaching’ than simply through moral exhortation.”163 In other words, Dominic 
recognized the value of helping believers come to understand the theological reasons for Christian 
behavior, as well as the intrinsic value of understanding what one believes. Such understanding, 
as Thomas expresses, provides consolation to the believer.164 Thus, while preaching is the 
common thread holding poverty, itinerancy, and education together, the cloth is woven for the 
sake of others’ souls.   
 Van Engen has made a recent and significant contribution to this understanding of the 
originality of the Dominicans’ outwardly-directed missions. All religious communities in the 
Middle Ages were founded upon a regula (rule) and formed by a vita (life). Their members 
dedicated themselves to a common regula and found encouragement in exemplary vitae.165 These 
examples were meant to animate their journey to personal perfection. While the Dominicans, like 
the Franciscans, were founded and formed in these ways, the Dominicans were also the exception 
to this pattern. For example, Francis was certainly a reformer, the connection between his life and 
rule was similar to the pre-existing pattern, as his personal vita had become essential to 
sanctioning his regula. The Dominicans, by contrast, departed from this medieval pattern in two 
ways. First, they adopted the already-established Augustinian rule as their regula.166 Second, 
instead of turning to Dominic’s personal vitae (as the Franciscans had done with Francis), they 
turned to several vitae, those of the first preachers and thereby, the origin of the Order of Preachers. 
The point was to emphasize their unique identity as preachers from the very beginning: “The 
Dominican tradition, in short, was not grounded in a life written to capture the holy radiance of 
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an acclaimed saint but in life-stories written to delineate the origins of a guild of Preachers.”167 
They were not explicitly shaped by a distinguishing regula or vita.168 Their uniqueness in this 
regard discloses the source of what set them apart from their contemporaries. The reason they 
focused their vitae on their origins as preachers rather than on Dominic was because their mission 
was not personal holiness, but outward directly missions.169 The Dominicans were animated by 
recalling why they were founded. 
 There were certain distinctive features of Dominic’s life that affected the Preachers. 
However, even when his personal vita was featured in the collective vita, his personal virtue was 
only spoken of after his missionary work. The emphasis was always on the latter. As Van Engen 
explains: 
Unlike traditional monks or holy people, Preachers could regard their individual virtues 
as in some sense subsidiary to their mission. This was revolutionary. In the entire monastic 
tradition since the Desert Fathers—and in Francis too—the mission was personal 
holiness. Outwardly-directed missions, as functionalist arguments have presented them, 
only sprang from holy powers accrued by, or perceived as already present in, people of 
God. Dominic and his bishop from the beginning made virtue instrumental to the mission, 
thus adopting poverty to refute (or compete with) heretics. Dominic’s band gave up 
immoveable property and became mendicants to be free for preaching, as the vita makes 
very clear.170 
Here we have an entire order dedicated to the apostolate, and the radical and groundbreaking 
nature of this dedication cannot be underestimated. Every aspect of the Dominican life has an 
apostolic quality—prayers and devotions, studies, even their dispensations. This is because, as 
Tugwell writes, “The all-absorbing ambition of the friars was to be ‘useful to the souls of others.’ 
Their own spiritual exercises were designed to make them better preachers, and their own 
spiritual progress was not sought as a goal in its own right, but rather as a kind of spin-off from 
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their service of others.”171 Further, their apostolate was constitutive of their religious life, rather 
than the other way around. Even the pope attached their preaching of the Word of God to the 
remission of their sins. This is important because it underscores that for these preachers—unlike 
monastics and canons regular—their way of sanctification was through their apostolic work, not 
through their regular observance. There is no gap, as Tugwell expresses it, between their religious 
life and their ministry. Essentially, the unique formative emphasis placed upon their apostolate 
underscores that for the Dominicans, personal holiness was not the goal of their order. The goal 
of their order was to be useful to the souls of others. This does not mean that sanctity and service 
are not related, but historically, the Dominicans are pioneers in seeking first and foremost the 
spiritual well-being of their neighbors rather than their own. 
 To this historical research into the unique character of the outwardly directed mission 
and their unparalleled dedication to the apostolate of saving souls, I add that the Dominicans 
interpreted their work of saving souls as imparting the knowledge necessary for salvation by way of 
studious, learned preaching.172 Such knowledge is necessary, as Thomas expresses, because God is 
our end and in order to effectively direct our living to our end, we need to know about our God, 
our end. They grounded their serviceability to souls in studying sacra doctrina, and they preached 
because the service they endeavored to give their neighbors was the spiritual work of handing on 
salvific knowledge. 
5.2 Thirteenth Century Pastoral Needs 
The early Dominicans formed a religious order dedicated to the service of others rather than 
establishing a cloister for the salvation of those who entered. Thus, the shape their life took was 
determined by the needs of others whom they served. In the thirteenth century, these needs 
corresponded to the intellectual developments and religious movements of the eleventh and 
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twelfth centuries. In many ways, the Church had failed to embrace the opportunity the 
evangelical spirit occasioned, and instead sequestered it to the margins and pushed people to the 
extremes of heresy. Dominic, however, succeeded where the Church had failed, recognizing that 
“[o]nly someone who genuinely shared the evangelical aspirations of those who were disaffected 
with the official church could have hoped to make much impression on them.”173  Further, a great 
number of the people who followed the heretical groups were not so much abandoning 
Catholicism as they were simply ignorant of Catholic beliefs. This shortcoming was related to the 
prior urban developments and the accompanying ecclesiastical reorganization that had taken 
place. As Nicholas explains: 
By the eleventh century a parish organization had developed. In principle, each parish 
was under one priest, who was usually assisted by a vicar and various persons in minor 
orders. The growth of urban populations during the central Middle Ages made some 
parishes too large for one man to minister to the spiritual needs of all inhabitants, and 
many urban parishes were subdivided…the inadequate supply of clergy in the larger 
centers contributed to the growth of heresy among the underinstructed masses.174 
Compounding these ecclesiastical shifts was the fact that most of the clergy of the early thirteenth 
century had insufficient theological training.  
 Tugwell assesses a twofold need that had to be met in order for the Church to prevail in 
the midst of what had become a restless evangelical movement. First, the Church needed to 
demonstrate that the new evangelical spirit had a home within the Church. Second, the Church 
needed to provide basic catechesis, both doctrinal and moral, to its people by providing an 
effective and educated core of preachers.175 The Dominicans responded to both of these needs, 
making a home for the evangelical spirit within the official Church and making catechesis 
available for the masses.  
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 A third need arose in response to the aforementioned intellectual developments, for a new 
Catholic theology was necessary to cope with these advances, especially in the recently emergent 
universities.176 Just as the intellectual developments had become institutionalized in the 
universities in the thirteenth century, the Church found an institutional response to the 
evangelical movements in the advent of the mendicant orders.177 The Dominicans also responded 
to this intellectual need. They supplied educated preachers by developing their own extraordinary 
academic structures, which educated both laity and clergy. They also contributed intellectuals to 
the academic world of the universities. Providing learned teachers and preachers responded to the 
urgent need of the Church for educated clergy, at last making the mandates of Lateran III and IV 
a reality.178 
 Pastorally and intellectually, thirteenth century Europe was in need of poor, itinerant, 
and educated preachers and theologians capable of meeting the spiritual and intellectual demands 
of the thirteenth century. The Dominicans provided both pedagogically-minded teachers as well 
as impoverished, doctrinally-sound preachers. Thomas, as we have seen, was celebrated as both. I 
now turn to the Dominican academic structure in order to grasp Dominican pedagogy.   
6. The Dominican Tradere Aliis Contemplata: Handing on the Fruits of the their 
Contemplative Study for the Sake of Others  
From the very beginning, Dominican education and ministry were interwoven into a relationship 
of mutual mediation. Similarly, at the inception of the Dominican order, mutually mediating 
relationships emerged between contemplation and action, on the one hand, and the speculative 
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and practical elements of sacra doctrina, on the other.179 Study serves the Dominicans’ ministry of 
preaching, which is done for the sake of the salvation of the souls of their neighbors. Study and 
the concrete economy of salvation are thus intimately linked. Mulchahey illustrates the relation 
between preaching and study by way of Dominic’s decision to adopt the Rule of St. Augustine as 
the rule of his order of preachers.180 She comments on his transformation of the Rule: “At 
Dominic’s hands the regular life became also the life of the itinerant preaching, contemplation was 
transformed into study, the direct preparation for preaching in word, while austerity and poverty 
became the preconditions for preaching by example.”181 Mulchahey observes that Augustine’s 
rule was not an obvious choice for the Order of Preachers. Thus, Humbert offers reflections upon 
Dominic’s decision, which Mulchahey summaries and which reflects the Rule’s amenability to 
transformation: 
First, says Humbert, echoing something which seemed so obvious to Dominic, preachers 
must be learned; Augustine, being wonderfully learned himself, serves as a good example 
to the disciples of his Rule who would be preachers…Fourth, Humbert observes that 
Augustinian canons are not bound to a single cloister as are monks. They are free to practise 
the active life, as preachers must, and they may have the cure souls in their own parishes…And [sixth], 
Humbert points out that in its brevity the Rule of St. Augustine was, indeed, 
extraordinarily flexible. To it could be added all the statutes needed to regulate a community of 
preachers, especially statutes regarding study.182 
Humbert’s fourth and sixth points accentuate the distinct way in which Dominic understood the 
active and contemplative lives. The active life was specifically the activity of preaching. The 
contemplative life was contemplation through study. It is this transformed notion of 
contemplation as study that is especially noteworthy. For the Dominicans, their contemplation 
came from study rather than from the monastic lectio divina. They sought to teach and preach from 
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the scientia they gained from this transformed contemplation. Contemplation as study must figure 
into any attempt to understand Dominican education and pedagogy. Pedagogically, the 
Dominicans pursued contemplation as study, which itself supported their active ministry. Equally, 
their study was pursued as contemplation, that is, as directed toward the love of God, which 
delights the soul.183 
 Not only did the Dominicans transform contemplation by finding its source in study 
(rather than in lectio divina), but they also reordered contemplation’s telos by putting it at the service 
of their outwardly-directed mission. That is, they contemplated (and therefore studied) for the 
sake of others. One of the most recognized Dominican mottos, contemplata aliis tradere (handing on 
to others the fruits one has gained in contemplation), reflects this reordering of contemplation and 
echoes its transformation. This phrase actually seems to originate with Thomas. We have already 
seen him say as much in his sermons.184 Thomas also practiced this motto in his own life. As a 
preaching friar, he gave his life over to the care of souls through handing on the fruits of studious 
contemplation by preaching the gospel.185 Finally, what the Dominicans contemplated and sought 
to hand on was nothing short of sacra doctrina, that is, salvific knowledge, both speculative and 
practical, intended to guide the pilgrim on her journey to God. Herein lies the intimate bond 
between contemplation, study, preaching, and the salvation of souls. The Dominican must study 
in order to know and love God. He must know and love God in order to speak the words of God 
in his preaching such that others may know and love God and direct their lives to God as their 
salvific end. The shared fruits of the Dominicans’ contemplation—particularly in Thomas’s 
hands—are knowledge and love of the triune God, which delights the soul and conforms it to the 
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Trinity, itself. In their contemplative study and learned preaching of the knowledge necessary for 
salvation, the early Dominicans were unparalleled.  
6.1 The Locus of Dominican Theological Formation 
Accompanying their pedagogical technique of practicing contemplation as study for the sake of 
preaching was their decision about how to educate their friars. Their ultimate goal required a 
novel approach to education and formation. According to Mulchahey, “As Dominic and his friars 
first contemplated the institutional parameters according to which they would build an ordo 
Praedicatorum, a single education concept had animated their thinking: Dominican preachers had 
to be formed in theology, and so they would be, right in their own convents.”186 Wendlinder 
summarizes the essence of Dominican formation as “the life of faith and contemplation which 
guided the life of study—with the active goal of learned preaching necessary for the salvation of 
souls.”187 The Dominicans discerned that establishing their own schools and with their own 
teachers was the best way of forming friars for this exceptional aim. 
 Dominic’s commitment to being useful to the souls of others influenced the destinations 
he set for his preachers’ education. He chose university towns because these were centers of 
learning, allowing the friars to study, preach, and find literate men to enter their order.188 Within 
the first few years of the order, he also sent friars to study at the University of Paris. However, 
while the university would continue to serve a critical purpose in the Order, Dominic also 
envisioned the Preachers establishing their own conventual schools in which the Dominicans 
themselves would educate the friars as preachers. This vision of Dominic’s underscores the 
pedagogical priorities of the young Order in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. 
Dominican education during this time period was overwhelmingly oriented toward a pastoral and 
                                                
186 Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’, 219. 
187 Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 33. 
188 Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’, 26. 
  Chapter 1 – Page 55 
practical end, namely, the preparation of men as preachers and confessors.189 This preparation 
most often took place in the order’s conventual schools, called schola, rather than in advanced 
studia. However, even once these scholae were established, the university played an ongoing role in 
the Order, for Dominic modeled these conventual schools after the universities and continued to 
send friars to the universities to study theology.  
6.1.1 The Dominican Three-Tiered Education System 
While Dominic and his order were committed to educating the friars in the conventual schools, 
they soon recognized a quickly emerging necessity—the Dominicans’ local schools presupposed 
the order would have qualified teachers to lecture in them.190 At the same time, they began to 
discern the possibilities of a second tier of education beyond these local schools, namely, the 
studium. These possibilities arose out of the close proximity of several Dominican priories to the 
university centers of Europe and their great secular studia. These urban priories “could develop 
schools which offered an education in theology a cut above that available in most other 
Dominican loci, as masters and learned men of the universities joined their communities and 
began to teach.”191 The Dominican studium was based upon St-Jacques of Paris, which already by 
1220 could be singled out as the order’s studium—“not merely a schola, but a studium, a place of 
serious study—to which the best and the brightest friars could be sent from every corner of 
Europe.”192 By 1248, the Dominicans were establishing studia in Cologne, Oxford, Montepelier, 
and Bologna. The Dominicans soon discerned even more expansive possibilities, and quickly 
developed an internal three-tiered education system: the schola, the studium, the studia provincialia, 
and the studia generalia (the studium and the stuida generalia are really the same tier of education, as 
we will see).  
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 The first level of education, the schola (conventual school), provided the friars with the 
education they need in order to become learned preachers. The schola was “the doctrinal heart of 
Dominican training, or perhaps the theory behind the practice of the order’s ministry.”193 Again, 
many of the Dominican manuals and summa were written with the expectation that they would be 
used in these scholae rather than in the university. The schola was in many ways the institutional 
realization of Dominic’s dream. He wanted to create “a permanent corps of theologically-
informed preachers, able to represent the teachings of the Church from a position of intellectual 
and ecclesiastical authority.” 194 The scholae were the means of developing this corps and providing 
themselves with “the sine qua non of the Dominican mission: the learning which would enable them 
to work as preachers, as priests, and soon, as confessors amongst the Christian people.” 195 These 
schola also had an open-door policy, thereby providing bishops with an educational opportunity 
for their clergy and meeting a pressing need of the Church. 
 Within twenty years of Dominic’s death, the Dominicans had been experimenting with 
specialist curricula in order to remain current with the momentum that Aristotelian and Arabic 
philosophy were gaining as the thirteenth century progressed. These experiments gave birth to 
the second tier of Dominican education, the studia provincialia. Mulchahey explains the relationship 
of these three tiers now present with the establishment of studia provincialia:  
If every convent had a school [schola] and the order at large had access to St-Jaques [a 
studium], these new courses were to be offered by a few studia operating in each province. 
Studia provincialia, that is, schools administered at the provincial level for select provincial 
students, became the means by which the Dominican order provided intermediate 
training in the subject increasingly deemed to be prerequisite to the study of advanced 
theology at Europe’s universities.196 
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In other words, these studia provincialia were academically intermediate schools between the scholae 
and the studia of the universities, though chronologically they came into existence after the first 
studium at St-Jacques had been established. As intermediary, they represent a new chapter in the 
history of Dominican schools. They are also an important element of Thomas’s history, as a 
writer, teacher, and a member of Dominican committees on education. 
 The first studia provincialia were studia artium. These liberal arts schools were not like those 
of the universities because they did not properly include the natural philosophy of Aristotle.197 
Studia naturarum (schools of philosophy which included Aristotle’s natural philosophy) would begin 
to emerge later in the history of the Dominican education system, beginning with a single 
experiment in 1262, which eventually gave birth to a fully-integrated and permanent network of 
philosophy schools in 1271.198 The Dominicans also developed a provincial school of theology. 
Thomas’s studium personale at Santa Sabina in Rome (1265-1268) was the first such school. 
 Finally, the third tier of Dominican education, the studia generalia, was really just the 
development of the early studium of St-Jacques. (This studium was already a reality by 1220, and so 
at that time, it was considered the second-tier of Dominican education, since it predated the 
provincialia studia). In 1248, the Dominicans decided to develop four further studia in order to ease 
the pressure on St-Jacques that their rapid expansion was causing. At that point, they began 
referring to St-Jacques and the four others for the first time as studia generalia et sollempnia. Both the 
schools and their label were new: “St-Jacques had never been called a ‘general’ school, or a 
‘solemn’ place of study; it was simply the order’s ‘studium.’”199 Their technical designation was now 
studia generalia, adopted from the great secular studia generalia. The Dominican studia generalia were 
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exclusively schools of advanced theology, unlike the secular studia generalia, which could encompass 
any of the higher of disciplines.200  
 While their five studia were modeled after the Parisian one, the Dominican format of 
teaching differed in important ways, even at St-Jacques. One of the most significant features was 
the premium Dominicans placed on forming teachers, as exhibited by alterations in the curricula 
and by different expectations meant to allow the bachelor to become of a master of students. The 
master of students was a “friar bachelor” or frater studens—very few Dominicans became bachelors 
of the Sentences. According to Mulchahey: 
The bachelors in Dominican studia generalia, clearly, were there to cultivate their qualities 
as shepherds of students as much as they were there to be put through their paces 
presenting their required texts. This is a point not be glossed over when commenting 
upon the course in a Dominican stadium generale: that the primary goal of the general course was, 
emphatically, to train teachers.201 
Likewise, the Dominican magister at a university studium was tasked first and foremost with training 
the order’s teachers, who would in turn train the order’s rank-and-file preachers and confessors.202 
These rank-and-file Dominicans, engaged in the order’s daily ministerial work, were called the 
fratres communes. Thus, “To fill the lectorate was ever the purpose of the Dominican studium 
generale.”203 Even as their studia generalia progressed, the Dominicans there continued to be 
pastorally-minded: “[T]he Dominicans were much more concerned with creating a staged 
curriculum which met the needs of their pastoral work than with being at the universities per se or 
reproducing the universities’ curricula in Dominican guise.”204 Such was the order Thomas chose 
to enter. 
 The Dominicans studying at the studia generalia were sent there in order to become 
conventual lectors, which meant they did not usually stay to complete their degree. They studied 
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for a maximum of three years before returning to their province for their teaching assignment at a 
conventual schola. In order to teach at the next level—the studia provincialia—he had to prove 
himself as a teacher. Thus, he had to serve a few years teaching at the schola before advancing. Next, 
only after teaching at least two years at the studia provincialia could he be nominated to serve as a 
cursor at one of the studia generalia. For the Dominicans, academic advance was not only linked to 
intellectual giftedness, but also to demonstrated pedagogical ability.205  
6.1.2 The Structure of Conventual Education 
Again, Dominican conventual education (the schola) was patterned after the university pedagogy 
and curriculum. The order already had a well-developed syllabus and detailed pedagogical 
techniques for the schola by the middle of the thirteenth century. It was also already well oriented 
toward the practical training of the fratres communes (the rank-and-file friars). Coming to terms with 
conventual education helps address questions about how Dominicans learned to preach and hear 
confessions.  
 The formal course followed the general scholastic structure of Europe’s studia generalia, 
that is, the scholastic practices of lectio, repetitio, and disputatio. At the Dominican schola, there were 
two daily lectures, one on the Bible and one on the Sentences, a repetition of each lecture, and 
weekly disputation and repetitio generales (review of week’s materials). It is significant that historical 
evidence now indicates the conventual lectures were on the Bible and the Sentences, for previously 
scholars presumed these texts were too difficult for beginners in theology: “A new measure of the 
ambitiousness of the Dominican vision for standardized training in theology for the order’s rank 
and file lies in this basic curricular identity with Paris: the texts used at Paris in the humble 
Dominican schola were meant to be the same.”206  
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 With this syllabus, the schola lectures provided the fratres communes with basic scriptural 
knowledge and familiarity with the basic fundamental arguments of Christian theology, thereby 
giving them the ministerial tools they required as the Dominican priests who would spend most of 
their lives as “work-a-day preachers and confessors.”207 The disputations were the way of 
practicing what they learned in the lectures. As at the universities, the disputation was another 
form of teaching, an “active pedagogy.”208 The third formal exercise of the schola, the repetition, 
was essentially a tutorial “in which an assistant to the teaching master went over the material the 
master had presented his lectures…”209 
 To return to the lectures, those on the Bible provided students with cursory knowledge of 
the sensus historicus (historical sense), intended to help the friars “understand the narrative structure 
of the text as well as its literal meaning.”210 As Mulchahey explains, this starting point was ideal 
for friars who would need to elucidate scripture from the pulpit. However, it was only that—a 
beginning, for the heart of the preacher’s craft was “the sensus moralis, the middle of the three 
spiritual senses, which explored Old and New Testament alike to discover lessons for Christian 
behavior beneath the veil of literal meaning.”211 This transition required “right doctrine,” which 
was provided in the second daily lecture on the Sentences. This second lecture especially discloses 
the closeness of scientific theology to Dominican ministry:  
Here, with the Lombard’s help, [the young Dominicans] made first contact with the 
theological science essential to preaching and to its peculiar exegetical needs, and were given 
the tools with which to delve into the sensus moralis and to begin making the connections 
between Scripture, doctrine, and tropology.212  
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6.2 Dominican Pastoral Formation: the Making of a Preacher-Confessor 
These three academic exercises—lectio, repetito, disputatio—were only one part of the training the 
fratres communes received at the conventual school, for “Dominic’s friars not only needed to know 
the difference between heterodox and orthodox theology, they needed to now how to preach 
it.”213 While praedicare was the third and crowning task of the university magister, it was not a part of 
the threefold scholastic pedagogy. The Dominicans, by contrast, actually incorporated preaching 
into their curriculum, “for students learned to preach just as they learned to dispute.”214 At the 
schola, the Dominicans adapted each scholastic pedagogical technique to their own end of saving 
souls. As Wendlinder explains: 
[E]ach of the scholastic techniques used in instruction, for the Dominicans, was intimately 
related to the friar’s spiritual and religious formation: lecture as meditation on the Word, 
repetition as their life of prayer and liturgy (for example, liturgy of hours and so forth), 
and disputation as related to preaching—imparting knowledge to others; thus the 
contemplative life issued forth into the active.215 
 However, in addition to the schola curriculum and academic exercises—which prepared 
them to think on their feet theologically—they also needed training in pastoral care in order to be 
able to apply their academic lessons to their preaching and hearing of confessions. Mulchahey 
demonstrates that the friars were formed as Preachers by “the oft-repeated cycle of study, hearing 
the Word of God propounded, and practice in preaching to one’s community.” 216 That is, by 
study, imitation, and practice. They consulted the relevant texts in their convent library. They 
also observed their brother preachers and practiced in their own communities before preaching 
publicly outside of the convent.  
 Until now, I have emphasized the Dominicans as Preachers because it was for preaching 
that they were founded. Hearing confessions entered the order’s history when, in 1221, Pope 
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214 Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 62. 
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216 Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’, 193. 
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Honorious III gave a general and unprecedented mandate to the Dominicans to become 
confessors. It arose from the Fourth Lateran Council explicitly allying the function of hearing 
confessions with that of preaching. However, hearing confessions quickly became a constitutive 
moment of Dominican ministry. As Boyle has demonstrated, from 1221 onward, the Dominicans 
saw their mission as one of both preaching and hearing confessions.217 The friars were readily able 
to incorporate this sacramental ministry because though formed as preachers, they were also 
formed as priests. As Humbert of Romans comments, one sows the seeds by preaching and 
gathers the fruits by hearing confessions because “a large number of those who have been affected 
by the words of a preacher will be disposed to go to confession to him…”218 Thus, hearing 
confessions was naturally and easily integrated into their ultimate aim of saving souls.  
 This ministry brings us to the third and final element of conventual education, the “collatio 
scientifica,” which prepared the friars to become confessors.219 Mulchahey posits that the best 
construal of this phrase in the early Dominican context is “an educational discussion” and that it 
is best described as a study session.220 While “collationes” changed in meaning from the monastic to 
Dominican context, and then also evolved within the Dominican context, it acquired an 
established meaning very early in the order’s history: “The collation became a forum for 
discussing the issues of Christian morality which would confront the friars as doctors of souls, a 
forum for examining sample cases of conscience such as would be brought to them in confession, 
and for staying abreast of Church law regarding the sacrament of penance and the confessor’s 
office…”221 
                                                
217 See Boyle, “The Setting of the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas.” 
218 Humbert of Romans, Treatise on Preaching, trans. Dominican Students Province of St. Joseph, ed. Walter 
M. Conlon, O.P. (Westminster: Newman Press, 1951), 116-17. 
219 See Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’, 193-203. 
220 Ibid., 194. 
221 Ibid., 198. 
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While these collations were not, strictly speaking, part of the schola curriculum, they were essential 
to the Dominican’s formation. The schola were the doctrinal backbone of their practical ministry, 
but this ministry had to be exercised and practiced, itself. This is why there were three elements to 
Dominican formation: contemplation as study, practice sermons, and collations. As Mulchahey 
writes, “If practice sermons were important as training for the preacher, collationes were important 
as training for the confessor. If the schola and its classes were monitored with care, attendance 
mandated, curriculum enforced, the collationes were also vital to the brothers’ formation.”222 The 
reason these practice sermons and collationes were so vital was because they were the milieu in 
which the fratres communes reviewed and discussed the practical theology essential to their 
apostolate. They also became familiar with the relevant pastoral handbooks during these times. 
The collation was integral to the formation of the fratres communes because it was the “academic 
exercise which brought the brothers of a Dominican community together in their common search 
for the tools which would make them better confessors and better priests.”223 
6.2.1 The Modern Sermon 
The early Dominican schools are the visible sign of the friars’ interior life of continual efforts to 
become preachers and confessors. To begin to access their interior life, itself, Mulchahey suggests 
turning to the practical texts they used and produced.224 These texts facilitate discernment of how 
Dominicans worked to make their ministry “a practical success among the people.”225 In the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, there was a wide array of materials available that had some 
applicability to the cura animarum, and Dominicans made contributions in nearly all the genres that 
existed. Mulchahey divides them into three main categories: “those which were designed in the 
first instance as preaching aids; those which had their origin in the classroom as tools for biblical 
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exegesis, but which came to be recognized as having great relevance for preaching; and manuals 
of moral theology and law intended for use by confessors.”226 
 The preaching style that began in the twelfth century reached its peak of technical 
development in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This new style had a new environment, 
and was given a new label, the sermo “modernus” (the “modern’” sermon). The modern sermon was 
closely connected to both the scholastic and mendicant worlds. The Dominicans preached 
“modern” sermons and their preaching aids were designed to help the friars reproduce the 
modern sermon. What set the modern sermon apart from the ancient manner of preaching was 
the elaboration upon a single thema—generally an individual line from scripture—rather than a 
verse-by-verse commentary.227  
 Equally constitutive of the modern sermon was the deliberate structure that underpinned 
the thema.228 The preacher introduced his theme, divided it into at least two parts (divisio), and 
made each part a separate section. Once he set forth the division of his sermon, he elaborated 
upon the various sections he devised by a process called “dilatatio”; literally “an expanding,” but 
more accurately rendered “development.”229 With few exceptions, preachers developed their 
theme by focusing upon the moral sense of scripture. As Mulchahey explains, “Their job was to 
reach the individual soul through their preaching, to convert that soul if necessary, and to lay 
before it the road which must be travelled to salvation.”230 
7. Dominican Preaching: Learning to Speak about God for the Cura Animarum 
We have thus far cast our gaze back upon the contemplative study that supports the preached 
word. We also considered the formation of the Dominican preacher and confessor, and the type 
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of sermon he preached. It is now time to follow the preached word inward as we set our sights 
upon the care of souls that this word supports. What is the relationship of the preached word to 
the interior life? How is this word related to the word conceived in study? I presently consider 
these questions from an historical perspective, and will return to address them systematically and 
methodologically when engaging Thomas’s trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology. 
 In an excellent and recent study, Wendlinder compares Thomas Aquinas and Meister 
Eckhart on their approaches to religious language in the context of their Dominican education, 
teaching, and preaching.  Specifically, she explores the complex and interdependent relationship 
between speaking about God and knowing God, which is expressed by the Dominican notion of 
“learned preaching.” In this context, Wendlinder conceives preaching as “speaking about God.” 
For the early Dominicans it was necessary to speak about God because it was the means of 
imparting knowledge necessary for salvation.231 In this project, I take up Wendlinder’s way of 
understanding preaching as “speaking about God” in the deep sense of wrestling with language 
about a God at once immanent and transcendent, and at once one and triune. In Chapters 3-6, I 
will consider speaking itself by way of Thomas’s treatment of role of the verbum in human 
understanding in general and in human faith-seeking-understanding in particular. Specifically, I 
will engage his profound reflections upon the verbum in his trinitarian anthropology and trinitarian 
theology in order to consider anew the relationship between knowing God and speaking about 
God in learned preaching, and the love animating both knowing and speaking.232  
                                                
231 Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 64. 
232 To consider the relationship between knowing God and speaking about God, I will use Lonergan’s 
functional specialization of theology. Lonergan’s work will help me think methodologically about this 
relationship in terms of the functional relationship between Systematics and Communications (the 
seventh and eighth of Lonergan’s eight functional specialties according to his method in theology). 
Specifically, I will consider the functional relationship between the psychological analogy for the Trinity 
(Systematics) and preaching about the trinitarian mystery of faith (Communications). See Bernard J.F. 
Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). First published 1972 (Great 
Britain: Darton, Longman, and Todd Ltd.). 
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 As Wendlinder expresses, “Learning to speak about God is integral to the faith journey—
on the part of both the speaker and the listener.”233 The preacher plays a pivotal role in the 
ongoing, communal process of faith. His role is a particular way of speaking about God, and he has 
a particular reason why he speaks about God. As Wendlinder writes, “the preacher’s vocation is to 
convert; the converted believer now continues her journey towards God in personal conversation 
with God and with her own questioning and contemplation—a journey that takes place together 
with other believers and in the deep silence of her own heart.”234 By way of their contemplative 
study, the early Order of Preachers drew closer to God. By way of their preaching—their religious 
language—they drew others closer to God. These drawings are interdependent, flowing both 
ways.235  
 While preaching is their mission, it is involved in a paradox. Speaking about God is at 
once an impossible task and a necessary task; something believers find themselves incapable of 
and yet drawn to irresistibly. This paradox is linked to the paradox between knowing and loving 
God that Augustine raises in his search for a trinitarian analogy—which comes first, knowledge or 
love?236 In considering Dominican preaching, the complexities surrounding speaking about God 
and the interdependent relationship between this speaking and knowing in the process of faith 
must be kept in the foreground. Preaching is anything but a mechanical, formulaic process 
because it seeks nothing short of a response of a living faith in salvific knowledge on the part of its 
hearers, which is something only God can give; the preacher is ever a secondary and instrumental 
                                                
233 Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 5. Wendlinder contrasts speaking to God 
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cause of faith (and even of natural knowledge).237 God gives the light of faith to the hearer as well 
as what Humbert calls “the grace of preaching,” which is a form of what Thomas calls gratia gratis 
data (gratuitous grace)—grace freely given to one person so she may cooperate in the justification 
of another.238 And yet, in his speaking about God, the preacher “fuels the search for God,” 
propelling the pilgrim onward on her journey to encounter God personally. We will return to this 
difficult yet necessary task in Chapter 6, once we have considered Thomas’s analogy for the 
Trinity, which at its heart is conversational. That is, it is an analogy based upon the spiritual 
processions of word and love. These processions are most like the divine processions when they 
arise in the context of a conversation about the good, thereby imitating and even participating in 
(through grace), the divine conversation about the good in which there is a Speaking, Word, and 
Listening.   
8. Conclusion 
The Dominican’s outwardly-directed mission seeks to speak about God for the care of other souls. 
Ultimately, it is speaking about God that threads together Dominican study, preaching, and the 
salvation of souls. It also illuminates the pastoral relevance of Thomas’s trinitarian theology and 
trinitarian anthropology because meaningful speaking depends upon interiorly conceived words, 
which underscores the significance of his choice of the psychological analogy in which the verbum 
(inner word) is central. There is, I argue, an intimate connection between the verbum of the 
psychological analogy for the Trinity, the divine and incarnate Verbum, and the verbum of the 
preacher. The verbum—especially in its trinitarian context in which the paradoxical relationship 
between knowing and loving comes to the fore—is also at the center of the questions Wendlinder 
                                                
237 See ST Ia, q. 117, a. 1. 
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poses about religious language (speaking to God, speaking about God, and knowing God). The 
verbum is a common feature of each of these intentional acts. 
 Attending to the role of the verbum in the interrelated areas of Thomas’s pedagogical 
concerns and pastoral-mindedness enriches the more recent scholarship on these topics. In this 
way I seek to systematically integrate the compelling advances made by historical scholarship into 
theological reflection. That is, I seek to integrate the historical research on Thomas’s role as a 
teacher and preacher-general with Thomas’s theology of teaching and preaching in the Summa, 
which I argue is informed by and connected to his trinitarian theology. Not only do the spiritual 
processions of the psychological analogy (the processions of word and love) illuminate the 
trinitarian mystery, but they also illuminate the human teacher and preacher’s participation in the 
divine economy. The divine economy, itself, establishes a trinitarian order of grace in which the 
teacher and preacher’s spiritual processions actually come to participate in the divine processions, 
such that their speaking about the triune God to others overflows from their participation in 
divine conversation. In this way, they help to further incorporate others into the divine 
conversation. 
  This chapter has sought to present the necessary background by which we can 
understand Thomas as a Dominican, that is, as a friar preacher who hands on the fruits of his 
contemplation to others. With recent historical and Thomist scholarship, I suggest that Thomas’s 
Dominican life is the primary lens through which to encounter his theology, not the university as 
previously thought. This perspective presents Thomas as a pastorally-minded theologian—a 
pedagogue, a public theologian, a teacher, and a preacher. I suggest that this perspective 
challenges us to reconsider his speculative trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology in the 
Summa theologiae—a text that was written in a Dominican studia provincialia, in response to 
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pedagogical needs, and for the Order of Preachers.239 As I proceed, I ask, How does Thomas’s life 
affect how we approach the psychological analogy for the Trinity? How does it challenge us to 
rethink the relationship between the analogy—so speculative in character—and the 
communication of this mystery of faith to the minds and hearts of believers (perhaps by 
preaching)?  
 In what remains, I explore how the Summa forms friars capable of crafting words for their 
sermons, words that can enlighten minds and warm hearts. This exploration will contribute to 
recent scholarship, which reads the Summa as a transformative text and attends to the place of 
deification in Thomas’s theology.240 I will continue this important scholarship by considering the 
relationship between “trinification” (assimilation to the Trinity) and preaching by way of the 
psychological analogy and its elucidation of the verbum, alongside the relationship between the 
verbum and love, of knowing and loving.  
 In the following chapter, I will treat the form and content of the Summa theologiae, focusing 
specifically on the ordo disciplinae (the order of learning) and arguing that Thomas’s organizational 
decisions in the Summa primarily reflect pedagogical decisions. This consideration will also include 
an exposition of the meaning of sacra doctrina, especially insofar as Thomas argues it is a scientia and 
sapientia, necessary for salvation. I will also continue the historical work by engaging the context in 
which Thomas wrote the Summa and the situations to which it responds. This historical context 
will help to substantiate my interpretation of the form and content of the Summa, and how the 
Summa can be read as a formative text for learned preaching in which one speaks meaningfully 
about God to others. 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                        
THOMAS AQUINAS, THE WISE PEDAGOGUE: THE PLAN 
AND METHOD OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 
1. Analepsis and Prolepsis 
THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRST chapter was to bring St. Thomas Aquinas to life by retrieving him 
as a friar in the Order of Preachers endeavoring to hand on the fruits of their contemplation to 
others by learning how to speak about God. The purpose of this chapter and the next is to enliven 
the Summa theologiae by retrieving it as a pedagogically- and pastorally-minded performative text 
that can be fruitfully engaged as a series of contemplative questions for the intellectual and 
spiritual formation of the Dominican. They will treat the Summa in general, where the two 
following chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) will treat the Trinity and the mixed life of the preacher, in 
particular. In support of this retrieval, I argue that the form and matter/content of the Summa 
cannot be separated without impoverishing the text. The form of the Summa has many aspects, 
including its plan and method, its style, and its genre. In this chapter, I will focus on the 
relationship of form and content by considering the plan and method of the Summa. Specifically, I 
explore Thomas’s generalized and analogical application of the Aristotelian ordo disciplinae (order 
of learning) to sacra doctrina. I argue that the ordo disciplinae is the primary motivation behind 
Thomas’s organization of the Summa. In more technical terms, the ordo disciplinae is the internal 
order of sacra doctrina and the corresponding starting point is what does not presuppose the 
understanding of anything else. Thomas makes clear in the opening prologue that the order in 
which sacra doctrina is handed on is essential to its being received. Attending to the ordo disciplinae 
illuminates the intricate relationship between the Summa’s form and content while also enlivening 
the text by underscoring its pedagogical-mindedness.  
 As we proceed, it is useful to recall the Introduction in which I gave an account of 20th 
century objections to Thomas’s trinitarian theology. Karl Rahner’s critique has been especially 
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influential. In this chapter, Rahner’s dismay over Thomas’s “starting point”1 in the Summa 
theologiae and its corresponding “forgetfulness of the economic Trinity”2 will be in the background. 
Presenting a corrective to Rahner’s interpretation is not my main concern, primarily because this 
has already been expertly done.3 This critique nevertheless provides a focal point for my efforts to 
contribute to the renewal of Thomist trinitarian theology, which I believe cannot be successfully 
accomplished apart from grasping the structure of the Summa that so perplexed Rahner.4 Thus, 
my consideration of the Summa’s plan and method in this chapter will center on the various 
starting points or principles of sacra doctrina. In turn, my effort to retrieve the ordo disciplinae involves 
me in the conversation about the plan of the Summa that M.D. Chenu began in 1939 when he 
introduced the salvation-historical dynamic of the exitus-reditus as the basic structure of the text.5 
My entire project is a prolonged effort to enrich this dynamic and demonstrate that Thomas’s 
methodology and trinitarian theology (the psychological analogy) is eminently capable of 
communicating the radical consequences of the trinitarian doctrine for Christian living. I am 
doing so by integrating the performative features of the Summa with its structural ones, focusing on 
the process of trinification in the overall movement of exitus-reditus. I begin this effort in this 
chapter. I undertake this prolonged effort to speak to both Thomas’s detractors and his supporters 
because it simultaneously responds to critiques and while also developing Thomist scholarship. 
2. Introduction 
As mentioned above, the form of the Summa includes at least its plan, method, style, and genre. 
The plan of the Summa is complex and multivalent. In general, the plan is creedal because the 
                                                
1 See Rahner, The Trinity, 14, 16-17. 
2 See Ibid., 134. 
3 See Wilkins, “Method, Order, and Analogy: Karl Rahner’s Critique of the ‘Psychological’ Approach.” 
4 See Rahner, The Trinity, 15-16. 
5 For the history of the conversation, see the Introduction to this dissertation. 
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articles faith are the first principles of sacra doctrina as scientia.6 That is, the creed provides the 
content, which the plan marshals according to other considerations. Thomas unfolds these 
principles in a way commensurate with salvation history by using the neo-Platonic exitus-reditus 
structure to facilitate an expression of a fundamental scriptural pattern in which God is freely and 
providentially the beginning and end of all things.7 However, Thomas systematically reorders the 
articles of faith into a more scientific pattern that also wisely brings the nexus of these mysteries of 
faith into relief.8 Methodologically, the Summa proceeds according to the ordo disciplinae in order to 
develop an orderly understanding of the faith (intelligentia fidei) by way of Thomas’s careful 
differentiation of the twofold mode of truth in which he distinguishes between the kinds of reasons 
available for the mysteries of faith and those available for naturally known realities. It thereby 
methodically pursues that God is and what God is not, but also uses analogies and arguments of 
fittingness (convenientia) to develop an understanding of revealed truths and their harmonious 
interrelations. Stylistically, the Summa endeavors to be as clear and as brief as the topic allows, 
while also being transparent in its intentions (a function of the prologues).9 Further, as Mongeau 
expresses, the “clarity, transparency, and spareness of the text promote an adequation of the form 
of the text to the matter of the divine mysteries,”10 which are themselves ordered by divine 
wisdom. In this way, the style of the Summa helps the faithful “imperfectly approximate the 
simplicity and comprehensiveness of the vision of which faith is a foretaste.”11  Generically, the 
                                                
6 See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 7c; a. 8c; a. 8 ad. 2. 
7 See Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas Aquinas. Also see ST Ia, q. 1, a. 3 ad. 1; a. 7c. 
8 See ST IIa-IIa, q. 1, aa. 7-8. 
9 For example, compare earlier treatments of the same topic. The Summa is often briefer than earlier works. 
This difference has led to misinterpretation, as scholars sometimes turn, for example to the Sentences or 
even the De potentia to elaborate on and interpret the trinitarian theology of the Summa theologiae, as the 
former generally treats the same topics at greater length. What this method of interpretation can overlook 
is the possibility that Thomas’s thought developed, and that this development could include brevity, 
which often accompanies clearer and more mature thinking. The brevity and clarity of the Summa is 
recognized in comparison of different texts by Thomas.  
10 Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 87. 
11 Jean-March Laporte, “Christ in Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: Peripheral Or Pervasive?” The Thomist 67 
(2003), 240. 
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Summa belongs to the medieval literary genre of the summa, which was scientific in its aspirations, 
pursuing a concise and organized explanation of the whole of a given field.12 While all these 
elements are important, the plan and method are the primary focus of this chapter. 
To contextualize the reasons for emphasizing the complementarity of form and content, on the 
one hand, and to explain the meaning and application of the ordo disciplinae in the Summa, on the 
other hand, I present a brief overview of the reception of the Summa and of Rahner’s objection to 
Thomas’s starting point, respectively. I will accentuate the now-standard negative appraisal of 
Thomas’s trinitarian theology in both instances. 
2.1 History of the (Mis)Reception and (Mis) Interpretation of the Summa  
In the history of the reception and interpretation of the Summa, the intricate ordering of the parts, 
questions, and articles has often been divorced from the content of the Summa. This divorce begins 
in the transmission of the Summa shortly after Thomas’s death, and occurs again in our 
contemporary presentations of the Summa.13 The most basic failure in its immediate reception was 
material, given the shear magnitude required of the codex. The Summa was copied as individual 
units corresponding to the Parts. However, these units were copied at different rates. The Secunda 
Secundae was copied at the highest frequency because it was deemed the most immediately useful 
part of the Summa. Soon, the Secunda Secundae was itself abridged, simplified, and alphabetized. 
This redaction (the Summa Pisana) became more popular than the Secunda Secundae itself.  Even 
                                                
12 See Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, 298-301. According to Chenu, “[I]n the XIIIth century and 
making allowance for unavoidable fluctuations in an evolution of this kind, the word summa designates a 
literary work undertaken with a threefold purpose: first, to expound, in concise and abridged manner, the 
whole of a given scientific field of knowledge (this is the original meaning of summa); second, to organize, 
beyond piecemeal analysis, the objects of this field of knowledge in a synthetic way; finally, to realize this 
aim so that the produce be adapted for teaching students” (299). 
13 See Boyle, “The Setting of the Summa”; Mark D. Jordan, “The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching – and 
Its Failures,” Contemplating Aquinas: on the Varieties of Interpretation (London: SCM, 2003). For contemporary 
examples, see Timothy S. McDermott, ed., Summa theologiae: A Concise Translation (Westminster: Christian 
Classics, 1989). McDermott produces a one-volume translation of the Summa that adapts the Summa to the 
sensibilities of the modern reader, i.e., with paragraphs and chapters, rather than articles and questions. 
For a critique of McDermott’s modern rendering, see Candler, Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction, 90-97.  
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those who defended the content of the Summa at large during the first Thomist controversies in the 
1280s often re-arranged the questions according to the order of Thomas’s first commentary on 
the Sentences.14 They disassembled the Summa, gathering his answers to questions and aligning 
them with the standard order of topics.  
 From this material limitation emerged a judgment about the relative value of practical 
theology, and what made theology practical. Theology was practical if it addressed explicitly 
practical questions such as those about virtues and vices. However, this way of proceeding was 
foreign to Thomas’s method and to his position on sacra doctrina as both a speculative and practical 
science. For Thomas, the active and contemplative lives are also interdependent, and so he 
presents the most complete Christian life as the mixed life.  
 Further complicating the Summa’s reception was the fact that the Sentences was prized as 
Europe’s theology textbook, “par excellence.”15 Thus, great care was taken to regulate its 
presentation in the Dominican schola.16 When Thomas wrote the Summa theologiae— “the next 
great theological synthesis,” after the Sentences17—the Dominicans faced a challenge so momentous 
that they called a general chapter in 1313 to formally discern how to introduce Thomas’s writings 
into the conventual curriculum. However, they did not introduce the Summa theologiae as a new 
textbook. Instead, lectors were to comment on the Sentences according to the mind of Thomas by 
using three or four of his articles per day. 18 Mulchahey hypothesizes that the Dominicans used 
both Thomas’s commentary on the Sentences and the Summa in their lectures.19 The result is again 
the separation of the content of the Summa from its form, overlooking the possibility that the 
former can only be adequately understood in the context of the latter. 
                                                
14 Jordan, “The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching,” 48. 
15 See Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’, 141. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 161. 
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 What this brief history demonstrates is that on the whole, the medieval Dominicans 
disassembled the structure of the Summa theologiae. Further, as Jordan writes, “[T]he intellectual 
reasons for Thomas’s growing importance may have depended upon such misunderstanding [of 
the curricular reform in the Summa]  –  on the supposition, say, that he was offering clear doctrinal 
and moral formulae (rather than slow or subtle dialectical sequences).”20 Thus, this divorce of 
form and content also betrays a privileging of answers, of certainty. From this perspective, what 
mattered was what Thomas said about this or that, and adding his pronouncement to the voices 
of authority. The fact that what he said had a context and was hermeneutically situated within a 
deliberate structure was not just overlooked, but rejected. 
 More recently, readers continue to mistake Thomas’s project, but for different reasons, 
which are primarily philosophical rather than theological. The nineteenth century turn to 
Thomas, under the direction of Pope Leo XIII, was polemical. The concern was to counter what 
were perceived as grave philosophical errors in the wider culture – for example, skepticism, 
relativism, modern science, and modern historiography. These emerging Neo-Thomists treated 
Thomas as an authority and considered the Summa a canonical text, segmenting it accordingly. 
They divided the text in an attempt to harness it for responses to the philosophical errors, as if 
Thomas had considered and resolved all matters sufficiently, and as if closure, completeness, and 
certainty were his intention. However, as Jordan contends “to read the Summa under this regime 
of authority conceals all the ways in which the text is an exemplar for a single act of theological 
teaching. It is to miss the Summa’s immanent pedagogical programme.”21 Further, this approach 
mistakes the style of the Summa—its brevity, clarity, and transparency—for the completeness and 
finality of a closed system, and conceives his responses not as efforts at understanding but as 
repositories of certainties somehow capable of settling all inquiries for all times.  
                                                
20 Jordan, “The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching,” 49. 
21 Ibid. 53. 
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 Where the medievals reassembled the Summa into moral manuals and so prioritized the 
Secunda Pars, the nineteenth century retrieved Thomas for philosophical reasons, and thereby gave 
primacy of place to the Prima Pars – sifting through it for its metaphysics and epistemology.22 
Historically, this division is partially responsible for the negative assessments of Thomas’s 
trinitarian theology. These assessments presumed that since the “philosophical” questions came 
before the “theological” questions, Thomas privileged the former and prioritized an ontology of 
substance (the so-called “treatise on God”) over interpersonal relations (“treatise on the Trinity”). 
Even when he “finally” considered the Trinity, this artificial division read Thomas’s trinitarian 
questions as metaphysical speculation rather than theology.23  
 There was also a penchant for treating the Summa as if it were an encyclopedia of Catholic 
philosophy and theology. As we have seen, both the immediate and more recent receptions and 
interpretations of the Summa separate form and content, which in turn neglects its pedagogical 
intention and fails to perceive the synthetic element undergirding the moving viewpoint of the 
text, a movement that is transformative when performed. This neglect results in more than 
overlooking that Thomas was a Dominican teacher with pedagogical gifts and goals; it confuses 
his entire theological project, which was an effort at understanding—not certainty—and 
specifically, explanatory and synthetic understanding. This confusion is exemplified by Capponi 
della Porrecta’s five-volume work, Elucidationes formales in Summam theologicam S. Thomae, in which he 
reduced each of the Summa theologiae’s 2,660 articles to a syllogism. Like other followers of 
Thomas, della Porrecta “wildly exaggerated” Thomas’s appeal to syllogisms.”24⁠ Attentiveness to 
                                                
22 As Jordan observes, Thomas had remained integral to theological scholarship. What was distinct in the 
19th century was the use of Thomas to combat perceived philosophical errors. 
23 For this reading, see Rahner, The Trinity; see also Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and 
Christian Life (Chicago: HarperCollins, 1991). 
24 See Denis R. Janz, “Syllogism or Paradox: Aquinas and Luther on Theological Method,” Theological 
Studies 59 (1988), 9. He is citing S. Thomae Aquinatis Angelici et V. Ecclesiae Doctoris Ordinis 
Praedicatorum Summa theologica cum elucidationibus Ven. P. Fr. Seraphini Capponi a Porrecta, 13 
vols. (Bonn, 1853). The number 2,660 is Janz’s. Also see Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas Aquinas, 
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the ordo disciplinae in light of Thomas’s position on human knowing and its influence on his 
theological method can help correct the confusion historically surrounding the Summa in general, 
and its trinitarian theology, in particular.  
2.2 Starting Points/Principles in the Summa theologiae 
In his book, The Trinity, Rahner admits bewilderment over the reasons Thomas’s “separated” his 
consideration of God into two separate “treatises,” one on the divine unity and one on the divine 
persons.25 In this respect, Thomas seems to “start” with divine essence, which Rahner interprets 
as indicative of Thomas’s privileging the divine essence at the expense of the divine persons. 
Similarly, when Thomas does treat the Trinity, he starts not with the missions (the “economic” 
Trinity) but instead with the processions (the “immanent” Trinity), which Rahner interprets as 
revealing Thomas’s preoccupation with metaphysics and psychology, over and against salvation 
history.26 Rahner considers both of these starting points (the starting point of Thomas’s theology 
in general and of his trinitarian theology in particular) to be “methodological deficiencies.”27 In 
general, Thomas’s theology isolates the Trinity. In particular, his isolated trinitarian theology 
compounds this problem by focusing on the “immanent” Trinity to the neglect of the “economic” 
Trinity. Lastly, Rahner objects to the psychological analogy on the grounds that it does not 
explain with necessity why there are processions in God, and so it fails.28 In other words, the 
analogy does not attain certainty, but only understanding, which Rahner considers a 
shortcoming. Rahner’s criticism of Thomas’s starting point (the divine essence in general and the 
divine processions in particular) as he understood it suggests that there is only one valid starting 
                                                                                                                                            
63. Chenu considers Porrecta’s presentation of the Summa in syllogisms as an act of treason against 
Thomas in particular and theology in general.  
25 See Rahner, The Trinity, 15-16. 
26 See Ibid., 119. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Karl Rahner, The Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, trans. William V. 
Dych (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2002), 134. 
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point for theology—the Father.29 However, for Thomas, there are actually a number of different 
starting points (principles) for theology, depending on what specifically theology is doing. This 
variety underscores the methodological differentiation Thomas had acquired over the course of 
the year. I will also refer to “starting points” as “principles”, where principle means the first term 
or part of something and indicates a certain order of terms/parts to each other.30 
 Rahner’s criticisms actually center on three different issues, even if he does not clearly 
explain so.31 Jeremy Wilkins offers an account of these three views: “(1) the relationship between 
systematic theology and the documents of revelation, (2) the relationship between systematic 
theology and the articles of faith, and (3) the problem of order within systematic theology.”32 In 
Thomist terms, systematic theology is roughly sacra doctrina, or better, sacra doctrina as science, and 
especially as speculative science. The documents of revelation are sacred scripture. The Articles of 
Faith are found in the Apostle’s Creed. Each problem pertains to starting points, or better, to 
different types of order. Thus, these same three issues can be understood in terms of (1) the ordo 
inventionis, or the order of the sources, or the dogmatic order (which begins from authorities and 
moves to the determination of the mysteries to be believed), (2) the methodical order of sacra 
doctrina to the Articles of Faith, and (3) the order internal to sacra doctrina, itself, namely, the ordo 
disciplinae. Further, as there are multiple orders in theology, so there are multiple problems. 
Correspondingly, there is (1) the problem of relating systematic theology to its sources, (2) the 
                                                
29 See Rahner, The Trinity, 16-17. Rahner is not alone in suggesting this starting point—which he takes to be 
the East’s starting point which the West ought to adopt. As seen in the Introduction, LaCugna shares the 
same position. Numerous contemporary theologians from Eastern Christian traditions share this position, 
too.  
30 See ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1.  
31 I am indebted to conversations with Jeremy Wilkins for this way of focusing Rahner’s critique. His article, 
“Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology,” serves as the starting point of my own thoughts 
here. I seek to elaborate upon his work in what follows, primarily by focusing on the ordo disciplinae and 
the prologues and correlating the methodological structure of the Summa with its rhetorical features.  
32 Wilkins, “Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology,” 570. 
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problem of distinguishing and ordering the various tasks theology has33, and (3) the problem of 
determining the corresponding methods and orders for each theological task, internally.34  
 Having recounted the history of the mis-reception of the Summa’s form and content and 
Rahner’s critique of Thomas’s starting point, I proceed to explain what the ordo disciplinae is, and 
how it affects the Summa’s structure. I begin by asking , How does Thomas apply the ordo disciplinae 
to sacra doctrina in the Summa? I then go into greater detail, inquiring after Thomas’s theological 
method. I ask two related questions: What made the ordo disciplinae of the Summa possible? What 
sets the ordo disciplinae apart as a theological method?  
QUESTION 1: HOW DOES THOMAS APPLY THE ORDO DISCIPLINAE IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE? 
3. The Prologues of the Summa theologiae and the Performance of the Ordo 
Disciplinae 
We have seen in the history of the Summa’s reception a tendency to segment and reorganize the 
text, which both betrayed and perpetuated a misinterpretation of the text. This tendency also 
naturally included a downplay of the significance and even a forgetfulness of its prologues. For 
example, the online Latin-English version of the Summa theologiae, supported by the Dominican 
House of Studies at The Priory of the Immaculate Conception, omits the opening prologue.35 Yet, 
Thomas includes in these very prologues his reasons for proceeding in the order he does. He also 
draws his own connections among the parts and subparts of the Summa. These reasons most often 
are those of the ordo disciplinae, indicated by the basic formula, “having considered X, it remains to 
consider Y,” where the implicated relation is both the spontaneous movement of inquiry from X 
to Y, as well as the intelligible dependence of Y on X. Nevertheless, many contemporary editions 
ignore the organizational reasons Thomas’s explicates in his prologues and impose their own 
                                                
33 See Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet IV, q. 9, a. 3. I will discuss this passage below. 
34 For Thomas, the situation was simpler than it is for us today, insofar as it was uncomplicated by historical 
critical method and the affirmation of the development of doctrine. 
35 See http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/index.html. 
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groupings and structuring of the texts. The result is that the Summa is divided into artificial 
“treatises.” Yet, a decision about how to begin a text, how to make the best first impression on 
one’s reader is a critical moment for any author and pedagogue.   
 In considering Thomas’s analogical and generalized application of the ordo disciplinae to 
sacra doctrina as its internal order, I will treat the major prologues and three key articles.36  What 
follows is a general overview of the plan/structure of both the Prima Pars and the Summa theologiae 
as a whole. The goal is to enliven the Summa as a pedagogical text in which the integration of form 
and content enriches the student’s gradual development. The remainder of this dissertation will 
treat these in more detail according to the particular consideration of Thomas’s trinitarian 
theology and trinitarian anthropology. Therein, the goal will be to continue to enliven the Summa 
as a pedagogical text, but to enrich this by drawing out its performative dimensions as a spiritual 
pedagogy, as a text for the spiritual exercise of the beginner who will one day speak about God in 
his preaching and teaching.  
3.1 The Divisio Textus and the Introduction the Summa theologiae 
Among other things, the prologue is a rhetorical device known as the divisio textus (division of the 
text), it is one of the most prevalent and important rhetorical tools Thomas uses. This division is 
directed especially to the student’s memory. Medieval education was heavily oriented toward and 
dependent upon memory. Every major part of the Summa is introduced by a prologue. Therein, 
Thomas presents what he will consider and why. As such, these prologues serve as the student’s 
guidebook. As Eschmann writes, “At every point those travellers [sic] are informed as to where 
they are and how they might pass from one hall to another.”37   
                                                
36 Ia, q. 1, a. 7; IIa-IIae, q. 1, aa. 7-8 
37 Ignatius Theodore Eschmann, “Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P., The Summary of Theology, I-II: Prologues 
and Question 1, Articles 1-8” in Ignatius Theodore Eschmann, The Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Two 
Courses, ed. Edward A. Synan (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1997): 3-158 at 10. 
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  The opening prologue is decisive for everything that follows because it gives the primary 
reason for all the subsequent divisions of the text.  Question 1 on sacra doctrina is an extension of 
this opening prologue and an introduction to the discipline of the Summa theologiae. In the opening 
prologue, Thomas explains that in this work, he will treat whatever is included in sacra doctrina and 
that he will do so according to the ordo disciplinae. In Question 1, he explains what this sacra doctrina 
is that he will hand on as a teacher of Catholic truth. The prologue to Question 2 is a companion 
to the opening prologue. As the first paragraph of this prologue makes clear, the content of sacra 
doctrina begins properly with Question 2. (I refer to the prologue to Question 2 as the “general 
prologue” because the first paragraph is really the prologue to the remainder of the Summa, not to 
Question 2.)  
 These prologues and the opening question belong together, forming a unitary 
introduction to the entire Summa and thereby decisive for everything that follows. They are what 
Eschmann calls “coordinated texts.” Where the Summa’s opening prologue gives the primary 
reason for the method of proceeding (and the intended the audience, the teacher’s aims and 
responsibilities, and the topic of this work), the general prologue lays out the plan and division of 
the content. Thus, these three – the opening prologue, Question 1, and the general prologue – 
mutually enrich one another and together, they explicate the method, content, and the plan of the 
Summa. I focus specifically on Article 7 of Question 1 because in a way, it is a culmination of the 
logic of the question, naming the object of this particular science. I first consider this introduction 
in the context of starting points, and then explain the division and plan of the Summa.  
Opening Prologue: 
Since the teacher of Catholic truth [Catholicae veritatis doctor] has not only to instruct the 
proficient [provectos debet instruere] but also to unrude beginners [incipientes erudire], according 
to the Apostle: Even as unto little ones [parvulis] in Christ I have fed you with milk and not meat (1 
Cor. 3:1-2); for this reason it is our purpose in this present work to hand on the things 
which pertain to the Christian religion in a style serviceable to the instruction of 
beginners.  
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 For we have considered that beginners [novitios] in this doctrine have been 
considerably hampered by what various authors have written, partly on account of the 
multiplication of useless questions, articles and arguments; partly, also because those 
things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of learning 
[ordinem disciplinae], but according as the plan of the book might require, or according as 
the occasion for disputation arises; partly, too, because frequent repetition brought about 
weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers.   
 Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God’s help [divini 
auxilii], to set forth whatever is included in this holy teaching [sacram doctrinam] as briefly 
and clearly as the matter itself may allow.38 
Ia, q. 1, a. 7c: 
I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between a science and its 
object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now properly 
speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things 
are referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight 
in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects of sight. But in holy 
teaching, all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God 
Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that 
God is in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the principles of this 
science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the principles and 
of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its 
principles…39 
General Prologue: 
Because the chief aim of holy teaching is to hand on knowledge of God, not only as He is 
in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of 
rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor 
to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance 
towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.40 
 I identify four principles (starting points) in these coordinated texts which are (1) the 
beginner, (2) the ordo disciplinae (3) the Articles of Faith, and (4) God. These can be considered the 
subjective principle, the pedagogical principle, the scientific-theological principle, and the 
ultimate principle, respectively. Numbers 2-4 are presently considered. In the next two chapters, I 
will consider the subjective principle in order to accentuate the performative dynamism of the 
                                                
38 ST, Ia, prol. 
39 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 7c. 
40 ST Ia, q. 2, prol.  
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text. The pedagogical principle corresponds to the internal order of sacra doctrina. The scientific-
theological principle corresponds to sacra doctrina as a subalternate science.  
 In considering God as a starting point, I mean two things. One, ultimately God is the 
starting point of any fides quarens intellectum because God is the cause of faith. God proposes things 
for our belief, and in this way is the causa cognoscendi for our knowledge of supernatural truths, 
revealed for our salvation. God also move us inwardly to assent to the things divinely proposed.41 
A trinitarian dimension ought to be observed in this divine self-communication in which Christ 
reveals the mysteries of faith in the fullness of time and the Spirit moves us to listen and assent as 
we become adopted children of the Father.42 Two, Thomas does not select God as the synthetic 
principle from which all our human knowledge could flow.43 In other words, the divine essence is 
not the synthetic principle of sacra doctrina as Thomas practices it. The divine essence is the causa 
essendi, so to speak, of all that is, but knowledge of it is disproportionate to human intelligence and 
so unavailable as a pedagogical starting point or principle of understanding. I will elaborate more 
on this point below. 
 Based on this introduction to the Summa, I suggest the following division. Notice that the 
introduction discloses a fundamental unity to the entire Summa, such that there is a sense in which 
the whole Summa is a consideration of God in which the threefold division is inscribed.44 This is 
not to deny more specific divisions of the text, but rather, to emphasize the theocentricity of the 
whole, and ultimately, its trinitarian perspective, which beautifully and seamlessly includes a 
consideration of God and God’s image, and all that the creation and recreation of this image 
entails. 
                                                
41 On the cause of faith and this twofold necessity, see ST IIa-IIae, q. 6, a. 1c.  
42 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad 4; a. 7 sc; a. 7c; Ia, q. 33, a. 3. 
43 While we cannot know the divine essence, we can “truly understand the relations of properties flowing from 
the essence, both from the connection between the mysteries and from the analogy of nature” (Lonergan, 
Verbum, CWL 2, 219). 
44 See Mongeau, “Spiritual Pedagogy,” 102. 
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Fundamental unity of the entire Summa theologiae:  
“The chief aim of holy teaching is to hand on knowledge of God [est Dei cognitionem tradere]…” 
 
GOD 
Initial Distinction Summa Second Distinction: Threefold Division Summa 
God in Godself [in se est] Ia, qq. 2-43 God [de Deo] Ia 
God as beginning and 
end [est principium 
rerum et finis earum] 
Ia, qq. 44-
119; IIa; 
IIIa 
Rational creature’s movement to God [de motu 
rationalis creaturae in Deum] 
Ia-IIae & 
IIa-IIae 
  Christ, who as human, is our way to God [via est 
nobis tendendi in Deum] 
IIIa 
Table 1 
In the next sentence of the general prologue Thomas writes: “In treating of God there will be a 
threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the divine essence; (2) Whatever 
concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from 
Him.”45 Where the first sentence explained the unity and division of the entire Summa, this 
sentence explains the division of the Prima Pars. Just as the entire Summa can in a sense be 
understood as one consideration of God, such that the threefold division is inscribed in this more 
fundamental unity, so too can the Prima Pars be understood as inscribed in the same unity. Where 
the Secunda and Tertia Pars are inscribed in this unity on account of relating to God as the end of 
all things, the Prima Pars is inscribed in this unity on account of (a) considering God in se est 
according to the divine essence and according to the distinction of persons, and (b) considering 
God as the beginning of things, that is, considering the procession of creatures from God.  
Ia, q. 2 – IIIa God 
Ia, qq. 2-43   God in se est 
 Ia, qq. 44-119   God as beginning of all things – principium rerum 
 IIa-IIIa   God as end of all things – finis earum 
    IIa The rational creature’s movement toward God 
    IIIa Christ, who as human, is our way to God 
Table 2 
 In the final sentence of the general prologue, Thomas gives the division for the 
consideration of the divine essence: “Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) 
Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is not the manner of His 
                                                
45 ST Ia, q. 2, prol. 
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existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations – namely, His knowledge, will, power.”46 In the 
prologues to Questions 3 and 14, Thomas elaborates upon this division: 
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of 
the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we 
cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering 
how God is, but rather how He is not. Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; 
(2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.47 
Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's 
operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation 
proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding 
abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the 
power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior 
effect…48 
Notice Thomas’s explanation for proceeding in this manner. Since operation naturally follows 
substance in the order of being, he now considers divine operation. Operation and substance are 
one in God, but according to the development of our concepts, it is intelligible to begin with 
substance and move on to operation. We can now elaborate upon the division of the Prima Pars: 
Ia, qq. 2-43 (God in se est) 
 Ia, qq. 2-26 (divine essence) 
  Ia, q. 2 (God’s existence – An sit?) 
  Ia, qq. 3-11 (How God is not – Quomodo non est?) 
   Ia, q. 12 (How God is known by us – Quomodo a nobis cognoscatur?) 
   Ia, q. 13 (How God is named – Quomodo nominetur?) 
  Ia, qq. 14-26 (God’s operations) 
   Ia, qq. 14-24 (immanent operations: knowing and willing) 
   Ia, q. 25 (transitive operations: power) 
   Ia, q. 26 (divine beatitude) 
 Ia, qq. 27-43 (distinction of persons) 
Ia, qq. 44-119 (procession of creatures from God)* 
Table 3 
With this basic structure in mind, we can now focus on two examples of the ordo disciplinae as the 
internal order of sacra doctrina and some of its corresponding pedagogical starting points. Herein, I 
will present one example of how Thomas introduces a solution to a problem that has ongoing 
explanatory power for subsequent problems. I will then present an example of how later parts of 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 ST Ia, q. 3, prol. 
48 ST Ia, q. 14, prol. 
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the Summa presuppose understanding what was developed in previous parts. Together, these 
examples will clarify why the Trinity and Christ are not afterthoughts for Thomas, as if he 
prioritized the divine essence over either of these mysteries of faith.  
3.2 The Essence-Existence Distinction: A Highly Fruitful Act of Understanding  
At the outset of the Summa, Thomas begins from what can be understood without presupposing 
the understanding of anything else because he seeks to teach beginners how what is said is true. As 
we have seen, this does not mean starting with the divine essence as a synthetic principle. Rather, 
he selects these considerations about God as his pedagogical starting point because grasping (a) the 
fact that we cannot understand the divine essence, and (b) the terms and relations introduced in 
the via negativa of Questions 2-11 are necessary for all that follows.49 These questions, together with 
Questions 12-13, also cultivate the methodological acuity and humility required for approaching 
the mysteries of faith.50 According to Thomas, coming to terms with the fact that we cannot 
understand the divine essence is itself a very valuable insight and even a perfection of our 
knowledge of God: “[T]he more perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand 
that He surpasses all that the mind comprehends.”51 Thus, the via negative is not devoid of meaning 
and content.  
 In the prologue to Question 3, Thomas alluded to the spontaneity of inquiry and the 
natural relation among certain kinds of questions. An sit questions lead to quid sit questions, as 
Thomas remarks in commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Having established God’s 
existence according to the ordo inventionis (beginning with things closest to our senses, like 
movement), Thomas proceeds to understand the manner in which God exists, now according to 
the ordo disciplinae. However, as more recent scholarship has demonstrated, Thomas does much 
                                                
49 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c. 
50 For the necessity of humility, see SCG 1, c. 5, §4. 
51 ST IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c. 
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more than “prove” God’s existence in Question 2. As Mongeau explains, the question is not really 
about God’s existence, for that is self-evident (to God, not us). Rather, it is about how to 
understand God’s existence, and thus, it is really “a question of moving from foolishness to 
wisdom.”52 And because, among other things, the intellectual progression from dependent 
realities to an independent reality is an arduous process, Thomas repeats this exercise five times. 
Thus, Question 2 is the beginning of an exercise in coming to terms with divine transcendence. 
Question 3 marks the beginning of attending to the reasons why independent and dependent 
realities are radically different, and so the beginning of coming to terms with the meaning of what 
everyone calls “God.” Though the ultimate reason is the unknowable divine essence, we can 
develop concepts in an orderly fashion in order to help us grasp the relationship between God and 
the world as one of non-reciprocal dependence.53 In fact, as Question 13 makes clear, that which 
makes us radically different than God is also the reason we can develop an analogical 
understanding of God: while God is the only reality in which essence and existence are identical 
(q. 3, a. 4), anything that exists participates to some degree in God’s existence (q. 4, a. 3). In 
Question 3, the student is initiated into the exercise of understanding essence and existence, and 
the corresponding terms, potency and act; matter and form. The analogous relation is that the 
former limits the latter in each pair.  
essence :: potency :: matter :: 
     existence            act 1         form54 
 
                                                
52 Mongeau, “Spiritual Pedagogy,” 105. 
53 See ST Ia, q. 13, a. 7. For thinking of Thomas’s presentation of the Creator-creation relationship and 
distinction as a relational of “non-reciprocal dependence,” see Sara Grant, Toward an Alternative Theology: 
Confessions of a Non-Dualist Christian (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002). 
54 This analogy is actually more complicated insofar as together, common matter and form make up the 
essence of a thing, such that form + common matter = essence = potency. Yet, the analogy stands insofar 
as what is most actual is most formal, and existence is the most formal of all things. See ST Ia, q. 7, a. 1c. 
Of these terms, existence is altogether unique, and so Thomas devotes considerable time to clarifying it. 
Existence is not a super-essence, but is rather isomorphic with the act of judgment, just as essence is 
isomorphic with the act of understanding. As Thomas puts it, ens is not a genus. See ST Ia, q. 3, a. 5c. 
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This exercise continues through Question 11, until Questions 12 and 13 when the student is 
brought to reflect on what all this means for his ability to know and name God. 
 Coming to terms with the fact that God’s essence is God’s existence (put negatively, that 
God is not composed of essence and existence) allows for the subsequent problems concerning the 
divine nature to be answered. For example, in dependent realities (creatures), simplicity implies 
imperfection. However, this is only because the creature is in potency in some regard. Existence is 
what makes every form actual, and it is limited by essence, but God’s essence is God’s existence. 
Therefore, there is no potency in God, which means that simplicity in God does not imply 
imperfection. And because (a) “existence is the most perfect thing of all,”55 and (b) God is pure 
existence, God is perfect. According to order of our concepts in their development, simplicity is 
the “causa essendi” for perfection and goodness. In other words, according to the genesis of 
explanatory understanding in human knowing, the essence-existence distinction does not 
presuppose understanding anything else. Instead it illuminates what follows. Thomas uses the 
essence-existence distinction of Question 3 to make his argument in Question 4. Thus, these 
terms and their systematic relationship represent a “highly fruitful acts of understanding” and can 
be considered a principle of understanding, and so a starting point for theological reflection and 
reason’s task of ministering to faith. 
 Coming to terms with divine simplicity is likewise indispensable to Questions 27-43. 
Without progressing from dependent realities to independent realities (q. 2), and without coming 
to terms with what radically differentiates them (qq. 3-11), the student cannot grasp the trinitarian 
problem. Unless the student understands the meaning of divine simplicity, confused responses to 
divine “tri-unity” arise. He will not appreciate the difficulty for understanding how this belief can 
be true, which means that the question will not spontaneously arise for him—and without good 
                                                
55 ST Ia, q. 4, a. 1 ad. 3. 
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questions, good answers are lacking. Further, he will be susceptible to compromising divine unity 
at the expense of distinction (or vice versa) or distinguishing persons apart from and prior to their 
relations.56   
 The remaining major prologues to each part elaborate upon the division set forth in the 
general prologue. Thus, as the Summa progresses, later prologues actually shed led on earlier 
divisions, much like later content sheds light on earlier content. This is because as understanding 
develops, the reasons for the divisions and their interrelations become clearer. Thus, in keeping 
with the medieval emphasis on memory, recalling earlier divisions (prologues) allows the student 
to locate later divisions (prologues) within the overall unity of the Summa. At the same time, 
returning to earlier divisions in light of later divisions deepens the relationship among the parts 
and the text as a whole. These remaining prologues, in relation to the general prologue, disclose a 
basic movement from the general to the concrete and particular, made possible by the gradual 
development of terms and relations. Yet, while later prologues develop earlier ones, the earlier 
divisions govern each newly emerging division. This movement discloses the explanatory, 
synthetic goal of the ordo disciplinae in this ongoing narrowing and underlying unity.  
3.3 The Pedagogically-Motivated Organization of the Three Parts of the Summa 
How are we to understand the Summa’s organization in light of the remaining major prologues? 
How is this organization is pedagogically motivated? Let us turn to the remaining major 
prologues of the Summa to address these questions. 
Prologue to Prima Secundae Pars 
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in 
so far as the image implies ‘an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-
movement’: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things 
                                                
56 This last element is what Schmaus identified as the trinitarian problem—is the Father Father because he 
generates? Or does he generate because he is Father? Either answer involves one in a problem—
identifying the Father with the divine essence prior to generation introduces priority into God 
(problematic given divine simplicity);  
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which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to 
treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having 
free-will and control of his actions. 
Prologue to Secunda Secundae Pars 
After a general consideration of virtues, vices, and other things pertaining to moral 
matters, it is necessary to consider each of them in particular. For universal moral 
discourse is less useful, since actions are singulars. Particular moral matters can be 
considered in two ways: first, with respect to the moral matter itself, for example, this 
virtue or that vice; secondly, with respect to the special states of men, for example, 
subjects and prelates, people in active or contemplative life, and so one for other 
differences of men. 
Therefore, first we will consider in particular everything that pertains to people of 
whatever state, secondly, what pertains to people in special states of life. 
It should first be remarked that, if we were to treat virtues, gifts, vices and 
commandments separately, we would have to say the same thing many times over. For, if 
you were adequately to treat the commandment ‘Do not commit adultery,’ you would 
have to examine adultery, which is a particular sin, and to understand it you must 
understand the opposite virtue. Therefore, it will be a briefer and quicker to treat together 
the virtue and the gift corresponding to it, along with the opposite vices and the 
affirmative and negative commandments…57 
Prologue to Tertia Pars 
Forasmuch as our Savior the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to ‘save His people from their 
sins’ (Mt. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of 
truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in 
order to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, 
and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Savior of all, and of 
the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race. 
The prologue to the Secunda Pars introduces the image-exemplar relationship into the division of 
the text. This was made possible because in the Prima Pars, Thomas developed the terms “image” 
and “exemplar,” along with their relationship.58 Now he can specify that the rational creature is 
the image of God, the exemplar. It is on account of being created to the image of God that God is 
especially the beginning and end of the rational creature of the general prologue. Thomas can 
also now expand on the rational creature’s advance toward God because as the imago Dei, this 
                                                
57 This prologue expresses value of proceeding according to the ordo disciplinae, indicating that by way of it, 
Thomas will avoid the repetition referenced in the opening prologue. 
58 See esp. ST Ia, qq. 35, 93. 
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advance will be a free advance, just as every act of God is free.59 In this way, the prologue to the 
Secunda Pars is a more particular elaboration of the earlier division. This elaboration includes the 
human person’s natural and supernatural movement toward God, who helps her through 
instruction and grace. In this way, the Secunda Pars begins to unfold the coordinated divine 
missions of Question 43 of the Prima Pars.60 It also begins to develop the threefold image in the 
human person found in Questions 33 and 93. (The human person is created to the image of God 
according to nature, grace, and glory.) 
 The Tertia Pars continues to consider God as the end, but now the focus is on Christ, the 
God-human, who as such is our way to God. Pedagogically, Thomas is moving from the general 
(IIa) to the concrete (IIIa) because to consider Christ is to consider the human person’s concrete 
means of reaching her end. Further, as the Prima Pars has made clear, the Son of God is the Image 
of the Exemplar61and so the image-exemplar relationship is further unraveled. Now, it is enriched 
by the notion of adoptive children.62 This consideration continues the human person’s 
supernatural movement toward God, now according not only to grace but also to glory through 
conformation to Christ’s suffering and death. Thus, it continues to unfold the divine missions.63  
 These major prologues enrich the general prologue as they move from the more general 
consideration of the rational creature, to the more specific consideration of the rational creature 
as image, to the concrete consideration of the Image by whom the human person reaches her 
                                                
59 See ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 3 in which Thomas explains why it is soteriologically necessary for Christians to 
know the Trinity. Knowledge of the Trinity teaches us to think rightly about creation and salvation, and 
this thinking rightly means understanding that both are free gifts. 
60 Particularly, the invisible missions of the Spirit and Son. 
61 See ST Ia, q. 35. 
62 See ST IIIa, q. 3. For example, Thomas writes, “Now the members must be conformed to their head. 
Consequently, as Christ first had grace in His soul with bodily passibility, and through the Passion 
attained to the glory of immortality, so we likewise, who are His members, are freed by His Passion from 
all debt of punishment, yet so that we first receive in our souls "the spirit of adoption of sons," whereby 
our names are written down for the inheritance of immortal glory, while we yet have a passible and 
mortal body: but afterwards, "being made conformable" to the sufferings and death of Christ, we are 
brought into immortal glory…” (IIIa, q. 49, a. 3 ad 3).  
63 Particularly the visible mission of the Son (and occasionally the visible mission of the Spirit, for example, 
at Christ’s baptism. See ST IIIa, q. 39, a. 6. 
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end. These prologues accentuate the special place of the human person in both divine providence 
and the divine economy. God is naturally present to the human person in a special mode above 
and beyond the common mode according to which God is in all things by essence, presence, and 
power. According to this special mode, God is present in the human person as the known in the 
knower and the beloved in the lover (here we speak of natural aptitude knowledge and love of 
God).64 God is also supernaturally present to the human person through sanctifying grace, 
elevating human nature and thereby indwelling the human person such that he freely knows God 
truly and loves God rightly (here we speak of supernatural actual and habitual, but imperfect, 
knowledge and love of God).65 This supernatural presence is fulfilled through the human person’s 
glorification in Christ (here we speak of perfect knowledge and love of God).66  Human 
participation is above and beyond the common metaphysical participation of every creature, and 
even above her own native capacities. Any account of the plan of the Summa needs to take this 
special personal participation—that is, deification (or really, trinification)—into account: 
Ia, q. 2 – IIIa God, the exemplar 
Ia, qq. 2-43   Exemplar in se est 
 Ia, qq. 44-119   Exemplar as beginning of all things – principium rerum 
 IIa-IIIa   Exemplar as end of all things – finis earum 
 IIa    The imago Dei, an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self 
  movement’, who as such is the principle of his actions 
 IIIa   Christ, the Imago Dei, by whom we attain eternal bliss through  
  resurrection 
Table 4 
 This organization is pedagogically motivated. Appreciating this will allay any suspicions 
that Christ is an afterthought in Thomas’s theological plan. Not only does Thomas maintain that 
Christ is the consummation of theology, but according to the ordo disciplinae, it is intelligible that 
Christ, the God-human, would come after considering divine and human nature, divine and 
                                                
64 See ST Ia, q. 8, a. 3; q. 93, a. 4c. 
65 See ST Ia, q. 38, a. 1. 
66 For this threefold distinction, see ST Ia, q. 93, a. 4c. For the indwelling and the human person’s 
participation in the very processions of divine Word and Love, see ST Ia, q. 43, a. 3; q. 38. For a similar 
explanation of the trinitarian dynamism of the Summa, see Torrell, Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master, vol. 2, 
25-226. However, Torrell does not connect this trinitarian aspect with the Summa’s plan.  
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human freedom, and grace and freedom. In the Prima Pars, Thomas treats the divine nature and 
human nature. In the Prima Secundae Pars and Secunda Secundae Pars, Thomas further discusses 
humankind. However, now the emphasis is human freedom—free acts—and to understand 
human freedom presupposes understanding human nature (operation follows substance). Herein, 
Thomas treats of the relationship between grace (which can be discussed now that the divine 
nature has been treated) and freedom. In the Tertia Pars, Thomas turns to the Incarnation. The 
Incarnation is considered third because understanding it presupposes understanding divinity and 
humanity. Divinity was covered in the Prima Pars and humanity was covered in the first two parts. 
Furthermore, understanding Christ’s humanity presupposes understanding both human nature 
and human freedom. Lastly, understanding that the Incarnation occurred and the effects of 
Christ’s passion and resurrection presupposes understanding grace.  
 It is also necessary to develop the student’s theological method and ability to make 
methodological differentiations before considering Christ. Why? Because the radical contingency 
yet mysterious fittingness of the Incarnation and Christ’s suffering on the Cross can only be 
understood once the divine nature and divine freedom have been understood (as far as possible). 
In other words, the Incarnation and crucifixion, as Thomas understands them, are contingently 
predicated of God. They are not necessary mysteries, like the Trinity is. And so there are no 
necessary reasons for the Incarnation and crucifixion, but only fitting reasons (arguments of 
convenientia). While there are “necessary reasons,” so to speak, for the Trinity, these remain 
disproportionate to our human mode of knowing.67 Similarly, the fitting reasons are grounded in 
divine wisdom, which is freely operative in itself and unsearchable to us in this life. Thus, 
pedagogically speaking, the student must continually be exercised in Thomas’s methodological 
differentiations in order to grasp his christology in the Tertia Pars. Further, Thomas insists that 
                                                
67 See below, §4. Sacra Doctrina 
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knowledge of the Trinity is necessary for the believer to be able to think correctly about salvation, 
which means appreciating it as a radical gift, and so contingent.68 Lastly, because Thomas 
understands the divine missions as the divine processions with created terms, it is only after 
coming to an analogical understanding of the divine processions that the meaning of the missions 
can be worked out and integrated with the lives of grace and glory. In this way, the explanatory 
power of the psychological analogy is not limited to Question 27 or even to Questions 27-43, but 
extends throughout the Summa, as in a theology that appreciates the fitting connections between 
missions and processions. 
 Thus, quite contrary to the concerns that the Incarnation is an afterthought in St. 
Thomas, it is actually central. It is treated in the Tertia Pars because in order to understand the 
hypostatic union, we must first understand divinity, humanity, and grace. Wisdom itself is central 
to this entire ordering. Wisdom judges and orders.69 These activities move us toward a single 
view, such that we distantly approach the way God understands. The centrality of wisdom makes 
the Tertia Pars doubly significant, for there we have the Incarnation of Wisdom itself, restoring the 
divine ordering of the universe. 
The true depth of Thomas’s thought arises when we consider how he integrated the ordo disciplinae 
with salvation history. He orders the material pedagogically, selecting a universal starting point 
and proceeding according to the needs of the student. Yet, he also gives voice to God’s 
involvement with human history, not by proceeding chronologically, but by accentuating the 
divine wisdom and goodness holding creation and redemption together in one single and simple 
view. Thomas explains salvation history in its concrete unfolding in the human person and in the 
common good of the human community. If we turn to the role the Articles of Faith play in 
                                                
68 ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad. 3. 
69 See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 6c. 
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Thomas’s plan for the Summa, we can see how he integrates the pedagogical organization of the 
Summa with the dynamism of salvation history.  
 Historically, many medieval theologians identified the Articles of Faith as first principles. 
However, the lists and numbers of Articles were as diverse as the theologians using them, as was 
their systematic exposition. The term, “Articles of Faith,” arose in the theology of the twelfth 
century, and became a topic of consideration at the beginning of the thirteenth century.70 The 
Articles’ emergence began with the Apostles’ Creed, but soon the emphasis shifted from the 
apostolic authorship of the Articles to their theological content.71 Theologians began enumerating 
their own lists of Articles, which included either twelve or fourteen Articles divided into two equal 
sets. Though these lists varied, thirteenth-century theologians understood the Articles to represent 
the irreducible elements of faith, which is why they functioned like the first and indemonstrable 
principles of other sciences.72 This development of thinking about belief in terms of “articles” in 
the Middle Ages has been an overlooked as an aspect of the historical development of theology as 
science. As Goering claims, “these articles are central to the medieval claim for a scientific status, 
indeed the highest scientific status, for theology.”73 This status is on account of how powerful and 
probative the Articles are for shedding light on reality. Let us now turn to Thomas’s own mature 
use of the Articles of Faith in relation to sacra doctrina. Coordinated with the prologues to the three 
parts and the aforementioned introduction is Question 1 of the Secunda Secundae, Articles 7 and 8. 
These Articles specify Article 7 of Question of the Prima Pars in which Thomas identified the 
Articles of Faith as the first principles of sacra doctrina.  
                                                
70 Joseph Goering, “Christ in Dominican Catechesis: The Articles of Faith,” in Christ among the Medieval 
Dominicans, 127. 
71 Ibid., 128-29. 
72 See ibid., 133. For Thomas explanation of this point, see ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, aa. 7-8. I will discuss these 
articles below when considering the structure or plan of the Summa.  
73 Goering, “Christ in Dominican Catechesis,” 133. 
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IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7c 
The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident 
principles to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain 
order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to 
their first principle…In like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain 
primary matters of faith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation 
of man, according to Heb. 11: ‘He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a 
rewarder to them that seek Him.’ For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in 
God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things 
which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness… 
IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 8c 
[T]o faith those things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal 
life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Two things are proposed to us to be seen in 
eternal life: the secret of the Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of 
Christ's Incarnation, ‘by Whom we have access’ to the glory of the sons of God, according to 
Rm. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): ‘This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, 
the…true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.’ Wherefore the first distinction in 
matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the 
mystery of Christ's human nature, which is the ‘mystery of godliness’ (1 Tim. 3:16)… 
 Thomas makes two important points in his enumeration of the Articles of Faith into two 
sets. One, the Articles fit together harmoniously as do the parts of a whole.74 Two, a certain order 
obtains among the Articles of Faith, just like in the sciences, and so some Articles implicitly 
contain the others.75 This means that the Articles can be systematically reordered. The theologian 
operating with the goal of understanding has a corresponding twofold task. He must manifest the 
harmony among the Articles. He must also select the most general Articles, that is, the ones that 
implicitly contain the others. This generality is the necessary pedagogical starting point for a 
beginner. Together, these tasks generate an explanatory, synthetic understanding. They also 
cultivate an appreciation of divine wisdom and goodness because the intelligible nexus of the 
mysteries discloses the fittingness of God’s free involvement in human history. 
 Where the Articles of Faith are the principles of sacra doctrina in its subalteration to the 
science of God and the blessed, the selection of the most general of these is the internal starting 
                                                
74 ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 6c. 
75 ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7c. 
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point (principle) of sacra doctrina because the most general is the most pedagogically effective 
starting point. This Question specifies that there is a twofold principle, enumerated most generally 
by Hebrews: God exists and is providential. Thomas explains that he takes this principle in the 
most robust sense (not as the preambles of faith) such that they include all that exists in God 
eternally and all that God dispenses in time for our salvation.  This same twofold principle is 
expressed more concretely by John: that we may know the Father (that is, the majesty of the 
Godhead) and Jesus Christ, whom the Father has sent (that is, the mystery of the Incarnation). As 
noted above, the Articles of Faith are based on the Apostles’ Creed: 
I believe in (1) God, (2) 
the Father almighty, 
(3) creator of heaven and 
earth. 
 
I believe in (4) Jesus Christ, God’s 
only Son, our Lord,  
(5)who was conceived by the Holy 
Spirit, 
(6) born of the Virgin Mary, 
(7) suffered under Pontius Pilate, 
was crucified, died, and was 
buried; 
(8) he descended into hell. 
(9) On the third day he rose again; 
(10) he ascended into heaven, 
he is seated at the right hand of the 
Father,  
(11) and he will come to judge the 
living and the dead. 
I believe in the (12) Holy Spirit, 
(13) the holy catholic and 
apostolic Church, the 
communion of saints, the 
forgiveness of sins, 
(14) the resurrection of the 
body, and the life 
everlasting. Amen. 
Table 5 
Thomas systematically re-orders these creedal proposition as follows: 
Majesty of the Godhead Mystery of Christ’s Incarnation 
Unity of Godhead (1 Article) Incarnation/Conception 
Trinity of Persons (3 Articles) Virginal birth 
Works proper to Godhead: Passion, death, and burial 
- order of nature (Article on creation) Descent into hell 
- order of grace (Article on sanctification) Resurrection 
- order of glory (Article on resurrection and life 
everlasting, or in other words, reward) 
Ascension 
Judgment 
Table 6 
Thomas plans the Summa around these two creedal principles. The first pertains to God and is the 
most universal. The second pertains to Christ and is the most particular and concrete. The 
movement of the Summa is both a movement from the simpler to the more complex and from 
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general to concrete. In both ways, the student of the Summa progress toward understanding 
Christ. Based on the introduction, prologues and IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 8, we find the following 
systematic reorganization of the Articles of Faith: 
  Chapter 2 – Page 99 
Article of Faith Prologue Wording Place in Summa 
Majesty of Godhead 
(Articles 1-4, and 12-
14) 
God in se est and as principium rerum et finis earum Ia, IIa and IIIa 
(wherever the question on 
the work of glory would 
have begun – after 
sacraments) 
Unity of Godhead  (A. 1) God in se est (essence) Ia, qq. 2-26 
Trinity of Persons (AA. 2, 
4, 12) 
God in se est (distinction) Ia, qq. 27-43 
Work of Nature (A. 3) God as principium rerum  Ia, qq. 44-119 
Work of Grace (A. 13) [and 
more on human nature] 
God as finis earum and Human as imago IIa  
Mystery of Incarnation 
(Articles 5-11) 
Christ, qui quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum 
(Ia, q. 2, prol);, and of the benefits bestowed by 
Him on the human race (IIIa, prol.) 
IIIa 
Incarnation (A. 5) the mystery of the incarnation, itself IIIa, qq. 1-26 
 Things suffered and done by the Savior, God 
Incarnate 
(IIIa, qq. 27-59) 
Conception, Virginal birth 
(AA. 5-6) 
- Those things that relate to his coming into this 
world 
IIIa, qq. 27-39 
Incarnation (again, A. 5) - Those things that relate to the course of his life 
in this world 
IIIa, qq. 40-45 
Passion, death, burial and 
Descent into hell (AA. 7-8) 
- His departure from the world IIIa, qq. 46-52 
Resurrection and 
Ascension (AA. 9-10) 
- His exaltation after this life IIIa, qq. 53-59 
Judgment (A. 11) “It will be more suitable to consider the 
execution of the Last Judgment when we treat 
of things pertaining to the end of the world” 
(IIIa, qq. 59, prol.) 
IIIa, qq. 58-59 (power of 
judgment) and qq. ?76  
(execution of judgment) 
Majesty Godhead 
(Article 14) 
God as finis earum  
Work of Glory (A. 14)  “things pertaining to the end of the world” IIIa, qq.? after 
sacraments (qq. 60-?) and 
after Christ’s judgment 
Table 7 
                                                
76 Thomas also considers the sacraments in the Tertia Pars. Though we do not know how the Summa ends, 
since it remained unfinished at his death, if we look to the final prologue before his sacramental theology, 
we can gather that he would have returned to Christ after the sacraments, considering lastly the last 
judgment. This is consistent with the exitus-reditus pattern and salvation-historical dynamic that Chenu 
finds in the Summa. Of the placement of glory within his plan, Thomas writes: “We have now to consider 
Christ's judiciary power. Under this head there are six points of inquiry… It will be more suitable to 
consider the execution of the Last Judgment when we treat of things pertaining to the end of the world. 
For the present it will be enough to touch on those points that concern Christ's dignity” ST IIIa, q. 59, 
prol. 
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As Laporte underscores, Thomas deviates from the narrative of the Creed, except he concludes 
(intended to conclude) the Summa with the work of glory instead of following the systematic order 
he enumerated.77  
QUESTION 2: WHAT MAKES THE ORDO DISCIPLINAE OF THE SUMMA POSSIBLE? 
Having considered the pedagogical ordering of the Summa in relation its overall creedal plan, I 
now consider Thomas’s theological method and the important of his methodological 
differentiations therein by treating sacra doctrina and the ordo disciplinae in greater detail. This 
consideration further specifies Thomas’s pedagogy by attending to his explicit goals in handing on 
sacra doctrina according to the ordo disciplinae. 
4. Sacra Doctrina  
In the final sentence of the opening prologue, Thomas commits himself, as a teacher of Catholic 
truth, to set forth sacra doctrina as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow. He then 
immediately proceeds to elaborate upon the meaning of sacra doctrina in Question 1. I take up the 
suggestion of Bauerschmidt that the best English translation of “sacra doctrina” is “holy teaching” 
because “it refers less to a body of information than it does to a process of instruction, by which 
God’s own knowledge is shared with human beings in order to lead them to blessedness.”78 
Thomas begins by inquiring after the reason for divine instruction. According to Thomas, holy 
teaching is necessary for our salvation, which is the reason for its existence.79 Thomas considers 
the necessity of holy teaching again in the trinitarian questions. Therein, he explains why it is 
necessary, in particular, to have knowledge of the divine persons: this knowledge permits us to 
think rightly concerning creation and salvation because it teaches us to approach them as gifts.80 
                                                
77 In the Compendium theologiae, Thomas did follow the systematic ordering, treating the work of glory first 
and then Christ.  
78 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 46. 
79 See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 1c. 
80 See ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1, ad. 3. 
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Throughout the Summa, holy teaching carries this soteriological purpose, which amounts to 
understanding something of our ultimate end—the triune God—so that we may direct our lives 
accordingly.  
 Holy teaching is primarily speculative because its ultimate end is the beatific vision. 
Though contemplation is not technically the same as speculation, Thomas generally uses 
speculativivus and contemplativius as basically equivalent.81 This is why Torrell suggests considering 
sacra doctrina as scientia as “contemplative knowing.”82 Dominican education exemplified the value 
of seeking to know God in order to speak about God. Thomas is even more radical in this regard 
than his fellow Dominicans. Where his contemporaries construed sacra doctrina primarily in terms 
of a practical rather than speculative science, Thomas framed the Dominican pastoral and 
practical curriculum within the whole of theology.83  
 We perhaps must stretch ourselves a bit to grasp the relevance of sacra doctrina as 
speculative science for Dominican ministry. Yet, this stretch is valuable. Dominic Doyle writes, 
“While Aquinas’s theoretical mode of presentation is sometimes criticized for abstracting from 
concrete personal experience, such a conceptually driven account can, in Bernard Lonergan’s 
terms, be an enriching abstraction that answers questions of intelligibility and coherence that 
naturally arise for reflective believers.”84 Thomas’s epistemology and anthropology, which affirm 
a natural desire to know God and the human person’s creation to the image of God, underscore 
                                                
81 Gilles Emery summarizes Pinckaers, explaining that Thomas usually uses speculativius in his works inspired 
by Aristotle, while he reserves contemplativus for his works that draw on Christian sources. See Gilles 
Emery, “Trinitarian Theology as Spiritual Exercise in Augustine and Aquinas,” in Aquinas the Augustinian, 
eds. Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2007), 18, fn. 107. 
82 Jean-Pierre Torrell, “Le savoir théologique chez saint Thomas,” Revue Thomiste  96, no. 3 (1996), 369, as 
cited in Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 66. 
83 Jordan, “The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching,” 43. Also see Eschmann, “Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
O.P., the Summary of Theology,” 3-6. 
84 Dominic Doyle, “Changing Hopes: The Theological Virtue of Hope in Thomas Aquinas, John of the 
Cross, and Karl Rahner,” Irish Theological Quarterly 77, no. 1 (2011), 22. 
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the value of ministering in response to these questions.85 It was precisely the exigencies of the 
Preachers’ ministry that demanded they have clear definitions and explanations of the mysteries 
of faith, especially concerning the virtues but also including the trinitarian mystery. For Thomas, 
this exigency was best met by elaborating holy teaching scientifically, according to the ordo 
disciplinae. 
 Given that sacra doctrina is necessary for salvation, it is distinct from theology, strictly 
speaking, lest we be in the unfortunate position of all having to become theologians. Mongeau 
helpfully draws attention to the distinction between sacra doctrina and revelation, which is not the 
distinction between two separate bodies of knowledge, for example, theology and scripture. 
Rather, according to Thomas, divine revelation refers to God’s act of revealing or the act of 
causing human persons to know what naturally they could not. Sacra doctrina corresponds to this 
divine act, for it is the result of revelation: “We can say, then, that sacra doctrina is human 
participation, in all its forms, in God’s act of revealing.”86  
 Lastly, I follow Torrell in distinguishing between the objective and active meanings of 
sacra doctrina: 
In its objective meaning (‘what’ is taught), it initially applies to Christian truth as a body 
of doctrine, and doctrine in a wide sense that runs from Scripture to theology. In its active 
meaning (the act of teaching) doctrina suggests every activity through which Christian truth 
comes to us: God’s instruction, made known through revelation, Tradition, Church 
teaching, theological training.87  
These activities on the part of believers are participations in Christ’s teaching activity, and as 
such, they further assimilate the believer to the imago Dei. As I proceed in this chapter and the 
next, I keep Torrell’s distinction in mind, but emphasize the active dimension. In this regard, I 
take up Mongeau’s characterization of sacra doctrina: “a complex reality that holds together an 
                                                
85 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c.  
86 Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 16-17. Mongeau uses Donneaud’s work as the basis of his distinction 
between theology and sacra doctrina, illuminated by the relationship between revelation and sacra doctrina. 
87 Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master, Volume 2, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 2. 
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objective dimension, namely the content that is taught, and an active dimension, namely the 
various practices and tasks of the teacher who transmits the teaching.” With Mongeau, I seek to 
develop the active dimension of sacra doctrina as the “pedagogical praxis of the wise teacher 
transmitting what he or she has received from God,”88 contemplata aliis tradere. 
4.1 Sacra Doctrina as Scientia 
Immediately following his establishment of the salvific necessity of sacra doctrina, Thomas asks 
whether it is a science. This question was customary at the time, as was an affirmative answer. 
How holy teaching was a science, however, was something about which many theologians 
disagreed. Aquinas scholars continue to offer varied interpretations of what has historically 
proven to be quite an enigmatic question. Some scholars are concerned to argue that the sacra 
doctrina of the Summa theologiae is an Aristotelian science – even though subalternate – in the strict 
sense of the term.89 However, I find it more accurate to affirm that Thomas uses scientia 
analogously in the Summa, and that what he accomplishes is an expansion of Aristotelian science 
to make room for the Augustinian crede ut intelligere (believe that you may understand).90 My 
intention is to shed light on why Thomas was so concerned to construe holy teaching as a science, 
which has to do with what science could offer this fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking 
understanding). This will begin to become clear in this section, and it will receive further 
elaboration when we consider Thomas’s theological method. Presently, I consider Thomas’s 
reason for affirming that the discipline of holy teaching is scientific, namely, because it is a 
subalternate science: 
Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. 
There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of 
                                                
88 Mongeau, “The Spiritual Pedagogy of the Summa,” 91-92 
89 Eugene Rogers, whose scholarship I use below seems to posit that the sacra doctrina of the Summa is an 
Aristotelian science, strictly speaking. However, his concern is far wider than proving this, and he is most 
committed to demonstrating how thoroughly theological (rather than philosophical) Thomas is.  
90 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 221. 
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intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed 
from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective 
proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established 
by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles 
established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. 
Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the 
mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.91 
 As a subalternate science, sacra doctrina borrows it principles from a higher science, 
namely, the science of God and the blessed. Divine science includes understanding the reason for 
(cause of) everything, which is the divine essence, which is identical with God’s unrestricted act of 
understanding.92 The first principles of sacra doctrina and the first principles of God’s science are 
not identical, just as the first principles of optics are not identical to those of geometry. Rather, the 
former are derived from the latter. Does this borrowing of first principles compromise the 
scientific character of sacra doctrina? It depends on a few things: (1) how we understand the 
relationship between first principles and the science that proceeds from them, (2) the relevance of 
whether the subalternate scientist has the possibility of knowing the principles from which her 
principles are derived, and (3) what Thomas intends to gain from construing sacra doctrina as a 
science. Ultimately, as a subalternate science, sacra doctrina has both possibilities and limitations. 
Working this out contributed to the possibility of the ordo disciplinae of the Summa because it 
specified just what theological science could accomplish. I begin with the relationship between 
science and its first principles.  
 Eugene Rogers suggests that Thomas came to understand that what makes a discipline 
scientific in the Aristotelian sense is its procession from its first principles. That is, the more it 
proceeds from first principles (procedere ex principiis), the more scientific it is.93 This procession from 
                                                
91 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 2c. 
92 See ST Ia, q. 14, a. 4c. 
93 According to Rogers, this phrase appears about six times in the first question. For a more nuanced 
interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of science, see Patrick H. Byrne, Analysis and Science in Aristotle 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1997). Byrne argues that Aristotle’s understanding of science includes both 
knowing a demonstration and knowing an indemonstrable principle. 
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principles can mean two things, either proceeding as in a deductive chain of links or proceeding 
as in the development of understanding bringing new things to light. In the Summa, Thomas 
emphasized the second of these as what makes a discipline scientific because he recognized that:  
real first principles can relate to each other, without their relation depending on our 
knowledge of it…Scientific character now proceeds from first principles not on account of the 
(discursive) linkages they boast with a higher science, but on account of the (principial) light 
they shed, even if it lies beyond us.94 
The light first principles shed is that if one knows (or believes) the principle, then one knows 
reason why (the cause) because the principle is the reason. This recognition of what makes a 
discipline scientific helped Thomas to construe holy teaching as science. Though it borrows its 
first principles from divine science and is therefore a subalternate science, holy teaching is 
scientific because these principles shed a distinct (and ultimate) light on matters of faith and 
reason alike. As Jean-Marc Laporte explains, knowledge is the more scientific the more powerful 
and probative its principles are: “Because the principles of sacra doctrina derive from more certain 
and more comprehensive knowledge, that of God, this science differs from the sciences known to 
Aristotle not as a deficient instance but as a higher realization.”95 The principles of sacra doctrina 
are the most powerful and probative principles there are. They explain the “why” (science as 
knowing the reason why) of our universe and history with greater depth and breadth than any 
other principle.96 Thus, from one perspective, it is irrelevant whether first principles are borrowed 
or self-evident because it is their ability to illuminate the object of the discipline that counts.97 
When Thomas affirms in the Summa that a science proceeds from first principles, he is affirming 
                                                
94 Eugene Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 27 (emphases original). Rogers is here following Michel Corbin 
in recognizing that Thomas developed in his understanding of Aristotelian science. 
95 Laporte, “Christ in the Summa,” 241. See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 5. 
96 For example, ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 in which Thomas considers the explanatory power of the revelation of the 
Trinity. 
97 Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 77. 
  Chapter 2 – Page 106 
the science’s “deep connectedness with a concrete object that gives rise to it.”98 Sacra doctrina 
shares this with other subalaternate sciences, which also draw their arguments and their probative 
force from the higher science. This ability to probe is what Thomas came to emphasize in the 
Summa. Working out this possibility was one of the factors contributing to the success of the ordo 
disciplinae. Understanding the application of one’s first principles helps one order them. 
 It also useful to note that the very fact that there are identifiable first principles (starting 
points) for sacra doctrina is an aspect of what makes it scientific. Sacra doctrina, once free from the 
restrictions of the commentary tradition in which the theologian was locked into the order of the 
text (sacred scripture and Lombard’s Sentences, for example), could be organized around a set of 
first principles and consequently, presented in an orderly manner.  
 Earlier, we saw that in Articles 7 and 8 of Question 1 on sacra doctrina, Thomas identifies 
the Articles of Faith are the first principles of sacra doctrina. This identification pertains to the 
methodical order of sacra doctrina to the Articles of Faith.99 As a subalternate science, sacra doctrina’s 
starting point is the Articles of Faith, and the relevant order is its subalternation to the science of 
God and the blessed. There is also the relationship between the Articles of Faith and its sources, 
and the order of the sources themselves. Thomas points to sacred scripture as the source of the 
Articles.100 In the Secunda Secundae, in the question on the theological virtue of faith, Thomas 
explains why it was necessary for the truths of faith to be collected and organized into Articles. 
Notice the reason is because it was necessary for our salvation, harkening back to Question 1: 
The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expression, 
and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one 
needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require to know the truth of faith, 
                                                
98 Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 24-5. 
99 See above, §2.2 Starting Points/Principles in the Summa theologiae. 
100 Again, the relationship between theological understanding and the documents of revelation was less 
complicated for Thomas than for us, since the historical critical method had not been developed, which 
now largely mediates these documents to systematic theology. As Wilkins explains, the documents of 
revelation had an immediate application to systematic theology for Thomas. See Wilkins, “Method, 
Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology,” 570. 
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many of whom have no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to 
gather together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the 
belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.101 
There is also the relationship of scripture (and so the Articles of Faith) to the incarnation of the 
Word, and so the revelation of the Son, and through the Son, the Father and the Spirit. As 
Goering explains, in addition to thirteenth-century theologians’ agreement that the Articles 
represent the irreducible elements of the faith, they also believed the Articles were divinely 
revealed, and therefore a part of sacra doctrina.102  
 In Aristotelian scientific terms, Rogers explains that first principles take both 
propositional and real forms because first principles are not only the propositions of science, but 
also the real forms of real things: “First principles pervade everything that is. For that reason it is 
no paradox for Aristotle to locate first principles indifferently in two places that we moderns tend 
to regard as poles apart: in the mind103 and in things in the world.”104 In sacra doctrina scripture 
and the Articles are the propositional first principles, but as Thomas writes, “the act of the 
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing.”105 Later, in the same question on the 
object of faith, Thomas identifies these terminal things, which we will see in eternal life and by 
                                                
101 ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 9, ad. 1 (emphasis added). 
102 Goering, “Christ in Dominican Catechesis,” 133. 
103 As Byrne explains, according to Aristotle, nous (i.e., the intellectual habit) is the principle of principles. 
See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 100b16 in The Complete Works of Aristotle, the Revised Oxford Translation, 
Two Volumes, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995). Henceforth APo. All 
citations from Aristotle’s work are from this two volume series. I am indebted to Byrne for this comment 
and reference.  
104 Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 21. Perhaps the following is helpful: “The inner principles or forms 
[of actually existing things] are sources of intelligibility or enjoy intelligibility in themselves, whether 
anybody notices it or not. The corresponding first principles, therefore, found sciences, whether anybody 
practices them or not,” 23. Because the principles of already existing things and of science are the same, 
just in different guises, intelligibility also exists in itself apart from us, and so something can be more 
knowable in itself, but less knowable to us.  
105 ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 2 ad. 2. Thomas implies this Aristotelian relationship between propositional and real 
first principles in this reply. He continues, For as in science we do not form propositions, except in order 
to have knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith,” 
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which we are brought to that destination: the secret of the Godhead and the mystery of Christ’s 
humanity.106 
 Rogers suggests that Jesus Christ is the real first principle, for he is the concrete reality 
that has given rise to the science of sacra doctrina. This is why Rogers argues that the more 
christoform sacra doctrina is, the more Aristotelian it is.107 The real first principle also means the 
triune God, insofar as the entire Trinity decided from eternity to communicate Godself to us.108 
We have seen that in the prologue to the Tertia Pars, Thomas identifies Christ as the 
“consummation of theology” and as the one who brings us to our final destination by showing us 
the truth: 
Forasmuch as our Savior the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to ‘save His people from their 
sins’ (Mt. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of 
truth [viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstravit], whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal 
life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology [ad 
consummationem totius theologici negotii], that after considering the last end of human life, and 
the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Savior of all, and of the 
benefits bestowed by Him on the human race…109 
As Rogers expresses it, referring to this prologue, “The incarnation makes the Word not just a 
ratio of God, but a via into God. It makes the word not just the ratio of the First Truth, but a 
rational demonstration of the truth that we cannot see.”110 In a word, Christ reveals his Father and 
their Spirit, thereby revealing God’s very self. When considering Christ’s teaching activity, 
Thomas explains that the Word is the “demonstration of the Father.”111 In other words, Jesus 
Christ is God’s strongest argument, so to speak, stronger than any philosopher or theologian 
could make for God’s existence and providence. He is the most fitting instance of visible things 
demonstrating invisible things, and it was to demonstrate the invisible things of God that the 
                                                
106 ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 8c.  
107 See Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 17. 
108 I will expand on this below when considering the order of discovery and revelation.  
109 ST IIIa, prol. Also see ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad 4. 
110 Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 61. For Thomas’s many uses of demonstration in this scientific 
sense with respect to Christ, see Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 62-3. 
111 See ST IIIa, q. 42, a. 6, ad 2.  
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world was created.112 When considering the object of faith, Thomas recalls that conclusions can 
only be known through demonstrations.113 As the demonstration, Christ reveals conclusions we 
would otherwise never know about the mystery of the Godhead and our salvation. Having 
considered the meaning of sacra doctrina, specifically its starting points as ordered subalternately to 
the science of God and blessed, I now turn to three of the underlying factors that made possible 
Thomas’s generalized and analogous application of the ordo disciplinae to sacra doctrina.  
5. The Mode of Human Knowing in Aristotelian Science and Thomist Theology 
Where the subalternation of sacra doctrina to divine science was a first step in Thomas’ response to 
the problem of the order between sacra doctrina and its sources, there was also the problem of the 
internal order of sacra doctrina. Two distinctions helped Thomas respond to this internal problem. 
Following Aristotle, he distinguished between two methods, the ordo inventionis (the order of 
discovery) and the ordo disciplinae.114 Following Phillip the Chancellor, he systematically 
distinguished between the natural and the supernatural orders. In order to come to terms with 
these two distinctions, we have to first differentiate between the twofold operations of human 
knowing, namely, the act of direct understanding and of reflective understanding.  
 In this section, I will focus on the ordo disciplinae’s relationship to Aristotelian science, and 
analogously, to Thomas’s mature theological method. This will include (a) the two goals of 
Aristotelian science, (b) their corresponding methods, and (c) the foundations of these goals and 
methods in the twofold operations of the human mind. Herein, we will see how the starting point 
changes with goal and method.  Where the previous section addressed how Thomas construed 
                                                
112 See ST IIIa, q. 1, a. 1c. 
113 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 3c. 
114 For Aristotle’s distinction, see APo. I.13.75a14; Metaphysics 1.1.98a30: Nicomachean Ethics 3.3.1112b18-20. 
For the insight concerning the significance of this distinction for Thomas’s theological method, see 
Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 191-221; ibid., The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 7-123; and ibid., 
“Theology and Understanding,” in Collection, CWL 4. Also see Wilkins, “Method, Order, and Analogy in 
Trinitarian Theology,” 572-73. 
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sacra doctrina as scientia by considering starting points and subalternation, this section will address 
why Thomas was concerned to construe sacra doctrina as scientia, which has to do with the goal he 
set for scientific theology. 
5.1. The Twofold Operation of the Mind 
Following Lonergan, I maintain Thomas’s metaphysical account of human knowing was 
grounded in Thomas’s understanding of his own consciously experienced concrete acts of 
knowing. Thomas’s self-appropriation took place primarily in the context of his trinitarian 
theology and a serious engagement with the act, intelligere. It is this same self-appropriation that is 
the basis of the psychological analogy for the Trinity.115⁠ In what follows, I offer the broad 
brushstrokes of Thomist cognitional theory, with the primary purpose of demonstrating the 
connection between science and theology—their analogous goals and methods—and the twofold 
operation of the mind. The next chapter will delve deeply into Thomas’s understanding of 
intelligere. What follows will accentuate one of the most important features of Thomist cognitional 
theory, namely, that human knowing is a compound process, not a single intellectual operation.116 
Differentiating among intelligence’s acts will clarify the very specific goal Thomas sets by 
construing sacra doctrina as scientia. 
 The beginning of the complex and dynamic process of human knowing is the natural 
desire to know. Human knowing begins in wonder, and from wonder arises questions. The 
natural desire to know sets the entire movement of the intellect toward its goal in motion. As 
Thomas writes: “For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect 
which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men.”117 This natural desire includes wonder about 
God, about the divine essence of which we see the effects all around us. Furthermore, this natural 
                                                
115 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2. 
116 For a more exhaustive list of what Lonergan seeks to recover from Thomas’s analysis of human knowing, 
see Stebbins, Divine Initiative, 5-6. 
117 ST Ia, q. 12, a. 1c. 
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desire is itself a created participation in uncreated light, of which Thomas writes: “[T]he 
intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first 
light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace 
or of glory.”118 The ground of this intellectual light is the agent intellect, the source of all inquiry. 
 There are two experientially verifiable operations of the naturally inquisitive human 
mind, the act of direct understanding, which is the parent of the definition or concept, and the act 
of reflective understanding, which is the parent of judgment.119 These acts are intimately related, 
and both are needed for a complete act of human knowing. For example, Thomas writes: 
We must realize that, as the Philosopher says, the intellect has two operations, one called 
the ‘understanding of indivisibles,’ by which it knows what a thing is [quid est], and another 
by which it joins and divides, that is to say, by forming affirmative and negative 
statements. Now these two operations correspond to two principles in things. The first 
operation concerns the nature itself of a thing, in virtue of which the object known holds a 
certain rank among beings, whether it be a complete thing, like some whole, or an 
                                                
118 ST Ia, q. 12, a. 2c. As Thomas explains here, there are three lights by which the human person 
participates in the divine light: the natural light of human reason and the supernatural lights of grace (in 
this life) and glory (in the next life). The light of faith will be considered in the next section, and the light 
of glory in the context of the imago Dei and deification in Chapter 5.  
119 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 25. In fact, it is even more complex, as will be clarified in the following 
three chapters. Briefly, the act of direct understanding gives rise to the act of conceptualizing/defining. 
The act of reflective understanding gives rise to the act of judging. Occasionally, I speak of these twofold 
operations in terms of understanding and judgment, which correspond to the second and third levels of 
Lonergan’s cognitional theory, and everything that occurs on each of these levels. However, I have found 
it somewhat misleading to speak of the twofold operations in these terms because it makes it seem as 
though the act of understanding and the act of judging are parallel acts on different levels, when in fact, 
the act of understanding on the second level of consciousness corresponds to the act of reflective 
understanding on the third level of consciousness. It is the act of conceptualizing (second level) that 
corresponds to the act of judging (third level) because these are the acts at which each level terminates. 
Thus, it is more accurate to speak of the twofold operation in terms of the act of direct understanding and 
the act of reflective understanding, which in fact is in keeping with Thomas’s reference to each of these 
acts as intelligere; each is a distinct type of understanding, that in turn gives rise to a second distinct act and 
type of inner word.  
 It might be asked why Lonergan did not refer to the two levels as conceptualizing and judging, thereby 
naming each after the operation at which it terminates. My hypothesis is that given Lonergan’s 
extraordinary efforts to overcome the conceptualism (the prioritization of concepts over understanding) 
that had persisted in many interpretations of Thomas for nearly 800 years, Lonergan spoke of the second 
level in terms of understanding (intelligere) to emphasize that understanding is the source of concepts and 
the initial step on the journey toward knowledge (that is, after one has raised questions about her 
experience). Similarly, another one of Lonergan’s significant contributions was to clarify what judgment 
is and its role in tripartite process of knowing, which is quite distinct from what is occurring on the second 
level of consciousness. Hence, speaking of the third level, usually, in terms of judgment (rather than 
reflective understanding) helps to accentuate the difference between these two levels of consciousness..  
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incomplete thing, like a part or an accident. The second operation has to do with a 
thing’s being [esse], which results from the union of the principles of a thing in composite 
substances, or, as in the case of simple substances, accompanies the thing’s simple 
nature.120 
 As this passage indicates, like Aristotle, Thomas observed an isomorphism between 
knowledge and reality. As reality divides into essence and existence, so do the two Aristotelian 
intellectual operations regard the quiddity of a thing and its existence.121 Thomas refers to both 
operations as “intelligere” and to both expressed answers to the questions they address as “verbum,” 
hence some of the exegetical confusion surrounding Thomas’s position on human knowing. In 
what follows, I will refer to the first intellectual operation (that by which the intellect “knows what 
a thing is [quid est]”) as the act of direct understanding. I will refer to the second intellectual 
operation (“that by which it joins and divides…by forming affirmative and negative statements) as 
the act of reflective understanding.122  Both direct and reflective understanding have their 
principal cause in the agent intellect, as a spirit of wonder and inquiry or as a critical spirit, 
                                                
120 Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, q, 5, a. 3 c. See Thomas Aquinas, The Division and Methods of Sciences: 
Questions 5 and 6, trans. Amrand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1963). 
121 Thomas writes, “the first operation regards the quiddity of the thing; the second regards its existence.” 
See Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m. See also Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 17, fn. 24. However, it 
should be noted that Aristotle did not achieve the same clarity that Thomas did regarding the distinction 
between form (quiddity) and act (existence). As Byrne explains, for Aristotle, the distinction between form 
and matter sufficed. One of Thomas’s great achievements was to recognize and expand upon the role of 
act in metaphysics, a project that was underway already in one of Thomas’s earliest works, On Being and 
Essence. As Byrne explains, Thomas’s metaphysical distinction of form and act corresponded to his 
exploration of the distinction and relation between the act of understanding and the act of judgment. 
Two points are noteworthy. One, Thomas made an advancement beyond Aristotle in this regard. Two, 
metaphysics and cognitional theory correspond; being and knowing are isomorphic. I will discuss this 
point in greater depth later. I am indebted to Byrne for alerting me to the importance of clarifying the 
difference between Aristotle and Thomas on this point.  
122 Thomas typically speaks of judging (the act that proceeds from the act of reflective understanding) in 
terms of composition and division. For example, in De veritate, Thomas makes the same twofold division 
between the act of conceptualizing and the act of judging: “For the clarification of this matter, it should 
be noted that our intellectual word, which enables us to speak about the divine Word by a kind of 
resemblance, is that at which our intellectual operation terminates. This is the object of understanding, 
which is called the conception of the intellect—whether the conception can be signified by a simple 
expression, as is true when the intellect forms the quiddities of things, or whether it can be signified only 
by a complex expression, as is true when the intellect composes and divides [componit et dividit]” De ver. q. 
4, a. 2c. 
 However, as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 3, Lonergan has demonstrated that Thomas speaks of 
iudicare (the act of judging) as not only as compositio vel divisio but also as a positing, an affirming. Most 
scholars have missed this second meaning of iudicare in Thomas.  
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respectively. Direct understanding responds to the question, quid sit? Reflective understanding 
responds to the question, an sit?123 The question for understanding seeks the formal cause, the 
reason why, the causa essendi, the middle term. That is, the question for direct understanding seeks 
the cause that explains what something is insofar as it actually exists.124 The question for reflective 
understanding seeks affirmations, denials, probabilities of whether something is so. In short, 
questions for direct understanding seek reasons and questions for reflective understanding seek 
truth. 
 These two operations are related to Aristotelian science, which is defined as the certain 
knowledge of things through their causes (certa per causas cognitio). This definition points to the two 
goals of Aristotelian science: certainty and understanding through causes. These goals correspond to 
                                                
123 Aristotle clarifies epistēmē (science) by way of epistemic questions. He identifies four such questions, 
reducible to two pairs, and ultimately reducible to one goal: [“Our] questionings [ta zētoumena] are equal 
in number [estin isa ton arithmon] to as many things as [hosaper] we know scientifically [epistametha]. We seek 
[zetoumen] four [things]: the whether [or the fact] [to hoti], the why [to dioti], if it is [ei esti], what it is [ti estin] 
(II.1 89b23-25)…Now what we ask and what we know when we have discovered the answers are these 
and thus many [questions and scientific knowns]” (APo. II.1 89b35-36). See Byrne, Analysis and Science in 
Aristotle, 85. All our questions can be expressed by these four types. There is a progressive and 
spontaneous relationship among these questions. For example, when commenting on Aristotle’s four 
questions and their relation, Thomas turns to the numerical ratio that obtains between high and low 
musical notes: “[I]n the question that, one inquires whether there is a middle. But once we have found that 
there is a numerical ratio of high and low note, we then ask what that ratio is: and this is to ask what [quid 
sit] or why [propter quid sit],” (In Post. An. II, lect. 1, 90a2-24). Aristotle, as Thomas observes, bases this 
natural movement in psychological observation (see In Post. An. II, lect. 1, 89b26-32). As he explains, once 
we know the fact, we no longer ask “is it?” Instead, we ask, “why is it?” In this way, all four of the 
questions are related. We spontaneously seek (2) “the why” or (4) “the what-it-is” once we know (1) “the 
whether” or (3) “if-it-is”, respectively. The relatedness of these questions accentuates the fact that all four 
actually seek a single goal: “In all these questions we are asking either if there is a middle term, or what 
the middle term is. For the middle term is the cause, and in all cases that is what is sought” (APo., II.2 
90a6-9). The middle term is the “reason why” or the cause, particularly, the formal cause. As Thomas 
writes, “And [Aristotle] proves that the question why inquires what the middle is. For it is obvious that a 
cause is the middle in a demonstration which enables one to know scientifically, because to know 
scientifically is to know the cause of the thing. But it is precisely the cause that is being sought in all the 
above questions. That this is so he manifests first in regard to the question ‘that’. For when it is asked 
whether the moon is waning, then according to the manner explained above, what is being asked is 
whether or not something is the cause of the this waning. Then he shows this for the question ‘why’. For 
once we know that something is the cause of the moon’s waning, we ask what the cause is; and this is to 
inquire why. The same applies to the other two questions,” (In II Post. anal., lect. 1, 89b23-90a35). 
124 In other words, it seeks the formal cause, which is explanatory beyond the other three causes (material, 
efficient, and final), which only explain the coming-to-be of a thing. See Stebbins, Divine Initiative, 9; ST 
IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 1 c. and ad 3m. 
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the distinct operations of the intellect: the act of reflective understanding seeks certainty and the 
act of direct understanding seeks intelligibility. Given that there are two distinct objectives in 
science (and two corresponding intellectual operations), there are also two distinct methods or 
movements toward acquiring science, according to whether one intends to propose certain 
judgments by discovering causes or refine theories based on a mature grasp of the cause. These 
methods are the ordo inventionis (the order of discovery) and the ordo disciplinae, respectively. They 
each have their own corresponding starting point.  
 The first movement toward acquiring science “begins from an ordinary prescientific 
description of things and ends in the knowledge of their cause.”125 In other words, it starts from 
what is first for us (the data) and proceeds to what is first in itself. This movement has been 
variously called analysis, the way of resolution, the way of discovery, the way of certitude, and the 
temporal way. It is called the way of discovery “because previously unknown causes are 
discovered.”126 The other movement starts from the causes that have been discovered at the end 
of the first movement, and ends by understanding things in their causes. In other words, it starts 
from an understanding of the reasoned fact (the causa essendi, the formal cause, the reason why) 
and proceeds to an explanation of the data.127 This movement has been variously called synthesis, 
the way of composition, the way of teaching or of learning, the way of probability, and the way of 
logical simultaneity. It is called the way of teaching or of learning “because it begins with concepts 
that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a step at a time it may proceed in 
an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science.”128 The inquiring, investigating, and 
                                                
125 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 61. 
126 Ibid., 61. 
127 See Byrne, Analysis and Science in Aristotle, 201-04. 
128 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 61. Lonergan’s token example of these two movements is 
taken from chemistry: “For example of the two ways, compare the history of a science like physics or 
chemistry with the textbooks from which these sciences are taught. History reveals that these sciences 
worked out their various demonstrations starting from the most obvious sense data. But when one goes to 
a textbook, one finds at the beginning of the book, in chemistry, only the periodic table of elements from 
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demonstrating proper to the first movement, discovery, begin with what is obvious (that is, what is 
closest to our senses). The second movement, teaching, begins from those concepts that can be 
understood without understanding other concepts (that is, with what is most universal, most 
general, simplest—which is not the same thing as what is closest to our senses). These two 
movements are inversely related, and complement one another. In fact, actual thinking oscillates 
dialectically between these two methods, even though one may be the order proper to a given 
starting point.129 Thus, even though the ordo disciplinae is the primary reason for Thomas’s 
                                                                                                                                            
which three hundred thousand compounds are derived…The reason for this difference is, of course, that 
inquiring, investigating, and demonstrating begin with what is obvious, while teaching begins from those concepts that can be 
understood without understanding other elements,” 61-63. 
129 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 73-74 for the oscillation between these two methods of thinking. For 
example, while the ordo disciplinae has as its goal understanding, in actual thinking, in order to understand 
X, we are not only understanding, but we are also inquiring, refining our questions, examining new data, 
working out the implications of ideas, testing our ideas out, etc. In other words, though understanding is 
the goal, experiencing, judging, and deciding are also operative because human knowing and doing is a 
dynamic reality. However, because understanding is what is sought by sacra doctrina as scientia, 
understanding is the objective intended by the other elements of human knowing—experiencing, 
[understanding], judging, and deciding—and so understanding harnesses them for its end. See Lonergan, 
Method in Theology, 125-145, esp. 133-136. Lonergan writes, “[O]ur conscious and intentional operations 
occur on four distinct levels” and “each has its own proper achievement and end. So the proper 
achievement and end of the first level, experiencing, is the apprehension data; that of the second level, 
understanding, is insight into the apprehended data; that of the third level, judgment, is the acceptance or 
rejection of the hypotheses and theories put forward by understanding to account for the data; that of the 
fourth level, decision, the acknowledgment of values and the selection of the methods or other means that 
lead to their realization. Now in everyday, commonsense performance, all four levels are employed 
continuously without any explicit distinction between them. In that case no functional specialization 
arises, for what is sought is not the end of any particular level but the cumulative, composite resultant of 
the ends of all four levels. But in a scientific investigation the ends proper to particular levels may become 
the objective sought by operations on all four levels. So the textual critic will select the method (level of 
decision) that he feels will lead to the discovery (level of understanding) of what one may reasonable 
affirm (level of judgment) was written in the original text (level of experience). The textual critic, then, 
operates on all four levels, but his goal is the end proper to the first level, namely, to ascertain the 
data…Functional specializations arise, then, inasmuch as one operates on all four levels to achieve the end proper to some 
particular level. But there are four levels and so four proper ends. It follows that the very structure of human 
inquiry results in four functional specializations and, since in theology there are two distinct phases 
[namely, listening and speaking], we are led to expect eight functional specialization in theology,” 
(emphasis added). 
 In Method in Theology, Lonergan is explaining functional specialization and the grounds for his eightfold 
division of theological operations. While such a complex, dynamic, and explicit specialization was by no 
means present in Thomas Aquinas’s theology and theological method, he does, so to speak, functionally 
subalternate what Lonergan calls “Systematics” to “Doctrines” insofar as sacra doctrina is a science 
subalternate to the divine science of God and the blessed. See Jeremy Wilkins, “A Wisdom of the 
Concrete,” 29-31 (chapter in a forthcoming manuscript). Further, Lonergan has expertly demonstrated 
that Thomas was intimately aware of his own process of knowing, which comes to the fore most readily 
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organizational decisions, the ordo inventionis can be used within it for pedagogical reasons—for 
example, establishing the meaningfulness of the question at hand by asking, an sit?, as we have 
seen in Question 2 on God’s existence. Below, I will explain how the ordo disciplinae is not only a 
pedagogical order, but also an explanatory and synthetic order. For now, it is noteworthy that it is 
as an explanatory, synthetic order that the ordo disciplinae is the inverse of the ordo inventionis. 
 These two movements are connected to the twofold function that Lonergan finds in 
Aristotelian syllogisms. Some erroneously limit the syllogism to “an instrument for exhibiting the 
grounds of a judgment on the conclusion: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.”130 
This is the factual syllogism. Thomas however recognized and employed the second function of 
the Aristotelian syllogism, namely, as an instrument for developing understanding. This is the 
explanatory or scientific syllogism, which may often be overlooked given one’s cognitional 
presuppositions.131  The scientific syllogism is an instrument for the attainment of science’s two 
goals, understanding and certainty. The difference within this syllogism pertains to the middle 
term, which can either assign the causa cognoscendi (cause of knowing) and so move according to the 
ordo inventionis toward certainty, or the causa essendi (cause of being) and thus move according to the 
ordo disciplinae toward understanding.132 This syllogism accounts for the relationship between 
understanding and science because it emphasizes that science is reasoning, that is, understanding 
in process, moving from principles to conclusions in order to grasp both principles and 
                                                                                                                                            
in his trinitarian theology.  We can arguably find distinctions between experience (ST Ia, q. 84, a. 7), 
understanding (ST Ia, q. 16, a. 2; q. 27, aa. 1-2), judgments of fact (ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 2), and judgments 
of value (ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2).  Finally, throughout the Summa, we find Thomas adverting to experience 
(not only the article on God’s existence, but the plethora of examples Thomas uses, especially, for 
example, from medicine and doctors) and making judgments (any an sit article). He also makes an explicit 
decision—a practical decision—about the right way to proceed to hand on sacra doctrina to beginners. (See 
Wilkins, “A Wisdom of the Concrete,” 26.) Further, Thomas exhorts he readers to make decisions about 
the best way to live, offering the religious life of a Dominican as school in charity, which is the perfection 
of Christian life.  
130 Lonergan, “Theology and Understanding,” 117. 
131 For example, overlooking understanding, overlooking judging, collapsing human knowing – a tripartite 
activity – into one activity, e.g., experience 
132 As Patrick Byrne has pointed out to me, this distinction is in Aristotle, though the terminology is not.  
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conclusions in a single view.133 When Thomas says theology is a science, he means that like 
science, it is understanding in process; both theology and science are about understanding, and 
they seek understanding by an orderly procession from their first principles.  
 In this section, I have argued that technically, the ordo disciplinae seeks understanding 
rather than certainty, and I have done so by grounding this differentiation in human knowing and 
its isomorphism with being. Before continuing with how this ordo can be used in sacra doctrina, it 
remains to come to terms with Thomas’s methodological differentiation between faith and reason, 
and how, in light of this differentiation, we can understand the application of the ordo disciplinae to 
sacra doctrina. Before doing so, I review what we have covered. We have observed an isomorphism 
between knowledge and reality, as well as a series of parallels: 
    the act of direct understanding : the act of reflective understanding  [two operations of intellect] 
:: 
essence : existence  [reality/being] 
:: 
quiddity (quid est) : existence (esse)/truth [two objects of intellect] 
:: 
understanding : certainty  [two goals of science] 
:: 
ordo disciplinae : ordo inventionis        [two methods for reaching goal] 
5.2 The Systematic Distinction Between Grace and Nature  
In the twelfth century, theological method began undergoing a significant development. In the 
thirteenth century, Philip the Chancellor made a breakthrough, differentiating between the 
entitatively disproportionate orders of nature and grace.134 Thomas systematically used this 
                                                
133 Lonergan, “Theology and Understanding,” 118. Lonergan is citing ST Ia q.14, a.7; q. 79, a. 8; IIa-IIae, 
q.8, aa. 1-2. 
134 This occurred in the context of Philip’s defense of the human person’s natural love of God. The human 
person naturally has the capacity to love God above all things. By the gift of grace, the human person 
loves God in a way beyond her natural capacities. Thus, Philip “presented the theory of two orders, 
entitatively disproportionate: not only was there the familiar series of grace, faith, charity and merit, but 
also nature, reason, and the natural love of God” (Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, CWL 1, 17). However, 
while the human person has the natural capacity to love God above all else, for the human person to 
actually love God as God is in Godself above all else, grace is necessary. Thus, grace is necessary for the 
human person to love God supernaturally, and also for the human person to actually love God uti in se est 
naturally. That is, we can naturally desire God above all else, but to actually love God above all else 
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differentiation in his theological method and to address pressing thirteenth-century theological 
questions such as, What is the relationship between divine grace and human freedom, and how 
can they be related so as to preserve both?135 Lonergan coins Philip’s achievement “the theorem 
of the supernatural,” which I will use for brevity’s sake. This theorem yielded a differentiated 
account of the relation of faith and reason. It also set the conditions for distinguishing between the 
kinds of reasons available for the mysteries of faith versus those available for naturally known 
realities. Thomas speaks of this distinction in terms of the twofold mode of truth. 
5.2.1 The Proportion of Nature 
What Philip systematically posited “was not the supernatural character of grace, for that was 
already known and acknowledged, but the validity of a line of reference termed nature.”136 In 
other words, Philip’s achievement was made possible by a recovery of the natural order, that is, a 
deeper affirmation of nature’s relative autonomy. This recovery was sparked by the influx and 
integration of Aristotle. What did this recovery of the natural order consist in, and how did it 
allow Philip to present a theory of two orders, entitatively disproportionate? It has to do with 
                                                                                                                                            
requires grace. I owe this clarification to Patrick Byrne. 
135 For the full breadth and depth of Thomas’s achievement, see Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, CWL 1. 
Thomas developed his clarity about grace by not focusing on it; instead, he was occupied with “thinking 
out the Christian universe,” which put the questions about grace on a much wider footing: “Only when 
St. Thomas settled down to the vast task of thinking out the Christian universe in the Contra Gentiles did he 
arrive at the truth that divine providence is an intrinsically certain cause of every combination or 
interference of terrestrial causes,” 82. This “thinking out” included the law of universal instrumentality in 
which God applies every agent to its end (this is, in other words, an explanatory account of divine 
providence, for example, cf. ST Ia, q. 105; esp. a. 5), and so the certainty of divine providence, intelligible 
in the context of divine transcendence (for example, cf. SCG, 3, ch. 94; ST Ia, q. 103, a. 7). In turn, this 
law made a theory of the liberty of the human will possible. And in turn, this theory of human freedom 
made possible a theory of operative grace. In working through the order of divine providence (and clearly 
differentiating it from the order of grace) Thomas was able to demonstrate that on this natural level, the 
human will and divine providence were compatible, and then analogously apply this to the supernatural 
level on which God operates directly on the will. In other words, just as natural operation presupposes 
divine providence, so too does meriting supernatural beatitude presuppose actual graces by which God 
moves the agent to act. For the heart of Thomas’s answer to these questions, cf. esp. ST Ia, q. 111, a. 2 on 
the division of operative and cooperative grace. Also see Patrick Byrne, “The Fabric of Lonergan’s 
Thought,” The Lonergan Workshop Journal 6 (1986), esp. 19-37. 
136 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, CWL 1, 17. 
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something called the analogy of natural proportion, which is found in Aristotle and taken over by 
Thomas. We see this theory operative in Thomas’s metaphysics of participation and 
corresponding gradations of being or perfection.137 In fact, the proportion of nature is a 
specification of the general metaphysical principle that act is limited by potency. Thomas uses this 
principle to differentiate between God and creatures. Whereas in God, substance and the 
principle of operation are one, in creatures, there is a fourfold composition of essence and 
existence, potency and act in which existence : essence :: act : potency. 
 The theory of natural proportion affirms that this fourfold composition is proportionate 
in any given creature. In other words, it explains that the soul, its potencies, its acts, and its objects 
are naturally proportionate to one another, and moreover, all belong to the same grade of being. 
For example, seeing (an act) is received in and limited by sight (its corresponding potency). Sight is 
a result of and limited by its substance (the sensitive soul of an animal). Stebbins puts this parity of 
relations in more colloquial terms: “If a thing acts in a particular manner, it is because it has 
corresponding capacities or potencies that, in turn, must have their proportionate source and 
unity in some actually existing substance.”138  
                                                
137 In Thomist metaphysics, perfection is a measure of act. God’s essence is God’s existence, which means 
God alone is pure act because God’s existence is not limited by any potency, and therefore, God alone is 
perfect. Creatures, on the other hand, are composed of existence and essence, and so their act of being is 
restricted. Consequently, they are imperfect. However, they participate in God’s perfection simply by 
existing and operating, for to exist and to operate is to be in act. Creatures are more or less perfect 
depending on their degree of actuality, that is, depending on the degree to which existence is limited by 
essence. Cf. ST Ia, qq. 2-11. For the gradation of being and the proportion of nature, cf. ST Ia, q. 54, aa. 
1-3. For example, Thomas writes, “Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative 
faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then 
according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each 
proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and 
is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said. Now the act to 
which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to 
exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the 
angel's essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation,” 
Ia, q. 54, a. 3. 
138 Stebbins, Divine Initiative, 47-8. Lonergan offers an example of how this theorem operates: “If an ox were 
to understand and will, you would say that it had not only acts of understanding and willing, but also a 
possible intellect and a will; and consequently you would further infer that the ox's body was informed by 
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It is on account of this proportionate intelligibility that Aristotle could reason from knowledge of 
objects to knowledge of acts to knowledge of potencies to knowledge of souls (of natures, of 
substances).139 What occurs is an insight into an intelligible relation of dependence – that is, a 
cause-effect relation.140 For example, the act of seeing is intelligibly dependent on sight, which we 
can gather by understanding the difference between closed eyes and blindness. Without this 
proportion of nature, we could not arrive at knowledge of the existence of potencies (for example, 
the will, the possible intellect, the agent intellect), or of the differences between potencies, or of the 
differences between human and animal souls, or at knowledge of the spiritual nature of human 
souls and the materiality of animal souls.141  
 What the proportion of nature helps us to do—and why it becomes so significant for the 
systematic differentiation of the natural and the supernatural—is to explain why the natural is 
natural, to explain precisely what it is that constitutes a human being as human. As Stebbins 
explains, “the reason why we say that anything is natural with respect to some being is that it is 
proportionate to that being’s nature.” For example, it is natural for human beings to know 
because they are intellectual by nature. And it is natural to humans to know by phantasms 
because they are embodied knowers.142 This pertains to the mode of knowing, which is 
commensurate with one’s mode of existence/being. As we will see, if the mode of existence of the 
object of knowledge exceeds the mode of existence of the knower, the knower’s understanding will 
                                                                                                                                            
an intellective soul.” See Lonergan, “The Supernatural Order,” in Early Latin Theology, Collected Works 
of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 19, eds. Robert M. Doran and Daniel H. Mansour, trans. Michael G. 
Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 71.  
139 See Aristotle, De anima, II, 3, 414b32-415a13 and 4, 415a, 14-20; Aquinas In II De anima, lect. 6, §299 
and §304–6. With this progressive method inward, Aristotle was able to differentiate plants, animals, and 
humans according to their potencies, which indicated different kinds of souls operating on different levels 
of being. 
140 It is helpful to keep in mind that the intelligibility proper to analogies is between the similar relationship 
that obtains between sets. For example, seeing is related to sight as act is related to potency—the former 
is intelligibly (in the order of knowing) and causally (in the order of being) dependent on the latter. 
141 See Lonergan, “The Supernatural Order,” in Early Latin Theology, CWL 19, 67. 
142 See ST Ia, q. 84, a. 7. 
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be imperfect. For example, when considering whether the human soul in the present life can 
know immaterial substances in themselves, Thomas appeals to the proportion of nature:  
There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; 
such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that 
sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact 
that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being disproportionate to the sensitive 
power. And thus it is that immaterial substances are disproportionate to our intellect, in 
our present state of life, so that it cannot understand them.143 
 Once a thorough grasp of nature (especially human nature) is achieved with the help of 
this analogy of proportion, one can develop an adequate account of grace, explaining precisely 
why it is absolutely gratuitous.144 Consequently, one can come to terms with the entitative 
disproportion between nature and grace, between the natural and supernatural orders. The 
supernatural is what exceeds the proportion of some given nature; it exceeds its grade of being 
and perfection. 
 Grasping this distinction is essential to working out how grace supervenes on and perfects 
what it is that makes a human being human (her intellectual soul, her acts of knowing and loving, 
etc). In light of this distinction, the proportion of nature can be used analogically to posit a similar 
set of intelligible relations in the supernatural order.145 For example, the habit of faith is 
entitatively disproportionate to human nature; it must be infused.146 But as habits arise from the 
soul and its potencies, the soul must also be made proportionate to the infused habit of faith, 
                                                
143 ST Ia, q. 88, a. 1, ad. 3  
144 It helps clarify why everything is not grace, given that everything is from God—because there are 
potencies and acts that are natural to the beings to which they belong. It also clarifies why humanity 
would have needed grace even without sin—because the beatific vision is absolutely disproportionate to 
our nature and natural capacities. 
145 However, this is only an analogy. Grasping the proportion of nature is not the same as grasping the 
proportion between sanctifying grace and faith, which are mysteries. See Stebbins, Divine Initiative, 51. 
146 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 5, a. 1c; ad 2. Also see Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 5 s.c “Man is naturally the principle of his 
action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses the intellect and will 
of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) ‘Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into 
the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.’ Therefore man cannot attain 
Happiness by his natural power” and “The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just as, by the 
habits of other virtues, man sees what is becoming to him in respect of that habit, so by the habit of faith, 
the human mind id directed to assent to such things as are fitting [conveniun] to a right faith, and not to 
assent to others” (ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 4 ad 3). 
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which is what sanctifying grace accomplishes. Grace, an accident in the essence of soul, elevates 
human nature, proportioning it to the new acts and habits fit for a sanctified person.147 In the 
question on the division of grace, Thomas differentiates between the natural and supernatural 
orders by way of the notion of debt, thereby affirming the utter gratuity of grace in 
contradistinction from other divine gifts, like nature and all that follows from it: 
Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be 
taken in two ways: first, as arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do 
meritorious works, according to Rm. 4:4: ‘Now to him that worketh, the reward is not 
reckoned according to grace, but according to debt.’ The second debt regards the condition of 
nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in 
neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to His creature, but 
rather that the creature ought to be subject to God, that the Divine ordination may be 
fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, 
and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further. And hence natural 
endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second. But supernatural gifts are not a debt in any 
sense, and therefor they especially deserve the name of grace.148 
5.2.2 Faith, Reason, and the Twofold Mode of Truth 
The distinction of the supernatural and natural orders, together with the differentiation of the 
twofold operation of the mind, helped Thomas to expand Aristotelian science to make room for 
the Augustinian crede ut intelligas.149 I will elaborate on this expansion by way of two related points. 
First, insofar as Aristotelian science has not one but two goals (certainty and understanding) 
corresponding to the twofold operations of the human mind (reflective understanding and direct 
understanding, respectively), certainty does not have an exclusive claim on the ideal of sacra 
                                                
147 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 110, aa. 2-3: “And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a 
substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes 
accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus 
because the soul participates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, 
which is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, 
inasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the 
soul, though not in its mode of being,” (a. 2, ad. 2) and “And thus, even as the natural light of reason is 
something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace 
which is a participation of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived 
from and are ordained to this light…” (a. 3c). 
148 ST Ia-IIae, q. 111, a. 1 ad. 2. 
149 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 3 in which Thomas discusses the necessity of belief for the acquisition of science 
on the part of the learner. Also see The Sermon-Conferences, 18-25. Therein, Thomas explains the pragmatic 
necessity of believing, not only in matters of faith but in all areas of life. 
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doctrina as a science. Second, as the supernatural order is disproportionate to the natural order, so 
too are the reasons proportionate to supernatural mysteries disproportionate to human 
intelligence. It follows that faith and reason belong to two different orders and must be 
methodologically differentiated. Thus, Thomas distinguishes between the kinds of reasons 
available for the mysteries of faith, on the one hand, and those available for naturally known 
realities, on the other. He calls this the twofold mode of truth. 
 To the first point (certainty does not have an exclusive claim on science), we have seen 
that the ordo inventionis is the movement toward certainty, while the ordo disciplinae is the movement 
toward understanding. The same distinction of movements (the ordo disciplinae versus the ordo 
inventionis) and goals (understanding and certainty) is also found in theology. As Thomas writes in 
the Quaestiones quodlibetales: 
Every act should be performed in a way adapted to its end. Now an argument can be 
directed to either of two ends. One kind of argument is directed to removing doubts as to 
whether something is so…But another kind of argument is that of the teacher in the schools. 
It seeks not to remove error but to instruct the students so that they understand the truth 
that the teacher hopes to convey. In such cases it is important to base one’s argument on 
reasons that go to the root of the truth in question, that make hearers understand how what 
is said is true. Otherwise, if the teacher settles a question simply by an appeal to authorities, 
the students will have their certitude that the facts are indeed as stated;, but they will acquire 
no knowledge [scientiae] or understanding [intellectus] and they will go away empty.150  
Two relevant observations surface. One, the reference to “act” in conjunction with “argument” 
indicates that Thomas has in mind the two operations of the intellect. It is the cognitional element 
that guides and differentiates these two kinds of arguments. Two, the prologue to the Summa 
specifies that Thomas will pursue the latter argument—that which makes hearers understand how 
what is said is true. This means he is concerned with the first operation of the intellect, which is 
the province of the ordo disciplinae, and so the goal of the sacra doctrina in the Summa is 
understanding. Again Thomas affirms that sacra doctrina is a science because like science, it is 
                                                
150 Questiones quodlibetales, 4, q. 9, a. 3 (emphasis added), as quoted in Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 
CWL 12, 8-9. 
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understanding in process. Specifically, insofar as it proceeds according to the ordo disciplinae, it 
moves from principles to conclusions in order to grasp both principles and conclusions in a single 
view.151 That is, it moves toward synthesis.  
 However, given that theology’s subject is God—the divine reality, the divine essence—its 
goal is an analogical, obscure and imperfect understanding of what God is. Yet, the theologian 
achieves her respective goal in the same way a scientist does, by reasoning—even when reason is 
enlightened by faith. That is, she focuses on the first act of the intellect, understanding. Insofar as 
theology is analogously a science, what Thomas and the scholastics called the determinatio fidei is 
not completely different from the first movement (the way of analysis), nor is the intelligentia fidei 
completely different from the second movement (way of synthesis).152   
 In theology, the first movement (analysis, the ordo inventionis) leads, in general, from Christ 
to the triune God. For example, in the Tertia Pars, Thomas explains that Christ incorporates the 
disciples and all subsequent disciples into his teaching activity, and so, into his mixed life of 
contemplation and action. Thomas, himself, is part of this teaching activity, handing on to others 
what he has received from both human teachers and the divine teacher. Christ follows a certain 
order: he teaches, imprinting his teaching directly on peoples’ hearts instead of writing, and 
entrusts to his disciples the task of teaching others, by preaching and writing.153 This order is an 
aspect of divine providence, insofar as God uses human teachers to impart natural knowledge.154 
It is especially an aspect of the divine economy insofar as human teachers contribute to the 
common supernatural good by using reason to minister to faith.155 In other words, there is a 
process of “doctrinal communication” that begins with Christ156, is entrusted to his disciples, and 
                                                
151 See ST Ia, q. 14, a. 7; q. 79, a. 8. Also see Lonergan, “Theology and Understanding,” 118. 
152 See Thomas Aquinas, III Sent. D. 25, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 4 ad 1. 
153 See ST IIIa, q. 42, a. 4. 
154 See ST Ia, q. 117, a. 1. This question takes place in the group of questions on divine providence. 
155 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad 2; q. 2, a. 6c.  
156 Thomas also, of course, recognizes the Old Testament as a source of revelation. See ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 
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continues throughout the history of the church such that a body of material accumulates.157 This 
is the aforementioned order of the sources and it is a process of discovery, which eventually 
reaches a point when the discovered elements can be set forth pedagogically in the ordo disciplinae.  
 With respect to the history of trinitarian theology, the Council of Nicea (and Chalcedon) 
can be understood as the terminus of a process of discovery in which the trinitarian belief was 
determined, affirming the consubstantiality of the three Persons. This was itself a movement from 
what was first-for-us – the relations of the Father, Son, and Spirit to us – to what is first-in-itself – 
the relations of the Father, Son, and Spirit to one another. From this end point (consubstantiality, 
that is, the equality of the three divine persons), Augustine began his theological effort to 
understand the Trinity to whose image we are made. Augustine’s De trinitate can also be 
                                                                                                                                            
7. 
157 Laporte, “Christ in the Summa,” 244. Thomas also includes the prophets as a mediating source of divine 
revelation. See ST IIa-IIae, qq. 171-174. For example, Thomas considers the advancement of prophecy 
through the three ages with respect to the two irreducible truths of faith identified earlier in the Secunda 
Pars: “Prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not 
only instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according to Ps. 42:3, ‘Send forth Thy light and 
Thy truth: they have conducted me.’ Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true knowledge of God, 
according to Heb. 11:6, ‘He that cometh to God must believe that He is’; secondly, in the mystery of Christ's 
incarnation, according to Jn. 14:1, ‘You believe in God, believe also in Me.’ Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy 
as directed to the Godhead as its end, it progressed according to three divisions of time, namely before the law, under the law, 
and under grace. For before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically taught things pertinent to faith 
in the Godhead. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps. 104:15, ‘Do no evil to My prophets,’ 
which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation of things 
pertinent to faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than hitherto, because then not only certain special 
persons or families but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 
6:2,3): ‘I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God almighty, 
and My name Adonai I did not show to them’; because previously the patriarchs had been taught to 
believe in a general way in God, one and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the 
simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14): ‘I am Who am’; and this name is 
signified by Jews in the word ‘Adonai’ on account of their veneration for that unspeakable name. 
Afterwards in the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son of God Himself, according to Mt. 
28:19: ‘Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of 
the Holy Ghost’” (IIa-IIae, q. 174, a. 6c, emphasis added). It is noteworthy that Thomas (following 
Augustine) expressly states that before Christ, it was not the Father (nor the Son, nor the Spirit) who was 
revealed, but God. For Thomas, biblical revelation (beginning with the Old Testament) does not begin 
with the Father; it begins with God. This is an important point of disagreement among Thomas and his 
detractors (and a point of disagreement in medieval theology among Thomas and the theologians who 
privileged the analogy of the self-diffusiveness of the good for trinitarian theology). Like Augustine before 
him, this is an element of trinitarian theology because personal identity in God is because of 
relationships—you cannot have the Father without the Son. 
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understood as another terminus in this process of discovery, but now as a discovery of a way to 
illuminate the mystery, namely, the psychological analogy.158 Thomas’s trinitarian questions in 
the Summa can be understood as taking the determination of the Councils as his starting point 
insofar as sacra doctrina is a subalternate science. Similarly, the Summa can be understood as taking 
Augustine’s discovery of the analogy as the starting point – the principle of understanding – for a 
systematic consideration of the Trinity according to the ordo disciplinae.  
 If we return to theology’s analogous relation to science, it is complicated by the fact that 
Thomas identifies the subject of sacra doctrina as God, we come to the second point: the 
disproportion of human intelligence to divine mysteries and the twofold mode of truth.159 The 
divine essence is the sole sufficient and necessary reason (the causa essendi) for everything, including 
the Trinity. In fact, the divine essence is also the causa cognoscendi insofar as it is the reason we 
know that God is triune (among other mysteries).160 Yet, human intelligence cannot in this life 
understand the divine essence; we only know what it is not: “The vision of God is twofold. One is 
perfect, in which the essence of God is seen. The other is imperfect; though in this vision we do 
not see what God is, we do see what God is not. And in this life, the better we understand God to 
transcend whatever is grasped by intellect, the more perfectly also do we know him.”161  
 However, faith supervenes on and perfects reason insofar as faith makes human 
intelligence know with certainty the existence of the mysteries it would otherwise never know: 
This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its 
principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to 
whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this 
                                                
158 The analogy is not affirmed as another article of faith, but offered as a way to understand what is already 
believed. But good analogies can be a part of the discovery function of theology. For this history, cf. 
Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 213-221; The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 67-77. 
159 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 7. See above, p. 35. 
160 For this point, see Wilkins, “Order, Method, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology,” 582-83. 
161 ST IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c. As will be argued below, Questions 2-11 of the Prima Pars serve the pedagogical 
function of helping the student to come to terms with divine transcendence and the therapeutic function 
of recognizing the imperfection of their present human vision. 
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doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the 
weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest.162   
Thomas next introduces, in this very first question of the Summa, a fundamental aspect of his 
theology of grace – grace perfects nature; it does not destroy it:  
But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for 
thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are 
put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, 
natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. 
Hence the Apostle says: ‘Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience 
of Christ’ (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of 
philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural 
reason.163 
Thus, while faith perfects reason, elevating the human intellect to know supernatural realities 
unknown to natural human reason, it does not alter the mode of human knowing. As one of 
Thomas’s regular axioms has it, “Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for 
the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower.”164 In this life, the human 
mode of knowing naturally involves the sensible world. Faith does not destroy this relationship: 
It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of 
comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according to the 
capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through 
sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ, 
spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things.165 
Thomas had brought these two points about the excessive intelligibility of God and the mode of 
human knowing together in the Summa Contra Gentiles, which recalls the twofold operation of the 
mind and quiddity, understanding’s goal: 
That there are certain truths about God that totally surpass man’s ability appears with the 
greatest evidence. Since, indeed, the principle of all knowledge that the reason perceives 
about some thing is the understanding of the very substance of that being (for according 
to Aristotle ‘what a thing is’ is the principle of demonstration) [Posterior Analytics II, 3], it 
is necessary that the way in which we understand the substance of a thing determines the 
                                                
162 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2. 
163 ST Ia, q. 1, a.  
164 ST Ia, q. 14, a. 1 ad. 3. Also see Ia,  q. 12, a. 4c. 
165 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 9c. Also see IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 2c; 2, a. 3c. In this response, Thomas includes the gradual, 
discursive development of human intelligence as intrinsic to the human mode of knowing. 
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way in which we know what belongs to it. Hence, if the human intellect comprehends the 
substance of some thing, for example, that of a stone or of a triangle, no intelligible 
characteristic belonging to that thing surpasses the grasp of the human reason. But this 
does not happen to us in the case of God. For the human intellect is not able to reach a 
comprehension of the divine substance through its natural power. For, according to its manner 
of knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on the sense for the origin of knowledge; and so those 
things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the 
knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. Now, sensible things cannot lead the human intellect to 
the point of seeing in them the nature of the divine substance; for sensible things are effects that fall short of 
the power of their cause. Yet, beginning with sensible things, our intellect is led to the point of 
knowing about God that He exists, and other such characteristics that must be attributed 
to the First Principle. There are, consequently, some intelligible truths about God that are 
open to the human reason; but there are others that absolutely surpass its power.166 
Thus, even though the mysteries of faith are revealed to us and even though faith elevates the 
human mind to assent to these things beyond its ken, the mode of human knowing remains in our 
present state of existence in mortal bodies. Thus, the essence of God is unknown is this life.167 
However, our inability to understand the divine essence in a positive way does not mean that we 
cannot understand revealed truth (as found, e.g., in the Articles of Faith) in any positive fashion.168 
We are not limited to knowing that God is triune; beginning with our belief, we can start to 
understand how this might be so. This brings us to the twofold mode of truth. 
 As scholasticism and the quest for a scientific theology arose, so did the pursuit of what 
Anselm called “rationes necessariae” (necessary reasons). While today we might associate this phrase 
with rationalism and semi-rationalism, it would be both mistaken and anachronistic to assign that 
mode of thought to Anselm, and with him, Richard of St. Victor and probably Bonaventure. The 
doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation will serve as examples. There are mysteries that 
are necessary in themselves, such as the Trinity.169 Without a precise grasp of the difference 
                                                
166 SCG 1, ch. 3, no. 3 (emphasis added). 
167 See ST Ia, q. 12, aa. 12-13. The divine essence remains disproportionate to human intelligence in the 
next life even though we will have resurrected bodies united to minds illumined by the light of glory. The 
reason is that our minds are intrinsically finite in their mode of existence, and thereby simply cannot 
comprehend the divine essence, which is infinite in its mode of existence. See ST Ia, q. 12, a. 7. 
168 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 6 in which Thomas affirms that the gift of understanding allows us to penetrate 
what is proposed to faith for acceptance. Also see Lonergan, “Theology and Understanding,” 118-19. 
169 See ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 
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between philosophical and theological modes of reason—between reason and reason enlightened 
by faith—a theologian can make the methodological error of presuming that because the mystery 
of the Trinity is absolutely necessary in itself, and because therefore the reasons for its truth are 
also necessary, that human reason enlightened by faith can actually know these rationes 
necessariae.170 With Thomas we can pardon theologians like Richard of St. Victor from assuming 
such reasons were humanly possible and we can recognize that that they did not think the Trinity 
was rationally demonstrable. We can also notice, however, how critical an adequate 
differentiation between faith and reason is for the practice of theology, especially theology 
construed as science.171 When considering our knowledge of the Trinity, Thomas quotes Richard 
as one objector claiming the Trinity can be known by natural reason: 
Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): ‘I believe without doubt that probable and 
even necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth.’ So even to 
prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, 
who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons; while some 
are moved by the consideration that ‘no good thing can be joyfully possessed without 
partnership.’ Augustine proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by 
the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in this 
above. Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.172  
In response, Thomas makes the same methodological differentiation of the twofold mode of truth 
he had introduced in the opening of the Summa Contra Gentiles173: 
Reason may be brought to bear on something in a twofold manner: firstly, for the 
purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where 
sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of 
uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof 
of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the 
congruity of its results, as in astronomy the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is 
                                                
170 It is important to note that in another sense (when considering divine transcendence), we must say that 
God is beyond contingency and necessity. 
171 See Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 53-58. 
172 ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 obj. 2. Notice that as attempts to prove the Trinity, Thomas includes not only the self-
diffusiveness of the good (an analogy he rejected with increasing explicitness throughout his career), but 
also the psychological analogy. As we will see in his response, Thomas not only rejects the possibility of 
proving the Trinity, but also argues that the psychological analogy is not an attempt to prove, but only to 
understand.  
173 See SCG 1, ch. 1-9; esp. 3, §2.  
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considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly 
movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as 
some other theory might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; 
and the like. But in the second way, reason is brought in to manifest the Trinity because granted one 
knows the Trinity to be true, these reason fit; but not as if the Trinity of persons is sufficiently proved by 
these reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness 
of God is manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite 
power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that 
an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and 
capacity it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous 
possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect 
goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order to have the goodness of 
complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as 
the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says that by faith we arrive 
at knowledge, and not conversely.174 
We can neither prove revealed truths by reason alone nor can we provide necessary reasons for 
them even when reason is enlightened by faith. These reasons remain hidden in God, excessively 
intelligible relative to us. But while our enlightened intellect is disproportionate to the divine 
essence and so to the reason for revealed truths, it is proportionate to its native activity – 
understanding in process. Thus, it can pursue a positive understanding of revealed truths. This 
understanding is imperfect because the revelation is about God, and God is not understood.175 
 All of this sheds light on sacra doctrina as a subalternate science – its possibilities and 
limitations. Its possibilities lie in (1) its ability to know, according to the first mode of truth (e.g., 
according to reason) that God is, what God is not, and how God is not, and (2) its ability to make 
manifest, according to the second mode of truth (e.g., according to reason enlightened by faith), 
what we already believe to be true. It accomplishes the latter with analogies and arguments of 
fittingness.176 The ability of enlightened reason to manifest the faith underscores sacra doctrina’s 
limitations.  
                                                
174 ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2. Notice that Thomas is explicit about what the psychological analogy does not do 
and why – it does not prove that God is a Trinity of persons because the human intellect and ipsum 
intelligere are not the same. We cannot know the latter because it is identical to the unknowable divine 
essence. 
175 See Lonergan, “Theology and Understanding,” 119. 
176 For example, the psychological analogy manifests the trinitarian belief and even integrates it with the 
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5.3. The Possibilities and Limitations of Sacra Doctrina as a Subalternate Science 
To understand the possibilities and limitations of sacra doctrina as a subalternate science, we need 
to summarize the major points up until now. The first principles of subalternate science are 
derived from those of the higher science. Thus, while the divine essence is the first principle of the 
science of God and the blessed, the Articles of Faith (and scripture and Christ) are the first 
principles of the faithful and their teachers. These are what the theologian attempts to find 
reasons for, and while we cannot understand the divine essence in this life, we can advance a 
positive understanding of the revealed truths. However, we can only do so analogically and/or by 
arguments of fittingness (conveniens) because we cannot reduce our first principles to the first 
principle from which they are derived. Instead, we can only affirm the value of our analogical and 
fitting arguments by how much they manifest what we already believe to be true and how 
extensively they illuminate the connections among these mysteries.  
 Aristotelian science is certa per causas cognitio. But in light of the foregoing, sacra doctrina is 
not certain in the same sense that Aristotelian science is, nor is it understanding in the same way it 
is. This nuance brings us full-circle to the question of principles/starting points and sacra doctrina. 
On the one hand, to the extent that sacra doctrina is certain, it cannot be per causas because in this 
life, we cannot know God’s essence or wisdom, and so we cannot know the cause of the Trinity or 
of the economy of salvation. Instead, we have certainty about these realities because of faith. The 
most we can know with respect to the cause is that the divine essence is the causa essendi. Inasmuch 
as sacra doctrina is certain knowledge, the first principles of certainty – the starting points – are the 
revealed truths, articulated in the Articles of Faith.  
                                                                                                                                            
economy of salvation. Thomas gives no less than ten reasons for why the incarnation was fitting for the 
restoration of the human race: five relating to humanity’s furtherance in the good (culminating in the full 
participation of humanity in divinity) and five relating to humanity’s withdrawal from evil (culminating in 
the meeting of humanity and divinity in Christ). 
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 On the other hand, to the extent that sacra doctrina is per causas cognitio, it is hypothetical (or 
as Thomas puts it, “probable”), meaning not unconditionally verifiable.177 Because we cannot 
know the cause and so unconditionally verify our manifestations of the revealed truths, any 
understanding we have is only analogical or fitting. Further, it is also only understanding as 
opposed to knowledge in the strict sense—these arguments do not increase our knowledge of the 
mysteries. The psychological analogy is not certain, but rather, something that seems to illuminate 
the Trinity. The arguments of fittingness for the Incarnation are not certain, but rather, they 
illuminate the economy of salvation. In this sense, when faith is seeking understanding through 
causes, the causes or first principles of understanding (the starting points) are the analogical or 
fitting principles illuminating the revealed truths of faith.178 This pertains to the internal ordering 
of sacra doctrina, which proceeds according to the guided development of understanding. 
 Despite these limitations, arguments of fittingness and analogies for the mysteries of faith 
disclose the intelligibility of the faith, without proving the faith (recall the distinction between the 
levels of truth and understanding). This intelligibility can both defend and nourish the faith.179 
With respect to nourishment, while considering the relationship between faith and reason in light 
of merit Thomas writes, “For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, 
he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way 
human reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit.”180 Such 
nourishment is helped especially by disclosing the connections among the mysteries of faith, 
                                                
177 I owe this way of thinking about the limitations of sacra doctrina as a subalternate science to conversations 
with Jeremy Wilkins. See ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2 for Thomas’s expression of the possibility of multiple 
theories explaining one reality.  
178 There is an ambiguity of ‘principle’ in the Summa. On the one hand, Thomas explicitly states that the 
Articles of Faith are the principle. On the other hand, as far as his actual performance in the Summa goes, 
principle analogically means the principle of understanding, e.g., the intelligible emanations of the 
psychological analogy.   
179 See ST II-IIae, q. 6, a. 1 ad. 1. Also see ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 5 ad 2; a. 8c. See Augustine, De trinitate, 
14.1.1 (Hill, 370-71). 
180 ST IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c. Thomas is here describing the situation in which human reason is consequent to 
the believer’s assent – this is both Augustine’s crede ut intelligas and Anselm’s fides quarens intelligentia. 
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which is arguably what the entire structure of the Summa sets forth to do, according to the ordo 
disciplinae. As we will have occasion to see in the final chapter when considering the Summa 
theologiae as spiritual pedagogy—as a text for the spiritual exercise of the beginner—this 
nourishment is especially the province of the teacher to whom it is given to come to a fuller 
knowledge of the faith for the sake of the common good.181  
QUESTION 3: WHAT IS THE ORDO DISCIPLINAE? 
6. The Internal Ordering of Sacra Doctrina: the Ordo Disciplinae 
Having considered three of the factors contributing to the possibility of the ordo disciplinae in the 
Summa, I now proceed to consider the ordo disciplinae, itself. Just as we considered one of the orders 
and starting points of the Summa—the Articles of Faith insofar as sacra doctrina is a subalternate 
science to which certainty belongs—now we will consider another order and starting point of the 
Summa. In this section, we will explore the order and starting point internal to sacra doctrina in 
which the theological goal is understanding. The ordo disciplinae assumes a technical meaning in 
the Summa. It is both a pedagogical order, as well as an explanatory and synthetic order. It bears 
the central organizing role in the entire work, both in its fundamental/basic division and in its 
careful arrangement of questions, articles, and objects. It also helps Thomas make thematic 
connections among the parts. However, its technical meaning and significance has been 
historically overlooked by poor translations of this term within the prologues and questions in 
which it appears.   
6.1. The Ordo Disciplinae as a Pedagogical Order 
To begin to elaborate upon the pedagogical meaning of the ordo disciplinae, it is helpful to become 
familiar with its basic related terms and its particularly scholastic context. To begin, both discipulus 
and disciplina derive from the Latin verb, “discere” meaning “to learn.” As Michael Sherwin writes 
                                                
181 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c; q. 1, a. 7 ad 2 and ad 3. Also see ST IIa-IIae, q. 177, a. 1; q. 181, a. 1c. 
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in his article on Thomas’s commentary on the gospel of John, “It is the desire to learn that is the 
hallmark of the true disciple.”182 Mary Carruthers explains the meaning of disciplina according to 
its memorial context and the process of thinking in images. Where Sherwin highlights the 
relationship between teacher and disciple, Carruthers connects this relationship to the journey 
that learning is: 
Although the word disciplina is not attached by ancient grammarians to words meaning 
‘route’ or ‘path,’ it was thought to be derived from the verb discere, ‘to learn.’ And since 
ancient education was fundamentally modeled as ‘ways’ and ‘routes,’ the trivium and 
quadrivium of the arts, disciples are those who journey along the paths marked by the 
practical experiences of their masters…183   
Carruthers complements the derivation of disciplina from “discere” with “ducere” (“to lead”) and 
“docere” (“to teach”). In this light, the relationship between a disciple and teacher entails 
embarking on a shared journey.  
 I have mentioned the translation issues with respect to the ordo disciplinae. There is also 
another translation issue in the opening prologue. The difficulty is the word “tradere.” Thomas 
writes: “Propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent, eo modo 
tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientum.” Mongeau explains that the original 
Blackfriars translation rendered “tradere” as “to treat of,” thereby suggesting that Thomas was 
producing a treatise. However, Mongeau, following Roy Deferrari, argues that “the more obvious 
translation is ‘to hand over, to pass on, to transmit,’ which aligns the phrase with the theological 
understanding of ‘tradition.’”184 A correct translation is critical because “to hand over, to 
transmit” suggests a joint, organic, ongoing and incremental active exercise pursued by teacher 
and student alike, rather than a static treatise, any part of which a reader can turn to in order to 
                                                
182 Michael Sherwin, O.P., “Christ the Teacher in St. Thomas’s Commentary on the Gospel of John,” in Reading 
John with St. Thomas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology, eds. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew 
Levering (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 174. 
183 Mary Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 74. 
184 Mongeau, “Spiritual Pedagogy,” 91. He suggests this translation: “We propose in this work to hand on 
whatever belongs to the Christian religion in a way that fits with the education of beginners.” 
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find the answer to a question. Tradere is linked by way of the metaphor of the “hand” to the 
rhetorical aim, manuductio. Further, as tradere is aligned with tradition, manuductio here means 
handing on what one has received. In the Summa, what has been received and is handed on is the 
tradition of the Christian religion. These more accurate translations even allow a conversational 
dynamic of listening and speaking to emerge. It is important to hold all of these connotations 
together in order to gather Thomas’s meaning of proceeding according to the ordo disciplinae. In 
the Summa we find a man who has mastered the discipline of sacra doctrina and seeks to both lead 
and teach those who desire to learn this discipline by a route amenable to their journey as 
beginners. 
 In the scholastic period, as a pedagogical order, the ordo disciplinae technically addresses 
problems for understanding, which are to be distinguished from problems of coherence. The 
former seek understanding; the latter seek to settle matters of fact. In this way, they correspond to 
the acts of understanding and of judging, respectively. Problems for understanding were just 
beginning to develop scientifically during scholasticism’s dawn. 
 Peter Abelard had focused his contemporaries’ attention on the lack of harmony in the 
theological tradition, as exemplified by the title of his work, Sic et non (1120). Specifically, he 
highlighted the existence of incoherencies in theology in which two arguments yield contradictory 
conclusions. However, he did so without attempting to solve the dilemma.185As Chenu explains, 
this opposition between authorities extended beyond the immediate exegesis of the text with a 
view to enlarge upon doctrines, in themselves.186  As this shift from textual exegesis to doctrines 
occurred, the technique of the quaestio also developed:  
                                                
185 For example, the Holy Spirit is a se and not a se, both from itself and not from itself. When asking 
whether the Holy Spirit is a se (videtur quod non), the answer is no, since the Spirit is from the Father and 
the Son. But then one might remember (sed contra est) that the Spirit is God and God is a se. Therefore, the 
Holy Spirit is a se. Here, the question (videtur quod non) culminates in expressing a problem of coherence. 
186 See Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, 86. 
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It became no longer a simple question of submitting to research those problems already 
under discussion or still open to debate. Even the points accepted by everybody and set 
forth in the most certain of terms were brought under scrutiny and subjected, by 
deliberate artifice, to the now usual processes of research. In brief, they were, literally speaking, 
‘called into question,’ no longer because there was any real doubt about their truth, but because a deeper 
understanding of them was sought after. Theologians as well as philosophers asked the question: 
Does God exist?…Yet, of the question, only the form remained, with the typical word 
Utrum [Whether] everywhere, and over and over…187 
In other words, theologians were inquiring anew after what they already believed to be true, as 
evidenced in Thomas’s aforementioned Quodlibet.188 Their questions did not disclose doubt, but 
rather, a desire to know the mysteries of faith with greater depth. When Thomas asks the 
“whether” question, he is not simply settling a matter of fact or proving. Rather, he seeks a deeper 
understanding by “calling into question” what he believes. The technique of the quaestio, along 
with the theorematic differentiation of faith and reason, promoted the development of a 
methodical approach to faith’s seeking of understanding.  
 While Abelard pointed to a preliminary ordering of topics, his primary goal was to 
demonstrate that incoherence existed. To that end, the relevant and controlling relation is the one 
between the two contradictory arguments and their conclusions, not the interrelation among the 
questions addressed. This is because his intention was to demonstrate conflict, not order theology 
from within; he was not seeking the internal order of scientific theology. This focus raised 
methodological difficulties when theologians attempted to move from the problem of coherence to 
the problem of understanding, as they did with the emergence of the summae genera.189 
 In response to these problems of coherence, Peter Lombard collected and organized 
material for their solution in his masterpiece, the Sentences (1158). Lombard juxtaposed 
authoritative opinions and set forth his own resolution to apparent contradictions. He thus began 
to pursue the question as expressing a problem for understanding. While Abelard’s text was 
                                                
187 Ibid., 86-87 (emphasis added).. 
188 It is another thing to be clear about this difference, especially in relation to human knowing. 
189 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 22-23. 
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driven by the problem of coherence, not the problem of understanding, Lombard and the 
theologians commenting on him were seeking understanding, for in seeking answers, these 
theologians were moving beyond the problem of coherence to the problem of understanding. 
Theology as a science was developing. The commentaries on the Sentences began working out answers. 
However, the questions themselves were still disorganized, in part because they took their cue 
from the Sentences, which took its cue from Abelard’s compilation of the problems.190  
 As theologians began working on the problem of understanding, “they soon discovered 
that questions cannot be put in any order whatsoever. Some questions simply cannot be answered 
until others have been resolved. And sometimes the answers to one question immediately provide 
the answers to others.”191 The primary reason for the deficiencies of the Sentences and its 
commentaries was that these texts did not adequately transcend the problem of coherence and so 
they could not pursue the problem of understanding freely.  
 The historical scholarship indicates that it was in the context of developing his own model 
of theological education that Thomas embarked on the project of composing his own Summa 
theologiae. This means pedagogical and theological concerns and methods are intertwined in the 
inception of his masterpiece. His dismay over the Sentences and incisive grasp of its shortcomings 
came during his time at Santa Sabina.192 It was while attempting to teach his students using the 
Sentences that he realized its orderings and its commentaries’ orderings were not scientific enough. 
Instead of forcing students to pursue theology according to the established methods, Thomas 
wanted to help them learn sacra doctrina in a way suited to beginners. He discovered that 
theological questions themselves have to be intelligibly ordered in order to effectively pursue the 
problem of understanding. Thus, we observe a difference in the order of questions in his Sentences 
                                                
190 While Lombard had offered a topical organization, there is not yet a systematic ordering of questions. 
This is evidenced, not in the least bit, by Thomas’s and Bonaventure’s dismay over having to teach 
according to the order of the Sentences.  
191 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 22-23. 
192 Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’, 280. 
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commentary and his Summa theologiae in which he distinguished the order of learning from the 
order demanded by commentaries.  
 This right ordering is the ordo disciplinae as pedagogical, and it is what is in control of 
Thomas’s wise organizational decisions in the Summa. Thomas selects this internal order because 
he has discovered and made the wise judgment that answering questions individually and apart 
from their relation does not solve the problem of understanding catalyzed by the problem of 
coherence. Moreover, the ad hoc approach does not meet the natural desire to know. In fact, 
texts wear students down when they are not ordered in a way suitable to understanding the 
material at hand. Instead, the condition for understanding is to order the questions in such a way 
that you begin with the first problem.193 What makes a problem first? One, its solution does not 
presuppose the solution of another problem(s). Two, solving the first problem makes solving the 
next one easier, faster. Three, the process continues. Beginning with the first problem is the 
starting point proportionate to the problem of understanding. Lonergan writes: 
Thus, the problem of understanding is solved not because individual answers are 
provided to individual questions one at a time and separately, but because the whole 
series of questions is ordered by wisdom, because the first question is solved by a highly 
fruitful act of understanding, because the later questions are solved in an ordered way by 
the efficacy of the first solution, because a system of definitions is introduced through 
which the solutions can be formulated, and because a technical terminology is developed 
for expressing the defined concepts.194 
Compare this with the second sentence of the Summa’s opening prologue:  
For we have considered that beginners in this doctrine have been considerably hampered 
by what various authors have written, partly on account of the multiplication of useless 
questions, articles and arguments; partly, also because those things that are needful for 
them to know are not taught according to the order of learning, but according as the plan 
of the book might require, or according as the occasion for disputation arises; partly, too, 
because frequent repetition brought about weariness and confusion to the minds of the 
readers.195   
                                                
193 By contrast, the condition for the problem of coherence is to order the material so a problem emerges. 
194 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 24-25. 
195 ST Ia, q. 1, prol. 
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It is pedagogically expedient to begin the first problem for understanding because it circumvents 
confusion and weariness, and even replaces them with their opposites because of the intelligible 
and spontaneous progress from one question to the next. Rather than raise pointless questions, 
each answered question discloses new questions, and prior answers both illuminate the way 
forward and are themselves made more intelligible and meaningful in the present context. Thus, 
there is also the excitement that comes with the ever-deepening understanding. Rather than 
repeat things haphazardly, Thomas uses repetition rhetorically to initiate students into the full 
meaning of the term by exercising their intellect. Rather than confuse and weary the student, the 
ordo disciplinae propels the student along, enlightening and enlivening. Moreover, all the while, 
Thomas develops technical terms from the beginning. They will not undergo any significant 
alterations, but instead become part of the student’s toolbox for raising and answering further 
questions. This initial introduction and gradual unfolding of terms is evidence of Thomas’s 
pedagogical expertise. As Ignatius Eschmann writes: 
The didactic skill visible in the Summa consists in this, that at the beginning of a given 
treatise principles and doctrines are proposed in the clearest and simplest way, but not 
with all their implications made expect. The student is supposed to consider these 
doctrines to understand them as far as possible, but also to hold them in the memory, 
ready to be used at anytime. Everyone familiar with the Summa knows the almost endless 
repetition of certain principles, their use in different contexts, and of the new light which, 
consequently, is again and again thrown upon them. Thus the student will be able to fill 
in more and more details, penetrate more and more the virtuality of a given principle, 
and so more and more transform into formal, intellectual, possession that which first was 
only a material possession of memory. The transition from implicit to explicit knowledge 
is indeed the key to the extremely artful pedagogy of the Summa. This transition takes 
time: intellectual growth is as slow as, if not slower than, physical growth. The two virtues 
required fro the accomplishment of fruitful work in the Summa are patience and 
persistence, doggedness.196 
 Ultimately, the problem of understanding for Thomas is not about having the best order 
among all summae; it is about handing on the Christian religion to Dominicans who must end their 
education with greater fervor than they experienced in the beginning in order that they may be 
                                                
196 Eschmann, “Saint Thomas Aquinas O.P., the Summary of Theology I-II,” 7. 
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good ministers of God’s word and grace. It is not about helping students memorize useful 
knowledge; it is about causing understanding in the student himself, through the medium of the 
inner word, so that he in turn becomes a teacher. The ordo disciplinae is an order conducive to this 
kind of personal transformation because it is developed in accord with the student’s immanent 
and dynamic self-correcting process of learning. I now consider one final aspect of this process of 
learning, and how it figures in to Thomas’s theological method. 
6.2 The Ordo Disciplinae as an Explanatory and Synthetic Order  
As an explanatory order, the ordo disciplinae seeks to form the student into a particular kind of 
knower, namely one who understands the causa essendi. The pedagogical goal is not description but 
explanation—that is, understanding things as they relate to one another rather than as they relate 
to oneself. We saw one example of this in the development of trinitarian doctrine. Another 
example is “98.9” (explanatory) versus “hot” (descriptive). Description deals with things as related 
to me, e.g., something might feel hot to me but cold to you, depending on our body temperatures. 
Explanation is not totally independent of description, for it deals with the same things, but as 
related among themselves, e.g., a metal object may feel cooler than a piece of wood, even though 
both are the exact same temperature.197 In terms of theology, insofar as sacra doctrina is scientia, it 
seeks explanations.  
 Additionally, in the Summa theologiae, the move from description to explanation can also be 
understood as commensurate with tone and goal of the Summa’s spiritual pedagogy. Reading the 
Summa and appropriating its theocentric organization can have a decentering effect on the reader. 
In other words, the Summa can invite the ready reader to see herself in relation to God and to 
                                                
197 This temperature can be measured by a thermometer, which does not relate hot and cold to me, but to 
gradations on a column of mercury. Recognizing the connections between description and explanation is 
important, lest we presume that one type of knowing (usually explanation) is true while the other is false 
(usually description), rather than appreciate that both are correct ways of knowing something, but from 
different perspectives and to different ends. Nevertheless, description and explanation envisage things in 
fundamentally different ways. 
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everyone else under God (or “sub ratione Dei,” as Thomas puts it), rather than seeing herself as the 
center of everything.198 The move from description to explanation is commensurate with the 
decentering theocentric organization of the Summa because Thomas explicitly considers God, first 
and foremost (e.g., Ia, qq. 2-43), and he considers everything else only insofar as it is related to 
God (e.g., Ia, qq. 44-102), or insofar as everything in the created order is interrelated, under God 
and governed by God’s providence (e.g., Ia, qq., 103-119). The reader can understand Thomas’s 
theocentric approach – he can grasp the theological points made about the Christian God. But he 
can also mean and perform this theocentrism, such that he undergoes the displacing spiritual 
transforming of ordering his mind and heart to God, and to the common good, rather than to 
himself. As will be seen in the final chapter, this theological theocentrism of the Summa supports 
Christianity’s existential, spiritual theocentrism.   
 The ordo disciplinae is also a synthetic order. Human wonder is persistent and so 
understanding continues developing even once its reached an explanation of something it sought 
to know. The results of human knowing accumulate, and in more than an additive way. When 
the natural desire is for an explanatory account of something, it is left unsatisfied by unrelated or 
loosely related insights. Instead, human wonder pushes towards a unifying insight. In other words, 
it pushes toward synthesis, which is the product of what Thomas calls “intelligere multa per unam” 
(knowing many things according to a single intelligibility).199  
 Understanding itself is per se synthetic because God, who is ipsum intelligere (understanding 
itself), knows everything through the one divine essence. As Thomas writes, “We say that God 
sees himself in himself, because he sees himself through his essence; and he sees other things not in 
themselves, but in himself, inasmuch as his essence contains the similitude of things other than 
                                                
198 I use “theocentric” in contradistinction to “self-centered,” not in contradistinction to either 
“christocentric,” “pneumacentric,” or “trinity-centric.”  
199 See ST Ia, q. 58, a. 2, ad. 1. 
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himself.”200 It is on account of our created participation in this uncreated light—which is per se 
synthetic—that our desire to know spontaneously drives us toward the same single view God has, 
even though its attainment is supernatural and never comprehensive. 
 However, given the limitations of our created intellectual light—our human mode of 
knowing—we have to approach synthesis discursively. Likewise, we have to approach simple 
things by way of complexity. In response to a question on whether God’s knowledge is discursive, 
Thomas offers an account of this naturally discursive nature of human understanding:  
In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our 
knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we 
have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while 
the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we 
arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. 
For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we 
understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the 
parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one 
(thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. 
Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this 
second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from 
principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse 
thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the 
first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, 
but from the first. Now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, 
by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects 
in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.201 
By grasping the parts as in the whole, one’s understanding of both the whole and the parts is 
enriched. Synthesis is this understanding of one thing in another rather than one thing from 
another. The latter is merely discursive and can stop short at the accumulation of piecemeal 
insights, like “the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments”202 Thomas so 
lamented. This is a particular kind of insight, a synthetic insight according to which one grasps 
                                                
200 Ia, q. 14, a. 6. Also see ST Ia, q. 14, aa. 4-7. Thomas says the same in the trinitarian questions in the 
context of the Word (ST Ia, q. 34). 
201 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 7c (emphasis added). Thomas’s consideration of human understanding as both discursive 
and synthetic usually comes in the context of comparing the human, angelic, and divine intellects. Also 
cf. Ia, q. 58, a. 1 on angelic knowing. 
202 ST Ia, prol. 
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many objects in a single view. In human beings, synthetic understanding always represents the 
culmination of a development. We have now considered what made the ordo disciplinae of the 
Summa possible, and what the technical meaning of this ordo is.  
7. Conclusion 
This chapter that has attempted to integrate the form and content of the Summa within an overall 
creedal plan and pedagogical method toward the goal of synthetic, explanatory understanding. I 
conclude by complementing Chenu’s suggestion that the plan of the Summa is cyclical with the 
suggestion of scholars such as Michel Corbin, P.E. Persson, and Jean-Pierre Torrell that its plan is 
concentric, which will serve to integrate these various elements. We have seen an aspect of this 
narrowing centricity in the development of the imago Dei. Laporte uses the image of a cone with 
three slices to describe the three parts of the Summa: “The bottom and foundational one depicts 
the creation-wide scope of the Prima Pars, the middle one the human scope of the Secunda Pars, and 
the narrowest one the Christ-related scope of the Tertia Pars.”203 I will borrow this image and 
relate it to that of a circle. These complementary images integrate the scientific, pedagogical 
movement of the Summa with its salvation-historical dynamism. 
 To return to science and first principles, the emphasis on deduction that comes with this 
Aristotelian approach can cause readers to lose sight of the manner in which conclusions, 
especially more remote conclusions, are related to their principles. However, as Stebbins writes of 
the relation of remote conclusions to their principles: “That relation is not extrinsic, as is the 
relation of the first link in a chain to subsequent links. Instead, it more closely resembles the 
relation of the centre of a circle to a series of successively wider circumferences: each conclusion 
enlarges the field of data that the principle is seen to order and unify in a single whole.”204 
                                                
203 Laporte, “Christ in the Summa,” 231. 
204 Stebbins, Divine Initiative, 95. 
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 What we have encountered in studying how holy teaching is a science and how the ordo 
disciplinae operates therein is that Christ is both the center of the circle: Christ is the real first 
principle of holy teaching and the first teacher in the ordo inventionis. He is also the tip of the cone, 
which if looked at from above, he is the center of the concentrically narrowing circles. Stebbins’s 
concentric circles widen because the student is learning more and more, in an orderly fashion, 
and approaching the synthetic understanding in which he will understand all in one. Laporte’s 
cone narrows because it is moving more and more deeply into the first principle of sacred 
doctrine – the consummation of all theology. Our understanding widens as we move more deeply 
into the center of salvation history and the incarnation of Wisdom. 
 It is here that Thomas’s spectacular synthetic achievement comes to the fore, as the 
condition for the possibility of such a pedagogically wise ordering. The desire to know 
spontaneously seeks synthesis. However, because in human beings synthetic understanding is 
always the culmination of a development, a teacher cannot share the synthesis he has achieved in 
one fell swoop. Instead, he must proceed according to the ordo disciplinae, putting the students’ 
discursive reasoning at the service of the synthesis he hopes to gradually and eventually teach 
them. Christ is the culmination of this development, at once the most concrete and particular 
moment in divine revelation as well as the fullness—and the synthesis, so to speak—of divine 
revelation. The most concrete is also the most synthetic because it is the incarnation of divine wisdom. 
At the end of the Summa, had Thomas completed it, we can surmise that the Dominican who 
traveled the journey initiated by God and cultivated by Thomas would have looked back with 
wisdom and charity, prepared to take up the mixed life for the common good, helping other 
Dominicans and the laity make the same journey toward their final communal glory. It is for the 
sake of this destiny that sacra doctrina was necessary in the first place.
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                       
EMANATIO INTELLIGIBILIS: THE INNER WORD  
1. Analepsis and Prolepsis 
THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER EMPHASIZED THE significance of Thomas Aquinas’s theological 
method for his composition of the Summa theologiae. His method was informed by his differentiation 
between the two operations of the mind (understanding and judging) and their relevance for 
theology.1 Thomas insisted that the goal of sacra doctrina in the Summa theologiae was understanding, 
which he pursued according to a method known as the ordo disciplinae. Along similar lines, Thomas 
also carefully distinguished between faith and natural reason and the corresponding twofold mode 
of truth.2 As the supernatural order is disproportionate to the natural order, so too are the reasons 
proportionate to supernatural mysteries disproportionate to human intelligence. It follows that 
faith and natural reason belong to two different orders and must be methodologically 
differentiated. Thus, Thomas distinguishes the kinds of reasons available for the mysteries of faith 
from those available for naturally known realities. Human beings cannot know the reason (the 
‘why’) for the mysteries of faith because that reason is the divine essence, which in this life is not 
understood. Given this, Thomas instead endeavors to illuminate the mysteries through analogies 
and arguments of fittingness, which are based upon our knowledge of creatures. Our natural 
knowledge as creatures comes either by way of external sense experience or by interior 
experience. The former begins from sensible data, while the latter begins from psychological data. 
The psychological analogy is one such analogy, starting from the interior experience of the 
human mens (mind), pursued in order to illuminate the trinitarian mystery. This chapter prepares 
the way for the psychological analogy (Chapter 5) by continuing the exploration of Thomas’s 
position on understanding. Now, the focus on understanding deepens by pursuing the meaning of 
                                                
1 For these two operations, see Aquinas, Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, q, 5, a. 3 c: For the relation of these 
two operations to theology, see Aquinas, Questiones quodlibetales, 4, q. 9, a. 3. 
2 See SCG 1, ch. 1-9; esp. 3, §2. 
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the emanationes intelligibiles of the verbum and amor (intellectual emanations of the inner word and 
love), which are relevant for Thomas’s trinitarian theology and his theology of the divine missions. 
In this chapter, I will treat the intellectual emanation of the inner word. In the following chapter, 
I will treat the emanation of love. In order to differentiate these two processions—which are alike 
insofar as they are both intellectual processions (processio intelligibilis)—I take up a term Thomas 
uses in his questions on human knowing and willing—“inclinatio intelligibilis.”3 When focusing on 
their differences, I call the intellectual procession of the inner word an emanatio intelligibilis and the 
intellectual procession of love an inclinatio intelligibilis. 
2. Introduction: Emanatio Intelligibilis and Trinitarian Theology  
The psychological analogy is based on the suggestion that the divine processions can be conceived 
on an analogy with the human mind, and specifically, with what is highest in the mind.4 For both 
Augustine and Thomas, this meant attending to the human mind in its most rational operations, 
where rationality is understood in the context of the mind’s capacity for reflection.5 Specifically, 
we must understand what Thomas names the “emanatio intelligibilis” because it is what in us is 
supposed to be analogous to the divine processions, and especially what he means by calling such 
emanations or processions “intellectual.”6 This is the technical term Thomas developed to explain 
what Augustine meant by the verbum intus prolatum. For example, the opening question of the 
trinitarian questions in the Summa theologiae Thomas uses this term to specify the only type of 
procession in us that might illuminate the divine processions: 
                                                
3 ST Ia, q. 87, a. 4.  
4 See ST Ia, q. 93, a. 6. 
5 See especially De ver. q. 1, a. 9; q. 10. Merriell expertly demonstrates that the developments observable in 
Thomas’s trinitarian theology throughout his career came from his engagement with De trinitate. 
Thomas’s understanding of this text and precisely what Augustine selected as a trinitarian analogy and 
why underwent significant development. See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity. I will return to Aquinas’s 
development when discussing the imago Dei. 
6 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1. 
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Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to 
local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for 
instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by 
way of an intelligible emanation [emanationem intelligibilem], for example, of the intelligible 
word [verbi intelligibilis] which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense 
the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.7 
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas explained in greater detail the types of processions that must 
be eliminated, concluding, “God is manifestly incorporeal. We are, therefore, left to understand 
the divine generation according to an intellectual emanation [intellectualem emanationem].”8 In the 
Summa, Thomas seems to generalize “emanatio intelligibilis” at least once to discuss the procession of 
love from the intellect and in the will, calling it an “inclinatio intelligibilis.”9 
 However, Thomas does not use the term especially frequently, though variations of it do 
appear as early as his Parisian Sentences commentary.10 This infrequency, both in the Summa and in 
his earlier writings  (and the variations of emanatio intelligibilis that occur) may account for the lack 
of attention it has received in Thomist scholarship. Thus, while “emanatio intelligibilis” is certainly a 
Thomist term, its meaning has not received wide attention. Moreover, it is a highly elusive term 
and it is difficult to understand. However, as Crowe underscores, “The occurrence of this phrase 
in two key loci for Thomist trinitarian doctrine cannot but be significant for the meaning Thomas 
                                                
7 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1c.  
8 SCG 4, c. 11, §8.  
9 See ST Ia, q. 87, a. 4c. Cf. ST Ia, q. 19, a. 4. 
10 According to a search through the Index Thomisticus, “emanatio intellectualem” occurs in the Summa Contra 
Gentiles (4, c. 11, §8;  c. 42, §1) and “emanatio intelligibilis” occurs in the Summa theologiae (Ia, q. 27, a. 1c). 
These two phrases mean the same thing. A slight variation, “emanatio intellectus” occurs in ST Ia, q. 34, a. 
2c as well as in De veritate (q. 2, a. 4 arg. 7) and even in the Sentences Commentary (bk. 1, d. 27 q. 1 a. 1 ad 4; 
q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1 ad 1). In the Summa theologiae, Thomas sometimes uses “actionem intelligibilem” to specify the 
procession of the Word. Another phrase—processio intelligibilis—which means the same thing, appears in 
two additional texts, In De divinis nominibus (1, lect. 3) and In Ioan. (c. 5, lect. 3, no. 750). Thomas also uses 
“verbum intelligibile,” which according to the Index Thomisticus, he uses in Summa Contra Gentiles, book 4. It 
also appears in Catena Aurea: John. There, Thomas is quoting Augustine. He returns to that quote in In 
Ioan., c. 8, lect. 3, no. 1183. 
 Cf. Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 183-85. After citing a number of texts in which 
Thomas uses the word “intelligibilis,” Lonergan concludes that Thomas uses that word to designate 
whatever is strictly spiritual. (On the intelligible and spiritual, see below, §2. Introduction: Emanatio 
Intelligibilis and Trinitarian Theology. 
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attached to the phrase.”11 (The two key loci are the above quoted passages.)12 Emanatio intelligibilis 
refers to a particular type of procession that occurs within human consciousness. It designates 
what Lonergan calls “the basic and essential rationality of rational consciousness,” the “operation 
of rational consciousness,” or “reflective rationality.”13 In the last phrase, “reflective” does not 
mean, as Crowe writes, “second act supervening on direct understanding and knowledge; it 
means rather that reflection in a special sense is internal to every procession of a word in us; it 
means the same as the ‘because of’ character of our inner words.”14 Further, this phrase, 
“reflective rationality,” indicates the dynamism of the human mind, the very core of what about 
our minds is least unlike God, where dynamism means a relation of “from…to” As Crowe writes, 
dynamism indicates the “‘because of’ linking ‘from X’ and to Y,’” where X is intelligere, Y is the 
verbum, and ‘because of’ is the intellectual procession of Y from X.15 More specifically, emanatio 
intelligibilis refers in general to the procession of both concept and judgment in us (though in God 
these are one procession) as well as to the procession of love (analogous to the second procession 
in God ) of the Holy Spirit). The burden of this chapter is to articulate the precise meaning of 
Thomas’s elusive term. Once the meaning is grasped, its significance for shedding some light 
upon the trinitarian mystery can be explored. Thus, prior to explaining Thomas’s psychological 
analogy, we must to come to terms with the natural analogues—the emanationes intelligibiles of word 
and love—and the most fundamental reason for their selection.16  
                                                
11 See Frederick E. Crowe, “For Inserting a New Question (26A) in the Pars prima,” in Developing the Lonergan 
Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes, ed. Michael Vertin (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2004).  
12 See ST Ia, 1. 27, a. 1; SCG 4, c. 11, §8. 
13 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 48, 207. Here, “reflective” does not mean the specific act of reflective 
understanding that takes place on third level of consciousness, in Lonergan’s terms. Rather, it means the 
general reflection that occurs in the processions of the word and love. For example, the word “reflects” so 
to speak, the act of understanding from which it arises and on which it depends. In this way, the word, 
like the act of speaking is also intelligent. 
14 Crowe, “For Inserting a New Question (26A) in the Pars prima,”338, fn. 17. 
15 Ibid. 339. 
16 Differentiating the natural analogue from its use in the psychological analogy will clarify the questions 
taken up in the final chapter. There, we will inquire after (1) the relevance or consequences of coming to 
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 In order understand the human mind, we have to understand its immanent terms and 
relations. Relevant to trinitarian theology, in Thomas’s view, are the terms and relations having to 
do with the acts of understanding (intelligere, which includes both direct understanding and 
reflective understanding), its relation to the inner word (concept or judgment, respectively), and 
the relation of understanding and its word to the procession of love in the will. Coming to terms 
with the acts of intellect and will as well as their relations is absolutely central to Thomas’s project 
of developing an analogical understanding of the trinitarian mystery. If they are misunderstood, 
Thomas’s analogy for the divine processions will also be misunderstood.  
 Thomas’s account of the soul, its powers, and its acts was cast in metaphysical 
terminology. However, Lonergan argues convincingly that what Thomas was presenting was 
based on his “having achieved a personal reconnaissance of the psychological facts regarding the 
verbum intus prolatum.”17 That is, Thomas’s metaphysical account of intelligere and the human soul 
“reflected an incisive grasp of psychological realities.”18 Thus, according to Lonergan Thomas 
performed introspective rational psychology in which he came to understand intelligere by 
reflecting on his own acts of understanding (even if Thomas did not thematize his performance in 
psychological terms, or elevate it to a method for psychology or a technique for reflection.19 For 
example, when asking about the human soul’s self-knowledge, Thomas writes: “The human soul 
understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its 
power and nature.”20 This passage attests to Thomas’s insistence that we must grapple with the 
                                                                                                                                            
terms with the natural analogue, (2) the practice of using this knowledge to understand the Trinity, (3) 
and the way this understanding of the Trinity enriches the remainder of the Summa and illuminates the 
very structure and movement of the mixed life of the Dominican preacher and his vocation to hand on 
the fruits of his contemplation in his preaching and teaching.  
17 Frederick Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Foundations for Constitutive Communications,” Lonergan Workshop 
Journal, vol. 10 (1994), 238. 
18 See Jeremy D. Wilkins, “Why Two Divine Missions? Development in Augustine, Aquinas, and 
Lonergan,” Irish Theological Quarterly 77, no. 1 (2012), 56. 
19 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 5-6. 
20 ST Ia, q. 88, a. 2 ad 3: “dicendum quod anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, quod est 
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reality of human intelligence itself and conceive the human intellect in terms of the act of 
understanding. We understand intelligere (the act of understanding) by paying attention to what we 
are doing when we are actually understanding something. Thus, we cannot understand Thomas’s 
natural analogue for the Trinity by mere metaphysical analysis. Rather, with Augustine, Thomas, 
and Lonergan, we must advert to our own interior lives.  
 We will return to this passage in Chapter 5 when considering the imago Dei and what is 
required for growing in likeness to God. For now, it is enough to note that we are attempting to 
know intelligere by its own proper act of understanding through introspective rational psychology in 
order to develop an analogical conception of the divine processions. Such a development is a 
genuine psychological analogy. It is distinct from a psychological analogy that attempts to 
conceive the divine processions by analogy with human intelligence, but misconstrues that very 
intelligence. For example, intelligence is misunderstood when it is understood not on its own 
terms but, on analogy with human sensitive knowledge.21  
 Before proceeding, we must attend to a translation issue with Thomas’s phrase “emanatio 
intelligibilis.” The literal translation, “intelligible emanation,” does not capture Thomas’s meaning 
because intelligibilis had a more robust meaning in the medieval scholastic context than the English 
word “intelligible” does. The Latin word can also be translated “intellectual” or “intelligent.” In 
this way, the Latin word conveys not only intelligible objects, but also intelligent subjects. 
Intelligibility is what is known by intelligent beings. For example, a human being is both 
intelligible and intelligent. She is intelligible because she is a created being, and all of being is 
                                                                                                                                            
actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam.” 
21 See ST Ia, q. 50, a. 1: “The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing 
to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but 
what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagination, 
they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes. Thence came the error of 
the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8). But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a 
reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect alone.” See also 
ST Ia, q. 50, a. 2; q. 75, a. 1. 
  Chapter 3 – Page 151 
intelligible—capable of being understood. She is also intelligent because she can understand and 
know being, at least the being that is proportionate to her intelligence.22 Thus, there is 
intelligibility that is not intelligent, and there is intelligibility that is also intelligent. To distinguish 
the two, we can call the former intelligibility “material” and the latter “spiritual.”23 Emanatio 
intelligibilis is a spiritual intelligibility because it is also intelligent. “Intelligible” in its ordinary 
English meaning is an appropriate translation because causes and proportions are intelligible. 
Thus, insofar as the procession of the word is caused by and in proportion to the understanding 
from which it proceeds, it is intelligible. “Intellectual” is preferable, however, because it 
emphasizes that the emanatio intelligibilis is not a material intelligibility, but rather, a spiritual 
intelligibility that is not just caused by understanding but is because of understanding-in-act. This 
kind of causality is unique to the spiritual order. In what follows, I use “intellectual emanation” or 
leave it in Latin because of the importance of the fact that the emanation is a spiritual 
intelligibility. Sometime, I adopt Robert Doran’s suggestion, calling intellectual emanations 
“autonomous spiritual processions” or simply “spiritual processions.” 
 It is worth noting that Lonergan plays a major role in my examination of the emanatio 
intelligibilis. Lonergan stands out among theologians returning to Thomas Aquinas in response to 
Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical, Aeterni Patris, in which the pope exhorted Catholic theologians to 
operate ad mentem divi Thomae. Lonergan’s explicit intention was “to understand what Thomas 
meant by the intelligible procession of an inner word,” as he remarked in the Epilogue to the final 
chapter of Verbum.24 It seems that no prior Thomist was asking precisely the question Lonergan 
was in this retrieval.25 Thus, as much of my work in this chapter is on understanding Lonergan 
                                                
22 For example, ipsum esse is disproportionate to her intelligence. See ST Ia, qq. 12-13. 
23 See Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 
Volume 3, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 
539 (henceforth Insight, CWL 3). 
24 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 222. 
25 Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Foundations for Constitutive Communication,” 266. 
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because he is such an important teacher when it comes to comprehending Thomas. Lonergan is 
an important teacher because he worked at the intersection of Thomas’s position on human 
knowing and a method for authentically interpreting and retrieving Thomas. As he writes, “Now 
to understand what Thomas meant and to understand as Thomas understood are one and the 
same thing; for acts of meaning are inner words, and inner words proceed intelligibly from acts of 
understanding.”26 I therefore turn to both Thomas and Lonergan in this chapter because the 
ultimate systematic goal of this project is to come to an analogical understanding of the trinitarian 
mystery and the relevance of this understanding to ministry and communicating Christian 
meanings and values.  
3. Paying attention to the Experience of the Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Levels of 
Understanding, Judging, and Deciding 
Three passages from the first trinitarian question in the Summa provide the key to what Thomas 
means by emanatio intelligibilis: 27  
1) “[W]henever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds 
something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing 
from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object.”28 
                                                
26 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 222-23. 
27 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 132-35. 
28 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1c. This translation is Michael G. Shields. See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 
12, 133. Lonergan discovered that the key phrase in this passage had been omitted from the B. Geyer (in 
Florilegium Patristicum XXXVII, 1934) edition of questions 27-32 (Prima pars), as well as from the 
Blackfriars edition, except in a note (see vol. 6, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, and New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1965). The key phrase is ex vi intellectivia proveniens (issuing from our intellective power). When 
omitted, the translation becomes “which is the conception of the thing understood, proceeding from 
knowledge of it,” rather than “which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our 
intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge.” That the inner word proceeds from our 
intellective power is the reason of the procession of the inner word is an emanatio intelligibilis. When the key 
phrase is omitted, Thomas’s meaning is changed and the core meaning of the intellectual emanation of 
the inner word is lost. The edition with the key phrase emphasizes the dynamism of the intellect, namely, 
that the intellect originates meaning (inner words) and does so autonomously (rather than spontaneously 
or rather than concepts popping into it, (perhaps by amnanesis), which it then goes on to understand). 
These elements—which are absolutely essential to what Thomas means by intelligere and its relevance to 
trinitarian theology—are glossed over when the key phrase is omitted. Furthermore, the absolute 
dependence of the inner word on intelligere (on understanding) in which act proceeds from act, is also 
ambiguous in the inaccurate edition. See Robert M. Doran, The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine 
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2) “For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the word; 
since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect…love requires 
by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect…”29 
3) “Whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; 
indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it 
proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the 
intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the 
very act of understanding is made one with the object understood.”30 
By attending to our intellectual experience, we can verify each statement and identify these 
intellectual emanations in our own experiences. In so doing, we will focus on the unique 
characteristics intellectual emanations have as a particular type of procession. These emanations 
are immanent, actual, and intellectual processions. You may be able to recall four different, but 
related, experiences: (1) times when you genuinely understood something and could therefore 
explain what you understood and other times when you merely memorized something and (2) 
times when you judged rashly and other times when you judged soundly; (3) times when you 
loved something because you understood and times when you loved with infatuation or from 
delusion, or perhaps times when people attempted to inspire in you love of their cause without 
convincing you of its value31; and (4) times when you acted unreasonably and other times when 
you acted reasonably. What makes the difference among each instance is an intellectual 
emanation. Intellectual emanation is what is absent from memorization, but present in speaking 
from understanding; absent with rash judgment, but present with sound judgment; absent with 
irrational love but present with rational love; absent with irrational behavior, but present with 
reasonable behavior. The first experience occurs on the level of direct understanding, when you 
are intelligently conscious.32 The second experience occurs on the level of reflective 
                                                                                                                                            
Missions, Volume 1: Missions and Processions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 191 fn. 38 
(henceforth The Trinity in History, vol. 1). 
29 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3. 
30 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1, ad. 2. 
31 See Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 124-25. 
32 “Level” is Lonergan’s metaphor for distinguishing between the various identifiable sets of conscious 
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understanding, when you are rationally conscious. The third and fourth experiences occur on the 
level of decision and action, when you are reasonably or rationally self-conscious. Notice that 
intellectual emanations proceed not from level to level, but within a level. It is only on the level of 
decision and action (what Lonergan calls the fourth level of consciousness), when we are engaged 
with value (rather than with mere facts), that we have the procession of both an inner word from 
understanding, and of love from the word.33  
 Take the classroom as an example. The first instance of intellectual emanation 
distinguishes students who understand the course material from students who merely repeat what 
the teacher said. The worst-case scenario is one in which both the teacher and the students are 
merely regurgitating information. In this case, as the saying goes, the notes of the teacher pass 
from the teacher to the students without passing through the minds of either. Yet a good teacher 
can identify the student who understands because this student is able explain the material in a 
variety of ways; she is flexible, not tethered to the words of the book, and she is able to create her 
own examples. The key is to recognize why intellectual emanation is present in the good student 
and absent in the poor student. A student’s ability to intelligently define, explain, give examples, 
etc. is possible precisely if, and because, she understands and knows that she understands. She 
knows that she is not “faking it.” Instead, she knows that she has a sufficient grasp of the situation 
in order to be able to speak about it and others like it. If we can identify this difference between 
the presence and absence of intellectual emanation on the level of understanding, we will be 
                                                                                                                                            
operations—experience, understanding, judging, deciding/acting (and perhaps, loving). There are limits 
to this “spatial metaphor of speaking of levels of consciousness,” which Lonergan, himself acknowledges. 
Lonergan actually wanted to remove this metaphor and replace it with Rahner’s notion of sublation, 
which is more explanatory. See Bernard Lonergan, “Faith and Beliefs,” in Philosophical and Theological 
Papers: 1965-1980, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 17, eds. Robert C. Croken and 
Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 36. See also Patrick H. Byrne, 
“Consciousness: Levels, Sublations, and the Subject as Subject” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 13, no. 1 
(1995), 138. 
33 That is, we do not break forth into love when we are merely judging the correctness of our insights (the 
level of reflective understanding, when we are rationally conscious).  
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getting closer to understanding Thomas’s meaning in the initial trinitarian article: “Whenever we 
understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a 
conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and 
proceeding from our knowledge of that object.”34 Notice that there are “two stages,” so to speak, 
namely, the insight (“whenever we understand”) and the definition (the proceeding “conception”). 
It is only on account of the fact that we have interiorly spoken a word to ourselves because we 
have understood that we are then able to communicate meaningfully with others. That is, the 
procession of the inner word of definition from understanding is the condition for the possibility of 
communicating what we have understood to others. 
 The second instance of intellectual emanations distinguishes someone who carefully 
considers matters from someone who jumps to conclusions or fails to reach a conclusion despite 
compelling evidence. Again, the key is to identify the reason why intellectual emanation is present 
in the former and absent in the latter. Here, a person judges soundly precisely if, and because, she 
is satisfied with the evidence, and knows it is sufficient. A rash person judges either without 
evidence or by ignoring the evidence. The third instance distinguishes a mature lover from the 
merely infatuated or the unconvinced. Lastly, the fourth instance distinguishes someone who acts 
reasonably (and so has a clear conscience) from someone who acts irrationally (and so rationalizes 
her behavior in order to quell her conscience). The reasonable person chooses a good precisely if, 
and because, she has approved of the worthiness of the good, and knows this approval is a 
sufficient reason to choose it. If we can identify the differences within the third and fourth 
instances, we will be closer to understanding what Augustine and Thomas mean by “knowledge 
with love.” For example, Thomas writes, “Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but 
                                                
34 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1c. However, it should be noted that Aquinas is speaking more broadly in this Article. 
This emanation includes not only the one that distinguishes understanding from memorization, but also 
sound judgment from rash judgment. As will be seen below, understanding (intelligere) for Aquinas 
includes two operations, each of which gives rise to a corresponding word.  
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one Who breathes forth Love [verbum spirans amorem].”35 If we can identify experiences of these 
intellectual emanations in our own lives, we can then inquire after their nature, focusing upon the 
reason for their emergence. As these examples suggest, this reason is grounded in the “because”—
precisely if, and because, one has understood, weighed the evidence to her satisfaction, approved. I 
will expand on this “because-of-ness” in Chapter 4. First, let us return to the three passages from 
the Summa and further our understanding of why the emanatio intelligibilis is the natural analogue 
Thomas selects for the divine processions. 
 The first two passages pertain to the intellectual emanations of word and love, 
respectively. The third passage pertains to the unique relationship of dependence proper to 
intellectual emanation in which absolute distinction is not only unnecessary, but also decreases in 
proportion to the perfection of the procession.36 In order to understand the procession of the 
word, we have to understand the relationship between the act of understanding and its word. In 
order to understand the procession of love, we have to understand the relationship between word 
and love. 
 Before proceeding, a short outline of why the emanatio intelligibilis is the natural analogue 
Thomas selects for the divine processions is in order. Thomas makes a distinction between two 
kinds of immanent processions—that is, a procession that remains within rather than proceeding 
to an exterior effect.37 First, there is the kind that proceeds from potency to act. This is the 
procession of a perfection (e.g, an operation such as the act of understanding) in what is perfected 
(e.g., the possible intellect), which Thomas calls a processio operationis (the emergence of a perfection 
from (and in) what is perfected). Second, there is a procession that proceeds from act to act. This 
                                                
35 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad. 2. 
36 Aquinas begins working the coincidence of principle and term out in SCG 4, c. 11, §1-7. 
37 See ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1: “Careful examination shows that both of these opinions [of Arius and Sabellius] 
take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God 
Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession 
corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession 
corresponding to the act remaining within the agent.” 
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is the procession of something produced by an operation; a procession of something operated; it is 
the emergence of one thing from another. Thomas calls this second type of procession a processio 
operati.38 Both types of processions are immanent processions, and in both we find a distinction of 
principle and term.39 These features are relevant to understanding procession in God. However, a 
processio operationis is ultimately irrelevant to trinitarian theology because it includes potency. A 
processio operati is, however, relevant because it excludes potency; it is a procession that occurs 
entirely within the realm of act. That is, the principle is related to the proceeding term as act to 
act.40 With respect to the Trinity, the divine processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit remain 
entirely within God, the three Persons are distinct according to the relations of principle 
(originator(s)) and terms (originated) among them, and God is pure act. Thus, processio operati is 
relevant because it is an immanent procession, because there is a distinction of principle and term, 
and because it excludes potency. 
 Examples of processions of acts from potency are the emergence of act of seeing a shark 
from the power (potency) of sight in the eye, the emergence of the act of understanding within the 
intellect, or the emergence of the act of love within the will. As examples of processions of acts 
from acts, there is the act of fear proceeding from an act of seeing a shark, an act of defining 
proceeding from an act of understanding, an act of judgment proceeding from an act of reflective 
                                                
38 See De ver. q. 4, a. 2 ad 7. See also SCG 4, c. 14, §3: “In like manner, too, the word conceived by our 
intellect does not proceed from potency to act except in so far as the intellect proceeds from potency to 
act. For all that, the word does not arise in our intellect except as it exists in act; rather, simultaneously 
with its existence in act, there is a word conceived therein. But the divine intellect is never in potency, but 
is actual only, as was shown above. Therefore, the generation of the Word Himself is not like the process from potency 
to act rather, it is like the origin of act from act, as is brilliance from light and an understanding understood from 
an understanding in act. Hence, clearly also, generation does not prevent the Son of God from being true 
God, nor from being Himself eternal. Rather, He is indeed necessarily coeternal with God whose Word 
He is, for an intellect in act is never without its word” (emphasis added). 
39 However, as we saw in the passage from Question 27, this distinction is not absolute; there can be a 
coincidence of principle and term, even while there is an ordered relation among them. I will discuss this 
point in Chapter 5.  
40 A processio operationis can also be an immanent procession involving the distinction of principle and term, 
for example, the emergence of an insight from a question. However, this is an immanent procession that 
involves potency, and is therefore irrelevant to trinitarian theology.  
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understanding, or an act of love that proceeds from an intellectual grasp of the good. Of these 
examples, the procession of fear is irrelevant to trinitarian theology because the procession is 
within human sensitivity. The last three are relevant to trinitarian theology because they are 
within human intelligence. Each one is a processio operati that is also processio intelligibilis, meaning 
that the procession of what proceeds is because of understanding (which cannot be said of the 
procession of fear).41 As Thomas expressed in Question 27, it is this specific type of processio operati 
that ultimately is relevant to trinitarian theology precisely because of the relationship of intellectual 
dependence among principle and term.  
4. The Intellectual Emanation of the Inner Word: Emanatio Intelligibilis on the 
Level of Direct Understanding 
While it can be easier to understand intellectual emanations on the level of reflective 
understanding (judgment), it is also beneficial to proceed according to the order of the levels of 
consciousness, especially for the sake of coming to terms with the primary act of the intellect, 
understanding. Thus, I begin with intellectual emanations on the level of direct understanding 
(insight). What we are trying to catch hold of is the difference between on the one hand, 
consciously ‘getting the point,’ and on other, conceptualizing the point in words and concepts. 
Keep the following chart in mind as we proceed. I will return to it in Section 4.3:  
                                                
41 See Lonergan, Verbum CWL 2, 207. See above on the translation of emanatio intelligibilis, §2. Introduction: 
Emanatio Intelligibilis and Trinitarian Theology. 
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(Act A as act) intelligere: the act of direct understanding (which might or might not  
 function as dicere, i.e., act as a source of speaking what it has understood)   
  (Act A as grounding another act) dicere: the act of direct understanding 
  as speaking, as pivoting on itself to produce a word, as processing from  
  understanding to conceptualizing (which in us includes “sorting or figuring 
  out,” disentangling, formulating what we understand in order to speak) 
 
(Act B) concipere: the act of formal meaning, conceiving, conceptualizing, receiving a verbum 
(inner word), a concept, a definition generated by dicere. 
 
– Intelligere can be understood relationally. It is related to its object (illuminated phantasm) and 
 to its term (word). 
– Notice that intelligere and dicere are the same act (the act of understanding) viewed in two 
 different ways; dicere is really identical with intelligere. Intelligere is one act that has two different 
 modes of operating. It can operate as act (as simply being in act), and then it is termed 
 intelligere. It can also operate as an act grounding another act (in which case it is operating as 
 a procession—the procession of conceptualizing-in-act from understanding-in-act) and then 
 it is termed dicere. 
– Concipere is a distinct act, which proceeds from intelligere. This procession is a processio operati, 
 which is also an emanatio intelligibilis. Notice that intelligere/dicere (Act A) processes toward 
 concipere (Act B). The process is from the formation of the inner word (intelligere/dicere) toward 
 the reception of the inner word (concipere). This procession of act-to-act is what dicere consists 
 in. 
Table 8 
 I offer three preliminary notes, which I will unfold in this section.42 First, intelligere has two 
modes of operating. It operates as the act of understanding (insight) and as the act of speaking an 
                                                
42 I owe the words “disentangling” and “concipere” to Dr. Patrick Byrne. “Disentangling” (and its synonym, 
“formulating”) is the word (the phantasm, if you will) Byrne used to help me understand the series of acts 
under insight’s governance on the way to the final expressing of the insight, where the final expressing 
(the procession) is what, strictly speaking, dicere consists in. As Byrne said during an informal conversation 
we had, “Formulating is a process; but expressing is not the process of formulating; it is the end point of 
formulating.” Insight’s pivoting on itself to produce a word is the actual speaking/expressing/dicens of the 
insight.  
 In a conversation Patrick Byrne had once with Lonergan, Lonergan shared he called the second act 
proceeding from intelligere “concipere.” I have, therefore, decided to use this word to name the second act 
throughout my dissertation. While “concipere” does not appear in his Verbum studies, Lonergan does at 
times use the word “conceptualization” to designate the act that intelligere grounds, which is one way to 
translate “concipere” (though I have chosen, on Byrne’s recommendation, to use “conceptualizing” to 
emphasize that act of conceptualization). For example, Lonergan writes, “The Scotist rejection of insight 
into phantasm necessarily reduced the act of understanding to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, 
while for Aquinas understanding precedes conceptualization which is rational, for Scotus understanding is 
preceded by conceptualization which is a matter of metaphysical mechanics” (Verbum, CWL 2, 39, fn. 
126, emphasis added). Again, Lonergan writes, “Conceptualization is the self-expression of an act of 
understanding; such self-expression is possible only because understanding is self-possessed, conscious of 
itself and its own conditions as understanding…it is in the self-possession of understanding as the ground 
of possible conceptualization that one may best discern what is meant by saying that the self-expression of 
understanding is an emanatio intelligibilis, a procession from knowledge as knowledge and because of 
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inner word; intelligere is an operation (insight) that operates (speaks) an inner word. To put it 
differently, the operation or action of the intellect has two meanings, which Thomas clarified 
exactly because of the precision required by trinitarian theology. As Lonergan writes, “the terms 
operatio or action sometimes mean simply act or being in act and sometimes mean the exercise of 
efficient causality.”43 When the operation of the intellect is meant in the sense of act, it is termed 
intelligere. When the operation of the intellect is meant in the sense of one act grounding another 
act, it is termed dicere.44 Thus, dicere is really identical with intelligere, but it denotes intelligere’s 
operation as grounding another act, as processing toward another act. Dicere is intelligere as a 
principium operati45, and more particularly, as an intellectual procession—as an emanatio intelligibilis—
of a concept from an act of understanding.  It is only insofar as the intellect is in act that it can 
ground another act, which means that it is only insofar as we understand that we can form 
concepts. Insofar as we can distinguish acts according to their object, we can distinguish these two 
modes of operating according to whether the object of intelligere is the intelligibility in the 
phantasm (which initiates the process of understanding), or the inner word (whose procession 
signals the completion of the process of understanding). Understanding is, as Lawrence writes, 
“perfected in the utterance of the inner word.”46  
 Second, notice that we have the procession of an act (concipere) from an act (intelligere)—and 
thus a processio operati. This procession is what dicere consists in. I have termed the second act 
“concipere,” which carries the connotations both of receiving and conceptualizing. This 
terminology is consonant with Thomas’s meaning, though he typically refers to the emergence of 
                                                                                                                                            
knowledge as knowledge.” (ibid., 55-6). Lastly, “rational consciousness (dicere) is the act of understanding 
as ground and origin of inner words of conceptualization and judgment…” (ibid., 152). See also ibid., 38, 
52-53, 56, 58, 70, 72. 
43 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 136.  
44 See ibid. 
45 Principle of a thing produced by an operation.  
46 Frederick F. Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Retrieval of Aquinas’s Conception of the Imago Dei: The Trinitarian 
Analogy of Intelligible Emanations in God,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83, no. 3 (2009), 372. 
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the content of the act (the concept or inner word) rather than the act of conceptualizing itself.47 
Notice that the verbum is not an act, but the content of an act, and specifically, the content of the 
act that intelligere/dicere processes toward. The fact that Thomas names this second act (concipere) 
only implicitly by means of its content (verbum, conceptus) obscures the act-to-act procession. It 
seems that the reason Thomas typically refers to that which proceeds from intelligere simply as 
“verbum,” rather than referring to the second act that proceeds from intelligere is because he is 
working out the meaning of verbum in the context of trinitarian theology.48 In God, there is only 
one infinite act. Thus, the point in trinitarian theology is to emphasize the distinction between 
intelligere and verbum without emphasizing the distinction of acts. However, because we are 
currently trying to understand the natural analogue, we must attend to the distinction of these two 
acts, for in us, one distinct act proceeds from another distinct act.  
 While Thomas only implicitly names concipere in terms of its content, he does refer to the 
emergence of the act of judgment (iudicare) from a reflective act of understanding (intelligere), which 
is the parallel act-to-act procession on the level of judgment.49 For Thomas, the content of the act 
of judgment (the inner word of affirmation/denial) is an expression in the same way the content of 
the act of conceptualizing is an expression. Thus, given the parallel between the contents, it seems 
that while Thomas does not enunciate a technical term for the second act that emerges on the 
level of direct understanding, it is reasonable to conclude that he knew of this second act. 
                                                
47 See Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being: The Hallifax Lectures on Insight, Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan, Volume 5, eds. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2005), 280-81 (henceforth, Understanding and Being, CWL 5).  
48 See above, fn. 38 (SCG 4, c. 14, §3). This is an instance in which Thomas alludes to an act following 
intelligere, though he still speaks in terms of the verbum. 
49 Lonergan aligns conceptualization and judgment (what I call “concipere” and “iudicare”) in a way that 
indicates that he conceives of conceptualization as the act that proceeds from understanding: “There 
remain to be considered the psychology of judgment, the metaphysical analysis of insight, of 
conceptualization, and of judgment…” (Verbum, CWL 2, 59). When Lonergan says “insight,” he means 
both direct insight (from which the act of conceptualizing emerges) and reflective insight (from which the 
act of judgment emerges).  
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 As another preliminary note, while my examples often include outer spoken words, these 
words are distinct from the verbum, from the “inner word” or the “word of the heart” (verbum intus 
prolatum) that Augustine and Thomas mean when they are setting forth their analogies for the 
Trinity.50 Augustine speaks of the inner word as what Lonergan calls ‘prelinguistic’: “for, although 
the words are not sounded, he who thinks utters (them) in his heart.”51 Further, “Whoever is able 
to get hold of a word . . . not only before it is sounded, but even before the images of its sounds 
are revolved in fantasy (cogitatione)…can see…in this dim reflection some likeness of that Word of 
whom it is said: In principio erat Verbum.”52 A prelinguistic “word” is experienced, for example, as an 
interior shift to formal meaning—to knowing what you have understood, to knowing the meaning 
of your insight, to having a sense of the stability and universality of your understanding—that 
precedes any linguistic formulation (including the inner monologues that are clothed in images of 
sound).53 As Lawrence explains, even Gadamer—an expert in hermeneutics—holds the same 
position. Lawrence summarizes: 
Although Gadamer usually stresses that both in the genesis of understanding and in the 
formulation of that understanding we cannot attain true understanding without using 
language, here he insists in that the verbum cordis or inner word is irreducible either to the 
previous use of language by which we come to understand any Sache or matter of concern 
to us, or to the conventional language that enables us to appropriate and express what we 
have newly understood. …Gadamer does not hesitate to recognize the necessity of an 
inner word in our coming to know; he realizes that it grounds his more well-known 
teaching that an intrinsic linguisticality, a naturally dialogical component, is essential to 
being human.54 
In fact, sometimes the language does not yet exist for the concepts expressing our insights, and so 
language must develop beyond what Gadamer calls the “conventional language.” Reflecting on 
                                                
50 It is difficult to figure out a good English word for dicere, given the importance of the distinction between 
“outer spoken” words and the inner word. I use “speaking” to translate dicere, but admittedly this can cause 
some confusion given that outer words are literally spoken. 
51 Augustine, De trinitate, 15.10.17 (Hill, 407-08). 
52 Ibid., 15.10.19 (Hill, 409). 
53 See Ibid. 
54 Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Retrieval of Aquinas’s Conception of the Imago Dei,” 374. Lawrence is referring 
to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: 
Continuum Press, 1989), 422-24. I owe the following Gadamer references to Fred Lawrence. 
  Chapter 3 – Page 163 
the Gospel of John in Truth and Method, Gadamer points to the Church’s gradual realization that 
the Stoic distinction between the verbum insitum (the innate word of the human person’s native 
rationality, inner thought) and “its secondary, diminished externalization,” the verbum prolatum (the 
outer word) was inadequate to express the mystery of the Word that comes forth from the Father 
(John 8: 42).55 Gadamer acknowledged the implication of the shared trinitarian theology of 
Augustine and Thomas, which underscores the priority of the inner word (verbum intus prolatum) to 
language.56 It is only this word that is analogically relevant to understanding the Word of which 
John speaks. As Gadamer writes: “The greater miracle of language lies not in the fact that the 
Word becomes flesh and emerges in external being, but that that which emerges and externalizes 
itself in utterance is always already a word.”57 This word that is “always already a word” is the 
miracle of language, for it is a “word” that is nevertheless prior to language. The inner word is 
completely independent of its external utterance in one or the other conventional language. It is a 
word that is nevertheless prelinguistic, that is, independent of and prior to conventional 
language.58 When Augustine and Thomas turn to the problem of the verbum in order to find an 
adequate natural analogue for the procession of the Word as uttered from the Father as speaking, 
they are concerned exclusively with the this inner word and its relation to intelligere.59 
                                                
55 Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Retrieval of Aquinas’s Conception of the Imago Dei,” 371. The innate word of the 
human person’s native rationality is the conversation we have with ourselves as we try to work something 
out. See also Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 6. 
56 See Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Retrieval of Aquinas’s Conception of the Imago Dei,” 370-71. Lawrence is 
referring to Gadamer, Truth and Method, 420. 
57 Ibid., 420. 
58 Gadamer recognizes the paradox of this so-called “prelinguistic” word: “It may be asked whether we are 
not here using the unintelligible to explain the unintelligible. What sort of word is it that remains the 
inner dialogue of thought and finds no outer form in sound? Does such a thing exist? Does not all our 
thinking always follow the paths of a particular language, and do we not know only too well that one has 
to think in a language if one really wants to speak it? …The ‘language of reason’ is not a special language. 
So, considering that the tie with language is irremovable, what sense is there in speaking of an ‘inner 
word’ that is spoken, as it were, in the pure language of reason? How does the word of reason (if we 
translate intellectus here by ‘reason’) prove itself a real ‘word’, if it is not a word with a sound, nor even the 
image of one, but is that which is signified by a sign, i.e. what is meant and thought itself?” Truth and 
Method, 421.  
59 See Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Retrieval of Aquinas’s Conception of the Imago Dei,” 371-72. See also 
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 Inner words are the source of language, of what Thomas calls “outer words” or “vocal 
sounds”.60 These outer words are linguistic. They can be written or spoken words or they can be 
the imagined-sound words we use “in our heads” as we talk to ourselves. Outer words are 
important and they play an instrumental role as phantasms facilitating our acts of understanding 
and our production of inner words. In this way, language conditions and directs future acts of 
understanding. We use language to think things out. This is the “previous use of language” to 
which Gadamer refers. However, the ultimate source of outer words is understanding, for it is 
understanding that gives rise to inner words, which outer words signify.  
 We have run into an issue of paucity of vocabulary in trying to express the meaning of the 
Latin words “dicere” and “verbum,” and especially, the relationship of the latter to outer words. 
Insights are pre-conceptual (and therefore prior to language, but not in the same sense as inner 
words—the former precede the existence of inner words), whereas inner words are concepts, and 
yet distinct from outer spoken words. “Prelinguistic” is the term Lonergan settles on as 
communicating Augustine and Thomas’s meaning. In the Summa, Thomas addresses the difficulty 
surrounding the meaning of verbum in the question on the personal name for the Son. He 
distinguishes between the interior concept, the vocal sound, and the imagined sound, explaining 
that the first of these is the primary meaning of “verbum”: 
[O]ur own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense 
it is taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is 
said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source…For, 
according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound signifies the concept of the 
intellect. …The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a word: 
wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact the it signifies the 
interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and chiefly, the interior 
concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the 
interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a 
word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that 
‘word’ is called ‘the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and 
understands, and thinks, as light and splendor;’ which is the first kind. ‘Again,’ he says, 
                                                                                                                                            
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 420. 
60 See De ver. q. 4, a. 1; ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1c; In Ioan., c. 1, lect. 1, §25. 
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‘the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart [rursus verbum est quod 
non verbo profertur, sed in corde pronuntiatur];’ which is the third kind.61  
Given Thomas’s threefold distinction, we can understand the verbum cordis that proceeds from 
intelligere as a word without sound, whether voiced or imagined, which itself gives rise to sounded 
words. This is another way to describe the meaning of a “prelinguistic” word that is nevertheless 
uttered or spoken within. The speaking is the aforementioned interior shift, the self-possession of 
one’s act of understanding, the stable experience of reaching a universal definition.  
4.1 Understanding the Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Level of Experience: 
Understanding the “Aha! Moment” and the “Tip of the Tongue” Experiences 
In what follows, two important points arise. One, the primary meaning of intelligere is 
understanding (also called insight). Two, the inner word proceeds because of understanding, 
which means that understanding precedes concepts (and not vice versa). This is an important 
issue. Scotus maintained that concepts preceded understanding. Many commentators agreed. Of 
conceptualism, Lonergan writes: 
Conceptualists conceive intellect only in terms of what it does; but their neglect of what 
intellect is, prior to what it does, has a variety of causes. Most commonly they do not 
advert to the act of understanding. They take concepts for granted; they are busy working 
out arguments to produce certitudes; they prolong their spontaneous tendencies to 
extroversion into philosophy, where they concentrate on metaphysics and neglect 
gnoseology.62 
Lonergan’s Verbum articles demonstrated that this conceptualist interpretation is a misreading of 
Thomas. Thomas, by way of an incisive grasp of psychological fact, emphatically insisted that 
intelligere means understanding, and that it precedes the formation of concepts. This ordered 
relationship between understanding and concepts—between intelligere and the verbum—is the 
central issue of an analogical conception of the divine processions, and must be grasped correctly. 
This procession is the intellectual emanation. In order to come to terms with it, the complex 
                                                
61 See ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1c. 
62 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 194. 
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nature of the act of understanding must be grasped (Act A as act and Act A as an act grounding 
another act, Act B). Additionally, the distinction and relation between understanding and defining 
(Act A and Act B) must be grasped.  
4.1.1 The Question for Intelligence: What? Why? How?  
Human understanding begins with inquiry, with the desire to know. We have experiences, and we 
ask questions about them. In order to answer our questions, we form phantasms (images, which 
can be visual, auditory, etc.) and draw diagrams. We manipulate them to focus our attention on 
particularly relevant elements of the data.63 For example, your teacher asks you to define “circle.” 
You begin imagining some circles you have experienced in your own life. You imagine the 
wooden wheels of wagons and the rubber, metal wheels of your bike. You notice how different the 
two are, and that the latter is much more perfectly round. You wonder why. You wonder what 
makes the bike tire round, or more generally, why any circle is round.64 Before this question 
occurred, you may have been operating only under the necessity of doing the homework. Now 
inquiry has taken over and you have become intelligently conscious. Your question is in charge of 
your intelligent acts. Your inquiry is eliciting images and past memories that it anticipates will be 
helpful to answering your question. Your inquiry is what is doing the structuring of your 
imagination. Inquiry is the phenomenon that makes your imagination creative rather than 
randomly associative.  
 Currently, you are experiencing the tension of having a question and not knowing the 
answer to it. At times it is even frustrating, a “nagging question.” While we have thousands of 
questions of all different kinds, they all have one thing in common—when we have a question, we 
                                                
63 See ST Ia, q. 84, a. 7c: “As anyone can experience for himself, if he attempts to understand anything, he 
will form phantasms for himself which serve examples in which he can consider what he is attempting to 
understand. This is the reason, indeed, why, when we want to help someone understand something, we 
propose examples to him so that he can form phantasms for himself in order to understand.” 
64 The circle is one of Lonergan’s most oft used examples. I use and modify his example it in what follows. 
See Lonergan, Insight, CWL 3, 31-37, 
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are conscious of the fact that we do not know the answer, that we are missing something. Yet, we 
are also conscious of the fact that we have the ability to arrive at an answer.65 In other words, you 
have an interrogative anticipation of the answer, and this guides your imagining. Notice that 
understanding depends on questioning, and questioning depends on the desire to know. 
Questioning is the key activity because it transforms what is potentially intelligible into something 
actually intelligible; that is, questioning makes the object intellectually knowable.  
4.1.2 The Act of Understanding: Insight into Phantasm and Speaking 
Let us return to the example of defining a circle. You play around with these two images of 
circles, until you notice that the cartwheel’s spokes vary in length. The bike wheel, by contrast, 
has equal spokes. And then all of a sudden, it hits you, “I’ve got it! I’ve grasped the intelligibility of 
this particular round thing I’ve been trying to understand.” This is intelligere, or what Lonergan 
calls “insight” (Act A as act). These moments are surprising and can even catch us off-guard. 
Once you get it, you experience a release of tension, which gives way to the joyful pleasure of 
discovery, of “getting it.” It is this release of tension that alerts you to the fact that you have found 
something that might explain what you were looking for in the first place. Nobody tells you that 
you discovered it; it is not something you know because there is some preliminary picture or 
eternal form with which you can compare your insight. Neither is it a recollection, as Plato would 
have us think. As Lonergan writes, “Aquinas replaced mythical Platonic anamnesis by 
psychological fact, and, to describe the psychological fact, eliminated the subsistent Ideas to 
                                                
65 See Joseph Flanagan, Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan’s Philosophy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997), 17. Of course, this arrival may take years or even generations. We can also 
recognize that we are asking about something disproportionate to our intelligence (e.g., the Trinity), and 
so must have recourse to analogies and arguments of fittingness. Lastly, sometimes the insight that occurs 
is inverse, meaning we realize that there actually is no answer to our question because there is no 
intelligibility. For example, asking why evil exists is a question that requires an inverse insight because evil 
is not intelligible, given that it is non-being. But in the face of this inverse insight, another question can 
arise—what is God doing about evil? That is a question we can begin to answer. 
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introduce formal causes in material things.”66 You are conscious of the fact that you understood 
because the tension has evaporated and been replaced by joy.67   
 Despite this joy, another question arises, But what did I get? In order to figure this out, 
you begin trying to formulate what you’ve understood. It is your insight that governs this figuring 
out  what it got, and it is the insight that speaks once it has done so. We are referring to the same 
act, intelligere, but we are now focusing on something else it does—something besides “aha!” (i.e., 
being in act)—namely, speaking a word (i.e., grounding another act). Let us return to the 
question, “But what did I get?” The tension of inquiry may have been replaced by joy, but the joy 
was incomplete because what exactly it was that you got is not yet clear. The “unknown” that you 
discovered is still a bit fuzzy—you cannot yet express to yourself what you understood. Insight still 
needs to sort out the relevant material from the irrelevant material in the phantasm. The reason 
insight does so is because, as Byrne explains, “[a]ny phantasm is always very rich and always 
contains more material than is relevant or necessary for the occurrence of any single insight that 
arises from it. Every phantasm is capable of giving rise to numerous insights. (A red circle can give 
rise to insights about color or about geometry, among other things.)”68 
 We can usually recognize this further question (What did I get?) as a “tip of the tongue” 
experience, or the experience of not quite being able to “put our finger on it.” We know that we 
have “got it” and yet, we cannot yet quite say what it is we have gotten—we are still tied to the 
image that occasioned our insight, and therefore, to the particularities surrounding our insight. 
We have to come to terms with our understanding in order to be able to speak. Perhaps a 
                                                
66 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 195-96. 
67 Of course, the tension can return as further questions arise. Moreover, the spirit of wonder gives way to 
the critical spirit, as another and distinct kind of question arises—the “Is it so?” question. And so, this joy 
that comes with insight is not the end of the process, but it is a crucial aspect. Thus, even though you are 
aware of the fact that you understand, this is not sufficient grounds for affirming that you understood 
correctly. You are simply aware that you have had an insight into the problem at hand, and it might be a 
mere bright idea. I will return to this below. 
68 I owe this understanding to Professor Byrne. This quotation is from a comment he offered on my 
dissertation on July 13, 2017. 
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classmate observes your “light bulb” moment of insight and asks you what you understood, but 
you find you cannot explain yourself. You respond, “Give me a moment,” and you get to work. 
You feel another tension. This tension feels different than the initial tension because now you 
know you are close. Now, it is the tense excitement that comes with being on the verge of 
something. Before (prior to the aha! moment), when you were asking questions and playing 
around with your images, you might go hours or even days without actively considering the 
problem. In fact, the aha! experience may have come when you were not even thinking about 
circles—maybe it came when you were pumping your bike tire and happened to notice the 
spokes.69 No matter what, you could not force the “aha!” experience. The insight did not come at 
your beck and call. It had to come in its own time, on its own terms. Thus, the occurrence of 
insight has a passive, spontaneous character. 
 By contrast, now that you have had the insight, you are actively and autonomously 
working to figure out what it is you “got.” The word is on the tip of your tongue, but you cannot 
quite put your finger on it. Perhaps your eyes travel upwards and off to the right, as if searching 
for the words in your mind. Your insight is now in control of your intelligent acts, whereas prior 
to your insight it was inquiry that was in control of them. You’ve gone from the state of inquiry to 
the state of being intelligent-in-act. Importantly, the same act of intelligence that “got it” is still 
operating. Now intelligence is actively and autonomously trying to speak what it passively and 
spontaneously understood when it got “it.”70  Once you have an insight, your insight takes over 
and is in charge of your efforts to formulate what you have understood. You are operating 
                                                
69 This highlights the reason Thomas considered intelligere a pati. The intelligible species is something received 
in the passive intellect, though its reception is made possible by agent intellect’s inquisitive illumination of 
the phantasm. See ST Ia, q. 79, a. 2. 
70 Recall that your questions passively occur to you. Once a question occurs to you, your inquiry takes over 
your intelligent acts—you play around with images, for example. In this regard, you are operating 
actively and autonomously once a question occurs to you. However, while you can play around with 
images, you cannot force an insight—insights, like questions, passively and spontaneously occur to you. 
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actively and autonomously, and it is precisely your active and autonomous operating that 
proceeds toward another act, concipere.  
 This active, autonomous activity of intelligence is the key point. The tense excitement of 
trying to put something you understand into words is a conscious manifestation of this activity. 
Once you understand what you have understood—that is, once you speak what you have—there 
is another release of tension, but this time it is not the joy of discovery. Rather, it is the 
recognition not only that you have understood, but understanding precisely what you’ve 
understood. While this is also a joyful experience, it is more like the joy of satisfaction rather than 
the joy of discovery; it is relaxing.  
4.1.3 Intelligent Meaning and Defining  
Where the release of tension that comes with the insight (aha!) is like the ecstasy of a young lover, 
the release of tension that comes with the speaking of the inner word is like the calm assurance of 
a mature love. The young lover wants to tell everyone about her beloved, but has not quite 
formulated the ‘why’ of her love. The mature lover is able to avow her love precisely because she 
has formulated the ‘why.’ Yet, like the young lover—for they are one and the same lover—the 
mature lover cannot help but avow her love now that she understands it. Where the young lover 
is impatient at her discovery, the mature lover speaks up because it is unthinkable not to. 
Furthermore, the mature lover is in the stable state of having grasped and firmly holding the 
reason for her love. In other words, you cannot help but utter your understanding (dicere, Act A as 
grounding Act B) in an act of conceptualizing, of defining, of formal meaning (concipere, Act B), 
and when you do, you experience a sense of completion, stability, satisfaction. Dicere, as the act of 
intelligere (understanding) formulating itself, is the (proximate) origin, and its term is concipere.71 
                                                
71 I owe this way of putting it to Professor Patrick Byrne. 
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 This experience of needing to speak once you know is most noticeable when you recall 
moments of finally “putting your finger on it.” However trivial your understanding, you feel a 
desire to tell someone about it. You could not really tell anyone about it while it was still on the tip 
of your tongue. If you had tried, your words would be confused, ambiguous—though this effort 
could help you in finding the words for your understanding. But once you do find the word for it, 
you want to share it with others. You find what you have understood exciting, meaningful. And 
perhaps more importantly, you want to share your understanding with others because it is yours; 
because it expresses you, and you are different because of your new understanding. You have 
moved beyond yourself, who you were, by this understanding. You are becoming someone on 
account of your understanding. In this way, the inner word you speak about what you have 
understood is also always a self-expression. 
 Notice that the speaker and the spoken word are distinct, and yet there cannot be one 
without the other, as with the lover and love. They are relative terms. As Augustine writes, “And 
[lover and love] are called two things relative to one another. Lover has reference to love, and love to 
lover; for lover loves with some love, and love is of some lover…take away lover and there is no 
love; take away love and there is no lover.”72 The same is true of speaker and the spoken inner 
word. The act of speaking (dicere) grounds the relationship between the speaker and the speaking.73 
Thus, lover : love :: speaker : speaking. In us, having an insight and having a word are different 
acts (or states of being). Insight entails both the excitement of the aha! experience as well as the 
relaxing satisfaction of coming to terms with your insight and thereby being able to speak. The act 
of defining (or having a word) is like the experience of being in possession of oneself—of knowing 
exactly who you are, where you came from, and how you came about, and why you are here. 
Why? Because defining emerges precisely because insight has understood what it “got.” The inner 
                                                
72 Augustine, De trinitate, 9.1.3 (hill, 272-73). 
73 See, for example, ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3. 
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word of definition intelligently expresses what insight got because it was spoken by the insight, 
which knows itself as the sufficient grounds for speaking. The word therefore knows that it has 
nothing of its own but everything from the insight from which it emerged. Yet in knowing its 
dependence, it knows itself and could almost be said to be faithful to its source—the speaker—
because it knows its absolute dependence on its source.  
 To summarize, your intelligent inquiry and imagining set the conditions for an insight to 
emerge. The content of your insight is an idea. However, as yet, you have not spoken, and, 
therefore, you have not conceptualized your idea; your idea is pre-conceptual, meaning it is 
basically undifferentiated and not yet clearly defined. (This is why you have the “tip of the 
tongue” experience—you’ve got it, and yet, you’re not quite all the way there). Your idea is about 
why this circle is round; not about why all circles are round or in other words, what a circle is. 
Your idea is of how this is so or why this is the case. In other words, your idea is of the universal in 
the particular; it is not yet of the universal common to many. That is, you have intelligently 
disregarded what was irrelevant in this particular phantasm, but you have not yet conceived a 
universal definition of this kind of thing, in general. However, your idea can be universalized 
because the here and now of this particular thing are not intrinsic to the idea.74 For this reason, your 
idea (the content of your insight) is the foundation for conceptualizing the universal definition of 
all such similar instances. In order to reach this universal definition, you need to formulate “the 
connection between your idea and the image that evoked it,”75 so that you can set up what you’ve 
understood apart from its material conditions (e.g., ‘this,’ ‘here,’ and ‘now’) that are tethering the 
intelligibility to this one instance.  
 You begin to feel another tension—the tip of the tongue experience as you begin 
formulating your idea. Formulating is of your idea because it is the activity that sorts out what “it” 
                                                
74 I owe this way of formulating the matter to conversations with Jeremy Wilkins.  
75 Mark D. Morelli, Self-Possession: Being at Home in Conscious Performance (Boston: Lonergan Institute, 2015), 
165. 
  Chapter 3 – Page 173 
was that you “got”; it separates what is not intrinsic to the idea (this, here, now) and intelligently 
disregards them as irrelevant to the act of understanding. The content of your formulating is “the 
set of aspects of the image that were essential to the occurrence of your act of understanding.”76 In 
order to determine the essential aspects, you also have to focus on the insight, itself. When you 
formulate your idea, you put your finger on it and finally express or speak it.  
 The content of your act of conceptualizing (the content of your definition) is the idea of 
the universal common to many (not of the universal in the particular). That is, the content of your 
definition is a concept or a word. Now your idea is conceptual, meaning it is clear and 
differentiated because you have formulated the connection between your idea and the image. 
Conceptualizing (concipere) is the terminal activity to being intelligent; it is the terminal activity on 
the level of direct understanding and the inner word is the terminal object of understanding. As 
Thomas writes, “it should be noted that our intellectual word, which enables us to speak about 
the divine Word by a kind of resemblance, is that at which our intellectual operation terminates. 
This is the object of understanding, which is called the conception [conceptio] of the intellect.”77 
The primary activity of direct understanding—of being intelligent—is the insight, but we need to 
bring direct understanding to completion in order to press forward with our desire to know the 
meaning of X (e.g., of a circle). With this terminal activity, your understanding is now of the 
universal common to many (the concept, the word) whereas before, it was of the universal in the 
particular (the formal cause of the material thing) because it was caught up with the image.78  
 To bring the foregoing together, the content of the insight is the idea of the universal in 
the particular. The content of the conceptualizing is the idea of the universal common to many 
(the concept, the definition). Dicere is the procession from insight to conceptualizing, from the idea 
of this particular thing to the concept of all similar instances.  
                                                
76 Ibid. 
77 De ver., q. 4, a. 2c. 
78 See Morelli, Self-Possession, 164-65. 
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 Before proceeding to relate the foregoing to Thomas’s metaphysical language and 
analysis, there is one last relevant experience to note. We can recognize in our students that those 
willing to risk making mistakes generally excel, while those students who prefer to remain silent or 
only give textbook answers by which they are assured they will earn a passing grade do not 
change much over the course of the semester. I can recognize this fear of mistakes in my own 
intellectual life when I am afraid to put pen to paper and write. I prefer the comfort of research 
and the excitement of insight after insight to the discomfort and challenge of putting these insights 
into intelligent formulations (not to mention the further challenge of judging whether what I have 
understood explains the data of my experience). Perhaps it will become clear to me that I did not 
actually understand. Like my students, the fear of making a mistake or feeling unintelligent 
inhibits me, such that I may not pivot from my insight to speaking. By contrast, where some are 
afraid to speak for fear of discovering their lack of understanding, others speak presumptuously, 
without any concern for the intelligibility of their words.  
 To recognize this in your own experience, try to recall times when you jumped to the 
tension of trying to speak without having actually passed through the release of the tension of 
insight, or even without ever taking time to figure out what your question was. I admittedly do 
this when I want to appear intelligent or keep up with the conversation. I also do this when I am 
impatient or not up to the challenge of taking the time to discern my questions and to really 
understand their possible responses. We may speak and engage in conversations without first 
understanding, but then our outer words will be empty, and perhaps even fake and meaningless. 
For without insight, there is nothing to express in an inner word, and without an inner word, 
outer words are hollow shells, recognizable as language but void of communicable meaning. And 
so I say something in conversation, and another person asks me to explain what I mean. I will 
fumble, backtrack, change the subject because I did not understand. What I am referring to is the 
experience of speaking too soon, whether we do so out of impatience, fear, pride, necessity, etc. It 
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is an important moment in our self-understanding to recognize that sometimes we speak too soon, 
and perhaps have even made a habit of it. Alternatively, speaking before having the words can be 
beneficial if it is directed toward trying to understand and a willingness to make mistakes along 
the way. Often, if I refuse to speak before I understand something perfectly, I rob myself of 
valuable input from others, of the possibility of learning from those who have gone before me. 
Discernment is key. The first situation involves an effort to mask a lack of understanding at the 
risk of never actually understanding what you are talking about. The second involves the risk of 
exposing your own lack of understanding for the sake of actually coming to understand. As 
humans, understanding is a complex process that can be caught up in the dramatic pattern of 
living our lives, though we strive to let the pure desire to know to take over.  
 We now proceed to understand the necessity of inner words, as this will help clarify the 
difference and relationship between the act of understanding and the act of defining that proceeds 
from it. This relationship can be puzzling, but it is the key to the analogy for trinitarian 
processions. The following chart will be a reference point for the next two sections: 
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grounding concipere 
 
 
processio operati 
 
TO 
 
ACT 
 
D
escription of Act 
 
 
 
 
What? 
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Having an insight: 
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insight “got” 
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concept, 
meaning) that 
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insight because 
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what you got 
C
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Idea of universal in 
particular, i.e., the 
intelligibility (pre-
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Set of aspects of image that 
were essential to the 
occurrence of the insight 
Idea of universal 
common to 
many, i.e., the 
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Table 9 
                                                
79 After much consideration, I have elected to refer to the insight (Act A as act; insight), formulating (the 
activity of identifying the set of aspects of the phantasm that are essential to the understanding, the act of 
speaking (Act A as grounding another Act B; speaking; the operation of the intellect as grounding 
concipere)), and the act of conceptualizing (Act B: the act of receiving the inner word/the expressing in 
concepts of what is understood). The most important thing is consistency in our language about these 
conscious operations, and acknowledgment of their spontaneous order.  
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4.2 Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Level of Direct Understanding: Why We Utter 
Inner Words of Definitions 
In order to understand the relationship between the act of understanding and the act of 
conceptualizing, we must clarify why understanding speaks, and what this interior speaking is. 
The first relevant question is, Why are we generally not content to rest with the “I got it!” but 
move on to figure out what it is we “got”? Why does understanding need an inner word? The 
second relevant question is, What is intelligere doing when it is producing or speaking an inner 
word? 
 First, why does intelligere attempt to put its understanding into words? Intelligere pivots from 
the phantasm to the work of speaking a word that expresses what it has understood for two 
reasons. One, because while the insight was into the phantasm, not all aspects of the phantasm 
are relevant to the insight. Recall that any phantasm is always very rich and always contains more 
material than is relevant or necessary for the occurrence of any single insight that arises from it. 
Byrne continues, “When an insight first arises, it is ‘fused’ with that rich, supersaturated, 
originating phantasm, with all of its material, relevant or irrelevant.”80 Yet, as merely insight 
(intelligere) it does not immediately grasp which aspects are relevant. Thus, in order to understand 
itself properly, insight has to “detach itself from the extraneous imaginative material and retain 
only the material that is relevant to its own concrete particularity.”81 Insight is aware of its 
dependence on the phantasm because we form images in order to understand, which helps it 
detach itself from the extraneous material. It is also aware of its independence from the phantasm 
and of the fact that it has understood something over and above the phantasm. Why? Because the 
fact that we raised a question about a situation or thing anticipated an answer that is not provided 
by merely in the phantasm. As Stebbins writes, “While by insight we grasp an intelligibility as 
related to or immanent in a phantasm, we can conceptualize because simultaneously (and 
                                                
80 This quotation is from Patrick Byrne’s comment on July 13, 2017. 
81 Ibid. 
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precisely because of our insight) we also know the intelligibility as something distinct from the 
phantasm.”82  
 Two, we understand by becoming one with what we understand. As Thomas affirms, 
following Aristotle, knowledge is by immaterial/intentional identity—intelligence-in-act is 
intelligibility-in-act. 83 In other words, intelligere becomes an intelligent actuation of the species, i.e., 
of the form, which in a human consciousness is now the intelligible-in-act. That is, the form of the 
understanding in act is assimilated to the form of the understood in act—the possible intellect 
receives the intelligible likeness of the species of the material thing. According to this assimilation, 
we say that the two (understanding in act and the understood in act) are identical.84 It is on 
account of this assimilation that we are said to understand—we understand because we have 
become like the understood in form (that is, in the immaterial element). However, intelligence in 
potency is not the intelligible in potency/material. While intelligere is an intelligent actuation of the 
particular intelligible species, it is also more than the particular species precisely because it is 
intelligent whereas the species is only intelligible. Yes, intelligere has become this species (identity in 
act). Nevertheless, intelligere is not absolutely identical with a species that also exists as the actuation 
of another potency that is distinct from intellectual potency (i.e., the intellect’s capacity to 
understand the species, often referred to as the “passive” or “possible” intellect).  
 Intelligere does not immediately grasp its difference in potency from the intelligible. As 
Byrne has it, it is in formulating “that this difference of potency is grasped.” Further, this act of 
formulating “is the act of understanding, not of the illuminated phantasm, but of itself. It is the act 
                                                
82 Stebbins, Divine Initiative, 11. 
83 See ST Ia, q. 14, a. 2c. 
84 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 158-62. Lonergan quotes Thomas on this point: “This saying of the 
Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason 
of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object 
understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in 
act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself 
understood by the same species as by its own form” (ST Ia, q. 87, a. 1 ad 3). 
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of understanding expressing itself precisely as such.”85 By doing so, intelligere recognizes that “to be 
intelligent” (which is what it is to be intelligere) is not identical with this intelligible species. 
Intelligence recognizes that in intelligence there is more to being intelligent than this particular 
insight—it can be an intelligent actuation of countless intelligible species in act. Intelligere can 
recognize this because we have the experience of intelligence in its unrestrictedness every time we 
have an insight, even though we do not actually attain that unrestrictedness. Because of this 
recognition, it can then figure out what the intelligence that is operating here really is, and by 
knowing what the intelligent contribution is, it can sort out what is essential and what is not, 
which enables us to know the universal common to many (beyond the universal in the particular). 
On the basis of this self-understanding, it can understand what conditioned the understanding in 
the first place, and so understanding can speak an inner word that expresses the insight. In other 
words, because of this self-understanding, insight can speak a word that expresses both the 
intelligibility (contributed by intelligere as its proper content) and its conditions (known by the same 
intelligere).  It is for these reasons that the definition (inner word) is universal—it allows the insight 
to be predicated of many instances, not just the one instance through which you happened to get 
the insight. For example, it allows the insight to be predicated of all circles, and not just this 
particular bike tire through which you happened to grasp “necessary roundness.”  
 To turn to our second questions, what is intelligere doing in its mode of acting as dicere, that 
is, its second mode of operating? It is sorting out the differences between the insight and the 
intelligibility that were not immediately grasped by the insight, and identifying the set of aspects of 
the phantasm that were essential to the occurrence of understanding (that is, the aspects of the 
phantasm that conditioned the insight). The intelligibility in both instances is the same, whether it 
is the received intelligible species or the uttered word expressing what has been understood. 
                                                
85 Byrne, “The Fabric of Lonergan’s Thought,” 48 (emphasis added). 
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However, there is this difference. With intelligere as caused by the illuminated phantasm (first mode 
of operating), the intelligibility is entangled with the phantasm. With intelligere as grounding the 
verbum (second mode of operating), the intelligibility is disentangled from the phantasm. The 
intelligibility may still include general aspects of the phantasm, but only insofar as intelligere has 
understood that it was conditioned by those aspects—that it depended on them for its 
occurrence—thereby making them relevant to the definition. Notice that the sorting out of the 
relevant from the irrelevant material in the phantasm, and so also sorting out the difference 
between the insight and the intelligibility, is not a second act because nothing new is understood. 
The sorting out is done by the intelligere (insight), itself. As such, intelligere takes on the role of dicere. 
 For example, I first understand why a human being is a human being—she has a rational 
soul, which I have abstracted from my phantasm, from this particular image of human being, 
Catherine and her signate matter. Only consequently do I understand that my ability to 
understand this “why” was conditioned by the essential material components, flesh and bones 
(common matter), which allows me to define “human person” as “rational animal”—a definition 
that includes the why (rational) and the common matter (animal, i.e., flesh and bones). While 
initially I disregarded the signate matter (this flesh and these bones), I subsequently realize that I 
could not have understood the intelligibility (the ‘why’) apart from the common matter (flesh and 
bones, in general), which allows me to utter a definition that integrates the intelligibility and its 
conditions (in this case, common matter). In other words, intelligere now understands its conditions, 
which is not a further, distinct, act, but the “deepening” of the original insight. Because of this 
understanding of conditions, I can speak a word interiorly that expresses both the intelligibility 
(contributed by intelligere as its proper content) and its conditions (known by the same intelligere). 
Thus, the inner word expresses not only what is grasped by understanding but also what is 
essential to the understanding in the understood. The verbum, itself, is also thereby disentangled 
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from that particular phantasm, and is instead expressive of the intelligibility of all similar 
phantasms. This is why the verbum is universal.  
 Dicere, then, is intelligere’s mode of acting as disentanglement; its mode of generalizing; its 
mode of processing toward conceptualizing. As such, it is an act of self-possession because through 
this disentanglement, intelligere comes to terms with itself (with its conditions and its proper 
contribution). As Lonergan writes, “Conceptualization is the self-expression of an act of 
understanding; such self-expression is possible only because understanding is self-possessed, 
conscious of itself and its own conditions as understanding.”86 In knowing itself, intelligere knows it 
can speak a word that expresses itself. The inner word, then, is not merely a product of 
understanding, but a known product. In speaking an inner word, we are conscious of what we are 
doing and our grounds for doing so; we are consciously proceeding from understanding to 
conceptualizing. Lonergan continues, “it is in the self-possession of understanding as the ground 
of possible conceptualization that one may best discern what is meant by saying that the self-
expression of understanding is an emanatio intelligibilis, a procession from knowledge as knowledge, 
and because of knowledge as knowledge.”87  
 In more technical terms, this disentanglement process is called “formative abstraction.” 
Formative abstraction is distinct from “apprehensive abstraction” which is not only prior to it, but 
is actually the primary mode of the act of the intellect, intelligere.88 This priority is ontological 
dependence, not temporal priority. While it can be the case that intelligere can sit for awhile as pure 
understanding before dicere and concipere occur, the priority of intelligere is is not that it occurs before 
dicere, but rather, that intelligere has “primary” and “secondary” functions. In other words, insight 
(corresponding to apprehensive abstraction) is the primary mode of intelligere, while the production 
                                                
86 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 55. 
87 Ibid., 56. 
88 This terminology is Lonergan’s. See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 163-179 and esp. 186-90. 
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of the inner word (corresponding to formative abstraction) is its secondary mode.89 Why? Because 
there is no inner word without insight. Understanding can only produce an inner word because it 
is in act. Furthermore, one can understand without formulating one’s understanding. For this 
reason, intelligere is called dicere only after it has produced concipere.90 It is the ontological 
dependence of the production of the inner word on understanding that is the reason for intelligere’s 
priority. Again, it is insight that governs the formation of meanings and definitions, as well as the 
application of these meanings and definitions to things. Quite simply, there is no inner word 
without intelligere because inner words express what intelligere is; they express both its content and 
its act. As Andrew Beards writes, “What Lonergan and, he argues, Aquinas, mean by 
apprehensive abstraction is illustrated by, among other things, Euclid’s definition of a circle as a 
series of coplanar points equidistant from the centre. In understanding what this jumble of words 
in the definition mean we have to experience the conscious insights that give rise to them.”91 
 Apprehensive abstraction “is not of material conditions,” though “it is not of something 
apart from material conditions.”92 Thus, the intelligibility is still entangled with these material 
conditions. But this is only the beginning. As Thomas writes: 
We must further consider that the intellect, having been informed by the species of the 
thing, by an act of understanding forms within itself a certain intention of the thing 
understood, that is to say, its notion [ratio], which the definition signifies. …But the 
intellect has this characteristic in addition, namely, that it understands a thing as 
separated from material conditions, without which a thing does not exist in reality. But 
this could not take place unless the intellect formed the above-mentioned intention [inner 
word] for itself.93  
                                                
89 Andrew Beards has a helpful way of explaining formative abstraction: “[It is] precisely the further 
insightful of activity of our intelligence as we strive to express our conscious insights in words and 
concepts in as coherent and complete a way as possible.” See Andrew Beards, Lonergan, Meaning, and 
Method: Philosophical Essays (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 152. 
90 I owe this understanding and formulation to conversations with Patrick Byrne. 
91 Ibid., 151. 
92 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2 189. 
93 SCG, 1, c. 53, §3. 
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It is formative abstraction that sets up the object apart from its material conditions. It is the same 
object because it is the same essence that is known, either in the particular or common to many.94 
Again, apprehensive abstraction is prior to and the reason for possibility of formative abstraction. 
Insight is into phantasm, and this is intelligere operating in its mode of receiving the intelligible species. 
The formation of the inner word is abstraction from the phantasm, and this is intelligere operating in 
its mode of producing the inner word and grounding the second act, concipere, which receives the 
inner word and thereby means what insight understood. 
 We can now begin to observe here the difference between intelligere and concipere, between 
ideas (as the content of insights) and inner words (as the content of acts of conceptualizing). Where 
understanding (intelligere) is by identity with the understood (in that the possible intellect receives 
the intelligible likeness of the species of the material thing), conceptualizing (concipere) is by 
engagement with the understood. As Thomas explains, the procession of the word is an origin of 
act from act because it is “an understanding understood from an understanding in act.”95 Thus, 
you can now contemplate what you’ve understood (the understanding understood) because you 
have a general, universal word about it; the insight is linked to image, but the concept is free from 
the image; insight has its object in this data, but in speaking a word the insight takes possession of 
itself.96 Nevertheless, it is difficult to distinguish understanding (intelligere) and conceptualizing 
(concipere) because as interior acts, they are closely united. As to content, we can observe how these 
two acts need one another. The word needs understanding in order to be intelligent, rational. 
Understanding needs the word in order to take possession of itself.97  
 Before proceeding, let me offer another example to illustrate the relationship and 
difference between the act of understanding as act (intelligere) and the act of understanding as 
                                                
94 Recall, form and essence are not so much ontological differences as they are responses to two different 
kinds of questions, which are ultimately about the same thing. 
95 SCG 4, c. 14, §3. 
96 See Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 144. 
97 Ibid., 125. 
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grounding another act (dicere). Rather than take an example from mathematics, I offer one from 
theology, specifically, from soteriology. It pertains to the relationship between the redemption and 
what Lonergan calls the “Law of the Cross.”98 The law of the cross, as Lonergan conceives it, is 
“a precept of the utmost generality that enjoins not overcoming [the evils of the human race] by 
power but by absorbing them in a loving surrender that returns good for evil done.”99 As Hefling 
explains, “The law of the cross formulates or expresses the ‘form,’ the intrinsic intelligibility of 
redemption.”100 Here, the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption is what is understood in an act of 
understanding, and the Law of the Cross is the concept expressing that intelligibility, which 
proceeds from the act of understanding. The data that are understood are “the data on the 
human race in so far as it is in the process of being redeemed,”101 the law of the cross expresses 
this insight. As Hefling notes, in this analogy, the matter of redemption is “man” and the form of 
redemption is what the law of the cross expresses. In fact, the relationship between the intrinsic 
intelligibility of redemption and the law of the cross not only illustrates the relationship between 
the act of understanding (as both act and as an act grounding another act) and the act of 
conceptualizing, but the process of affirming the law of the cross as the content of the divine 
judgment of value—expressed humanly in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth—
namely, “that divine wisdom has ordained and divine goodness has willed, not to do away with 
human evils by wielding power, but by converting those evils into good in keeping with the just 
and mysterious law of the cross.”102  
                                                
98 This example came to me from reading Charles Hefling, “Grace, Christ, Redemption, Lonergan (In that 
Order),” Lonergan Workshop Journal 14 (1998), 103. 
99 Doran, The Trinity in History, vol. 1, 232. 
100 Hefling, “Grace, Christ, Redemption, Lonergan,” 103. 
101 Ibid. 
102 This passage is from the supplement to Lonergan’s work, De Verbo Incarnato. The supplement will be 
published as part of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. The passage as cited is found in Hefling, 
“Grace, Christ, Redemption, Lonergan,” 112-13. 
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4.3 Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Level of Direct Understanding: The Metaphysical 
Terms 
Recall the following: 
(Act A as act) intelligere: the act of direct understanding (which might or might not function as 
dicere, i.e., act as a source of speaking what it has understood) 
 (Act A as grounding another Act) dicere: the act of direct understanding as speaking, 
 from understanding to conceptualizing (which in us includes “sorting or figuring out,” 
 disentangling, formulating what we understand in order to speak) 
(Act B) concipere: the act of formal meaning, conceptualizing, receiving a verbum (inner word), a 
concept, a definition generated by dicere. 
Table 10 
Let us begin with some of Thomas’s own words about the process of understanding:  
There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and 
thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. 
The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an 
absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the 
intellect. For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed 
[informatur] by the intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms an 
[inner] definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by an [outer] word [Qua 
quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem 
significatur]. Wherefore the concept conveyed by an [outer] word is its definition; and an 
[outer] proposition conveys the intellect’s [inner] division or composition. [Outer] words 
do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect 
forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.103 
Notice Thomas’s language. The intellect’s act includes both being informed and forming; it is 
formed and forms. Not only does his language highlight the fact that he considers intelligere a 
passive operation, but it also has the effect of inexorably linking the process of forming to the act 
of having been in-formed. The formation of an inner word does not take place without the prior 
in-formation of the intellect. It also highlights that intelligere has two modes of operating. In-
formation corresponds to the aha! moment. Formation here corresponds to the activity of 
formulating and speaking what you have understood as described above.  
                                                
103 ST Ia, q. 85, a. 2 ad. 3. I have inserted “outer” and “inner” in accordance with the interpretation I am 
advancing here. My interpretation is supported by Thomas’s use of “significare” (here translated as 
“express” and “convey”). 
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4.3.1 Intelligere and Dicere  
Now, I proceed to draw on the preceding sections in order to offer interpretations and 
clarifications of key texts from Thomas’s corpus. In considering direct understanding, we are 
analyzing one act (intelligere) from two points of view: from the point of view of its principle and 
from the point of view of its term. That is, from the points of view of the intellect’s being informed 
(=insight) and forming (=dicere). In other words, intelligere has two modes of operating. An act is not 
restricted to one mode of acting.104  A passion can be an act (and insight is a pati; it is something 
we receive)105, and further, an act can have both passive and active aspects; a potency can receive 
its act, and upon receiving its act, it can produce another act. We can differentiate these two 
modes according to their respective objects. Thomas calls the object corresponding to intelligere’s 
first mode of operating an “active object” and the object corresponding to its second mode an 
“end” or what Lonergan calls a “terminal object.”106 Thomas identifies the active object as the 
phantasm; it is the principle of the act of understanding.107 In De veritate, Thomas considers the 
inner word at length wherein he identifies the inner word as the terminal object of understanding: 
“For the clarification of this matter, it should be noted that our intellectual word, which enables 
                                                
104 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 133-38. Herein, Lonergan demonstrates that Aquinas used the 
Aristotelian and Avicennist schemes of analysis to account for the different aspects of understanding 
(intelligere). Failure to recognize the differences among these schemes was in part responsible for 
conceptualist interpretations of Aquinas. See also Byrne, “The Thomist Sources of Lonergan’s Dynamic 
Worldview,” The Thomist 46, no. 1 (1982), 119. 
105 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 116-121. This claim that an act can be a passion is found in Aristotle 
and adopted by Thomas. It is based on Aristotle’s distinction between movement and operation. 
Movement involves succession in time and therefore is imperfect (actus imperfecti), whereas operation “does 
not become through time but endures through time. At any instant it is completely what it is to be (actus 
perfecti).” Insight, like all intellectual acts, is an operation – not a movement. Thomas broadened 
Aristotle’s meaning of pati to simply mean a subject’s receiving according to its potency (pati communiter) 
such that passion does not diminish but actually perfects the recipient. A recipient is perfected in 
receiving its act. See Byrne, “The Thomist Sources of Lonergan’s Dynamic Worldview,” 124-26; 
Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 110-16. 
106 See Thomas Aquinas, In II De anima, lect. 6, §305. Also see De ver., q. 16, a. 1 ad 13. 
107 For example, see In Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 2 ad 6: “The phantasm is a principle of our knowledge as being 
that from which the operation of the intellect begins, not as something transient but as a permanent basis 
for intellectual operation…” Also see SCG 2, c. 73, §38, as cited in Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 
CWL 12, 572-73: “Before the reception [of the intelligible species] the intellect needs the phantasm in 
order to receive the intelligible species from it, and thus the phantasm is related to the possible intellect as 
the object moving it.” 
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us to speak about the divine Word by a kind of resemblance, is that at which our intellectual 
operation terminates. This is the object of understanding, which is called the conception of the 
intellect…”108 Thus, we can analyze intelligere from the perspective of both its moving object and 
terminal object—an act can be passive or receptive as well as active and productive. As Byrne 
writes, “As ‘insight’ or ‘understanding,’ intelligere is a passive act moved by its object, namely 
phantasm (image) illuminated by the agent intellect (the desire to know, questioning). As 
‘formulating’ or ‘expressing,’ intelligere expresses itself, once it has occurred, in an inner word, the 
terminal object of this mode of acting.”109 The former mode is denoted by “intelligere” and the 
latter by “dicere.” To put it somewhat differently, insight has the distinctive characteristic of a 
“passive operation” while dicere is the productive activity of forming an inner word.110 Concipere, as 
we will see, is the receiving of the inner word produced by dicere. 
 It was in the context of the precision necessary for trinitarian theology that Thomas came 
to clearly specify the distinct meanings of intelligere and dicere.111 First, we must distinguish between 
operation and movement. An operation is an actus perfecti, whereas a movement is an actus imperfecti 
(an act of what is incomplete).112 For example, understanding and seeing are operations: you are 
                                                
108 De ver., q. 4, a. 2c. Cf. ST Ia, q. 90, a. 1: ““Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the 
work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may 
consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. 
With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition…” 
109 Byrne, “The Fabric of Lonergan’s Thought,” 45. 
110 See Byrne, “The Thomist Sources of Lonergan’s Dynamic Worldview,” 123. 
111 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 133-38, esp. 136. Lonergan contends that the ongoing misinterpretation 
of Thomas’s position on human knowing was related to the assumption that Thomas used “intelligere” and 
“dicere” indifferently to refer to intelligence only as producing the concept, hence Lonergan’s term, 
“conceptualism” according to which it is assumed that concepts precede understanding and are what 
understanding understands. It surmises that concepts mysteriously, unconsciously, and automatically are 
received in the mind, which the mind in turn goes on to understand. This version of conceptualism 
claims its roots in Thomas’s analysis of the human mind, but no such roots can be found. 
112 This distinction between movement and operation is an instance in which Thomas used the same 
expressions to refer to different things at different times. Basically, Lonergan meant by actus imperfecti and 
actus perfecti what Aristotle meant by movement and operation. However, Thomas did vary in the terms 
he used to denote this distinction: “He referred to this contrast variously as a difference between operatio 
(operation) and motus (movement), or as a twofold operatio, or finally as a twofold motus” (Lonergan, Verbum, 
CWL 2 114). Thus, as Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer explains, “the fluidity or lack of stability in the 
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at once understanding and have understood, at once seeing and have seen.113 By contrast, walking 
is a movement: at once, you are not walking five miles and have walked five miles. The difference 
between operation (actus perfecti) and movement (actus imperfecti) is that in the former instance action 
and end are coincident, whereas in the latter instance there is a difference between action 
(walking) and end (having reached the destination, five miles away). The reason movement is an 
imperfect action is because it is incomplete—when you are walking, you have not yet reached 
your destination. By contrast operation endures through time. It “exists as a fully completed 
whole at each and every instant.”114 However, while movement and operation are distinct, they 
are also complimentary. Jacobs-Vandegeer explains this complementarity through the example of 
understanding:  
The transition from ignorance to knowledge, for example, entails a process of reasoning, 
a movement, which eventuates in the intellectual act of understanding, and operation. 
…A person either understands and has understood or has not understood and continues 
to ponder and search. The act of understanding marks the term of the movement. It 
denotes the end anticipated in the question for intelligibility (quid sit?)115 
 This distinction between movement and operation is significant for grasping how an 
operation can be an instance of being moved. As Jacobs-Vandegeer explains, “For Aristotle, ‘the 
phrase ‘undergoing change’ (paschein) is not univocal,’ and operation as being in act does not rule 
out the idea of passion. The distinguishing feature of movement in the technical sense lies in its 
incompleteness as an action, not in its subject being moved.”116 In other words, it is not being 
                                                                                                                                            
meanings of key categories created significant problems for scholastic interpreters in working out the 
metaphysics of cognition.” See Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, “Reading the Actio of Cognitional Acts in 
Bernard J.F. Lonergan and Joseph Owens,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88, no.1 (2014), 82. I 
am indebted to Jacobs-Vandegeer for helping me come to terms with Lonergan’s third Verbum article, 
which is an attempt to cut through this “metaphysical jungle,” reducing the ambiguities to merely verbal 
difficulties (Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 10). Jacobs-Vandegeer’s help can be seen throughout the next few 
pages.  
113 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL, 12, 606-07; ibid., Verbum, CWL 2, 110-16, esp. 112. See 
also Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 6, 1048b18-34; Physics, III, 2, 201b24-433.  
114 Jacobs-Vandegeer, “Reading the Actio of Cognitional Acts in Bernard J.F. Lonergan and Joseph 
Owens,” 83. 
115 Ibid., 83-84. 
116 Ibid., 84. He is citing Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2,113; see also ibid., 119. 
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moved that is intrinsic to movement, but incompleteness. Movement in the broad sense (the sense 
that includes simply being moved) includes the actus perfecti, as a pati.117 Thomas distinguished 
between pati proprie (pati in the proper sense) and pati communiter (pati in the most general sense).118 
As Jacobs-Vandegeer explains, the latter concentrates on the movement of reception and includes 
the meaning of perfection.119 The significant question is whether operation, as an actus perfecti, can 
be called a pati in the sense of a received perfection. The difficulty in answering this question, 
which occurred as scholastics attempted to interpret Thomas, is that “the definition of operation 
seems to imply an exercise of efficient causality…The supposition that ‘I’ as a grammatical subject 
in the statement ‘I see’ also denotes the efficient cause of the operation [seeing] supports a 
common sense view of agency and action. On this view, living beings produce their own acts.”120 
Lonergan, however, argued that Thomas distinguished operatio as actus perfecti, as a being in act 
from operatio as an exercise of efficient causality.121 He writes, “in many contexts [operatio] denotes 
the exercise of efficient causality. …But such usage certainly is not exclusive. …For operatio also 
means simply ‘being in act’…”122 In other words, while we may have a tendency to associate 
operation or action with efficient causality, Thomas held a more expansive view, and 
distinguished two meanings of operation. Jacobs-Vandegeer explains the significant implications 
of this reading for the metaphysics of rational psychology: “No longer would the grammatical 
subject of the act plainly denote the ontological subject of an efficient cause. Though ‘I see,’ my 
very act of seeing may depend on an agent other than me.”123 As we will shortly see, the operation 
of one potency (e.g., the possible intellect) can include both meanings of operation.  
                                                
117 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 116. 
118 Ibid., 117. See also De ver., q. 26, a. 1c; ST Ia, q. 79, a. 2c; Ia-IIae, q. 22, a. 1c. 
119 Jacobs-Vandegeer, “Reading the Actio of Cognitional Acts in Bernard J.F. Lonergan and Joseph 
Owens,” 84-85. 
120 Ibid., 85.  
121 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 119. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Jacobs-Vandegeer, “Reading the Actio of Cognitional Acts in Bernard J.F. Lonergan and Joseph 
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 Intelligere is the operation of the intellect; intelligere is an operation. However, as we have 
just seen, operation (operatio), itself can “sometimes mean simply act or being in act and sometimes 
mean the exercise of efficient causality.”124 As Lonergan discovered, it was the precision of 
trinitarian theology that led Thomas to distinguish exactly between these two meanings with 
regard to the operation of the intellect. When the operation of the intellect is meant in the sense of 
act, it is termed intelligere. That is, intelligere specifies the act of understanding—the insight into the 
phantasm, the primary mode of the act of the intellect. Intelligere is simply act or being in act. It is 
the operation of a passive potency (the possible intellect). When the operation of intellect is meant 
in the sense of operating an effect, of that same act (understanding) grounding another act, it is 
termed dicere, which is the secondary mode of one and the same act (intelligere).125 That is, dicere 
specifies the act of “express[ing] a word from oneself.”126 It is a kind of making, which is not 
contrary to the act of understanding but is grounded in it; “when we utter interiorly we form and 
produce an inner word.”127 Dicere is the operation of an active potency (the possible intellect in 
act). 
 For example, in De veritate, in the same question on the Word, Thomas both specifies how 
intelligere and dicere are distinct while also acknowledging their identity. In response to the objection 
that any of the three divine persons can be called “word,” Thomas writes, “Here Anselm seems to 
contradict himself, for he says that Word is predicated only personally and belongs only to the 
                                                                                                                                            
Owens,” 86. 
124 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 136. 
125 See ibid., 150. Cf. Matthew Levering, “Speaking the Trinity: Anselm and his 13th-Century Interlocutors 
On Divine Intelligere and Dicere” in Saint Anselm-His Origins and Influence, ed. John R. Fortin (Lewiston: 
Edwin Mellon Press, 2001). Of Thomas’s trinitarian theology in the Summa, Levering writes, 
“Understanding (intelligere), as such, is not the procession of a word or concept, but rather is the intellect’s 
condition of ‘habitude’ as being informed by what is known. …Speaking involves not simply the intellect 
as actualized by the thing understood, but the intellect as actualized through the speaking of a word. “By 
adding the aspect of the word, speaking – as opposed to understanding – ‘imports a habitude to the thing 
understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who understood.’” (139-40). Levering is 
quoting ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3. 
126 De ver., q. 4, a. 2 ad 4.  
127 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL, 12, 606-07. 
  Chapter 3 – Page 191 
Son, while to speak belongs to all three Persons. To speak, however, means nothing else but to send forth a 
word from oneself.”128 Thus, in strict terms, dicere signifies the grounding of a word. This is why only 
the Father can be said to speak. Later in De potentia, Thomas revisits the relationship between 
intelligere and dicere. In this passage, we can again observe that dicere is intelligere, but that these two 
must also be clearly distinguished. He writes: 
Dicere may be taken in two senses. First strictly and then it means to utter a word: and in 
this sense Augustine (De Trin. vii) says that in God each person does not speak, but the 
Father alone. Secondly, in a broad sense in which to speak denotes intelligence: and thus 
Anselm (loc. cit.) says that not only the Father speaks but also the Son and the Holy 
Spirit: and though there are three who speak there is but one Word which is the Son: 
because the Son alone is the concept of the Father who understands and conceives the 
Word.129 
Here, as Thomas explains, when we take “dicere” in the broad sense, we mean intelligence 
precisely because it is the act of understanding (intelligere) that is doing the speaking; there is no 
speaking unless there is understanding. In fact, if you cannot speak a word about what you have 
understood, it reveals that you did not actually understand anything in the first place. However, 
when we are considering dicere strictly, we are considering intelligere in its mode of operating as an 
act that grounds another act. Similarly, in the same question from De veritate, Thomas explains 
how it is that the act of understanding and the act of speaking are really the same act. Once you 
understand, you have the necessary and sufficient conditions to speak. He writes: 
As used of us, speaking signifies not merely understanding but understanding plus the 
expression from within oneself of some conception; and we cannot understand in any way 
other than by forming a conception of this sort. Therefore, properly speaking, every act of 
understanding is, in our case, an act of speaking.130  
                                                
128 De ver. q. 4, a. 2 ad 4 (emphasis added).  
129 De pot., q. 9, a. 9 ad 8. For more on the distinction the operation of the intellect as both intelligere and 
dicere, see ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad. 2-3, esp. 3.  
130 De ver. q. 4, a. 2 ad 5. The Latin reads, “Ad quintum dicendum, quod in nobis dicere non solum 
significat intelligere, sed intelligere cum hoc quod est ex se exprimere aliquam conceptionem; nec aliter possumus 
intelligere, nisi huiusmodi conceptionem exprimendo; et ideo omne intelligere in nobis, proprie 
loquendo, est dicere” (emphasis added).  
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 We need to distinguish between dicere per se and dicere in us, as this will be relevant for 
trinitarian theology. In us, we might say that intelligere finally operates as dicere at the end of a series 
of stages from the original occurrence of the insight until we finally speak interiorly. Dicere emerges 
at the end of this series of stages precisely because we have to come to terms with our insight in 
order to get the right word. However, in strict terms, dicere is intelligere when it is actually speaking 
what it has understood; it is the actual event of speaking, not the disentangling, guided by 
intelligere, that leads up to the speaking. That is, in strict terms, you have not spoken your insight 
(dicere) until you have spoken your insight. A partial expression of insight is not yet really dicere. 
What this means is that disentanglement, the series of transformations in the imagination, (guided 
by intelligere qua dicere as it sorts out what imaginative conditions are relevant and irrelevant to its 
understanding) is not necessary to dicere. Disentangling, sorting out, in order to find the right word 
is a condition of finite embodied intellects. In us, this disentanglement is nevertheless termed 
“dicere” (and not intelligere as understanding in act) because it is intelligere as ordered toward the 
inner word (and not the phantasm). A perfect infinite act of understanding simply and eternally 
utters its understanding in one perfectly expressive word. 
4.3.2 Concipere and the Reception of the Verbum  
While intelligere and dicere refer to one and the same act of intelligence operating in two different 
modes, there is also a second act of intelligence that is distinct from intelligere/dicere. It is the act 
that intelligere grounds when it speaks. Above, I explained that I have termed this second act 
“concipere,” which carries the connotations both of receiving and conceptualizing. Receiving 
signifies the dependence of concipere on intelligere, while conceptualizing (defining, meaning) signifies 
the distinction between concipere and intelligere as two different acts. The emanation of the verbum 
from intelligere is a conception of an intentional likeness of what has been understood.131 Concipere is 
                                                
131 The more perfect the procession, the more perfect the likeness, to the point of identity (yet without the 
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the terminal activity of the first operation of the intellect.132 While there is no further completion 
of understanding in concipere, there is an adequate self-expression, which is what was lacking in 
intelligere alone.133 Notice that concipere is an activity that occurs within intelligence. Concipere (the act 
of defining the thing) is an act uttered within. Concipere at last conceptualizes what the act of 
understanding understood in the phantasm, which was not a concept but an intelligibility. That 
your understanding was of an intelligibility was manifest in the fact that your insight was into a 
particular phantasm (whereas concepts express the universal common to many) and in the 
experience of not being able to put your finger on it (whereas if you have a concept, you have 
your finger on it). Thomas distinguishes clearly between the concept and the act of understanding, 
explaining that “conception [conceptio] itself is an effect of the act of understanding…Hence, two 
things pertain to the nature of our intellectual word: it is understood, and [the inner word] is 
expressed by an agent distinct from itself.”134 To return to the above distinction between actus 
imperfecti and actus perfecti, both dicere as the “speaking” of the inner word and concipere as the 
“receiving” of the inner words are acti perfecti; they are not processes. Once intelligere-qua-dicere has 
successfully completed its sorting out of the relevant from the irrelevant in the phantasm, concipere 
emerges as an actus perfecti. 
 Recall that Thomas follows a standard Aristotelian procedure in which one moves from 
object to acts to potencies to essences, and the corresponding metaphysical principle that an act 
receives its specification from its object.135  The distinction between intelligere and concipere can be 
                                                                                                                                            
elimination of reflection). See SCG 4, c. 11, §5. 
132 See De ver., q. 4, a. 1: “that at which the operation of our intellect terminates, which is what is 
understood, what is called the conception of the intellect.” 
133 I owe t his understanding and way of putting it to Patrick Byrne. 
134 De ver., q. 4, a. 2c. 
135 For example, see ST Ia, q. 77, a. 3c. Although this is the enumerated procedure, remember that Aquinas 
also explicitly states that the human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding (see ST 
Ia, q. 88, a. 2 ad 3). Thus, even while objects help us specify acts, when it comes to intelligere, Thomas 
maintains that the act, itself, can also be understood insofar as it is in act. The reason is because we are 
conscious of our acts of understanding and can thus inquire after them. 
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illuminated if we attend to their respective objects. There is the proper and proportionate object 
of human understanding, the quidditas rei materialis (quiddity existing in bodily matter).136 There is 
also the agent object of an act of understanding, the illuminated phantasm. Additionally, there is 
the terminal object, which is the term of the first operation of the intellect (i.e., of the direct level 
of understanding), and which is the definition or concept. Relating these objects, Byrne writes:  
First there is the proper object of understanding, which is the purely intelligible content. 
Such intelligible contents come to human consciousness in and only in acts of 
understanding. Without acts of understanding, there can be no human awareness of 
intelligibility. Second, there are also the agent objects of insights. These are the 
‘illuminated’ phantasms – images constructed under the inspiration of intellectual inquiry. 
When inquisitive construction hits upon a suitable imaginable composition, an insight 
with its proper intelligible content emerges and supervenes upon this agent object with its 
imaginable content. The emergent insight bestows its own proper object of intelligibility 
upon the image, since, strictly speaking, the image as merely imagined has no intelligible 
content of its own. Third, there is the terminal object which is a concept or definition, 
and which expresses the pre-conceptual, intelligible proper object of an insight. 137  
Since the intelligibility immanent in the phantasm (universal in the particular) and the definition 
(universal common to many) are really distinct objects, and since acts are specified by their 
objects, we may say that it is one thing to understand the intelligibility and another to define the 
intelligibility. While we define what we understand, nevertheless, the object when it is grasped and 
the object when it is defined are different.138  
 We can put this in terms of the difference between formal cause and essence. When the 
object is grasped, the corporeal matter is made known through the senses while the intelligibility is 
made known through the intellect. Further, what sense knows is the individual corporeal matter. 
When the object is defined, the matter posited in the definition is “the common matter involved 
                                                
136 For example, see ST Ia, q. 84, aa. 7-8; q. 85, a. 5, ad 3; a. 8; q. 86, a. 2; q. 87, a. 2 ad 2; a. 3; q. 88, a. 3. 
137 Patrick H. Byrne, The Ethics of Discernment: Lonergan’s Foundations for Ethics (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press: 2016). 
141-42. There is a fourth object – the real object – because the definition expresses only an intelligible 
possibility that may not be a real, objective intelligibility. This object pertains to the level of judgment: “If 
the rigours of reflection and further inquiry reveal the proper object to be virtually unconditioned, then it 
is also the objective intelligibility of some real object” (142). 
138 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 204-07. See also Doran, Trinity in History, vol. 1, 321.  
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in all such expressions of intelligibility.” In the definition, the intelligibility and the common 
matter are both known by intellect, the former directly and the latter indirectly. In other words, 
while both form and essence are principles of explanation, form is the correlative of the act of 
understanding and essence is the correlative of the act of conceptualizing. Further, we first 
understand form, then essence. Thus, when the object was first grasped it was known through two 
distinct types of acts (by sensing and understanding). When the object is then defined what was 
formerly known through distinct acts is now brought together in one act 
(conceptualizing/defining).139 As Br. Dunstan Robidoux puts it, “as acts of conceptualiz[ing] 
proceed from prior acts of understanding, an inner word or definition is formed which unites an 
abstracted, universal form with a generalized species of matter which is typically referred to as 
‘common matter.’”140 Thus, intelligere and concipere are distinct because even once intelligere has 
disentangled itself from the phantasm, still the matter and the form are known distinctly by sense 
and intellect. Yet, intelligere, by this very process, grounds concipere, which has nothing of its own 
but everything from intelligere. That is, while concipere knows in a unified way what before was 
known distinctly, it does not add anything to intelligere’s work. As Augustine says, “…from the 
vision of knowledge a vision of thought arises, which is a word of no language, a true word of a 
true thing, having nothing of its own, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born.”141 Concipere 
simply receives from intelligere everything it needs (the disentangled intelligibility). It is for this 
reason that I say that concipere is the act of receiving the inner word produced by dicere.142 Byrne 
                                                
139 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 204-05. 
140 Br. Dunstan Robidoux, “Essence in Aquinas and Lonergan,” http://lonergan.org/?m=200911. 
November 10, 2009. 
141 Augustine, De trinitate, 15.12.22 (Hill, 413-15; emphasis added). See also ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1c: “The concept 
itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself – namely, from the 
knowledge of the one conceiving.” 
142 While we speak of concipere receiving the inner word from intelligere, it is not receptivity, per se that 
distinguishes the processio operationis of understanding from the possible intellect and intelligible species 
from the processio operati of the inner word from the act of understanding. Rather, it is what that which 
receives its act receives it from – a potency or an act? Thus, the decisive distinction is that  
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provides a helpful example of what it means that concipere receives the inner word. The 
relationship between concipere and dicere is like a bucket of water receiving heat when a previously 
heated poker is inserted into it. As he writes, “The heat in the poker, which is in the act of being 
hot, takes on the role of heating, but only when there is a potency to receive its heat. Just so, the 
passive intellect as receiving the word is concipere, while the intellect in act producing this word is 
dicere.”143 
 Concipere is also the self-expression of intelligere, which is possible “only because 
understanding is self-possessed, conscious of itself and its own conditions as understanding.”144 
That is, intelligere’s becoming self-possessed is what enables it to speak a word with autonomous 
clarity in which matter and form are clearly related and distinguished. While intelligere and concipere 
are distinct, they are also related. Concepts are formed only with and within the intellectual act of 
understanding. This is what is meant by emanatio intelligibilis. These acts are related by an 
intellectual emanation since we are able to define because and only because we have grasped the 
intelligibility. This “because” names “the element of authentic autonomy in the procession” 
insofar as it is because I recognize that I have understood, I recognize that I can speak.145 Further, 
it is the reason intellectual emanation is relevant to trinitarian theology. The natural analogue for 
the first divine procession pertains to the procession of concipere from intelligere insofar as intelligere 
speaks. The natural analogue is not the procession of dicere from intelligere because they are the 
same act and so there is no procession.  
                                                                                                                                            
the possible intellect : the act of understanding :: perfectible : perfection :: potency : act 
whereas 
the act of understanding : inner word :: proportionate perfection : perfection :: act : act. 
143 This quotation is from a comment Byrne made on my dissertation on July 21, 2017. 
144 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 55. Lonergan continues to relate this self-expression to the three levels of 
abstraction.  
145 Doran, Trinity in History, vol. 1, 320. I will return to “because-of-ness” is Section 5. 
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4.4 The Relationship between Intelligere as Dicere and Concipere: An Analogy 
I have elaborated upon the difference between insights and inner words according to the 
difference between form and essence, as well as according to the difference of objects. This section 
will offer a clarification of the relation between intelligere and concipere in terms of “origin.” We 
proceeded thusly because we must distinguish before we can relate. The relation of the act of 
understanding to the act of defining or inner word, of speaker to what is spoken, is the relation of 
originator to what has an origin. As Thomas explains, “For whenever one thing originates from 
another there must be a real relation.”146 We can relate these as follows: 
   originator : originated    ::    insight : inner word    ::    speaker : spoken 
 
We are trying to keep the distinction between two realities—an originator (intelligere) and what 
originates from it (verbum)—which are the same except that one proceeds from the other. The only 
real difference between the inner word and the act of understanding is that one is derived from 
the other.147 This is why we have difficulty distinguishing between these two acts. 
 The relations of origin that I am referring to will become clearer with an example. An 
origin is from the originator and in the originated. The originated is that which has an origin. This 
means that origination grounds a relation between the originator and the originated. Knowledge 
or education derives from a teacher and emerges in a student. Knowledge as from a teacher is 
instructing. Knowledge as in a student is learning. The same reality is in both, but it is had 
differently. One has the origin as being its originator. That is, the teacher has knowledge as being 
the instructor, as being the one handing it on. The other has the origin as being the originated. 
That is, the student has knowledge as being the learner, as being the one receiving it. The teacher 
cannot be said to have taught nor the student said to have learned unless knowledge is present in 
                                                
146 De pot., q. 8 a. 1c. 
147 In us, this derivation is both intelligent and efficient. That it is intelligent is why it is relevant to 
trinitarian theology. That it is efficient means that one really distinct act is caused by another really 
distinct act (for an efficient cause is an extrinsic cause), even though both acts share the same 
intelligibility. 
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both. A teacher is not instructing if a student is not learning. A student is not learning but 
discovering if there is no teacher. This analogy is imperfect. While it demonstrates how a second 
intellectual act (the student’s knowledge) is dependent upon a prior one (the teacher’s knowledge), 
the knowledge in the student is not, strictly speaking, an inner word of the teacher’s intelligere. 
Rather, the knowledge in the student is a second instance of intelligere as received because of the 
teacher’s original intelligere, which gave rise to the teacher’s own inner word. The teacher’s inner 
word was, in turn, the basis of her outer words, which became the phantasms that elicited a 
second instance of intelligere (which in turn led to a second instance of an inner word) in the 
student.148 
 Again, the knowledge is the same in both teacher and student. As Thomas writes, 
“[K]nowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: 
for the same objective truth is known by both of them…”149 The same is true of the speaker and 
the spoken – the intelligibility is the same in both. The word emerges from intelligere and it emerges 
as concipere. The word’s emergence is the work of dicere. To put it differently, intelligere utters and 
concipere is uttered. As, Lonergan writes: 
[U]ttering is the inner word itself considered as being from the act of understanding and 
being uttered is that word considered as being in the possible intellect…to utter would regard 
the act of understanding itself as related to the word produced, while being uttered would 
regard the inner word inasmuch as the word results from the act of understanding.150  
 Let us put it more colloquially. Meaning emerges from a speaker and in a spoken word; 
from intelligere and in concipere. Again, origination grounds a relation. Here, we are talking about 
the procession of the inner word, which procession we call speaking. Speaking is a procession that 
grounds a relation between the speaker and the spoken. In fact, it grounds two relations: the 
speaker’s need to express itself in a word and the word’s dependence on the speaker. As Hefling 
                                                
148 I am indebted to Professor Byrne for pointing out the importance of expressing the inadequacies of the 
analogy. 
149 See ST Ia, q. 117, a. 1c. 
150 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL, 12, 606-07. 
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puts it, speaking grounds a relation of sincerity (the speaker’s honesty in expressing herself) and a 
relation of fidelity (the word’s dependence on the speaker for what it expresses).151 Hefling’s 
example, of course, adds a moral dimension to the basic cognitional process, but it is a helpful 
analogy.  
 The point in this analogy is that Act B depends on Act A for its origination. Let us return 
to the analogy of education. According to Aristotle, the fundamental requirement to be a teacher 
is that you understand.152 If you do not understand, you are not going to be able to help 
somebody else understand. The same is true of the act of defining, of the inner word. The 
fundamental requirement of defining—of having a word—is that you understand. If you do not 
understand, you are not defining—you do not have a word. A teacher cannot teach if she does 
not understand and a student cannot be said to learn if she does not understand. Both may speak, 
but neither has the inner word expressing understanding.  
 Also significant is that the analogy of teaching and learning underscores the 
conversational structure of human consciousness. Recall the necessity of phantasms for human 
knowing, which Thomas explains by offering the example of the teacher: “[W]hen we wish to 
help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms 
phantasms for the purpose of understanding.”153 Further, it is our intellectual light (which has its 
ground in the agent intellect) that makes a species to be intelligible-in-act because we inquire after 
the species.154 Together, the light of the agent intellect and the phantasm move our intellect to 
                                                
151 See Charles Hefling, “Gratia: Grace and Gratitude, Fifty Unmodern Theses as Prolegomena to 
Pneumatology,” Anglican Theological Review 83, no. 3 (2001), 481-83. 
152 See Metaphysics, 1, 2, 982a10-19. Herein, Aristotle is discussing the wise man, who is wise because he is 
capable of teaching the cause, and as we have seen, to understand the cause is what it means to 
understand.  
153 ST Ia, q. 84, a. 7c. 
154 See SCG II, c. 77, §5: “So, the function of that intellect is to make intelligibles proportionate to our 
minds. Now, the mode of intellectual light connatural to us is not unequal to the performance of this 
function. Nothing, therefore, stands in the way of our ascribing the action of the agent intellect to the 
light of our soul, and especially since Aristotle compares the agent intellect to a light.” See also De veritate, 
 
  Chapter 3 – Page 200 
understanding. The dependence of human intelligence for its act of understanding on phantasms 
and questions is what underscores in part the conversational structure of human consciousness. As 
Lawrence writes, “In Aristotle’s and Thomas’s teaching about the genesis of human knowing, 
therefore, one side of the integrally dialogical and historical nature of being human is clearly 
revealed: we receive sense impressions; and acts of understanding, just as the questions that give 
rise to them, occur to us.”155 In other words, there is a listening at the heart of human knowing and 
speaking. I will return to this conversational structure in Chapter 6 when discussing the imago Dei. 
 We now proceed to analyze the second operation of intelligere—reflective understanding or 
judging—in order to discover the intelligible emanation therein. It is with the additional, fulfilling 
involvement of level of reflective understanding that the psychological analogy obtains, for when 
we are referring to God, we are speaking not simply of understanding, but of knowledge in the full 
sense of the term—an understanding affirmed as true. However, as we will see, it is really only 
insofar as the uttered judgment is not only about the true/facts but also about the 
good/worthwhile that the psychological analogy obtains, for it is only an inner word that breaks 
forth into love that is relevant to the trinitarian analogy.156   
5. The Intellectual Emanation of the Inner Word: The Emanatio Intelligibilis on the 
Level of Reflective Understanding  
With the level of reflective understanding, we are speaking of activities distinct from those of the 
level of direct understanding. While these are two distinct operations, the internal relations among 
the activities of each intellectual operation are similar. On the level of direct understanding when 
one is present to oneself as intelligent, we identified three activities, internally related to one 
                                                                                                                                            
q. 10, a. 8 ad. 10: “As physical light makes all things actually visible, so the soul through its light makes all 
material things actually intelligible, as is clear from The Soul. 
155 Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Foundations for Constitutive Communication,” 241 (emphasis original)  
156 See ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2. 
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another: inquiry, direct insight, conceptualizing.157 On the level of reflective understanding, when 
one is present to oneself as reasonable, there are also three basic activities: critical inquiry and 
reflection, reflective insight, and judging. Another inner word proceeds on this level, now as a 
judgment—an affirmation or denial—from a reflective insight. It is critical to recognize that no 
less than the first kind of inner word, this second kind also emanates from an act of 
understanding, here designated as a reflective insight. This table illustrates the similarities and 
differences among these two inner words and their corresponding acts:158  
Inner Word of Definition Inner Word of Judgment 
Proceeds from direct act of understanding  Proceeds from reflective act of understanding  
Principal cause in agent intellect as spirit of 
wonder and inquiry 
Principal cause in agent intellect as spirit of 
critical reflection 
Instrumental and material cause: phantasm or 
schematic image 
Instrumental and material cause: reviews 
imagination, sense experience, direct acts of 
understanding, and definitions to find in all 
taken together the sufficient ground or 
evidence for judgment  
Direct act of understanding generates in 
definition the expression of the consciously 
possessed intelligibility of the phantasm 
Reflective act of understanding generates in 
judgment the expression of the consciously 
possessed truth, through which reality is both 
known and known as known 
Table 11 
In order to elaborate upon the emanatio intelligibilis of the inner word of judgment, I draw primarily 
from Chapters 9 and 10 of Lonergan’s Insight.159 
                                                
157 It is interesting to note that Lonergan’s language about direct understanding as grounding a second act 
sometimes changes depending on the context. In science, it is called “formulation.” In trinitarian 
theology, it is called “uttering an inner word.”  Sometimes Lonergan uses “utter” in the context of his 
philosophical work, which is a carry-over from his trinitarian work. While “utter” is intelligible in the 
philosophical context, the same is not true in reverse, for it would be improper to refer to the Father as 
“formulating” the Son. See Lonergan, Understanding and Being, CWL 5, 134, fn. 3 and 151-52; 413. 
158 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 60-61. 
159 I owe my understanding of these chapters to Patrick H. Byrne’s course, Insight and Beyond (Boston 
College, Fall 2009–Spring 2010), recorded for internet use and found at http://bclonergan.org/insight/. 
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5.1 The Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Level of Reflective Understanding: A New 
Tension and Heightened Responsibility  
As with direct understanding, let us appeal to our own experiences to understand the intellectual 
emanation of the inner word of judgment. Recall the difference between a time at which you 
judged rashly or guessed and a time at which you judged soundly. The latter occurred because of 
the presence of an intellectual emanation of the word of judgment. You judged because you knew 
you had sufficient evidence to make the judgment. It can happen the other way around, too. You 
can know that you have all the evidence you need to make a judgment, but nevertheless withhold 
your judgment. Rashness and hesitation are both instances of acting irrationally, in which there is 
no intellectual emanation. It is on this level of rational consciousness that the notions of truth and 
falsity, of certitude and probability emerge. In order to understand this kind of inner word, we 
have to contextualize it within reflective understanding, and in the latter’s relation to direct 
understanding in the overall process of knowing.  
5.1.1 The Proposition and the Critical Question: Is it So? 
If we pay attention to our own experience, we can recognize that we ask two basic kinds of 
interrelated questions in our desire to know reality, and that each question requires a 
fundamentally distinct kind of interrelated answer. The question for intelligence asks, “What is 
it?” (Quid sit?) while the critical question or question for reflection asks, “Is it so?” (An sit?) Further, 
these questions even reveal some things we know naturally, such as the first principle that the 
whole is greater than the part: 
[W]hen by a natural spontaneity we ask quid sit, we reveal our natural knowledge that the 
material or sensible component is only a part and that the whole includes a formal 
component as well. Similarly, when by a natural spontaneity we ask an sit, we again reveal 
our natural knowledge that the whole is not just a quiddity but includes an actus essendi as 
well.160 
                                                
160 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 70 (emphasis original). 
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While revealing our natural knowledge of one first principle, these questions also indicate that 
direct and reflective understanding contribute something above and beyond experience: an 
understanding of essence and an affirmation of existence, respectively.161  
 The question for reflection is not a question for intelligence, as you already know that you 
understand the intelligibility. You were satisfied with your idea for a little while, but there’s 
something else you begin wondering about: Wait, did I understand that correctly? I think it’s a 
good idea, but is it really true? Even though I was able to put my insight into words, I’m still 
skeptical. I’ve had bright ideas before that turned out to be incorrect. Does my word correspond 
to the reality I initially wondered about? The critical question transforms the concept from a mere 
possibility into a “something-to-be-verified,” just as the question for intelligence transformed the 
phantasm from mere data into a “something-to-be-understood.”162 The critical question initiates 
you into the realm of conditionality, which is the realm in which reflection takes over and you 
begin reasoning, e.g., “If…then…” This is a different state of being, and distinct activities are 
occurring. Figuring out the conditions of the truth of a proposition is different than understanding 
the nature of something. You still perform intelligent operations in your attempt to verify your 
insight, but these are now under the guidance of reason, that is, under the guidance of 
reasonable/rational operations.  
 While these two types of questions are distinct, the critical question is related to the 
intelligent question because the former is asking about the content of the direct insight (which 
responded to the question for intelligence). In other words, we are asking about the content of a 
proposition, which is the formulation of a direct insight. For example, you are asking “is it so that 
                                                
161 Existence is not something understood; it is not a “super-essence.” Rather, it is something affirmed. The 
difference in questions for intelligence and critical questions indicates this. For an excellent piece 
explaining the difference between essence and existence in relation to human cognition in Thomas 
Aquinas, see David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1986). 
162 For these phrases, see Stebbins, Divine Initiative, 14. 
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a circle is a set of points equidistant from a center?”163 Your question is about the correspondence 
between your proposition and the reality you initially inquired about. “Did I understand circles 
correctly when I said a circle is…?” “Does the conceptual content I expressed when I understood 
actually explain the existing reality I desire to know?” The critical question is borrowing its 
content (the proposition) from the direct insight and bringing a new, distinct mental attitude and 
set of activities to bear on the content. Insofar as we are being intelligent, we consider propositions 
as intelligible possibilities, as merely bright ideas. Insofar as we are being reasonable, we reflect on 
propositions as conditioned possibilities and eventually assent to them (or deny them), in which 
case the propositions are no longer objects of thought but have become objects of knowledge. The 
proposition is formulated on the level of direct understanding and affirmed on the level of 
reflective understanding.  
5.1.2 Reflective Insight: Sufficient Evidence 
As with the question for intelligence, your critical question will linger until you satisfy its demands 
and reach its goal, namely, an affirmation or denial. How do you resolve the critical question in a 
way that really releases the tension of inquiry? It may seem that resolving the “is it so” question 
would be easier than resolving the “what” question since the answer to the former question is 
either an interior affirmation or a denial (in English outer words, “yes” or “no”) whereas to the 
latter, there is seemingly an infinite possibility of responses. However, resolving the “is it so” 
question is a complex process—one which may take years or even the greater part of your life, 
depending on the proposition you are attempting to affirm or deny. How then do we resolve this 
tension? Byrne outlines the process well:  
When we ask about the correctness of a direct insight, we say in effect to ourselves, ‘Now 
that would be true if only thus and so.’ Figuring out the conditions under which 
something would be so is another marvelous capacity of the human spirit. Without yet 
knowing if our idea is correct, we can figure out how to figure it out. So our reflective 
                                                
163 This definition is intentionally incorrect.  
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insights are matters of putting the idea together with what it takes for it to be 
correct…[Further] Logic begins with axioms and deduces conclusion. But the reflecting 
human spirit begins with an insight which will subsequently become something like a 
conclusion, and searches for the conditions under which it will be able to grant its 
precious and personal assent.164 
As Byrne highlights, just as when you were asking, “What is it?” about something, your inquisitive 
spirit elicits images, memories, past insights, etc. to help you understand without yet 
understanding, so too your critical spirit figures out how to determine if your insight was correct 
by figuring out the conditions of its truth. In raising the critical question, you set up a demand 
within your own consciousness, namely, for sufficient evidence. Meeting this demand and 
satisfying your wondering is what gives rise to your judgment. However, between the critical 
question and the act of judgment there is the phenomenon of being reasonable and reflecting. In 
order to release the tension and properly respond to our question, we began to reflect—to return 
to ourselves—and the activity of reflecting terminates in a reflective insight, which is the only basis 
upon which we can utter a reasonable judgment.  
 To describe this process of what causes judgment, Lonergan selects the metaphor, 
“marshaling and weighing the evidence.” When you are marshaling and weighing the evidence 
you are performing experiential and intellectual operations. That is, you are reviewing and using 
your imagination and your sense experience. You are also raising further pertinent questions of 
the what, why, how, etc. type, that is, questions for direct understanding in your attempt to raise 
and answer all further pertinent questions. What about this? Did I think of that? How would this 
affect my insight? Have I thought of everything?165 Notice that insofar as critical inquiry is 
operative, you are performing each of these operations as rationally conscious.166 You are asking 
                                                
164 Patrick H. Byrne, “Spirit of Wonder, Spirit of Love: Reflection on the Work of Bernard Lonergan,” The 
Cresset 58 (1994), 7-8. 
165 See Morelli, Self-Possession, 146-47 for a list of questions that may occur. See Frederick E. Crowe, “For a 
Phenomenology of Rational Consciousness,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 18 (2000), 87. 
166 That is, while you are asking questions for intelligence (questions of the “what is it?” type) when engaged 
in reflection, those questions are now under the guidance of the critical question, in service of releasing 
 
  Chapter 3 – Page 206 
them in order to be able to affirm or deny the direct insight you are critiquing and reflecting 
upon. 
 Raising and answering relevant questions is the centerpiece of reflection and the 
condition of the possibility for being a person of good judgment. To put this description more 
technically, in the process of reflecting, what we are doing is figuring out the links between our 
conditioned proposition and its conditions. If these conditions are met, the conditioned 
proposition becomes virtually unconditioned—that is, while the insight is not in itself absolutely 
unconditioned, the occurrence of the fulfilling conditions gives the conditioned insight the power 
of being unconditioned (hence, virtually unconditioned). Understanding how to link our hypothesis 
to its fulfilling conditions is key to the process leading up to the reflective grasp of sufficient 
conditions and the consequent judgment. The fundamental way in which we link from an insight 
to its conditions is by means of asking and answering the further pertinent questions until we 
reach the point of no further questions. This emphasis on inquiry points to the fact that despite 
the use of terms such as “conditions” and “unconditioned,” we do not know truth through some 
simple process of comparing the proposition to a logically and predetermined standard.167  
 It is the direct insight that determines which questions are pertinent. As long as you are 
raising further pertinent questions, your initial insight is vulnerable. You might even discover a 
completely new slant on the issue. In this reflective conversation with yourself, you can undergo 
self-correction.168 As you raise and answer further questions, your initial insight is being modified 
and nuanced by further insights. This process is making your insight less vulnerable. For example, 
you may realize that your initial definition of a circle needed to be modified because it neglected 
the coplanarity of the radii. This modified insight (and consequently, inner word) was modified on 
                                                                                                                                            
the tension of critical inquiry. Rational consciousness is sublating intellectual consciousness, in other 
words. See Byrne, “Consciousness,” 136 and 139-40. 
167 See Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Retrieval of Aquinas’s Conception of the Imago Dei,” 380. 
168 See Lonergan, Insight, CWL 3, 309. 
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the level of reflective understanding as you returned to imagination and sense experience—maybe 
you imagined a globe—and asked why all the points on Australia did not form a circle even 
though they are all equidistant from the center. Now, you have a modified definition—a circle is a 
set of coplanar points equidistant to a center. 
 When there are no further questions, your insight is invulnerable; it has undergone all the 
correction it can undergo.169 The lack of any further pertinent questions is the key to the 
invulnerability of an insight because it is only through further questions that further insights arise, 
insights that complement, modify, or revise the initial insight. If there are no further pertinent 
questions in this self-correcting process, you cannot make your insight more correct. When you 
understand that you’ve raised all the further questions and met them, you will have fulfilled the 
conditions needed to affirm your proposition, which in virtue of its conditions being fulfilled, is 
now virtually unconditioned. The basis for making a judgment of the correctness of an insight is 
the insight’s invulnerability. This process of reflecting terminates in an act of reflective 
understanding grasping the sufficiency of evidence for affirming (or denying) that the content of 
an insight is correct. Only reflective understanding—not sensation, not direct understanding—
grasps the sufficiency of the evidence. To grasp the sufficiency of evidence for affirming a 
proposition means grasping the proposition as virtually unconditioned because there are no 
further pertinent questions. The sufficient evidence for an insight’s correctness is its 
invulnerability. 
 The reason raising and answering further pertinent questions can and does lead to a 
grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence and so to a judgment is because our desire to know is 
unrestricted; there is no reality about which we cannot ask. This unrestricted desire to know is 
intrinsically related to the unrestrictedness of being precisely because what we anticipate in our 
                                                
169 Importantly, if there are further questions that currently cannot be answered—maybe they require 
developments in another field of study, or maybe there is not equipment sophisticated enough to make 
the needed measurements—the reasonable thing to do is to withhold judgment. 
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unrestricted questioning is being. Objectivity rests on this proportionate relation between the acts 
of human knowing and their content, between knowing and known.170 Our inquiry must be 
unrestricted to obtain objectivity. The invulnerability of an insight depends on the 
unrestrictedness of being that corresponds to unrestricted inquiry. The criterion of “no further 
pertinent questions” is relevant to the objectivity of knowing precisely because we can ask about 
any and all realities.171  
 Grasping the sufficiency of evidence in an act of reflective understanding is what finally 
releases the tension of critical inquiry. The satisfaction of this inquiry feels different than the 
satisfaction of your questions about what something is. Where direct insights arise suddenly and 
ecstatically, reflective insights emerge slowly and carefully as you weigh the evidence. The release 
of tension that comes with a reflective insight is more like an experience of confidence than the 
ecstatic experience of a direct insight; it is a subtle shift from the tension of an unanswered 
question to a gentle peace of mind.172 You feel like you have assembled all the relevant questions, 
and your doubts begin to dissolve.173 It may also carry some exhaustion, but it is a satisfying 
exhaustion, an exhaustion in which you feel that you’ve really accomplished something, and it 
also brings an experience of relief because you’ve reached knowledge, which was what you 
desired all along. A further question may arise—maybe there is a decision to be made with 
respect to what you now know. But for the time being, you experience a sense of relief and 
accomplishment.  
 With the surge of confidence that comes with grasping the sufficiency of the evidence, you 
don’t just feel intelligent anymore; you feel like you have some authority to speak about this issue 
                                                
170 See Bernard Lonergan, “Cognitional Structure,” in Collection, CWL 4, 211. 
171 See Patrick H. Byrne, “Lonergan’s Retrieval of Aristotelian Form,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 
76, no. 3 (2002), 388. See also Frederick E. Crowe, “St. Thomas and the Isomorphism of Human 
Knowing and Its Proper Object,” in Three Thomist Studies, eds. Frederick F. Lawrence and Michael Vertin 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000): 207-235.  
172 Byrne, “Spirit of Wonder, Spirit of Love,” 7. 
173 See Morelli, Self-Possession, 147. 
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because you have ample evidence. You do have good reasons and you can state them. You are 
ready to give your assent, even though it feels risky because you feel like you are exposing yourself 
by making a judgment. Making a judgment feels personal in a way that expressing your 
understanding did not. Yet, if you did not give your assent upon grasping the sufficiency of the 
evidence, you know you would be acting unreasonably. In other words, because you know that 
you have sufficient evidence, you know you also have the sufficient grounds for affirming the 
proposition. In your reflective insight, you grasp that X’s conditions have been met (and so 
implicitly grasp that X is certainly true). Thus, because you grasp that X’s conditions have been 
met, you can reasonably give your assent to the proposition—“Yes, X is certainly true”—such 
that you make explicit what reflective understanding understood implicitly. Further, this 
affirmation transforms the proposition from an object of thought into an object of knowledge. It is 
your act of reflective insight that grounds the emergence of your act of judgment. As your grasp of 
evidence gives rise to your judgment, you experience an interior shift. You are no longer 
considering the proposition, nor are you reflecting on it. You are affirming the proposition and 
taking a stance on it. The proposition is now yours; you are taking responsibility for it.  
5.1.2 Patient Judgment 
 As we have seen, the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for you to grasp the sufficiency 
of the evidence pertain to having raised and answered all the further pertinent questions. But our 
ability to raise the pertinent questions is itself conditioned by the horizon within which we find 
ourselves. However, it is not that you do not have any further pertinent questions, but rather, that 
there are no further pertinent questions, period. This is why it is important to collaborate with 
others and consult texts. We all have different blind spots, different concerns and horizons, 
different areas of expertise. The key criterion for making a judgment about the correctness of our 
insights is to learn to pay attention to our consciousness and the peripheral questions that are 
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lingering, but we would rather ignore.174 Maybe these further questions would require too much 
extra work. Perhaps they would take too long to answer. Maybe they disclose a gap in our present 
knowledge that we would prefer not to admit. Or perhaps we would simply rather spend our time 
doing something that requires less “mental energy.” Yet, bringing your questions to their 
satisfactory completion is the only criterion for judging the correctness of an insight. This is what 
Lonergan means by authenticity—living in fidelity to oneself as an inquirer. Authenticity is 
learning to pay attention to the questions that you habitually push aside; learning to fall in love 
with your question as the ground for your knowing, rather than other things you can be in love 
with that can motivate you to make unreasonable judgments. Likewise, this means that a wise 
person is someone who undergoes the personal struggle of raising all the further pertinent 
questions she can, is not afraid to ask others if she is missing something, and is patient, especially 
when the judgment is an important one. This begins to disclose just how personal judgment is. 
My judgments are mine. They can enrich or constrict my world and my future judgments about 
it. They expose whether or not I am reasonable and indicate whether I take questions seriously or 
brush them aside.  
 This self-correcting process toward invulnerable insights also discloses just how thorough 
the process is by which one can make a reasonable judgment. Being a good judge about anything 
requires a vast accumulation of many other corrected insights and it takes a long time before 
people can be good judges about things in particular areas. Experts in a given field are typically 
people who know the field so well that they know the further pertinent questions to ask. This is 
why graduate students apprentice themselves to professors—their professors are there to help 
them learn the questions that need to asked in response to their insights. While it can take years to 
make a judgment about a particularly complex direct insight and while it may take a lifetime to 
                                                
174 I owe my understanding of this key criterion to Patrick H. Byrne’s Insight and Beyond course. See above. 
See also Patrick H. Byrne, Analogical Knowledge of God and the Value of Moral Endeavor,” Method: 
Journal of Lonergan Studies 11, no. 2 (1993), 114-15. 
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become wise, in the mean time, the reasonable thing to do is to recognize the areas in which you 
are already good at raising and answering questions and to also pay attention to the areas in 
which you habitually ignore further pertinent questions and start taking those questions seriously. 
The key is to learn to pay attention to yourself as a questioner and to embrace this fundamental 
dynamism at the core of your humanity. This dynamism is the heart of our existential self-
constitution, and so it is at the heart of (1) our analogy for God, who is in se eternally constituted as 
triune175 and; (2) the reason we are said to be created to the image of God. 
5.2 Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Level of Reflective Understanding: The 
Metaphysical Terms 
We now turn to Thomas to correlate his metaphysical language and introspective psychology with 
the foregoing. In Verbum, Lonergan argues that Thomas has a subtler, less acknowledged meaning 
for “judgment” (iudicare). Thomas typically speaks of iudicare in terms of compositio vel divisio, e.g.: 
when you say “All A are B” you are composing the concepts A and B into a proposition; when 
you say “A is not B,” you are distinguishing A and B.  Both of these are judgments. However, 
Lonergan argues that for Thomas, iudicare also and much more profoundly meant the act of 
positing or denying the compositio vel divisio.176 In other words, Lonergan argues that there are two 
distinct elements in Thomas’s understanding of judgment, a merely synthetic element (the 
composition or division, itself) and the positing of this synthesis. Further, it is understanding that is 
responsible for synthesizing and dividing, while a further act distinct from understanding is 
responsible for the positing.  
                                                
175 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 177-79. See below, Chapter 5.  
176 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 62-78, esp. 61-62. Lonergan suggests that Thomas’s achievement with 
respect to specifying the act of judgment is obscured by Thomas’s use of Aristotelian terminology 
(translated in Latin as compositio vel divisio). Lonergan contends that his specification is obscured because 
Aristotle did not clearly draw the distinction between the two synthetic elements found in judgment—the 
merely synthetic and the positing of synthesis. It seems to me that part of the difficulty in making this 
clear distinction is that Thomas seems to treat the merely synthetic element in the context of the first 
operation of the intellect—the operation which gives rise to it—but does not call this synthesis a compositio 
vel divisio because he is referring to the synthesis as the quidditas, in keeping with the question, Quid est? 
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 Certainly, Lonergan is clearer on this distinction than Thomas. The subtler meaning of 
judgment is obscured by Thomas’s use of Aristotelian language, such that it can seem as if the act 
of judgment uncovers a synthesis (or division) that was not previously understood.177 However, 
from Thomas’s position on the act of direct of understanding along with his differentiation 
between two types of question and their corresponding intellectual operations, it becomes clear 
that synthesis (or division) emerges on the level of direct understanding as we understand relations 
among things or within things, relations that can only be understood, not sensed.178 These 
relations get formulated as inner words that express the synthesis of A and B. In judgment, on the 
other hand, we assent to (or deny) the synthesis, affirming/denying the correspondence between 
the mental synthesis (of inner words in the mind) and the real synthesis (in the thing itself). 
Thomas elaborates upon these distinctions in his commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate: “Of the 
two phases of mental activity, the first is the understanding of essential meanings, while the second 
is a judgment, either affirmative or negative.  A dual reality corresponds to these activities: to the 
former corresponds the nature of a thing, according to its state of being, complete or incomplete, 
part or accident, as the case may be; to the latter corresponds the existence of the thing.”179 
 Having discussed the mental synthesis at length in the previous section and in Chapter 2 
(when considering the development of a science toward a single view), it remains to clarify the act 
of positing synthesis (judgment, the subtler meaning of “iudicare”) and relate it to the foregoing 
account of judgment (§4.1) To begin, the first operation of the intellect (direct understanding) does 
not include knowledge of the similarity or dissimilarity of the concept to its object. Such 
knowledge only arises through the second operation of the intellect. As Thomas writes “[T]he 
intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by 
                                                
177 See Ibid., 62. See also, for example, ST Ia, q. 3, a. 4 ad 2. 
178 See above, Chapter 2, §6.2 The Ordo Disciplinae as an Explanatory and Synthetic Order.  
179 In Boet. De Trin. q. 5, a. 3. This translation is Thomas Gilby’s. St. Thomas Aquinas Philosophical Texts, trans. 
Thomas Gilby (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 221, n. 604. I owe the reference to this 
helpful translation to Dunstan Robidoux. 
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knowing of a thing what a thing is [quod quid est]. When, however, it judges that a thing 
corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses 
truth [tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum].”180 As we saw above, the proposition is transformed from an 
object of thought to an object of knowledge. In this passage, Thomas also compares sensitive 
knowledge to intellectual knowledge. What differentiates sensitive and intellectual knowledge is 
this ability for the intellect to know that it knows—to know its own conformity with the intelligible 
thing. As Thomas writes, “For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not 
know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends 
concerning it.”181  
 However, a difficulty arises. How does the intellect judge that its knowing is similar to the 
known? This judgment would seem to involve a comparison between the knowing and its 
standard. What is this standard? In De veritate, Thomas gives us a clue. The intellect judges by 
returning to itself (by reflecting, that is)—something which sense can only do partially.182 This 
return is the ground for applying the term “reflection” to this intellectual activity. The standard 
                                                
180 ST Ia, q. 16, a. 2 c. Thomas’s distinction of the twofold operation of the mind what is peculiar to each 
operation can be found throughout the Summa—not only in the questions about the intellect in the Prima 
Pars. In fact, some of the later parts of the Summa convey this distinction more explicitly, as he develops 
more and more concepts to help the student understand what is at stake. Cf. ST IIa-IIae, q. 83, a. 1 in 
which Thomas considers prayer, determining that it is not an operation of the intellect, but of the 
appetitive power: “Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there are two operations of the 
intellective part. Of these the first is ‘the understanding of indivisibles,’ by which operation we apprehend 
what a thing is: while the second is ‘synthesis’ and ‘analysis,’ whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To 
these a third may be added, namely, ‘reasoning,’ whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown.” 
Also see ST IIa-IIae, q. 173, a. 2. Cf. De ver., q. 14, a. 1c: “For, according to the Philosopher, our 
understanding has a twofold operation. There is one by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, as 
what man is, or what animal is. This operation of itself does not involve truth or falsity, just as phrases do 
not. The second operation of the understanding is that by which it joins and divides concepts by 
affirmation or denial. Now, in this operation we do find truth and falsity, just as we do in the proposition, 
which is its sign.” 
181 ST Ia, q. 16, a. 2c. 
182 See De ver., q. 1, a. 9c: “Since sense is closer to an intellectual substance than other things are, it begins to 
return to its essence; it not only knows the sensible, but it also knows that it senses. Its return, however, is 
not complete, since it does not know its own essence. …But powers without any ability to sense cannot 
return to themselves in any way, for they do not know that they are acting. For example, fire does not 
know that it is heating.” 
  Chapter 3 – Page 214 
lays in the principles of the intellect itself. Later on in De veritate, when explaining that in us 
“mind” designates the highest power in the soul, Thomas begins with the etymology of mens, 
which is taken from the verb mensurando: “So, the word ‘mind’ is applied to the soul in the same 
way as ‘intellect’ is. For only the intellect receives knowledge about things by measuring them as if 
by according its own principles.”183  
 It is in measuring things by its own principles that the intellect verifies (or denies) its 
understanding of its object. This verification process occurs by a resolutio in principia (a reduction to 
principles) which Thomas aligns with the via iudicii (the way of judging) in which the mind reflects 
on its knowledge. Assent (the personal aspect of judgment), in order to be rational, must result 
from this reduction. As Thomas writes, “Human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, 
advances from certain things simply understood—namely, the first principles; and, again, by way 
of judgment returns by resolving to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has 
found.”184 What occurs in this process of reflection (the via iudicii) is that the intellect returns to the 
sources of its insight, namely, the senses and its intellectual light. We return to the data of sense to 
check whether our phantasm adequately represented the sense data on our object of inquiry. As 
Thomas writes, “Since the senses are the first source of our knowledge, we must in some way 
reduce to sense everything about which we judge.”185 For example, we may set up experiments in 
which we control for certain factors in order to isolate the variable under investigation. This 
                                                
183 De ver., q. 10, a. 1. This translation is by the editors of Verbum. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate: QQ 1-10, 
trans. by James V. McGlynn, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953). The Latin is “et ideo 
nomen mentis hoc modo dicitur in anima, sicut et nomen intellectus. Solum enim intellectus accipit 
cognitionem de rebus quasi mensurando eas ad sua principia.” McGlynn’s translation does not 
emphasize the unique character the mind has in its ability to measure things by its own principles. 
184 ST Ia, q. 79, a. 8.  
185 De ver., q. 12, a. 3 ad 2. He continues, “Hence, the Philosopher says that the sensible visible thing is that 
at which the work of art and nature terminates, and from which we should judge of other things. 
Similarly, he says that the senses deal with that which is outermost as the understanding deals with 
principles. He calls outermost those things which are the term of the resolution of one who judges. Since, then, in 
sleep the senses are fettered, there cannot be perfect judgment so that a man is deceived in some respect, 
viewing the likenesses of things as though they were the things themselves.” Cf. Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 
2, 75, fn. 65. 
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return indicates that reflection has “psychological conditions.”186 Thomas attends to these 
conditions when he insists, for example, that one must be wide-awake in order to judge precisely 
because we need the full use of our senses in order to reach a judgment.187 These conditions point 
to the fact that judging is an activity that involves the whole human person. Whereas in direct 
understanding we abstract from the here and now to form a universal concept, in reflective 
understanding, we return to the here and now to test the concept out. 
 Yet, besides human knowledge’s extrinsic origin in sensitive impressions, it also has an 
immanent source in intellectual light. Thus, the reflective activity of the way of judgment must 
also return to intellectual light.188 For Thomas, our native intellectual light is the key to our ability 
to reflect and hence to our ability to know reality. As Lonergan writes, “The ultimate ground of 
our knowing is indeed God, the eternal Light; but the reason why we know is within us. It is the 
light of our own intellects; and by it we can know because [as Thomas writes] ‘the intellectual 
light itself which we have within us is nothing else than a certain participated likeness of the 
uncreated light.’”189 In other words, our intellectual light, “operat[es] as a relentless desire to 
know that is capable of discerning when it ‘gets things right”190 and “figuring out how to figure 
out” if its insight is correct. As such, intellectual light is the proximate reason why we know. This 
means that we know by what we are—beings who participate in uncreated light—rather than by 
any vision or contact or confrontation with the other.  
                                                
186 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 75. 
187 For example, see ST Ia, q. 84, a. 8 ad. 2. 
188 As Lonergan explains, Aristotle provided Thomas with a theory of agent intellect, but with Augustine’s 
help, Thomas moved beyond Aristotle’s theory by arguing for the identification of agent intellect with the 
ground of intellectual light. See Lonergan, CWL 2, 90-1. See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 90-91. On agent 
intellect’s illumination of phantasms, see See ST Ia, q. 54, a. 4. 
189 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 85 (emphasis added). Lonergan is citing ST Ia, q. 84, a. 5c. See also ST Ia, q. 
12, a. 2c. In affirming that the ultimate ground of our knowing is eternal Light, Thomas is agreeing with 
Augustine. In locating the reason of human knowing within, Thomas is transcending the Platonism of 
Augustine’s theory of divine illumination.  
190 Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity,” Paper presented at Boston College 
Systematic Theology Colloquium (April 2013), 10-11. 
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 Thomas describes the return to intellectual light as an instance of ‘ratio terminatur ad 
intellectum” (reason attains its term in understanding).191 This phrase has two meanings, both of 
which are relevant for understanding the via iudicii. First, intellectus refers to the habitus principiorum 
(habit of principles).192 In returning to intellectual light, the intellect returns to naturally known 
first principles (e.g., the principle of non-contradiction), which are an effect of intellectual light. 
Thomas explains why we need to return to intellectual light in addition to sensation by explicating 
the relationship between the light of agent intellect and first principles: 
Accordingly, it is true that our mind receives knowledge from sensible things; nevertheless, 
the soul itself forms in itself likenesses of things, inasmuch as through the light of the agent 
intellect the forms abstracted from sensible things are made actually intelligible so that 
they may be received in the possible intellect. And in this way all knowledge is in a certain 
sense implanted in us from the beginning (since we have the light of the agent intellect) 
through the medium of universal conceptions which are immediately known by the light 
of the agent intellect. These serve as universal principles through which we judge about 
other things, and in which we foreknow these others.193 
For example, the principle of non-contradiction “does not arise from an insight into sensible data 
but from the nature of intelligence as such; and so its field of application is not limited to the 
realm of possible human experience.”194 Reducing the proposition to these principles provides 
evidence for making a judgment.195 Until the resolution reaches these principles, one can doubt. 
                                                
191 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 77. Lonergan bases the following on Peghaire’s study on intellectus et ratio 
in Aquinas. 
192 See De ver., q. 1, a. 12c: “For example, first principles are immediately known when we know their terms, 
and for this reason intellect or understanding is called ‘a habit of principles.’” 
193 De ver., q. 10, a. 6c. Cf. ST Ia, q. 58, a. 3. Cf. ST IIa-IIae, q. 171 a. 4. 
194 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 69. 
195 For example, Thomas considers the process of making a judgment as a collection of evidence and return 
to first principles, which is similar in both speculative and practical matters: ST IIa-IIae, q. 53, a. 4: 
“Thought [consideratio] signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about something [intellectus 
veritatem rei intuentis]. Now just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. 
Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the 
results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles. Hence thought pertains chiefly to 
judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to 
wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment 
depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin” (emphasis added). Here, Thomas is using 
“reason” (ratio) and “intellect” (intellectus) to refer to the faculties of reason and intellect, which is different 
from the distinction we have been using been using between two kinds of intellectual acts of 
understanding, namely, direct understanding and reflective understanding (which occur on the levels of 
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But once one has reached them, doubt is excluded. Whenever a correct resolution to principles is 
performed, falsity cannot be in the intellect.196 The intellect’s return to its sources in sensitive 
impressions and intellectual light is in Thomas’s terms what we explored above as the raising and 
answering of all further pertinent questions – the activity that linked the conclusion (the 
conditioned proposition) to its principles (the fulfilling conditions).197   
 Second, according to Lonergan, the phrase “ratio terminatur ad intellectum” refers to the fact 
that reason is understanding in process. Given this relationship between reason and understanding, 
and given the connection Thomas makes between human reasoning, judgment, and the resolutio in 
principia in Question 79 (a. 8), this means that the resolutio in principia cannot be interpreted solely in 
logical terms (i.e., in terms of coherent inferences from premises) but must also be interpreted in 
terms of understanding.198 Thomas continues in Article 12 of Question 79, referring again to 
human reasoning (ratiocinatio hominis): “The human act of reasoning, since it is a kind of 
movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things—namely, those which are 
naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable 
principle—and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally 
known, we judge [iudicamus] of those things which we have discovered by reasoning.”199 
                                                                                                                                            
intelligent and rational/reasonable self-consciousness, respectively). This question takes place in 
Thomas’s consideration of imprudence. For the relationship between reason and intellect, see ST Ia, q. 
79, a. 8. Cf. ST Ia-IIae, q. 63, a. 1: “…In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so 
in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain 
naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and 
moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with 
reason…” For Thomas’s use of inquisitio, see Roy J. Deferrari and Sister M. Inviolata Barry, A Lexicon of 
St. Thomas Aquinas based on the Summa theologica and Selected Passages of his other Works (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1948), 565. 
196 See De veritate, q. 1, a. 12c: “But [falsity] never occurs if a reduction to first principles is made correctly.” 
197 However, in grounding the objectivity of judgment in the raising and answering of further pertinent 
questions, Lonergan made a significant and original contribution, above and beyond Thomas’s cogitional 
theory. 
198 See Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity,” 10. 
199 ST Ia, q. 79, a. 12c. 
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 What this amounts to is that via iudicii—the reflective process of reasoning—results in an 
act of understanding no less than the discursive process of reasoning (level of direct 
understanding) results in an act of understanding. Further, “For no less than the first type of inner 
word, the second proceeds from an intelligere. No less than the procession of the first type, the 
procession of the second is an emanatio intelligibilis.”200 These are two distinct types of 
understanding—two distinct acts of intelligere—and so two distinct types of proceeding inner 
words. One is a direct act of understanding that understands the intelligible in a phantasm and 
speaks its understanding in an inner word that is a definition of essence. The other is an act of 
reflective understanding that understands the sufficiency of the evidence for affirming the existence 
of that essence and speaks its understanding in an inner word of judgment. We can observe the 
distinction between these two kinds of words in the following passages: 
Consequently, the quiddities formed in the intellect, or even the affirmative and negative 
propositions, are, in a sense, products of the intellect, but products of such a kind that 
through them the intellect arrives at the knowledge of an exterior thing. Hence, this 
product is, in a fashion, a second means by which understanding takes place.201 
For the intellect by its action forms a definition of the thing, or even an affirmative or 
negative proposition.202 
[T]hat which is the first and direct object in the act of understanding is something that 
the intellect conceives within itself about the thing understood, whether it be a definition or 
proposition according to the two operations of the intellect mentioned in De Anima, III. Now this 
concept of the intellect is called the interior word and is signified by means of speech: for 
the spoken word does not signify merely the thing understood, or the intelligible form 
thereof or the act of understanding, but the concept of the intellect through which it 
signifies the thing…203 
                                                
200 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL, 77.  
201 De ver., q. 3, a. 2c. See also De ver., q. 4, a. 2: “For the clarification of this matter, it should be noted that 
our intellectual word, which enables us to speak about the divine Word by a kind of resemblance, is that 
at which our intellectual operation terminates. This is the object of understanding, which is called the 
conception of the intellect – whether the conception can be signified by a simple expression, as is true 
when the intellect forms the quiddities of things, or whether it can be signified only by a complex 
expression, as is true when the intellect composes and divides. Now, for us every object of understanding 
really proceeds from something else.” 
202 De pot., q. 8, a. 1c.  
203 De pot., q. 9, a. 5c. 
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[T]hat is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms when 
understanding. Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. 
According to its operation which is called “the understanding of indivisibles,” it forms a 
definition; while according to its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an 
enunciation or something of that sort.204 
 If the intellect reduces the conclusion (i.e., the proposition that emerged as a possible 
intelligibility on the level of direct understanding) to its principles in the via iudicii, the intellect 
must assent to the conclusion (i.e., affirm that the proposition is a real intelligibility).205 Assent is 
the act of judgment, though it emphasizes the personal aspect of judgment. What leads up to it is 
reflection and what grounds it is a reflective act of understanding that has grasped the reduction 
to principles. Thomas discusses the necessity of making a judgment once one has resolved the 
conclusion to its principles in his commentary on Boethius’s De trinitate. He is differentiating 
between modes of assent, e.g., judgment, belief, and opinion:  
It may be said: Whenever there is acceptance of a truth, by whatever mode of assent, 
there must be something which moves the mind to assent: just as the naturally possessed light of 
the intellect causes assent to first principles, and the truth of those first principles causes assent to 
conclusions made from them…But that which inclines the mind to assent to the first principles 
of understanding or to conclusions known from these principles is a sufficient induction which 
forces assent, and is sufficient to judge of those things to which the mind gives its assent.206  
                                                
204 In Ioan., c. 1, lect. 1, n. 25. 
205 See De ver., q. 22, a. 6 ad. 4: “In demonstrative sciences conclusions are so related to principles that when 
the conclusion is removed the principle is removed. And so from this fixity of the conclusions with regard 
to the principles the intellect is forced by the principles themselves to assent to the conclusions” (cited in 
Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 75, fn. 62). 
206 In Boet. De trin., q. 3, a. 1 ad 4. Interestingly, in this passage Thomas also compares the habit of faith with 
the habit of principles. While the former is infused and the latter is natural, the habit of principles is not 
caused by sense but only receives a determination from sense. Similarly, the habit of faith is not caused by 
preaching, but only receives determination from hearing, e.g., in preaching: “And thus it is evident that 
faith comes in two ways: namely, from God by reason of the interior light which induces assent, and also 
by reason of those truths which are proposed exteriorly and take their source from divine revelation. 
These latter are related to the knowledge which is of faith as things known by the senses are to knowledge 
of first principles, because in both cases there is a certain determination given to cognition. Therefore, as 
cognition of first principles is received by way of sense experience, and yet the light by which those 
principles are known is innate, so faith comes by way of hearing, and yet the habit of faith is infused.” 
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This passage indicates the relationship between the reflective act of understanding and the 
proceeding act of judgment or assent in which the former serves as the motive for the later. One 
gives one’s assent when one judges the conception of the thing to be true.207 
 To summarize, in considering the standard by which the intellect measures things, we can 
refer to intellectus in relation to the habitus principiorum. In this case, we are referring to the criteria 
by which we make a judgment—resolutio in principiorum. We can also refer to intellectus in relation to 
reflective understanding and the assent that follows upon it. In this case, we are referring to the 
effect of this measuring return—an act of judgment proceeding from an act of reflective 
understanding.208 Before moving on to the next chapter, it will be helpful to summarize this 
section by explicating the relationship among the activities performed in the via iudicii. The 
relationships on the level of reflective understanding are the same as those on the level of direct 
understanding, so we proceed quickly through them. The following will be helpful: 
Act C as act: intelligere, the act of reflective understanding  
 
 Act C as grounding Act D: dicere, the act of reflective understanding as speaking 
 
Act D: iudicare, the act of judgment; the content of this act is the verbum (inner word of 
judgment—i.e., proposition, affirmation/denial) 
Table 12 
5.2.1 Intelligere and Dicere 
As with direct understanding, we have been analyzing one act—reflective understanding 
(intelligere)—from two points of view: from the point of view of the instrumental cause (agent 
object) and from the point of view of the term (terminal object). In this case, the agent object is the 
sufficient evidence (resolution to principles) and the terminal object is the inner word of judgment. 
To put this in colloquial terms, the act of reflective understanding “does” two things: it grasps 
                                                
207 De malo, q. 6, a. 1 ad 14 cited in Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 73. 
208 There remains a third element with regard to the intellect’s measuring of things. It is what Lonergan 
calls the critical issue, and it pertains to knowing our very capacity to know the truth. See Lonergan, 
Verbum, CWL 2, 86. The critical issue is intimately related to becoming present to oneself as created to 
the imago Dei and therefore, for coming to a truly fruitful understanding of the analogy for the Trinity. 
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(intelligere) the sufficiency of the evidence, and it pivots on itself to speak (dicere) an affirmation 
(iudicare) that expresses this grasped sufficiency. As with direct understanding, once you have a 
reflective insight, your insight is in control of your reflective activities, and so you are operating 
autonomously. As such, you are able to speak a word of judgment. It is as if, once grasping the 
sufficiency of the evidence, you say to yourself, “Oh, wow! I’ve got it!” and so you recognize you 
can reasonably proceed to affirm your (modified and nuanced) insight.   
5.2.2 Iudicare; Verbum 
The act of reflective understanding is distinct from the act of judgment that it grounds.209 Again, 
we can recognize this distinction by turning to the respective contents of these two acts. As 
sufficient evidence is one thing and the true is another, so also the act by which the evidence is 
grasped as sufficient is distinct from the act by which the true is affirmed.210 Thus, we must 
carefully distinguish between intelligere (the act of understanding by which the sufficiency of 
evidence is grasped) and iudicare (the act of affirming the true, which is an interiorly uttered word). 
At the same time, the two acts are connected by an intellectual emanation, for we are able to 
affirm the true because we have grasped the evidence as sufficient.211 There is no dicere grounding 
iudicare unless there has been a reflective grasp that the conclusion has been resolved to its 
principles. Affirmation/denial depend upon reflective understanding being in act and upon 
reflection knowing that in its grasp of sufficient evidence it has the sufficient grounds to speak a 
word of affirmation/denial. In other words, reflective understanding-in-act understands itself as 
the sufficient ground for the act of judgment, and so it speaks. Affirmations are given only with 
and within the reflective act of understanding. This is what is meant by emanatio intelligibilis. 
                                                
209 For example, see ST IIa-IIae, q. 53, a. 4 ad 2: “All thought about those things of which counsel takes 
cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is perfected in 
judgment…” 
210 See above, §5.1.2 Reflective Insight: Sufficient Evidence, pp. 186-87. 
211 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 204-05. 
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5.3 Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Level of Reflective Understanding: The Necessity 
of the Inner Word  
As with the inner word of definition, we can ask why we need the inner word of judgment. 
According to Thomas we form inner words in order to judge external things. In other words, 
inner words play an intermediary and mediating role between understanding and external things. 
As he writes, “The intellectual conception is a medium between the intellect and the thing known, 
because through its mediation the intellectual operation attains the thing. Hence, the intellectual 
conception is not only that which is understood but also that by which the thing is understood. 
Consequently, that which is understood can be said to be both the thing itself as well as an 
intellectual conception.”212 The necessity of these two types of inner words is related. In fact, to 
know the thing is the entire reason the intellect forms a concept: “The concept of the intellect is 
ordered to the thing understood as to an end; since the reason that the intellect forms in itself the 
concept of the thing is this, that it might know the thing understood.”213  
 On the level of direct understanding, the inner word was necessary for effecting the 
transition from grasping the preconceptual quiddity in the material thing (the formal cause) to the 
definition of the thing (the essence). However, at this stage, the conceived object is only an object 
of thought. When you raise the critical question of truth, which introduces a duality between your 
inner word (of definition/concept) and the external thing, then you begin to use your inner word 
as a medium of knowledge through which you apprehend the external thing.214 To say that your 
inner word is a medium of knowledge means that your knowledge of the existence of the external 
thing is your knowledge of the truth of your inner word (your proposition). Truth—a true 
judgment—is the medium by which we know reality. In other words, the second operation of the 
                                                
212 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 ad 3. According to Lonergan, this position on the mediating role of inner words 
appears as soon as Thomas moves beyond his initial Sentences commentary and remains throughout his 
thought.  
213 De pot., q. 8, a. 1c. For this reference, see Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 22, fn. 41. Also recall ST Ia, q. 85, 
a. 2 ad. 3. 
214 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 21; 200-01; Cf. Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 597-601. 
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intellect (reflective understanding) introduces the duality of idea and thing and makes the 
former—which is the inner word (the idea formulated on the level of direct understanding)—the 
medium in and through which one apprehends the latter when one passes judgment on the truth 
of the definition or concept.215 For example, to know that the human person is a rational animal is 
to know the truth of your inner word (your definition, your conceived object, your proposition) “a 
human person is a rational animal.”  Further, the reflective insight is not enough to serve as a 
medium of knowledge because it is a grasp of evidence, not an affirmation of truth.  
 McShane summarizes the necessity of both types of inner words. First, on the necessity of 
the inner word on the level of direct understanding, he writes, “There is a first necessity of moving 
from grasp of the quiddity of the material thing by insight into phantasm, to conception of the 
thing, in which intelligible form and common matter are combined. Without this 
conceptualization the thing is not known as thing but only its form by insight and its matter by 
sense, so there is simply no defining the thing.”216 On the necessity of the inner word on the level 
of reflective understanding, he writes, “The further transition from object of thought to 
knowledge of the existing thing makes necessary a verbum that is not a definition but a judgment, 
proceeding from grasped sufficiency of evidence, and through which one knows concrete reality. 
It is distinct from understanding as a grasp of sufficient evidence and affirmation of truth are 
distinct.”217 
 We can put the foregoing in terms of essence and existence, which also points toward the 
necessity of inner words for our ability to move beyond the sensible world. The inner word of 
definition expresses the essence of X; the inner word of judgment expresses that X exists. Both 
inner words are necessary because the material things we inquire after are composed of both 
                                                
215 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 21.  
216 Philip McShane, “The Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God” Theological Studies 23, no. 4 (1962), 
555. 
217 Ibid., 555-56. 
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essence and existence. Further, we need inner words even for that to which our intellects are 
disproportionate. Thus, we need them to know God analogically in this life. While we cannot 
know God’s essence, we can inquire after God’s effects to formulate a proposition such as “God 
exists” and by affirming this proposition, we know that God exists.218 In fact, in the trinitarian 
questions in the Summa, what Thomas is doing is helping the reader develop concepts—inner 
words of definitions (i.e., processions, relations, persons)—in order that she may develop an 
analogical understanding of Trinity in itself, which can then be elaborated upon to illuminate a 
theology of the divine missions. However, within trinitarian theology, the theologian must be 
content with potentially correct concepts.  
 To integrate the sections on the inner words of definition and judgment with one another, 
and also to draw out the relationship between knowing and being, and the relevance of the 
foregoing to trinitarian theology, Crowe has a very helpful summary: 
[For] St. Thomas the process [of intellectual emanation] was the expression of a word, 
that is, the inner word of mind, not the outer word of speech (which would be a later 
operation); further, he distinguished a twofold word in man, one on the level of 
understanding (the verbum incomplexum), and one on the level of reflection or judgment (the 
verbum complexum, so-called because a judgment is formed of subject, copula, and 
predicate). Now the concept, or verbum incomplexum, corresponds to essence, while the 
judgment, or verbum complexum, corresponds to existence; but in God, as essence and 
existence are one, so the concept and judgment are one; God utters but one eternal 
Word. However, either word in man offers an analogy for the emanatio intelligibilis of that 
divine Word.219 
As Crowe underscores, while there are two distinct emanations in us—the emanation of the inner 
word of definition and the emanation of the inner word of judgment—in God, there is but one 
eternal emanation of the Word in which there is perfect understanding and judging. That is, in 
God—who is the infinite act of understanding—direct understanding and reflective 
understanding are but one perfect act. 
                                                
218 See ST Ia, q. 2, a. 3. 
219 Crowe, Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 145. 
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6. Conclusion 
Having considered the intellectual emanation of the inner word on the levels of direct and 
reflective understanding, it remains to consider the second type of procession, which is not the 
procession of a word, but rather, a procession of love. To distinguish this second type of 
emanation, I at times use Thomas’s phrase, intellectual inclination (inclinatio intelligibilis). Like the 
procession of the inner word, the procession of love has an intellectual basis. However, there are 
important distinctions, hence the distinct term for this second type of intellectual procession. 
Before continuing, recall some of the key elements of the foregoing analysis of the procession of 
inner words. Insofar as the operation of the intellect (whether on the level of direct or reflective 
understanding) is meant in the sense of act, it is termed intelligere. Insofar as the operation of the 
intellect is meant that one act is grounding another, it is termed dicere. On the level of direct 
understanding, the grounded act is termed concipere (the act of conceptualizing) and its content is 
the inner word of definition or concept. On the level of reflective understanding, the grounded act 
is termed iudicare (the act of judging) and its content is the inner word of affirmation or denial. In 
both cases, the inner word proceeds because of understanding, and its procession is what dicere 
consists in. This procession is what we have been calling the intellectual emanation, and it is what 
is analogous to the procession of the divine Word in God. 
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CHAPTER 4                                                                                    
INCLINATIO INTELLIGIBILIS: PROCEEDING LOVE 
1. Analepsis and Prolepsis 
THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER PREPARED THE way for the psychological analogy (Chapter 5) by 
examining the first kind of procession in us, namely, the procession of the word. In this chapter, I 
will first explain the meaning of “emanatio intelligibilis” as a unique kind of procession. The 
processions of word and love share in this unique character, in which the second act emerges 
because of the first act. We define/judge and love rationally—we define or judge because we have 
understood, and we love based on this word. I will then treat the procession of love, the 
emanation of love. Together with Chapter 3, these two sections of Chapter 4 will prepare the way 
for the following chapter in which we will turn to the psychological analogy, using the processions 
of word and love in us as analogues for understanding—fruitfully yet imperfectly—the processions 
of Word and Love in God. This starting point—an analogous understanding of the processions—
allows for a progressive development of further concepts that build upon one another, namely, 
relations and persons. 
2. Emanatio Intelligibilis: Intellectual Dependence 
Before proceeding to discuss the psychological analogue for the second divine procession, i.e., the 
procession of the act of love, I will examine what intellectual emanation means and thus, why it is 
relevant to trinitarian theology. I begin with considering intellectual emanation before the 
procession of love because this consideration will help clarify the relationship between the first 
and second processions, and so between knowing and loving. More specifically, it will prepare us 
to appreciate the intellectual element of love’s procession and thereby cut through the obscurity 
that has long surrounded the second procession. The procession of the word and the procession of 
love are processions in the same sense—they are both intellectual emanations—but they are not 
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the same procession. Rather, the processions themselves are related, i.e., love proceeds because of 
the word, whereas the word proceeds because of understanding.  
 Recall that while there is intelligibility that is not intelligent, there is also intelligibility that 
is also intelligent. Again, intelligibility is what is known by intelligent beings. For example, a 
human being is both intelligible and intelligent. She is intelligible because she is a created being, 
and all of being is intelligible—capable of being understood. She is also intelligent because she can 
understand and know being, at least the being that is proportionate to her intelligence.1 Thus, 
there is intelligibility that is not intelligent, and there is intelligibility that is also intelligent. To 
distinguish the two, we can call the former intelligibility “material” and the latter “spiritual.”2 
Emanatio intelligibilis is a spiritual intelligibility because it is also intelligent. It is a particular type of 
procession that occurs within human consciousness. In us, there are a few aspects to the 
procession of an inner word. There is the actual aspect insofar as there is a procession of an act 
from an act. This aspect is relevant to trinitarian theology insofar as God is pure act, but 
irrelevant insofar as there is only one infinite act in God (not three). There is also the productive 
aspect insofar as the act of understanding is the efficient cause of the procession of a word. The 
productive aspect becomes increasingly irrelevant in Thomas’s trinitarian theology as his thought 
matures, for the Father is not the cause of the Son.3 Instead, with the Latin Fathers Thomas 
prefers to speak of God the Father as “principle.” This aspect is supplanted by the intellectual 
aspect, which sets intellectual emanation apart from other kinds of immanent processions. This 
kind of causality (“because-of-ness”) is unique to the spiritual order. In the actual aspect the 
procession is processio operati. In the intellectual aspect the procession is processio intelligibilis.4 The 
latter involves a different type of dependence, and this is precisely what Thomas calls “intellectual 
                                                
1 For example, ipsum esse is disproportionate to her intelligence. See ST Ia, qq. 12-13. 
2 See Lonergan, Insight, CWL 3, 539. 
3 See ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1. Efficient causality is extrinsic causality, making it irrelevant to an analogy for the 
divine processions. See Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 108. 
4 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 207. 
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emanation.” It is not just caused by understanding but is because of understanding-in-act. This 
kind of causality is unique to the spiritual order.  
 The intellectual aspect of the procession of the inner word in us should already be 
familiar in light of the previous Chapter, especially Section 3. Recall that once you have an 
insight, your insight itself takes over your intelligent activities; insight is operating autonomously. 
It does so in order to formulate a word that expresses what you’ve understood. Once insight has 
figured out what it “got,” it cannot help but speak a word about it. Thus, an act of 
conceptualizing proceeds from an act of understanding through an intellectual emanation—
through the speaking of a word. In other words, intelligent speaking grounds the relation between 
understanding and conceptualizing. Once the intellect comes to terms with its insight through its 
own autonomous activity, it knows that it is the sufficient ground for speaking a word that 
expresses its understanding.5 This “knowing that it is the sufficient ground for speaking” is what 
intelligere as dicere is (the operation of the intellect grounding another act). The act of understanding 
speaks and knows it is the sufficient ground of speaking precisely because it is operating 
autonomously as intelligence-in-act. It is this knowing that is the intellectual aspect of the inner 
word’s procession. 
 We can appreciate the intellectual aspect of an intellectual emanation if we compare it 
with causality. Intelligere and verbum are related as cause and effect; in us, the act of understanding 
does produce the inner word. However, the verbum is not only the product of the act of 
understanding, but it is also the rationally conscious expression of understanding. As Lonergan writes, 
“This production is not merely utterance, dicere, but the utterance of intelligence in act, [either in] 
rationally conscious disregard of the irrelevant [or in] critical evaluation of all that is relevant, of 
                                                
5 Again, intelligere is one and the same act as dicere, but it is not the same as concipere. It is difficult to find the 
English terms to say all of this properly. Here, my use of “conceptualizing” is not meant to be equated 
with dicere. It is, rather, concipere. 
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intelligere.”6 Crowe elaborates on this point: “[W]hen we define, not as parrots, but as intelligent 
men, we do so in virtue of understanding; when we judge not as bigots, but as rational men, we 
do so in virtue of reflection, and that ‘in virtue of’ does not indicate causation in the ontological 
sense; it indicates that the verbum is not only caused by but also is because of, in the cognitional sense of 
proceeding from rationally conscious grounds.”7 Where productive dependence relates principle 
and term on the basis of efficient causality, intellectual dependence relates principle and term on 
the basis of rational consciousness, within the unity of consciousness.8 This unique type of dependence 
occurs only within intelligent beings, and more specifically, only within intelligence—not within, 
for example, imagination.  
 The key to understanding this dependence is to come to terms with “because-of-ness” as 
distinct from cause and effect. Inner words proceed because of the act of understanding, which is 
why Lonergan says inner words proceed with reflective rationality. The difference between 
ontological causality and cognitional “because-of-ness” is the difference between natural 
procession and the procession of the inner word. Both processions are intelligible. For example, 
when fire heats a steak, we can understand this natural process, but this heating process is not 
itself intelligent. As Crowe puts it, “our act of understanding the fire is not the fire’s act of 
heating.”9 However, when understanding speaks a word that expresses itself, this spiritual process 
is not only intelligible (for we can understand it, as we have been doing); it is also intelligent. 
When we speak a word, we can understand this process (intellectual emanation, which is what 
dicere consists in) and the speaking process is itself intelligent (dicere is intelligere). The intelligibility of 
                                                
6 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 150. 
7 Crowe, The Doctrine f the Most Holy Trinity, 144-5. Recall Thomas’s words in the Summa, which are akin to 
Crowe’s language of ‘in virtue of’: “Whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we understand, 
something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our 
intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge” (ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1c). 
8 See Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology, (unpublished manuscript), 109. Wilkins cites In Met. 5 
lect. 2 §775. 
9 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 145. 
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the procession of the inner word is intelligible not passively or potentially, like the procession of 
heat, but actively and actually, because the procession of the inner word is the activity of 
intelligence in act.10 In this case, “our understanding is not now a separate act (except in further 
reflection) from the spiritual process itself; in the very act of defining or judgment we are 
intelligently conscious of what we are doing and of our sufficient cognitional grounds for doing 
it.”11  
 Further, the fire’s heating process has the intelligibility of some specific natural law, e.g., 
the laws of thermodynamics. It does not have the intelligibility of the very idea of intelligible law. 
This is precisely what the word does have. It proceeds as the very idea of intelligible law, as the 
pure case of intelligible law. There is no law for understanding the process of intellectual 
emanation; the process is understanding in operation already. As Crowe puts it, “Formulations of 
the law of sufficient reason, of the principle of non-contradiction, etc., are attempts to approach 
this pure case from without. But you cannot impose such laws on rational process, as a law is 
imposed on fire to govern its heating; intelligence is itself constitutive and creative of law.”12 These 
principles are not specific laws that govern the operation of intelligence; the operation of 
intelligence is the reason we know these laws in the first place.  
 In the following passage, Lonergan contrasts natural process and the procession of the 
word in a way that captures the unique type of process that occurs only with and within intelligent 
consciousness: 
Any effect has a sufficient ground in its cause; but an inner word not merely has a 
sufficient ground in the act of understanding it expresses; it also has a knowing as a sufficient 
ground, and that ground is operative precisely as a knowing, knowing itself to be sufficient. To introduce 
a term that will summarize this, we may say that the inner word is rational, not indeed with 
the derived rationality of discourse, of reasoning from premises to conclusions, but with the 
                                                
10 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 47. 
11 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 145. 
12 Ibid. 
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basic and essential rationality of rational consciousness, with the rationality that can be discerned 
in any judgment, with the rationality that now we have to observe in all concepts.13 
Focus on the phrase, “an inner word…has a knowing as a sufficient ground…” Here, we can 
observe the operation of the intellect as sufficient ground (dicere) of a second act (either concipere or 
iudicare) precisely because that ground is a knowing (dicere is intelligere). An intelligent inner word 
emerges because an intelligent person can and does understand an intelligibility. An affirmative 
inner word emerges because a reasonable person can and does understand the sufficiency of the 
evidence. It is this “knowing that you know” or “a knowing that knows itself to be sufficient” that 
is the reason for the intellectual aspect of the procession of the inner word.  The inner word 
proceeds from the act of understanding consciously; intellectual emanation always includes a 
conscious awareness of the dependence of the word on the act of understanding. Thus, the inner 
word consciously expresses the intelligibility grasped by the act of understanding. While all causes 
are proportionate to their effects, the act of understanding is proportionate to the inner word and 
knows itself to be proportionate to the inner word. That is why we say in us, the inner word is not 
only caused by but it is also because of the act of understanding.   
 While the intellectual emanation of the inner word has the aspect of both natural and 
intellectual processes, it is the intellectual process that is analogous to the procession of the divine 
Word. That is, it is the conscious rather than the causal aspect that is relevant. Later, in his article 
“Cognitional Structure,” Lonergan captures this basic rationality of human consciousness in 
terms of its functional role in our self-constitution as human beings: 
But human knowing is also formally dynamic. It is self-assembling, self-constituting. It 
puts itself together, one part summoning forth the next, till the whole is reached. And this 
occurs, not with the blindness of natural process, but consciously, intelligently, rationally. Experience 
stimulates inquiry, and inquiry is intelligence bringing itself to act; it leads from 
experience through imagination to insight, and from insight to the concepts that combine 
in single objects both what has been grasped by insight and what in experience or 
imagination is relevant to the insight. In, turn, concepts stimulate reflection, and 
                                                
13 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 47-48 (emphasis added). 
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reflection is the conscious exigence of rationality; it marshals the evidence and weighs it 
either to judge or else to doubt and so renew inquiry.14 
When Augustine and Thomas turn to the human mind as created to the image of God and as the 
analogue for the Trinity, it is because of this basic rationality of consciousness. If we do not grasp 
the conscious, rational character of our defining and judging, we might as well use fire’s heating as 
the analogy for the procession of the divine Word.15 Crowe explains this rationality as follows: 
[It] has to do with internal process. It is a process within intelligence. It is an intelligible 
process; more, it is an intelligent process. It is a process from knowledge to knowledge, 
from knowledge as insight, as perfection, as insight into particular phantasm, to knowledge 
as the expression of the insight, knowledge as conceived, objectified, made universal. It 
has a ‘because of’ character. It is a ‘because of’ intrinsically in itself and not just as seen in 
an object.16 
What Crowe highlights is that the procession of the inner word is intellectual because it is a 
procession from knowledge to knowledge; it is a procession that happens entirely within 
intellectual consciousness, and therefore the procession itself is also intellectual. With regard to the 
intrinsic “because of” character of the rationality of consciousness, what Crowe means is that 
while the objects we inquire after each have a “because of” immanent in them (that is, they have a 
reason, a why, a formal cause, a causa essendi), human rational consciousness is itself a “because of.” 
Intelligence grasps not only the reason for the eclipse, but intelligence also grasps that it is the 
reason it grasps the reason of the eclipse; intelligence grasps that it supervened on the phantasm, 
contributing something above and beyond experience. Thus, the word does not emerge blindly 
nor automatically. It has reason (a “because of”) and that reason is intelligent and autonomous.  
 In speaking of the fact that the inner word is rational because it has a knowing that knows 
itself to be sufficient, we are speaking of a unique capacity that intelligence has—only intelligence 
is capable of reflection. Thomas writes of this reflection in the trinitarian questions of the Summa 
                                                
14 Lonergan, “Cognitional Structure,” 223 (emphasis added).  
15 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 145. See also ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1: “Procession, therefore, is not to 
be understood from how occurs is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause 
proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot….” 
16 Crowe, “For Inserting a New Question (26A) in the Prima Pars,” 339. 
  Chapter 4 – Page 233 
Contra Gentiles.17 He then differentiates among the grades of intellect, demonstrating that “in 
perfect intellectual reflection, principle and term are identical without the elimination of the 
reflection and so without an elimination of the procession.”18 The possibility of this identity is due 
to the unique relationship of dependence proper to intellectual emanation in which absolute 
distinction is not only unnecessary, but also, decreases in proportion to the perfection of the 
procession. As one forms a rigorous conception of what one has understood and lets go of the 
unnecessary parts of the phantasm, the closer the identification between the conception and the 
act of understanding becomes. This is what Thomas means when he writes: 
Whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, 
the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it 
proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the 
intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the 
very act of understanding is made one with the object understood.19 
 It is precisely in the intellect’s capacity for reflection on itself that makes the intellect 
relevant to the procession of the word. (Here, I am referring to reflection as a characteristic of 
intelligence as such, not to the specific reflection that occurs on the level of judgment). While the 
human intellect can reflect on its own act to the point of coming to scientific knowledge of itself, 
the kind of reflective capacity to which we are here referring is something much more 
fundamental. This type of reflection is internal to every procession of a word in us. Any time there 
is an intellectual emanation in us, it is because of this reflective capacity. Thus, this type of 
reflective rationality does not require clear knowledge regarding the existence of the act of 
understanding, of inner words, and of their relation.20 This reflective capacity internal to every 
                                                
17 SCG 4, c. 11, §5. 
18 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 206. 
19 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1, ad. 2. 
20 Rather, the point is that “adequate inner words come from acts of understanding spontaneously and 
consciously when certain conditions are fulfilled; one can operate in accordance with the structure, and in 
that sense grasp consciously the why of the production of an inner word, without having clarity regarding 
the structure” (Editor’s note in Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 610-11 fn. 7). It is not clear 
to me why the editor uses “spontaneous” here when Lonergan typically contrasts the spontaneity of 
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procession of a word in us is a basic and fundamental element of human knowing: we consciously 
and autonomously speak because we understand. In the following chapter, in the context of the 
imago Dei, we will consider the intellect’s explicit self-reflection. 
3. The Intellectual Emanation of Love: The Emanatio Intelligibilis Emerging from 
Judgment 
In considering the intellectual emanation of two kinds of inner words, definitions and judgments, 
we have considered the natural analogues for the divine procession of the Word. While the 
procession of the Word in God is analogous to both the emergence of a concept from an act of 
understanding and to the emergence of judgment from an act of grasping the sufficiency of 
evidence, there is no distinction in God between direct and reflective understanding. The divine 
Word is therefore simultaneously both concept and judgment.21 God does not merely entertain 
the divine essence as an object of thought, but in one perfect act of understanding–judging, 
understands and knows (affirms) the divine essence (and all of creation).  
 Thus, while both kinds of inner words are relevant to trinitarian theology, the inner word 
of judgment proceeding from one who reflectively understands is nevertheless more relevant 
because judgment is the highest point of rational reflection. Yet, as Thomas explains in the 
question on the divine missions, this affirmative inner word is not any sort of word, but one that 
breaks forth into love (a “verbum spirans amorem”), or as Augustine calls it, “knowledge with love.”22 
Thus, beyond an affirmation of the existence of something, there is also simultaneously the 
affirmation of the goodness of something, and this affirmation itself grounds another processio 
intelligibilis, that of love. Following Lonergan, I call this affirmation a “judgment of value.”23 
                                                                                                                                            
insights with the autonomy of speaking inner words. It may be meant to indicate the fact that whenever 
we do understand, a word proceeds within us simply because we understand. 
21 See Charles Hefling, ““Over Thin Ice: Comments on Gratia, Grace and Gratitude,” Lonergan Workshop 
Journal vol. 18 (2005), 100.  
22  ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2. See Augustine, De trinitate, 9. 
23 This is technically following the “later” Lonergan, as Lonergan did not recognize the distinct fourth level 
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Though this is not Thomas’s term, it is a helpful way of distinguishing between a judgment that 
addresses the an sit question and a judgment about the goodness of something, which is the kind of 
judgment that results in a verbum spirans amorem. This second kind of judgment is different from an 
an sit judgment that affirms or denies the existence of something. However, it includes and 
sublates the prior kind of judgment. To distinguish the procession of love from the procession of 
this affirmative word of value, while also maintaining the crucial aspect—that Y proceeds because 
of X—I occasionally pick up on Thomas’s phrase, inclinatio intelligibilis. However, Thomas’s phrase 
is imperfect because, as we will see, love is not only an inclination, but also a resting—a 
complacency—and in fact, the latter is a better analogue for the procession of divine Love.  
 Of the similarity between the processions of word and love, Lonergan writes, “once one 
grasps the processio intelligibilis of inner word from uttering act of understanding, there is not the 
slightest difficulty in grasping the simple, clear straightforward account Aquinas offered of 
proceeding love.”24 While it may seem counterintuitive to refer to the procession of love as an 
intellectual emanation, Thomas’s point in using this phrase to name the type of procession that 
occurs in God is that both processions are rational, meaning there is a relationship of intellectual 
dependence—principle and term are related on the basis of rational consciousness, within the unity of 
consciousness. That is, both inner words and love proceed with reflective rationality.25 The 
second procession is distinct insofar as it proceeds from the intellect to the will in humans. 
Lonergan helpfully defines “intellectual emanation” in a way that accentuates what the two 
processions have in common: “Intellectual emanation, then, is the conscious origin of a real, 
natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both within intellectual consciousness 
                                                                                                                                            
of human consciousness until after writing Verbum and Insight. As Byrne underscores, Lonergan had 
attempted to ground the affirmation of goodness in the affirmation of being in Insight, but this is 
inadequate. 
24 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 211.  
25 See above, Chapter 3, §2. Introduction: Emanatio Intelligibilis and Trinitarian Theology. 
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and also by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the prior act.”26  Thus, both the 
procession of word and that of love occur within intellectual consciousness and by virtue of 
intellectual consciousness itself—that is the crucial point; judgment and love each proceed because 
of prior conscious acts within intellectual consciousness. As Crowe puts it, “Now this flow of love 
in the will from the verbum is also an emanatio intelligibilis; we do not love irrationally, at least love 
need not be irrational; we do not choose blindly; there is something of the rationality of intellect 
in the act of the will.27 The reason verbum spirans amorem is an emanatio intelligibilis is because the love 
proceeds from a knowing (judgment) of the value for the sake of which one loves. It is a love that 
can only process because of a knowing of the value of the beloved. The reason both processions 
are intellectual emanations then is not because verbum spirans amorem is, as Byrne explains, 
“intellectual-as-intelligere, but because it is intellectual as carrying the understanding of the beloved 
(the intelligere of the beloved) within its act, just as concipere carries its intelligere within it as its proper 
self-expression.”28 
 Doran suggests a new phrase to capture Thomas’s and Lonergan’s meaning: 
“autonomous spiritual processions.” He writes, “What Aquinas refers to as emanatio intelligibilis can 
be formulated in the language of autonomous spiritual procession, where ‘autonomous’ refers to 
processions of act from act grounded in an intelligible proportion between what proceeds and the 
principle from which the procession originates.”29 That is, “the word ‘autonomous’ refers 
precisely to the ‘because of’ and ‘in accord with’ or ‘in proportion to’ aspect of the procession, as 
that aspect is known to constitute the relation between the principle and what proceeds from it.”30 
Again, the reason both processions are called “intellectual emanations” is because this phrase 
captures a unique kind of causality that occurs only in the spiritual order (“because-of-ness”); it 
                                                
26 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 140-41 (emphasis added). 
27 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 146. 
28 This is from a comment on my dissertation from July 23, 2017. 
29 Doran, The Trinity in History, vol. 1, 183.  
30 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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refers to an intelligibility that is also intelligent. In short, the preceding section (“Emanatio 
Intelligibilis: Intellectual Dependence”) applies equally to both processions, and was intended to 
underscore the intellectual underpinning of proceeding love for this section. 
 Thomas often speaks of the relationship between word and love in terms such as these: 
“[T]he image of the Trinity [imago Trinitatis] in the mind is considered primarily and principally 
according to acts, namely as by thinking we form an inner word from the knowledge we have, 
and from this we burst forth into love.”31 Further, Thomas does in fact make a distinction 
between two kinds of judgment, which he does according to the distinction between the true and 
the good. In the commentary on the Sentences he writes, “…because there can be a twofold 
apprehension, either of the simple truth, or of the truth as it is expanded to take in the good and 
the fitting—and this latter is perfect apprehension—hence there is a twofold word, namely, of 
something pleasing that is set forth, a word that spirates love—and this is the perfect word—and the 
word of something also that displeases…or does not please.”32 The reflective understanding of 
something as not only true but also as good and fitting that, as such, gives rise to a word that 
spirates love entails both relevant natural analogues for the two divine processions: the emanation 
of a word (Son) from a grasp of the truth-as-good (God), and from this grasp and word, the 
emanation of love (Spirit). All three Persons share this grasp of the truth-as-good, as Speaking, 
Spoken, and Spirated—all within the single unified grasp that is God.33 
 Before proceeding, given that I turn to Lonergan in order to further clarify the reality of 
the second procession, an ambiguity in Lonergan’s own work is noteworthy. Lonergan, both in 
his earlier theology (i.e., the trinitarian theology we find in Verbum and The Triune God: Systematics) 
and later trinitarian theology (i.e., esp. articulations of the psychological analogy found in 
                                                
31 ST Ia, q. 93, a. 7c. 
32 Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 sol as cited in Lonergan, Verbum, 109-110, fn. 20. 
33 I owe this formulation to Patrick Byrne. 
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“Christology Today” and Method in Theology), maintained that the inner word that provides the 
analogue for the divine Word is not a concept nor a judgment of fact, but rather, a judgment of 
value (iudicium valoris). However, while writing his systematic work on the Trinity, Lonergan had 
not yet adequately appropriated what makes a judgment of value true nor did he ever explicate 
his appropriation of the procession of a true judgment of value as clearly as he had the procession 
of a true judgment of fact. Many years passed before Lonergan fully differentiated the operations 
that occur in response to questions of value and so to articulate the affective grasp of value that 
belongs to judgments of value. This differentiation was included within his decisive break with the 
tradition of faculty psychology.34 Later, once Lonergan had explicitly appropriated the role of 
feelings in relation to judgments of value and decisions, his articulation of the psychological 
analogy began to change because he expressed it not solely in terms of intellectual consciousness 
but more extensively in terms of existential consciousness. Existential consciousness includes and 
extends—that is, it sublates—intellectual and rational consciousness, and it pertains to the kind of 
person one is becoming through her decisions.   
 Based on more recent work in Lonergan scholarship as exemplified by Byrne, I will 
explore the procession of true judgments of value and their proceeding love in order to illuminate 
the reality of this second procession, and in order to address questions about the relationship of 
knowledge and love, and the relevance of this relationship to the psychological analogy. In what 
follows, I do not mean to impose Lonergan’s advance on Thomas, himself. Thomas does have a 
detailed account of appetite, the passions, etc. in the Secunda pars. However, his division of 
intellect, will, and appetite—and especially the misleading distinction between apprehensive and 
                                                
34 See Jeremy D. Wilkins, “What the ‘Will’ Won’t Do: Faculty Psychology, Intentionality Analysis and the 
Metaphysics of Interiority,” The Heythrop Journal 57 no. 3 (2016), 2-3. Wilkins writes, “[O]ne may surmise 
that the elimination of an artificial distinction between apprehension and appetition opened the way for 
Lonergan’s later position that feelings apprehend value and his interpretation of Pascal’s ‘reasons of the 
heart.’” 
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appetitive faculties35—constrict the integrative approach to the human person and human 
development that comes with Lonergan’s intentionality analysis.36 The goal is to illuminate the 
reality of the second intellectual emanation—now of love from the word of the intellect—in order 
to creatively retrieve Thomas’s articulation of the psychological analogy and its relationship to 
preaching, thereby rediscovering the fecundity of this tradition of trinitarian theology.   
3.1 Understanding the Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Level of Experience: The 
Affective Response of Love   
Where the procession of the words of meaning and judgment were roughly parallel, the 
procession of love is differently grounded, though its procession is still intellectual because it is also 
a procession that follows upon a “knowing” as its sufficient ground. In brief, where inner words 
are proportionate to and because of acts of understanding (direct or reflective), love is 
proportionate to and because of a judgment of value and the preceding “value-reflective act of 
understanding.”37 This term, “value-reflective understanding” is meant to differentiate the act 
that grounds a judgment of value from the act that grounds a judgment of fact (namely, reflective 
understanding).38 The “knowing” that is the known sufficient ground of love is the reflective grasp 
of the sufficient evidence for the value of something together with the judgment of value to which 
                                                
35 See Wilkins, “What the ‘Will’ Won’t Do,” 2. For Thomas’s account of the powers of the soul and the 
relation of apprehensive and appetitive powers, see ST Ia, qq. 75-89 and Ia-IIae, qq. 6-18. 
36 For detailed accounts of the differences Lonergan’s break with faculty psychology makes for 
understanding human development, see Jeremy D. Wilkins, “Grace and Growth: Aquinas, Lonergan, 
and the Problematic of Habitual Grace,” Theological Studies 72, no. 4 (2011). See also Wilkins, “What the 
‘Will’ Won’t Do.” 
37 This term, “value-reflective understanding” is meant to different the act that grounds a judgment from 
value from the act that grounds a judgment of fact (namely, reflective understanding).  
38 I take this phrase from Byrne. With respect to the procession of a judgment of value from understanding, 
he uses “value-reflective act of understanding, i.e., insight” to distinguish it from the reflective act of 
understanding that occurs on the third level of consciousness and which grounds a judgment of fact. See 
Byrne, The Ethics of Discernment, 199. See also Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge of God,” 116. Vertin names 
the act of understanding that occurs on the fourth level of consciousness a “deliberative insight.” Byrne’s 
name is preferable because it keeps the reflective element that the third and fourth levels share in 
common. It also makes more room for a judgment of value that is simply about the goodness of 
something.  
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it (the reflective grasp) gives rise. Value-reflective understanding and the judgment of value 
operate as one principle grounding love.  
 We have sought to identify experiences of intellectual emanations of words on the levels 
of understanding and judgment. Let us now try to identify in our experiences the intellectual 
emanation of love. You may be able to recall the following experiences: (1) times when you acted 
unreasonably and other times when you acted reasonably and (2) times when you lovingly 
consented to a good that simply is and times when you were merely infatuated or alternatively, 
uninspired to love. Or as Crowe puts it, “For the understanding of the second procession, think of 
the difference between the dull, routine performance of an other-directed automaton and the 
sensitive, rational performance of one who has seen his duty and done it. In one case, conduct 
that does not flow from formulated appreciation of the good, in the other case, conduct that does 
so proceed: amor a verbo.”39  
 In other words, the only adequate principle of rational love is the understanding of the 
true good expressed to oneself. What makes the difference among each instance is an intellectual 
emanation/ autonomous spiritual procession. Intellectual emanation is present with reasonable 
decisions but absent with irrational decisions. Similarly, intellectual emanation is present with a 
loving consent to a good that exists or could exist, but absent with responses of infatuation or 
when one is out of harmony with being as it is. Of loving consent, McShane writes, “it is most 
availably exemplified in that imperfect beatitude constituted by the contemplation of acquired 
truth.”40 It is an affective response that proceeds because of a judgment affirming the value of the 
existence of some good, or even its possibility.41 Such love is a “consent to being”42 or a “resting in 
                                                
39 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 125.  
40 McShane, “Intelligible Emanations,” 548. 
41 Crowe actually speaks about the intellectual emanation that is an affective response of will that follows on 
any judgment of being. Here, if I follow his argument correctly, he is distinguishing between speculative 
and practical intellect, suggesting that complacency in the good follows speculative intellect’s judgment of 
being, whereas concern (intentio boni) follows practical intellect’s judgment of the good. He does not mean 
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reality” or a resting in the possibility of some good before continue to try to bring the good 
about.43 In both experiences (acting reasonably and lovingly consenting), a judgment of value 
grounds an intellectual emanation. In the first instance, it grounds a decision, which is an act of 
love. In the second instance, it grounds an act of complacent love. What is important is to notice 
that in both cases, an act of love (a decision or complacency) emanates from a judgment of value, 
whether that value is a good to be done or made, or a good to be contemplated, respectively.44 
  As we have noted, judgments of value are distinct from the judgments of fact delineated 
in Chapter 3.45 We can distinguish the two kinds of judgment according to the questions to which 
they respond. Judgments of fact answer the question, “Is it so?” Judgments of value answer 
                                                                                                                                            
a cold judgment of being, but a judgment of being that spirates love, the way you and I can rejoice in the 
sheer existence of the beloved; beyond knowing that such and such a person exists, we value the existence 
of the beloved. Crowe writes of the “real” difference between compacentia boni and intention boni: “If one 
recognizes [that the difference is real] he can grant that will may respond to the good in passive affection, 
and so have no trouble whatever in admitting both that speculative intellect ‘moves’ the will and that 
‘moving’ the will is the exclusive province of the practical intellect; the ‘moving’ is simply taken in towtwo 
different senses. Speculative intellect moves the will to harmony with the good that it presents as being; 
practical intellect moves the will to pursuit of the good that may be achieved” (Crowe, Three Thomist 
Studies, 129).  
42 See Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 126. 
43 See Mark J. Doorley, “Resting in Reality: Reflections on Crowe’s ‘Complacency and Concern’,” Lonergan 
Workshop Journal: The Structures and Rhythms of Love: In Honor of Frederick Crowe, S.J., 13 (1997). 
44 In trinitarian theology, Crowe suggests that the act of love that springs from the inner word of affirmation 
is better conceived of as an act of complacent love than a decision. Yet Lonergan, even after Crowe’s 
Thomist studies, continues to use the language of decision to articulate the act of love that proceeds from 
a judgment of value. For now, the essential point is that an act of love springs from a judgment of value. 
With respect to trinitarian theology, McShane argues that just as there is no real distinction in God 
between the act of conceiving and the act of judging so there is no real distinction in God between the 
two acts of love, complacency and decision. See McShane, “Intelligible Emanations,” 549. Cf. Hefling, 
“Over Thin Ice,” 106-08. McShane is basing his position on Crowe’s refinement of Thomas, and offers a 
way of unifying Crowe’s refinement with Lonergan’s ‘early’ trinitarian theology. Michael Vertin has an 
interesting approach to the question about specifying the act of love that springs from the judgment of 
value. He refers to both complacency and concern as decisions. He characterizes complacency as “a 
decision to enjoy an actual good.” He characterizes concern as a “decision to attempt actualization of the 
possible value.” See Michael Vertin, “Judgments of Value for the Later Lonergan,” Method: Journal of 
Lonergan Studies 13, no .2 (1995), 239. 
 Below, I identify a third good, namely, the good of affirming and deciding what kind of subject it is worth 
becoming. This is the good of self-constitution. From one perspective, we can understand this as a 
decision—I decide it is worthwhile to become such and such a person, and so we can say that one’s own 
self is a good to be made. From another perspective, we can also contemplate the good that we already 
are or the good of becoming a person like X.  
45 See Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity,” 28. For a study of decision-
making and ethical judgments of value, see Byrne, Ethics of Discernment. 
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questions such as, “Is it worthwhile?” or “Is it truly good or only apparently good?” or “What 
should I do? and “Should I do it?” These are questions for evaluation and deliberation, and they 
intend value, just as questions for intelligence intend the intelligible and questions for reflection 
intend truth and being.46 There is a difference between questions for evaluation and those for 
deliberation, even though both intend value. Questions for evaluation “are simply for the sake of 
knowing values without any immediate intention to make decisions or undertake actions on the 
basis of these judgments of values.”47 Deliberation, however, includes considering possible courses 
of action, or what Byrne calls “ethical values.” Deliberating is “the process of seeking judgments 
of ethical value for the sake of choosing and acting on the basis of those judgments.”48 Though 
Byrne does not make this connection, I find a connection between evaluative questions and 
complacency, on the one hand, and deliberative questions and concern, on the other. Raising 
questions for value makes one present to oneself as responsible, as rationally self-conscious49, as 
existentially autonomous, and judgments of value occur on what Lonergan calls the fourth level of 
consciousness. 
 The process of evaluation and deliberation is similar in structure to the process of 
reflection that leads to judgments of facts. (Recall, we are now in the territory of Lonergan 
scholarship and Lonergan’s advance on Thomas’s position. Below, I will correlate the findings of 
                                                
46 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, 30. The question for value asks neither about the intelligibility or the 
truth of the situation in which an evaluation, decision, or action is required. Rather, it presupposes a 
correct understanding of the situation. However, if an emergency situation arises—e.g., someone’s life is 
in danger—you may immediately raise a question for value, moving from your experience to 
deliberation, and assess the intelligibility and truth of the situation under the direction of your 
deliberative activities. Here, I am in agreement with Byrne’s understanding of sublation, in which a 
higher level of consciousness preserves and brings lower acts to completion. Thus, of such an emergency 
situation, Byrne writes, “Inquiry, insight, and factual assessment of the situation do indeed take place; but 
I would suggest that they take place in a consciousness that sublates itself directly from the first to the 
fourth level because it is immediately and thoroughly immersed in the urgency of ethical deliberation,” 
(Byrne, “Conscious,” 139). 
47 Byrne, The Ethics of Discernment, 212. 
48 Byrne, The Ethics of Discernment, 212. 
49 In Lonergan’s terminology for cognitional theory, one is rationally conscious on the level of judgment 
and rationally self-conscious on the existential level of value, decision, and action. 
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this section with Thomas’s own thought on the second procession, which will bring some of the 
incompleteness of position to the fore.)50 We have already observed one similarity—the questions 
raised in each process (Is it so? and Is it worthwhile?) intend one or the other of a mutually 
exclusive pair of conscious operations, namely, affirming or denying, whether that be existence or 
value, respectively. Further, as Byrne explains, “judgments of fact will be reasonable only insofar 
as they are motivated by a reflective understanding of the virtually unconditioned as ground for 
affirming or denying.”51 Similarly, judgments of value will be responsible only insofar as they are 
motivated by an act of value-reflective understanding that grasps the good or the possible course 
of action as “virtually unconditioned value.”52 Because each type of judgment (of fact or of value) 
is motivated by an act of understanding, the inner words of both types of judgments emanate 
intellectually. Given these similarities, I restrict this section to highlighting three distinguishing 
features of judgments of value relevant to trinitarian theology. One pertains to how a value-
reflective insight occurs. Another pertains to the end of the respective processes, that of reflection 
(in the strict sense, as this term applies to the level of rational consciousness) versus that of 
evaluation or deliberation. The last pertains to the heightened self-constitution that occurs in acts 
of decision. The most relevant decision for trinitarian theology is the existential decision in which 
one “decide[s] for oneself what one is to make of oneself”53 such that one’s self-constitution 
becomes deliberate as she makes the one and only edition of herself. 
                                                
50 Again, the goal is to use Lonergan’s advance to further illuminate the reality of this second procession, 
and to address questions about the relationship of knowledge and love, and the relevance of this 
relationship to the psychological analogy. Ultimately, these efforts will help my goal of creatively 
retrieving Thomas’s articulation of the psychological analogy and its relationship to preaching, thereby 
rediscovering the fecundity of this tradition of trinitarian theology.  
51 Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge of God,” 115-16. 
52 This virtually unconditioned is similar to the one discussed with respect to judgments of fact, except that 
it addresses a question regarding value. As will be discussed, virtually unconditioned value is also reached 
by raising and answering all further pertinent questions, but how questions are determined to be 
pertinent in the realm of value is distinct, as this determination involves feelings as intentional responses 
to value.  
53 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 121. 
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 First, answering questions for evaluation or for deliberation involves both intelligence and 
the realm of feelings. Here, “feelings” is meant in Lonergan’s technical sense according to which 
feelings are intentional responses in which our apprehension of value occurs.54 These feelings are 
self-transcending, and are to be distinguished from feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction or of 
the agreeable and disagreeable, which are self-regarding and self-centered.55 As Lonergan writes, 
the felt intentional response to value “both carries us toward self-transcendence and selects an 
object for the sake of whom or which we transcend ourselves.”56 Feelings, though immanent and 
operative in the process of reaching commonsense judgments of fact, play a heightened role in 
deliberation.57 While feelings play a complex and important role in making judgments of value, 
perhaps the most relevant element to mention is their relationship to the value-reflective act of 
understanding. The relevance of this element is that it helps to specify the distinction between of 
judgments of value and judgments of fact, while at the same time recalling the way in which any 
judgment is an intellectual emanation—because they proceed from a grasp of the sufficiency of 
evidence, that is, from a grasp of a prospective judgment as an instance of the virtually 
unconditioned. Of this role of feelings, Byrne writes: 
[T]heir role is to provide the criteria according to which the individual subject will regard 
further questions as pertinent to the judgment of value. …Hence the feelings are not 
themselves the grasp of virtually unconditioned value, for that is the province of a kind of 
understanding or insight separate and distinct from either direct or factual reflective 
insights. Nor are feelings the fulfillment of conditions for the judgment of value, since that 
comes only when all of the further pertinent questions have been properly answered. 
                                                
54 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, 30-34, 37-38, 58, 66. As Lonergan writes, “Without these feelings our 
knowing and deciding would be paper thin” (30-31). It took Lonergan years to fully differentiate the 
operations that occur in response to questions of value and so to articulate the affective grasp of value 
that belongs to judgments of value. I do not mean to impose Lonergan’s advance on Thomas, himself. 
While Thomas has a detailed account of appetite, the passions, etc. in the Secunda pars, nevertheless his 
division of intellect, will, and appetite constrict an integrative approach to the human person, even 
though he does, for example, discuss the will as a rational appetite and the desire to know.   
55 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, 31. Cf. Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge of God,” 118-19. 
56 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 31. 
57 Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge of God,” 117. 
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Instead, the horizon of feelings determines what further questions will be felt as pertinent 
to the correctness of judgment of the values as felt.58 
Thus, on the level of reflection the pertinence of further questions was determined by whether 
their answers would yield “an immediate difference to me” (in the case of commonsense 
judgments of fact)59 or whether they would lead to a difference in my understanding of “how 
things relate to one another (in the case of explanatory judgments of fact).60 By contrast, on the 
level of evaluation and deliberation, what determines the pertinence of a further question are 
feelings, which “select an object for the sake of whom or which” we evaluate and deliberate. As 
Byrne explains, the value or object made present to me through my feelings functions in a way 
like the “immediate difference to me” or the “difference in my understanding of how things relate 
to one another” function in my judgments of facts. Given that feelings determine the pertinence of 
further questions in evaluation and deliberation, we can only be as responsible and authentic as 
our feelings permit. Recall that the authenticity of the wise person was grounded in her ability to 
raise further pertinent questions and her commitment to paying attention to them. It is similar 
here with the virtuous person, but complicated by the fact that being virtuous requires a 
maturation and refinement of one’s feelings.61 
                                                
58 Byrne, The Ethics of Discernment, 199-200. It should be noted that “[o]ur judgments of value can be 
virtually unconditioned relative to values of our horizon of feelings” (201, emphasis original). This raises 
the question of merely subjective values and the necessity of conversion. For the possibility of the 
objectivity of judgments of value, see Byrne, The Ethics of Discernment, 207-40. 
59 For commonsense knowledge, see above, Chapter 2, 6.2 The Ordo Disciplinae as an Explanatory and 
Synthetic Order. 
60 Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge of God,” 119. 
61 Ibid., 123. Beyond determining the pertinence of further questions, feelings also determine the flow of 
images, and images (phantasms), which are what we inquire after and have insights into. Yet, as Byrne 
argues, the determinative role of feelings is not absolute. One, there are also pre-conscious sources of 
phantasms within us (subconscious) and within our physical environments. Two, given the non-systematic 
component of the universe, we can expect that sooner or later, that “physical stimuli will give rise to 
images beyond the systematic control of any one person’s patterning of experience” (123, fn. 51). Lastly, 
there is God’s grace, which can immediately subvert the control of self-regarding feelings in a radical 
way. I would add that authentic conversations fulfill an important function in subverting the control of 
self-regarding feelings. There are conversations that can reinforce our self-regarding feelings (one has 
only to scroll down to the “comments” section of internet news articles or blogs) but these conversations 
are inauthentic insofar as they perpetuate various biases and neglect, in one way or another, the desires to 
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 Second, while the process of reflection reaches its natural end in judgments of fact, the 
process of value reflection does not reach its natural end in judgments of value.62 Rather, as 
Lonergan says, judgments of value provide but “an initial thrust toward moral self-
transcendence.”63 This point brings us to the pertinent element of judgments of value for 
considering the intellectual aspect of love. In considering the procession of love, the focus is not on 
the judgment of value per se, but rather, on the judgment of value and the value-reflective act of 
understanding as the principle of another act. Like the inner word of a judgment of fact, the inner 
word a judgment of value is the term or product of a reflective act of understanding. That is, a 
judgment of value intellectually emanates from a value-reflective grasp of understanding. 
However, unlike a judgment of fact, a judgment of value itself grounds another and distinct kind 
of intellectual emanation, i.e., that of love, within the same level of consciousness. In other words, 
whereas a judgment of fact is the terminal activity in the response to critical questions, a judgment 
of value is not the terminal activity in response to questions of value because it is only in the act of 
love that the value is fully realized. For example, the lover is not only affirming the worth of the 
beloved, but is also grateful for the goodness she has discovered and come to know64; one is not 
only affirming the worth of a course of action, but is personally committing oneself to it.65 Thus, 
with respect to the procession of love, we are concerned with the relationship between knowing 
and loving, or in terms of faculty psychology, between intellect and will.  
 Lastly, judgments of value and their proceeding decisions constitute the subject in a 
profound way. While all cognitional acts are constitutive of the subject, decisions constitute one as 
                                                                                                                                            
know and love.  
62 See Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge of God,” 116. 
63 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 38. 
64 See Hefling, “Grace and Gratitude,” 480-81. 
65 See Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge of God,”110. Byrne argues that values are only fully realized in 
decisions. I am taking his basic point, but generalizing it to include complacency. I understand his basic 
point to be that that on the level of existential consciousness, judgments of value are not the terminal 
activity; decisions are. By contrast, on the level of rational consciousness, judgments of fact are the 
terminal activity. As Byrne writes, “deciding is an act which completes a process of deliberating,” (111). 
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authentic or inauthentic. As Byrne writes, “Compilation of acts of experiencing constitute one as 
increasingly aware; accumulation of insights constitute one as learned and, when they combine 
with judgments which they ground, one is constituted as wise. But it is decisions that constitute the 
kind of being one is to be.”66 In other words, decisions actualize two things at once. One, they 
actualize a reality apart from oneself—the result of your action. Two, they actualize the being, the 
person, one becomes through this action. However, this second point is elusive. One may not—or 
ever—realize that by those very decisions, one is also constituting oneself: “If and when one does 
recognize this fact, there is a drastically altered ‘assessment of the situation’ which now 
encompasses certain knowledge of oneself. Such a discovery raises the stakes involved in making 
decisions, and indeed confronts one with a radically different kind of decision.”67 This decision is 
an existential decision, in which one “decide[s] for oneself what one is to make of oneself”68 such 
that one’s self-constitution becomes deliberate as she makes the one and only edition of herself. 
 The fourth level of consciousness includes a range of activities, from a judgment of value 
about the worthiness of a work of art to a worthwhile goal and the means of achieving it. In the 
realm of trinitarian theology, we are concerned specifically with a judgment of value about the 
good as end, rather than with the deliberation and judgments about means to an end because God 
is the ultimate good. Thus, in knowing and loving Godself, God is knowing and loving the end. As 
prime examples of the judgment of value relevant to trinitarian theology, Lonergan suggests 
judgments that affirm a good to be done or made, judgments that affirm goodness of the beloved 
(e.g., an other, oneself, the created universe, a work of art), and judgments in which one affirms 
what kind of person it is worthwhile to become.69 In each case, one exercises existential 
autonomy, according to which a word comes forth from understanding and an act of love from a 
                                                
66 Ibid., 116. 
67 Ibid., 117. 
68 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 121. 
69 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 176-79. 
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word. According to Lonergan, the best psychological analogy (and therefore, the best trinitarian 
analogy) is taken from existential self-constitution, which is, as Doran explains “the emergence of 
a good decision from an authentic judgment of value based on a reflective grasp of evidence, 
precisely with regard to the question, What am I to make of myself?”70 The reason existential self-
constitution is most relevant is because when we are inquiring about the Triune God, we are 
considering how God in se is eternally constituted as triune, that is, we are considering divine self-
constitution.71 In this chapter, I will focus on the judgment of value that affirms the goodness of 
the beloved. In the following chapter, I will consider the judgment of value in which one affirms 
what kind of person it is worthwhile to become, for this is especially relevant to the consideration 
of the imago Dei and to articulating the most suitable psychological analogy for the Trinity. 
 Examples of an act of love proceeding from an affirmation of the goodness of the beloved 
abound in our experiences. In many cases, we fall in love with people in ways that are totally 
disproportionate to anything that has preceded the act of love.72 We experience such love as a gift. 
                                                
70 Robert M. Doran, “Lonergan on Imitating the Divine Relations,” in René Girard and Ceative Mimesis, eds. 
Vern Neufeld Redekop and Thomas Ryba (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 210. 
71 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 176-79. Analogous to our existential self-constitution 
and the autonomous processions of word and love that occur in that realm, “the divine Word is a 
judgment of value resting on agape, Loving Intelligence in act…Divine Proceeding Love, the Holy Spirit, 
is spirated from such a dual origin: from Loving Grasp and the divine ‘Yes, this is very good!’ as the two 
acknowledge each other’s lovableness and breathe the Spirit of Love that unites them” (Doran, 
“Lonergan on Imitating the Divine Relations,” 210). 
72 Later in his life, Lonergan came to recognize a minor and major exception to the scholastic dictum, nihil 
amatum nisi prius cognitum (nothing is loved unless it is known beforehand): people fall in love with one 
another and with God in ways disproportionate to anything that has preceded their falling. Reflecting on 
this dictum in Verbum, Lonergan writes, “For Augustine, our hearts are restless until they rest in God; for 
Aquinas, not our hearts, but first and most our minds are restless until they rest in God” (Verbum, 100). 
For an account of Lonergan’s “Augustinian turn” and its affect on Lonergan’s hermeneutics and his 
effort to bring history into theology, see Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Search for a Hermeneutics of 
Authenticity.” See also Lonergan, Method in Theology, 122-23. Lonergan explains here that the gift of 
God’s love—the major exception to the dictum—recreates us in the dynamic state of being in love, and 
our love reveals values to us that we had not before appreciated. Yet, this state cooperates with what 
Lonergan calls the movement from below upwards—from experiencing, to understanding, to judging, to 
deciding. We need to learn to integrate what is occurring within us because of this gift, and so we have to 
inquire, investigate, and seek counsel. In light of the incarnation (which Lonergan refers to as God’s 
“outer word”) we can come to understand the gift of God’s love (which Lonergan likens to an “inner 
word” and identifies with the Holy Spirit) such that we come to personally know with whom we are in 
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In other cases, our love proceeds because we have understood and responsibly affirmed the value 
of the beloved. This is the intellectual emanation of love that is relevant for an analogical 
conception of the second divine procession. Byrne cites an illustrative example of such a 
procession from Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning. In this passage, one of Frankl’s fellow 
prisoners invited him to see a beautiful sunset. Frankl is reflecting on the intensification of inner 
life that occurred for the prisoners in the camps, sparked by his own remembrance of his wife, of 
whose fate he was uncertain. I quote Frankl at length because he vividly describes moments of the 
emergence of love from a reflective grasp of value—in this case, natural beauty—in the context of 
one of life’s most fundamental questions for evaluation and deliberation: is life meaningful? Is 
human existence worthwhile? 
The intensification of inner life helped the prisoner find a refuge from the emptiness, 
desolation, and spiritual poverty of his existence, by letting him escape into the past…As 
the inner life of the prisoner tended to become more intense, he also experienced the 
beauty of art and nature as never before. Under their influence he sometimes even forgot 
his own frightful circumstances. If someone had seen our faces on the journey from 
Auschwitz to a Bavarian camp as we beheld the mountains of Salzburg with their 
summits glowing in the sunset, through the little barred windows of the prison carriage, 
he would never have believed that those were the faces of men who had given up all hope 
of life and liberty. Despite that factor—or maybe because of it—we were carried away by 
nature’s beauty, which we had missed for so long. …Standing outside we saw sinister 
clouds glowing in the west and the whole sky alive with clouds of ever-changing shapes 
and colors, from steel blue to blood red. The desolate gray mud huts provided sharp 
contrast, while the puddles on the muddy ground reflected the glowing sky. Then, after 
minutes of moving silence, one prisoner said to another, ‘How beautiful the world could 
be!’73 
Byrne explains the relationship of this exclamation to feelings: “Frankl’s companion was 
expressing a felt intentional response to value which, for a time at least, affected his whole pattern 
of experiencing in a way that made him want to bring into being a world of ineffable beauty.”74 
                                                                                                                                            
love. In seeking to understand the experience of God’s gift of love through the outer word of Christ, we 
can affirm the value of being given the gift of God’s very self, which can itself inspire the love of gratitude 
for being made God’s beloved and for God’s offering of Godself as our beloved.  
73 Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (New york: Simona nd Schuster, lnc., 1971), 62-3 (emphasis 
added).  
74 Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge of God,” 122.  
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Affected by these feelings and understanding the valuable possibilities the sunset discloses, the 
prisoner affirms the value of what is not, but what could and should be. He understands the 
evidence for the goodness of the sunset and the potential goodness of the world, inwardly says 
“yes!” to this goodness, and momentarily rests content, grateful for the promise of goodness he 
has found and come to know.75 Unlike judgments of fact, judgments of value can say “yes!” to 
what does not exist because they are not restricted to what is but extend to what could or should 
be. If a certain good does not exist, there is an exigence to bring it into existence and even to 
become the kind of person capable of bringing such a good into existence. In watching the sun 
set, this man felt the value of the world as such. At the same time, he sees the sunset cast against 
the darkness of the surroundings of the concentration camp, and felt the disvalue of the world as it 
is. Perhaps a question arises—is the world beautiful? How could it be given such atrocities? 
Certainly his circumstances could lead the man to despair. Instead, as he raised questions in 
relation to his feelings, he found meaning and possibility within the beauty of the sunset. This led 
him to grasp that while the world is dark, it should be as beautiful as the sunset and say, “yes!” to 
this value that could and should be. And from this affirmation arises an act of love that rests 
momentarily in gratitude for this beloved possibility—the beauty of the world, the possibility of 
meaning and value beyond the walls of a concentration camp. It is a good that is known—the 
beauty of the world—but known as potential, as unfinished. 
 Such gratitude can in turn become a principle of choosing to creatively introduce beauty 
into despairing situations, as is captured in the film, Life is Beautiful. Here, a father is faced with a 
seemingly impossible situation—he is in a concentration camp with his little boy, separated from 
his wife. What should he do? Out of love for his son, he deliberates and judges that rather than try 
to escape or to rise in the ranks, that it is more worthwhile to somehow create a loving 
                                                
75 See Hefling, “Grace and Gratitude,” 480-81. 
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environment and the semblance of safety for his son in order to shield him from the violence and 
inhumanity of camp life. This judgment of value gives rise to the father’s decision to dedicate 
himself to keeping his son safe and making a life for him through the creation of a game. Even 
more fundamentally, the father affirms the value of his son and the value of being a father. From 
this judgment of value, he decides against all odds that he will continue to be a father to his son 
despite their circumstances. To look at it from the perspective of complacency or gratitude, from 
his judgment of value, an act of love flows, the love of—even under these conditions—being a 
father. It becomes for him an opportunity to reaffirm  (judgment of value) and recommit (love) 
himself to fatherhood and his son as he discerns new creative ways to live out being a father.76 In 
other words, he is making an existentially self-constituting decision about what kind of person it is 
worth being in this situation, in relation to this little boy. 
 These are examples of acts of love that flow from reflectively grasping the value of 
something that is or could be, whether that act of love is gratitude or a decision. At the same time, 
they also underscore the way being in love—with one’s wife, with one’s son—“reaches down to 
transform the whole of one’s subjectivity.”77 Being in love reveals other values to us that inspire us 
to ask further questions and affirm goods and possibilities we may otherwise have ignored, and 
from such affirmation, to be moved to further acts of love. In other words, the gift of being in love 
can bestow a new creativity on the spontaneous process in which we move from experience, 
understanding, judging, and thanking/deciding. This is because being in love is a state, not an 
event, and so the lover “is engaged in loving not only while attending to the beloved but at all 
                                                
76 When deliberating about what to do as a parent, we are in the state of being in love. Thus, “a father’s 
love transforms his sense of responsibility, eliciting new patterns of evaluation and discernment, inquiry 
and perception, intersubjective spontaneity” (Wilkins, “Grace and Growth,” 745). In this process, his 
judgment of value continues to be ordered to a decision, an act of love, even while his entire process of 
deliberation is motivated, sustained, and enriched by love. He is discerning how to be a good father—a 
good lover—and become a better one.   
77 See ibid. 732. 
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times”78 such that “she is different in what she is likely to imagine, notice, suppose, or wonder 
about, in whom she is willing to trust, in what she is open to accepting. Love underpins, 
overarches, and gradually penetrates the whole of subjectivity, transforming patterns of 
spontaneous attending, inquiry, presumption, valuation, and decision.”79 Thus, far from 
obliterating the movement of human development from experience upwards, the gift of love both 
heals brokenness and unleashes creativity by setting it within a new and even unrestricted 
horizon. Lawrence explains the interaction of knowing and loving in human development: 
“intellectual development’s rhythm of believing to understand and understanding to believe is 
both inevitable and reasonable because it describes just how reason works.”80 
 Before proceeding, it will be helpful to further flesh out the relationship between knowing 
and loving. Falling in love pertains to what Lonergan names the movement from above 
downwards, in which the way of healing and tradition moves from above downwards, operating 
through love’s influence on one’s decisions, judgments, insights, and experiential perceptions.81 I 
am emphasizing the mutual relationship between the healing (above downward) and creative 
(below upward) vectors. Being in love not only immediately influences our decisions, but it also 
influences our experience, which must be newly understood, etc. What I mean by my phrase 
“unleashing creativity” is what I take Wilkins to mean in the following passage: “Hence, to be in 
love is to be involved in an ongoing process of personal growth. Agape does not replace but does 
take us beyond our ‘mere’ humanity, not only healing but also sublating (or, as the Scholastics put 
it, ‘elevating’) the whole flow of our conscious operations toward a new and impossible finality, 
friendship with God and all things in God.”82 Further on, he writes, “In a precise and explanatory 
sense, development is ‘from above’ whenever developments on higher levels initiate 
                                                
78 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 32. 
79 Wilkins, “Grace and Growth,” 732. 
80 Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity,” 32. 
81 See Bernard Lonergan, “Healing and Creating in History,” in A Third Collection. 
82 Wilkins, “Grace and Growth,” 733 (internal citations omitted). 
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corresponding developments on the lower. In this sense, ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ point to 
the functional interdependence of the different genera, and different levels within each genus, in 
the process of human development and integration.”83  
 I take sublating as Wilkins uses it to mean that love sublates knowing, not negating or 
obliterating knowing but enriching and expanding it, which would still allow for knowledge to 
give way to love on the fourth level of consciousness. This point is important for trinitarian 
theology because the order of knowledge and love is central to understanding the second divine 
procession. Even in the dynamic state of being in love, knowledge is still ordered to love, such that 
judgments of value give rise to acts of love. For example, love takes priority in motivating and 
directing our entry into the world mediated by meaning and constituted by value. This is the 
world in which human development from below upward takes place. For this reason, effective 
teachers are those who inspire the trust of their students in order to teach them.84 The horizon of 
trust—a horizon of love—is the basis on which students learn and develop. Thus, while love takes 
priority, this learning motivated by love itself involves the movement from experience, to 
understanding, to judging, to decision (the way from below) in which knowledge still gives way to 
love. In other words, the way of learning—the via disciplina—still operates as such even when 
motivated by and grounded in the state of being in love, and this state actually enriches learning. 
 In light of this, when it comes to trinitarian theology—and what distinguishes Lonergan’s 
earlier trinitarian from his later—love continues to remain dependent on an act of judgment. 
Once Lonergan came to terms with the priority of love, rather than conceiving God as an infinite 
act of intellectual consciousness, he took his starting point for the psychological analogy in “that 
the higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of 
being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried 
                                                
83 Ibid., 745 (internal citations omitted). 
84 Ibid. 
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out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.”85 Thus, 
Lonergan began conceiving of God as the infinite act of understanding love or loving 
understanding, as Lawrence often puts it. Lonergan’s recognition that the Scholastic dictum has 
its minor and major exceptions did not change the order of knowledge and love within existential 
consciousness, but made existential consciousness the starting point of the psychological analogy, 
not intellectual consciousness, such that the analogy obtains when one’s judgments of value and 
acts of love emerge within the state of being in love. Being in love does not negate being 
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. 
3.2 Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Level of Existential Consciousness  
As has been the case throughout this chapter, the goal is not a strict exegesis of Thomas. Rather, 
it is to understand the reality of intellectual emanations as best as possible for the sake of a creative 
retrieval of the psychological analogy. Nevertheless, I do also aim to demonstrate that this 
understanding of intellectual emanations has its basis in Thomas’s thought and that the 
advancements do not negate Thomas’s own achievement. To do so, I will first correlate some of 
the foregoing with Thomas’s technique of the analysis of proportion and the corresponding 
metaphysical terms and relations.86 I include an important study Frederick Crowe conducted on 
Thomas’s understanding of the will and its basic act, love. Second, I will address an interpretive 
issue in Thomist scholarship that is fundamental to understanding the procession of love in us and 
its analogical relevance to trinitarian theology, namely, whether there is a processio operati (that is 
also a processio intelligibilis) in the will or not.  
 While the language of faculty psychology is no longer helpful in our contemporary 
context, it is useful to note that Thomas conceived of the will as a rational appetite. That he so 
conceived of the will underscores the complex relationship between the intellect and will and may 
                                                
85 Lonergan, “Christology Today,” in A Third Collection, 93. 
86 For the analysis of proportion, see Chapter 2, above. 
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help us understand the important interpretive point, namely, that the act of love proceeds from 
the intellect to the will.87 However, like Aristotle, Thomas conceived of the will as an appetite and 
accordingly stressed love as a tendency.88 As we have seen before—for example, with judgments 
of fact—Thomas sometimes attempts to move beyond Aristotle when Aristotle’s definitions were 
confining. The same is true here. Aristotle’s definitions of the will as an appetite, the good as the 
object of desire or an end, and the will’s basic act—love—as a tendency or inclination each confine 
Thomas throughout his writing.89  
 However, Crowe, in one of his Thomist studies, Complacency and Concern, argues that 
“Thomas recognized, at least incipiently, that the will is not just appetitive or desiring, that the 
good is not just something which is ‘away,’ something to be headed towards, and—most relevantly 
here, that love is not just tendency or concern, whether in the form of agape or eros.”90 
Accordingly, Crowe demonstrates that Thomas understood love to have two aspects. It is in 
articulating this second aspect that Crowe observes Thomas trying to move beyond Aristotle’s 
confining definitions in relation to the will. There is love as tendency, desire, appetition, which 
Crowe names “concern.” It tends toward possession of the good. Lonergan’s conception of the 
proceeding act of love as a decision emphasizes this aspect of love. There is also love as rest, 
harmony, consonance, quiescence. Crowe names this “complacency” in the good. It is an 
affective response to, a resting in, a union that comes with the attainment of the end, a 
complacency in the good that is.91 The above examples of the act of love proceeding as gratitude 
                                                
87 Contrary, for example, to irrationalist approaches that understand love as ineffable. Thomas teaches that 
the intellect specifies the act of the will, which is to say that the will is rational.  
88 See De ver. q. 22, a. 1c: “But to desire [appetere] is nothing else than to seek [petere] something, that is, to 
tend [tendere] toward something as ordered to it.” 
89 See Hefling, “Over Thin Ice,” 105. Hefling cites Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 124, 137. 
90 Hefling, “Over Thin Ice,” 105.  
91 In light of the convertibility of being and the good, the good is not only a desired end (the good as 
perfective), but is also as a harmony between being and appetite. See Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 115-18. 
It is this particular harmonious relation between being and the good that is significant. 
 Crowe argues that because there are Thomist accounts of the good in which being and the good are 
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or affective response emphasize this aspect of love. Crowe argues that Thomas generally—but not 
exclusively and consistently—conceives love as a tendency or inclination, and that this “dogs” 
Thomas throughout his work, as do the related concepts of the will as an appetite and the good as 
an object of desire or an end. Furthermore, Crowe argues that while love as concern is usually to 
the fore in Thomas’s thought, it is actually love as complacency—often only implicit in his 
thought—that is basic both psychologically and ontologically.92 The real difficulty is that Thomas 
never successfully integrated these two aspects, and it seems that neither did Lonergan. In order 
to try to integrate these two aspects of love, Crowe retrieves Thomas’s division of psychological 
activity into a duplex via that includes a via receptionis and a via motionis to explain Thomas’s 
understanding of the will.93  
 Before proceeding to integrate the two aspects of love by way of Thomas’s duplex via, I cite 
the following passages in which love as complacency comes to the fore in Thomas’s thought. The 
first passage is from the Summa Contra Gentiles. The next two passages are from the Prima Secundae 
and represent Thomas’s questions on the general form of love: 
Now, it is quite clear that man chiefly clings to God through love. For there are two 
things in man by which he is enabled to cling to God, namely, intellect and will. …Now, 
the union which is effected through the intellect is completed by the union which pertains 
                                                                                                                                            
convertible (distinct from the account in which the good is perfective of being), it means that the will is 
also referable directly to being as being (in relation), and not primarily to being as good (see, e.g., De ver. 
q. 1, a. 1c). In such cases, the will is still dependent on the intellect because we still have to judge that a 
thing is in order to love it, and we love things that are. For example, we rejoice in the sheer fact that the 
beloved is. I maintain that this is still a judgment of value—not of fact; it is still a word that spirates love 
because it is a judgment that unifies knowing and feeling. At the foundational level, to discover and affirm 
that being is good can spirate a consoling complacency. Crowe helpfully characterizes this affective 
response to the judgment of being as “consent to being” (p. 126). It is a judgment of value that simply 
affirms or approves of the goodness of something existing or being so, rather than a judgment of value 
that seeks to bring about a good.  
92 Crowe highlights passages from the Prima Secundae Pars, particularly Ia-IIae, qq. 26-39 on the general 
form of human love and Ia-IIae, qq. 8-17 on the general psychology of human acts (rather than the 
questions on the particular and personal love that is charity in IIa-IIae, qq. 23-46. This is because he is 
attempting to base his integration and theory on the general form of love, rather than its more particular 
personal form. See Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 96-7. 
93 See Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 81-91. 
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to the will, because through his will man in some way rests [quiescit] in that which the 
intellect apprehends.94 
And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love [aptitudo sive proportio 
appetitus ad bonum est amor], which is complacency in good [complacentia boni].95 
Love belongs to the appetitive power, which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object 
stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love 
must needs be love’s object. Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as stated 
above, love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, and to 
everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good 
is the proper cause of love.96 
 In the via receptionis, the will is at the end of a process, receiving from the intellect. Willing 
is a rest in a good that simply is, complacentia boni. Complacency regards the good that is. We 
possess this good by understanding.97 In the via motionis, the will is at the beginning of the process, 
moving other potencies to their actions. Our orientation toward the good is a tendency, an intentio 
boni.98 Concern regards the good that is not yet. A similar duplex via can be observed in the 
intellect. In the via receptionis, knowledge is received. In the via motionis, knowledge is causative of 
things (i.e., practical knowledge of the to-be-done or the to-be-made).99 Similar oppositions can be 
observed between speculation and art, respectively. It can also be observed between faith (as the 
contemplation of what is) and prudence, respectively.100 It is also this duplex via that reconciles the 
priorities of the intellect and will with respect to one another. For example, Thomas writes, “Will 
and understanding have a mutual priority over each other, but not in the same way. Intellect’s 
priority over will is in receiving [via receptionis], for if anything is to move the will it must first be 
                                                
94 SCG 3, c. 116, n. 2 as cited in Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 125, fn. 25. 
95 ST Ia-IIae, q. 25, a. 2c. 
96 ST Ia-IIae, q. 27, a. 1c (emphasis added). 
97 See Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 132-34. 
98 See ibid., 95.  
99 See Ibid., 82-84. Crowe cites De anima, a. 20c. Quodl., 7, q. 1, a. 3c, and In 4 Sent., d. 50, q. 1, a. 3c in 
support of the twofold function of the intellect involved in the duplex via. 
100 See Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 84. Crowe cites De ver. q. 14, a. 5 ad 11 for the duplex via applied to faith 
and prudence with respect to the intellect. 
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received into the intellect…But in moving or acting [in movendo sive agendo], will has priority, 
because every action or movement comes from the intention of the good…”101 
 What Crowe’s study suggests and why it is relevant for understanding the procession of 
love is that the basic act of the will (love) is a term rather than a principle.102 As he explains, “the 
will’s first response to the good is not movement toward it but a simple change in the subject, a 
complacency.”103 Love’s basic and primary act then is complacency, not concern—even when 
that complacency gives way to concern because the good demands action. The following is an 
instance in which Thomas speaks of the first response to the good as complacency. This passage 
describes the threefold structure of love’s activity: complacere, desiderare, quiescere, beginning with love 
as complacency, then love as principle of desire and of the consequent process leading to joy: 
“Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called ‘love,’ and 
is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement 
towards that same object, and this movement is ‘desire’; and lastly, there is rest which is ‘joy.’104  
 Love is a term insofar as it is spirated by a word expressing value. Again, the intellect’s 
priority over the will is in receiving.105 In this via receptionis, love is a term. In this case, the will 
                                                
101 De ver., q. 14, a. 5 ad 5 as cited in Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 82. See also ST Ia, q. 82, a. 4; Ia-IIae, q. 9 
a. 1. 
102 Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 89, 102. Crowe lists a number of terms Thomas uses to describe love itself 
in its basic act in the Prima Secundae, especially Ia-IIae, qq. 23, 25-26, 29: inclinatio, proportio, consonantia, 
coaptatio, connanturalitas, aptitudo, complacentia, convenientia, immutatio, intentio. Of these terms, only inclinatio and 
intentio clearly convey the notion of tending. Further, inclinatio actually refers to the subsequent movement. 
The remainder of the terms indicate a relationship, a harmony, an agreement, a resonance, a similarity, a 
concord. These terms are suited to the notion of love as a term and as love as a principle of tendency. 
Crowe stipulates that this proliferation of terms indicates Thomas’s struggle to express an idea that does 
not yet have its own technical name. We see Thomas struggle similarly in the trinitarian questions when 
contrasting the two divine processions and remarking on the lack of a good term to express the process by 
which love originates or for the relationship of love to its principle. See ST Ia, 37, a. 1. The questions on 
the nature of love in the Prima Secundae Pars and those on the intellectual emanation of love in trinitarian 
questions of the Prima pars refer to the same aspect of love, which has not been properly worked out and 
given a technical name.  
103 See Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 108. See ST Ia-IIae, q. 27, a. 4. 
104 ST Ia-IIae, q. 26, a. 2.  
105 See Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 82-86. See ST Ia-IIae, q. 9, esp. a. 3c and ad 1. Here, Thomas 
expresses that while the will move does move itself, its self-determination presupposes that it has already 
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depends on the intellect. It is only in the via motionis that love is also a principle. This is relevant for 
two reasons. One, and perhaps most importantly and most basically, understanding that love is a 
term emphasizes the dependence of love on a judgment of value, i.e., on knowledge. This is 
important for understanding that the relevant processio operati when it comes to love is from intellect 
to will, as will be discussed below. Two, and Crowe’s primary point, is that while both 
complacency and concern are spirated by a word expressing value, complacent love is not first 
receptive and then active (efficient), but simply a passive (receptive) act. That is, there is an act of 
proceeding love that simply rests content without the impulse to become the principle of 
something else. It simply accepts what is. However, in this life, for us, such complacency can only 
be fleeting.106 Of love as simply a “passive act,” Crowe writes:  
[It is] simply the end of a process, a coming to rest, an act that is more accurately named 
complacency in the good than will of an end. It is an affective response to the good that is, 
rather than a seeking in any form, selfish or self-giving, of a good that is not. It is under 
this aspect that love corresponds to and provides an analogy for the procession of the 
Holy Spirit in the Trinity, where the Third Person is a term bringing the divine 
processions to a close and is certainly not a Love for an object good-to-be-made, to-be-
done, to-be-attained, or to-be in any way that involves a not-yet.107 
It is like seeing a beautiful work and simply affirming its value and being grateful for its existence. 
There is not further impetus to do anything; you simply rest, beholding its beauty. As Thomas 
writes, “beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that ‘good’ means that 
which simply pleases the appetite; while the ‘beautiful’ is something pleasant to apprehend.”108 
(Notice the dependence of love upon a judgment of value.) By contrast, there is what we might 
call decisive love (concern, in Crowe’s terms), which is also first receptive—it is also spirated from 
                                                                                                                                            
been actuated with respect to its end. For the relationship between the intellect and will with respect to 
the question about grace and freedom, see Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, CWL 1, 94-104. 
106 For example, see ST Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 2 ad 4.  
107 Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 90-1. “Passive act” is Crowe’s term. He means to distinguish it from an act 
that is first passive and then active. 
108 ST Ia-IIae, q. 27, a. 1 ad 3. 
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a judgment of value—but it then desires something more, as it tends toward bringing about a 
possible good.109  
 We have already seen that Thomas does in fact make a distinction between two kinds of 
judgment, which are differentiated because one type of word of judgment spirates love.110 Let us 
now proceed, in light of the duplex via applied to love, to correlate the foregoing on judgments of 
value and proceeding love with Thomas’s work. In the Prima Secundae, Thomas revisits the 
question of the human will in the context of the human person as created to the image of God, 
specifically as the “principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.”111 As 
such, the human person can cooperate with God’s moving her toward Godself. Love as concern 
and the orientation of the will as tendency toward intentio boni is palpable in this prologue and 
indeed throughout much of the second and third parts of the Summa.112 For example, Thomas 
writes, “Love is called that which is the principle of movement tending toward the loved end.”113 
In this context, Thomas discusses the consent of the will, which sheds further light upon the type 
of judgment that spirates love. He writes, “the order of action [agibilium]is this: First there is the 
apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the 
desire of the means.”114 In this article, Thomas argues that consent is desire for the means, not the 
end.115 In the third reply, he maintains that consent is followed by choice, as choice includes a 
relation to something to which something else is preferred, whereas counsel could approve of 
many means to the end. Lastly comes execution, the action itself. Wilkins correlates the elements 
of this passage with judgments of value and love as follows: 
                                                
109 Crowe maintains that both agape and eros are consequent active forms of love, seeking the good of the 
other or the good of self.  
110 Super I. sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 sol as cited in Lonergan, Verbum, 109-110, fn. 20. 
111 ST Ia-IIae, prol.  
112 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 1, prol; q. 2, prol; q. 6, prol. 
113 ST Ia-IIae, q. 26, a. 1 as cited in Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 95.  
114 ST Ia-IIae, q. 15, a. 3c. 
115 In Article 1, Thomas describes this consent as complacency in the various means. See ST Ia-IIae, q. 15, 
a. 1. 
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Now, of the acts in this sequence, the first is an act of the intellect specifying the object of 
the will, i.e., making a judgment of value. The second is the spiration of love proceeding 
in the will from the judgment of the intellect. The third step, counsel, is a process of 
deliberation in the intellect, moved by the will, and terminating in a practical judgment 
about possibilities. The fourth, consent, is a movement in the will, in act with respect to 
the end, determining itself to the judgment of the intellect about what is to be done. The 
fifth, election, is a choice of means, and is followed by execution.116 
 Like the judgment of fact, the judgment of value is also grounded on an act of reflective 
understanding that grasps the sufficiency of the evidence. Agent intellect, manifested here in the 
question for value and deliberation, is an efficient potency (a principle of movement in the other, 
or in the self as other), marshaling and weighing the evidence. It is inquiry in charge of your 
value-seeking, deliberative activities. The possible intellect is a receptive potency (a principle of 
being moved by the other, or by the self as other) that receives the act of reflective understanding. 
The activation of the possible intellect is the aha! moment that cannot be forced. Once the 
possible intellect is reduced117 to act by the reflective insight, it is proportionate to produce the 
inner word of a judgment of value. This is the “yes!” that approves the goodness understood 
because of the sufficiency of the evidence. It is this word, which is spoken by the intellect, that 
specifies the will’s object. Together with the universal good (which is the will’s object, just as the 
universal true is the intellect’s object), this word moves the will to an act of love for the end. As 
Wilkins explains, “In this movement, the will is first receptive, then efficient. As from the 
intellectual apprehension of the good, it is a passion, love.”118 This corresponds to the duplex via. 
Crowe offers a helpful chart by which we can synthesize the above passage from the Summa with 
the duplex via: 
                                                
116 Wilkins, “What the ‘Will’ Won’t Do,” 17. It is important to note that the correspondences between 
faculties and levels of consciousness are not direct. It is not that practical, moral, and existential 
consciousness are the will while intelligent and rational consciousness is the intellect. Rather, the levels of 
consciousness “are expansions of the subject’s presence to the world and concomitant presence to herself” 
(18). 
117 Byrne suggests that a better translation of is “elevated.” See Byrne, Analysis and Science in Aristotle, 23-25.  
118 Wilkins, “What the ‘Will’ Won’t Do,” 17. Love is the basic act of both passion and appetite. See ST Ia-
IIae, q. 25, a.. 1-2; q. 26, a. 2c. 
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 A through D are acts that occur within the intellectual field. X and Y are acts in the 
sensitive field. A is the judgment of value on the good as end, specifying the act of willing the end. 
This judgment is a word proceeding from a reflective act of understanding. B is the spiration of 
love from the intellect in the will (the arrow from A to B). B is the passive act of willing the end, in 
which the will is moved, not a mover. C is the counsel of intellect searching out means to the end. 
It is an activity exercised under the influence of B in the via motionis (the arrow from B to C). D is 
the election of some means to the end, the act in which the will is moved and is also a mover. X is 
the influence of the sensible world on the higher powers in the way from things to the soul (via a 
rebus ad animam). Y is the activity of the human person, artistic or moral, on her own sensitive 
nature and the sensible world in the way from the soul to things (via ab anima ad res).120 Again, the 
crucial point Crowe is making is that B, where the via receptionis ends and the via motionis begins, 
can be simply a passive act. The process can simply stop at B because B is in some sense perfect or 
reflective of perfection. Sometimes, we simply rest in the beloved’s presence. Sometimes the good 
is not an end to which we must find means. Sometimes the good simply is. And it is in an affective 
                                                
119 Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 90. 
120 Crowe revisits this process later. It is worth quoting him: “Thus, to judgment of what is there 
corresponds an affective complacency of the will which comes to rest in this act as in a term. But the 
same intellect which has arrived at knowledge of what is may advance to a knowledge of what is not yet 
but could fittingly be; the result in will is a velle finim. This, in its first stage, is still passive, still receiving, still a 
form of complacency; but a further judgment makes us aware that the good which is not yet can be effected 
through our own efforts by appropriate means, and then will responds with the first indeterminate intenio 
finis. At this point deliberation about means can occur, the via motinis has begun, and freedom emerges” 
(Three Thomist Studies, 134). 
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response to the good that is that we simply rest complacently in the good, and love is simply a 
term of the first via without also being the principle of the second via. However, in us, there is 
often a consequent, and active pursuit of the good. And while in God in se no such active pursuit is 
necessary, and so the divine processions are not according to the via motionis, this way is 
nevertheless analogous to the procession of creatures from God and to the divine missions.  
 Thus, while sometimes (and primarily) complacency is simply a term, it also is a term that 
can become a principle. We might simply rest in the beloved, contemplating her goodness. But 
then this contemplation can in turn be the occasion for concern, perhaps to give ourselves fully to 
the beloved or to become a better lover.121 For example, if the good merely calls for approval, 
then complacency is the right and rational attitude. If, however, the good calls for action, then 
mere approval and complacency will not do. In the latter case, first we rest, then we seek as a 
viator, and then we finally come to rest in beatitude. We observed this progression in the passage 
on the structure of love’s threefold activity, love is the principle of desire and of the consequent 
process leading to joy. In other words, complacency is the principle leading to any further action 
toward the good. Yet, the very fact that love is a principle presupposes that love is something 
itself. What Crowe convincingly argues is that in itself, love is complacency and further, that 
complacency, as the principle of all movement, is not itself a movement but a simple change of 
will. This change in the will is because of the intellect. As Thomas writes, “for because intellect 
moves will, willing is the effect of understanding.”122 It is a change in the subject—a 
complacency—because of a judgment of value. The first response to the good is not a movement 
toward it, but simply the moved subject, where moved refers to the movement of act from act.123 
                                                
121 Doran agrees that these two meanings of complacentia boni persist in Crowe’s writings. See Robert M. 
Doran, “‘Complacency and Concern’ and Basic Thesis on Grace,” Lonergan Workshop Journal, 13 (1997), 
74. 
122 In Rom., 7, lect. 3, n. 564 cited in Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 103. 
123 It is worth noting that it makes sense that Thomas speaks of a complacency that eventually leads to joy 
in this context—that is, in the context of the Secunda Pars about the human person’s free movement 
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It is difficult for us to notice complacency in our own lives because of the predominance of 
concern in human existence. In our current state as viatores, complacency per se is fleeting because 
we cannot contemplate continuously and because we must also actively pursue the good, both 
through works and study. 124 We will return to the journey of the viatores in the final chapter when 
considering the mixed life in relation to Thomas’s trinitarian theology. What is clear by now is 
that in us, the basic act of will is a term, but in an imperfect way. Crowe summarizes: “Because it 
is a term it gives rest, complacency, beatitude. But because it is imperfect there remains a tendere: 
‘[Will] is not simply quiescent except in what is ultimate. For as long as anything is still awaited, 
the movement of will remains suspended, even though it has already reached a sort of term.’”125  
3.3 Processio Operati and the Second Procession  
Having attended to the two aspects of love, it remains to address an interpretive issue in Thomist 
scholarship that is fundamental to understanding the procession of love in us and its analogical 
relevance to trinitarian theology, namely, whether there is a processio operati (that is also a processio 
intelligibilis) in the will or not.  
  The interpretive difficulty arose with John of St. Thomas and continues to find its way 
into Thomist trinitarian theology. This view bases its conception of the second divine procession 
on the following assumption, which Doran summarizes: “[T]here are in our dynamic intellectual 
                                                                                                                                            
toward beatitude, which is not yet ours in our pilgrim state.  
124 For example, Thomas writes, “But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is 
in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, 
consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present 
state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man … in that state of happiness, man's mind will 
be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short 
of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a 
participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more 
one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the 
contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. And if at any time man 
is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the 
very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, 
as it were, continuous.” (ST Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 2 ad 4). 
125 Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 111 (emphasis added). Crowe is citing ST Ia-IIae, q. 11, a. 3c.  
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consciousness two processions, one within the intellect and the other within the will; in the first, 
the act of understanding produces the word, and in the second the act of loving produces the 
presence of the beloved in the lover.”126 This conception presumes that there is one procession in 
the intellect (the procession of the word) and another procession in the will (the procession of 
love), and that these two processions are parallel. As the act of understanding produces the word, 
so the act of love produces the presence of the beloved in the lover. Contrary to this typical 
interpretation of Thomas’s trinitarian theology, Lonergan convincingly demonstrates (1) that 
there is a processio operati from the intellect to the will, and (2) that the presence of the beloved in 
the lover is the act of love. I will take these two related points in order. As we proceed, the 
following is helpful to keep in mind, as it underscores that while these two processions are similar 
in a very important way, they are not parallel: 
[T]he reasons for holding that there is, in God, something analogous to the procession, in 
us, of an ‘act of love’ should be the same as the reasons for holding that there is 
something, in God, analogous to…the procession of the ‘inner word’ of concept or 
judgment. But while the reasons for drawing the two analogies ought to be same, the analogues ought to 
be different, so as to account for the fact that in God the Word is not the Spirit. In other 
words, the two processions need to be processions in the same sense, but not the same 
procession.127 
 In discussing the processio operati, we will be considering the procession of love as an 
intellectual emanation. The reason the processions of word and of love are analogues is because 
both are intellectual emanations (including the fact that both are processions of act from act). The 
difference is in found in the relationship between word and love and the distinct kinds of presence 
in knowing versus loving.  
3.3.1 Processio Operati or Processio Operationis? 
We have already discussed the difference between a procession of an act from act (or the 
emergence of one thing from another) and a procession of an act from a potency (or the 
                                                
126 Doran, Trinity in History, vol. 1, 343. 
127 Hefling, “Over Thin Ice,” 100. 
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emergence of a perfection from and in what is perfected).128 We have also expressed that an 
intellectual emanation is a particular instance of a procession of an act from an act, which makes 
it especially relevant to trinitarian theology. The question remains if and how Thomas conceives 
of the procession of love also as a processio operati.129  
 In De veritate, after drawing the distinction between these two kinds of procession, Thomas 
maintains that there can be no procession of an act from a potency because in God there is no 
capacity to be perfected.130 Thus, the analogue for divine processions must instead be sought in 
the procession of act from act—the emergence of one thing from another. He writes: 
One thing may proceed from another thing in two ways; First, it may proceed from it as 
action proceeds from an agent or as an operation proceeds from one operating. Second, it 
may proceed as a term of an operation from one operating. Now, the procession of an 
operation from the one operating does not distinguish a thing that is substantially existing 
from another substantially existing thing; it merely distinguishes a perfection from what is 
perfected, because an operation is a perfection of the one operating. On the other hand, 
the procession of the term of an operation distinguishes one thing from another. Now, in 
God the distinction between a perfection and what is perfected cannot be a real 
distinction. There are, however, distinct things in God, namely, the three Persons. Hence, 
a procession signified as existing in God as an operation from the one operating is a 
procession merely according to our manner of thinking. But a procession signified as that 
of a thing proceeding from a principle can really be found in God.131  
Thomas then goes on to differentiate between intellect and will according to the points at which 
their operations terminate: “Moreover, there is this difference between the intellect and the will: 
an operation of the will terminates in things, in which good and evil are found; but an operation 
of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which the true and the false are found, as is said in the 
Metaphysics.”132 This distinction is very significant for trinitarian theology and for coming to terms 
with the second procession. Given that the operation of the will terminates in things and not in 
                                                
128 See Chapter 3, §3. Paying attention to the Experience of the Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Levels of 
Understanding, Judging, and Deciding  
129 The following is based on Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 107-09 and The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 
144-230, esp. 218-30. 
130 De ver., q. 4, a. 2 ad 7. 
131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid. 
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the will, Thomas denies a processio operati within the will. This is the passage that has “so exercised 
Thomistic writers” to the point of many assuming Thomas must have changed his mind, except 
without providing adequate proof.133 Thomas writes: 
Consequently, there is nothing in the will that proceeds from the will itself except what 
proceeds in the manner of an operation. But intellect does have within it something that 
proceeds from intellect itself, not only in the manner of an operation, but also in the 
manner of something produced by the operation. Consequently, the word is signified as a 
thing that proceeds, but love, as an operation that proceeds. Hence, love is not such as to 
be predicated personally in the same way in which word is.134 
What proceeds in the manner of an operation is a processio operationis. Thus, Thomas is saying that 
in the will, there are only processiones operationum, whereas in the intellect there are both. However, 
if love pertains to the will, if there is no processio operati in the will, and if only a processio operati is 
relevant for trinitarian theology, how can we have an analogue for the second divine procession? 
This problem only persists if one assumes that there should be a parallel between the intellect and 
the will, and that accordingly the two processions should proceed in a parallel fashion.135 
However, intellect and will are not parallel. Neither are the two processions parallel (which, if 
they were, would make it difficult to understand how they are to be distinguished). Rather, it is 
precisely in the relation between intellect and will that we find the relevant analogue.136 This is the 
                                                
133 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 108 (internal citations omitted). Wilkins suggests that something scholars 
would have to overcome if they wanted to prove that Thomas abandoned this position is that Thomas 
continues to maintain that the true/false is in the mind whereas the good/evil is in things. The relevance 
of Thomas keeping this position is that given that the true and false are in the mind, it underscores the 
presence of immanent processions in the intellect. But if the good/evil are in things, this is in keeping with 
the position of De veritate that what proceeds in the will terminates outside of the will, and so is a transitive 
procession. 
134 De ver., q. 4, a. 2 ad 7. 
135 According to Lonergan, this position does in fact seem to be the position of Henry of Ghent and Scotus. 
See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 109. 
136 Gilles Emery is a contemporary Thomist who maintains a basic parallel between intellect and will, and 
so between the two processions. He finds a way of distinguishing the processions, but still misconceives 
the second procession. He writes, “When we say that ‘the Holy Spirit [is] Love in person,’ this name 
‘Love’ does not designate the act of loving, but the fruit of the Father and Son’s act of love, that is to say, 
the “impression” or the dynamic impulse that arises in the loving will of the Father and the Son. This 
impression of love proceeds within the loving will (immanent procession); it possesses a relation of origin 
to the will from which it proceeds, and to the Word who is presupposed to love (the will loves what the 
understanding has first conceived): This allows one to show the distinction of the Holy Spirit in 
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relation we have been attending to in the previous two sections. It is not the relation of the act of 
love to the will that is relevant. Nor is it the relation of one act of love to another act of love.137 
Rather, it is the relation of the act of love to understanding-in-act that is relevant. Further, 
Thomas considers the second divine procession to be analogous to an intellectual emanation no 
less than the first. Thus, to conceive of the second procession as parallel to the first except that it 
occurs in the will, with no clear relationship to the intellect, obfuscates how it is that this second 
procession is intellectual. Instead, according to Thomas, the act of love emerges from intellect and 
in the will, and that emergence is a processio operati because it is the emergence of the act of love 
from the act of value judgment. Therefore, like the first procession, this is also an intellectual 
emanation.  
 Let me summarize this seventh objection from De veritate that we have been examining in 
terms of intellectual emanation. In God, there are no real relations between the intellect and the 
act of understanding, nor between the will and the act of willing. Further, in us, the emergence of 
the act of understanding, the emergence of the inner word, and the emergence of the act of love 
are all emergences of perfections. The act of reflective understanding and the act of judgment are 
themselves acts that emerge in or from the intellect. The act of love emerges in the will. Even so, 
what counts is the relationship of these acts to each other, and what provides the relevant 
analogue is that one of these acts emerges from the other. Even more relevant is that one act 
                                                                                                                                            
relationship to the Father and the Son, and thereby to manifest the relative property of the Holy Spirit” 
(Gilles Emery, Trinity in Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 
154; emphasis original). Emery does correctly identify love’s dependence on the word. However, he also 
identifies a procession within the will, that is, in the will from the will. We have seen that Thomas denies a 
processio operati in the will. As Wilkins observes, “The relation of proceeding love to the will—whether as 
actuated, or as a potency—is in fact irrelevant to the analogy for the divine processions; what is relevant 
is the relation of proceeding love to understanding-in-act” (Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology, 
unpublished manuscript, 115).  
137 See ST Ia, q. 27, a. 5 ad 3: “As above explained, God understands all things by one simple act; and by 
one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor of 
Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being 
manifested His perfect fecundity.” In us, there is a procession of one act of love from another, but not in 
God, and so this kind of procession of love is not relevant to trinitarian theology. 
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proceeds because of the other act. Thus, the act of value judgment emerges from the act of value-
reflective grasp of the evidence because that evidence is known to be grasped. Similarly, the act of 
love emerges from the act of value judgment because the evidence on goodness of the beloved is 
understood and affirmed. If I affirm the value of the beloved, I know I have every reason to love 
him.  
 Lonergan has gathered an array of other texts throughout Thomas’s career supporting his 
interpretation that love depends upon and proceeds from the word.138 However much scholars 
may argue over the passage from De veritate and about the processio operati in relation to the will, 
these passages make it clear that Thomas understood there to be a processio intelligibilis from the 
word of the intellect to the act of a rational appetite139 (and such a procession is a type of processio 
operati). A few are worth quoting:  
“The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word the way love proceeds from a mental word.”140  
“For love proceeds from a word, inasmuch as we cannot love anything unless we conceive 
it in a word of the heart.”141  
“For it cannot be nor can it be understood that there is love of a thing that is not 
conceived beforehand by the intellect; wherefore any love whatever is from some word—
we are speaking of love in an intellectual nature.”142  
“It belongs to the very essence of love that it does not proceed except from a conception 
of the intellect.”143 
“But it is clear that we cannot love anything with an intelligible and holy love, except that 
we conceive it in act through the intellect. But the conception of the intellect is a word, 
wherefore it must be that love has its origin in a word.”144 
                                                
138 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 109-11, fn. 20. Cf. Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 225-
27. 
139 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 209. 
140 In I Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4. 
141 SCG 4, c. 24, §12. 
142 De pot., q. 10, a. 5c. 
143 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 3 ad 3.  
144 Thomas Aquinas, De rationibus fidei, trans. Joseph Kenny, O.P. 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Rationes.htm. Accessed August 18, 2017. c. 4. 
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Together with the passage from De veritate as well as the previous sections on the experience of the 
procession of love, these passages do settle quite convincingly that Thomas conceived of the 
second procession as an intellectual emanation from intellect to will.145 Perhaps to differentiate 
this second procession from the first while maintaining the crucial way in which the two 
processions are similar, we can call it “an intellectually grounded volitional emanation.”146 In fact, 
if this were not the case, it would not be clear why the will is defined as a rational appetite.  
3.3.2 The Presence of the Beloved in the Lover 
 Closely connected to the interpretive issues regarding a parallel between intellect and will is the 
question about how to understand the presence of the beloved in the lover. Is this presence 
produced by love or constituted by love? As Lonergan writes: 
The importance of this question is that corresponding to these opposed opinions there are 
opposed theoretical systems. Some take the trinitarian analogy from determining that 
there are two processions in us, one within intellect and the other within will; so that, just 
as the act of understanding produces the word in the first processions, so the act of love 
produces the ‘beloved in the lover’ in the second…147  
If the presence of the beloved is produced by love, this means it is “something really distinct from 
love and something that proceeds from love and so something that is produced by love in the 
mode of a processio operati.”148 There is an occasion in which Thomas seems to say that the act of 
love produces the beloved’s presence.149 However, the many texts cited above are to the contrary, 
                                                
145 While these phrases may seem to negate Lonergan’s later recognition of an exception to the dictum, 
“nihil amatum nisi praecognitum,” recall that I argued that the order of the processions of word and love 
remains in the state of being-in-love. That is, love continues to remain dependent on an act of judgment. 
Once Lonergan came to terms with the priority of love, rather than conceiving God as an infinite act of 
intellectual consciousness, he took his starting point for the psychological analogy in “the higher synthesis 
of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love 
manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of 
loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature” (Lonergan, “Christology Today,” 93). See above, §3.1 
Understanding the Emanatio Intelligibilis on the Level of Experience: The Affective Response of Love. 
146 Dominic Doyle suggested this phrase to me.  
147 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 220-21. 
148 Doran, The Trinity in History, vol. 1, 341. 
149 ST Ia, q. 37, a. 1c. Here, Thomas draws a surprising parallel, surprising because it does not correspond 
to his usual characterization of the two processions. He says that from the fact that someone understands 
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as is our own experience. Doran suggests that given the proximity of the two contrary positions 
(the beloved’s presence is constituted by the procession of love at q. 27, a. 3 and the beloved’s 
presence is produced by love at q. 37, a. 1), perhaps the question was not an explicit one for 
Thomas at the time of the composition of the trinitarian questions of the Summa. It is also 
interesting to note that in Question 37, Thomas is struggling with the linguistic lacuna for talking 
about love in technical terms. Given the context of what this question (the name of the Holy 
Spirit) and article (whether it is ‘love’) are wrestling with, perhaps Thomas was preoccupied with 
the linguistic lacuna and did not take enough care to negate the parallel. Lastly, we have just 
observed that Thomas denies such a procession of love within the will. It is easy to assume such 
production if one conceives the will as parallel to the intellect, for the intellect-in-act does produce 
a word. However, what we have seen is that it is the act of love that is a term. This act is produced 
by intellect-in-act uttering a value judgment, and this act of love is the beloved’s presence in the 
lover-in-act. Thomas maintains the beloved’s presence is constituted by an act of love. That is, the 
presence of the beloved is really the same as the act of loving. By contrast, if one maintains that 
the beloved’s presence is produced by love, the assumption is that this presence is really distinct 
from love and is something that proceeds from love.150 Doran puts this contrast in terms of a 
question: “Does love ‘operate’ something, namely, the presence of the beloved in the lover, or is 
that presence constituted by the very procession of love from the grasp of sufficient conditions and 
                                                                                                                                            
there emerges in the one who understands the conception of the thing understood, and similarly, from 
the fact that someone loves there emerges a certain impression of the beloved in the affections of the love. 
He seems to be saying that as the word is produced by the act of understanding; the presence beloved is 
produced by the act of loving. He writes: “…there are two processions in God, one by way of the 
intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of 
Love… For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a 
conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a 
certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which 
the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands…” 
This passage is what Emery refers to in his argument. 
150 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 220-21. 
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the judgment of value that follows from that grasp?”151 The former represents the presence of the 
beloved as produced by love, and the latter as constituted by love. 
 Thomas gives his perhaps most detailed explanation of the presence of the beloved in the 
lover in the Summa Contra Gentiles. He proceeds in three steps.152 First, he argues that in everyone 
who understands, there must also be a will.153 Next, he argues that the basic act of the will is 
love.154 Lastly, he underscores the difference between the presence of the beloved in the intellect 
and her presence in the will of the lover:  
what is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but in his will as well; but in one way 
and another. It is in the intellect by reason of the likeness of its species; it is in the will of 
the lover, however, as the term of a movement is in its proportioned motive principle by 
reason of the suitability and proportion which the term has for that principle. Just so, in a 
certain way, there is in fire the upper place by reason of that lightness which gives it 
proportion and suitability to such a place, but the fire which is generated is in the fire 
which generates by reason of the likeness of its form.155 
Here, the lightness is akin to the lover’s love. As the lightness is the principle of motion toward the 
higher level, so the act of love is the principle of motion toward the beloved. Thomas does not say 
                                                
151 Doran, The Trinity in History, vol. 1, 341. 
152 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 209. 
153 SCG 4, c. 19, §2: “For an intellect is made to be in act by an intelligible form so far as it is understanding, 
as a natural thing is made to be in act in its natural being by its proper form. But a natural thing, through 
the form by which it is perfected in its species, has an inclination to its proper operations and to its proper 
end, which it achieves by operations, ‘for as everything is so does it operate,’ and it tends to what is fitting 
for itself. Hence, also, from an intelligible form there must follow in one who understands an inclination 
to his proper operations and his proper end. Of course, this inclination in an intellectual nature is the 
will, which is the principle of operations in us, those by which he who understands operates for an end. 
For end and the good are the will’s object. One must, therefore, discover a will in everyone who 
understands.” 
154 SCG 4, c. 19, 3: “Although several acts seem to belong to the will, to desire, to delight in, to hate, and 
others of this kind, nevertheless for all of these love is found to be the one principle and the common root. 
This can be gathered from the following points. The will, as was said, is related to intellectual things as 
natural inclination to natural things (this is also called natural appetite). But natural inclination arises 
thus: The natural thing has an affinity and correspondence from its form (which we have called the 
principle of the inclination) with that to which it is moved. The heavy has such a relation with the lower 
place. Hence, also, every inclination of the will arises from this: by an intelligible form a thing is apprehended as 
suitable or affective. To be affected toward something—so far as it is of this kind—is to love that thing. 
Therefore, every inclination of will and even of sensible appetite has its origin from love. For from the 
fact that we love something we desire that thing if it be absent; we rejoice, of course, if it be present; and we are 
sad when we are kept from it; and we hate those things which keep us from the beloved, and grow angry 
against them.” 
155 SCG 4, c. 19,. §4. 
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that the lightness produces the higher level.156 Rather, where the beloved is present in the intellect 
“per similitudinem speciei, the beloved is present “dynamically”157, as the term of a movement in the 
movement’s proportionate principle. Thomas continues: 
And because, as was shown in Book I, the proper object of the divine will is His goodness, 
necessarily it is first and principally His goodness and Himself that God loves. But, since it 
has been shown that the beloved must somehow be in the will of the lover, and that God 
Himself loves Himself, it needs must be that God Himself is in His will as the beloved in 
the lover. But the beloved is in the lover so far as it is loved—an act of love, of course, is a kind of act of 
will…158 
Thomas maintains in this passage that the beloved is in the lover inasmuch as the beloved is 
loved, not because love produces something in the love. The lover’s act of love makes present to 
her the beloved.  
 If we turn to a few later works, we find the same position on the beloved’s presence as 
constituted by love. In the Summa, Thomas maintains that while the object of the intellect is in the 
intellect by a similitude of species, the object of the will or love is in the will, not by reproduction, 
but as a goal is present through rest in or tendency toward the goal.159 (This also means that while 
the procession of the divine Word is a generation, the procession of Love is not). Neither then 
does the act of love produce the beloved. In the Compendium, Thomas proceeds to the same point 
succinctly, and also connects love’s relation of dependence on the word:  
…what is loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is actually being loved. The fact that an object is 
actually loved proceeds from the lover’s capacity to love, and also from the lovable good 
actually understood. Accordingly, the fact that the beloved is in the one loving proceeds 
from two principles: from the loving principle, and from an apprehended intelligible, 
which the word that has been conceived concerning the lovable.160 
Lastly, if we recall De veritate in which Thomas maintains that nothing proceeds within the will after 
the manner of a term of an operation (processio operati), then we can also conclude that “the beloved 
                                                
156 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 223. 
157 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 209. 
158 SCG 4, c. 19,. §7. 
159 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 3c. See Lonergan, Verbum, 2, 210. 
160 Comp. theol., c. 49. See also De Malo, q. 6, a. 1 ad 13. 
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in the lover” is constituted by love rather than produced by love.161 With Lonergan we can 
conclude that Thomas explicitly taught that the second procession is of love from word; there is 
not a procession in the will except what proceeds in the manner of an operation (per modum 
operationis); and the beloved is present in the lover because the beloved is loved.162 
 Before concluding this section and chapter, it remains to ask what kind of presence the 
presence of the beloved is. Lonergan conceives of this presence “dynamically” as being moved 
toward, and so in terms of final causality. The most suitable name for love conceived in this way is 
choice or decision. Lonergan uses “election.” For example, “We choose [eligimus] because we judge 
and in accordance with what we judge to be useful or proper or fitting or obligatory…”163 As we 
have seen, Thomas also speaks of love in terms of impulse and movement: “Thus the procession 
of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its 
own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of 
impulse and movement towards an object.”164 This is quite clearly concern, not complacency. 
How does Crowe’s retrieval of complacency as the basic and primary act of love alter our 
understanding of the presence of the beloved in the lover by the procession of love?  
 Recall that Crowe argues that while both aspects of love—complacency and concern—
are present in Thomas’s thought, he never successfully integrated them. Yet, in coming to terms 
with complacency as the basic and primary act of love, we can understand that complacent love is 
the best analogy for the second procession. Resorting to complacency rather than concern as the 
analogy for proceeding love does not negate intellectual emanation—both rest and inclination 
arise because of a judgment of a value. Neither then does this negate that the procession of love is 
a procession per modum operati from the intellect to the will. It is still the dicere and the verbum that 
                                                
161 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 227. Cf. Doran, The Trinity in History, vol. 1, 342. 
162 There is a fourth conclusion, which I will treat in the following chapter, namely, that the Holy Spirit is 
both the beloved in the lover and proceeding love.  
163 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 138-39 (emphasis original).  
164 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 4c. 
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spirate complacency (not the will itself). Selecting the notion of love as rest rather than tendency 
seems to have no negative consequences for trinitarian theology, but actually makes a positive 
contribution. As Crowe writes: 
Which of the two is to be retained and exploited in the Trinitarian analogy? Clearly, the 
Holy Spirit is to be conceived on the analogy of complacentia boni. For that is love in its 
basic form, love as a term, love in clearest dependence on the word, love as passive. Nor is there 
any loss to Trinitarian theory through discarding the notion of love as tendency … we 
can … avoid the incongruity of comparing the Holy Spirit with an impulse ad aliquid 
faciendum [toward something to be done]. Moreover, the divinity of the Spirit is as well conceived 
through the presence of the loved object in the will by complacency as by its presence as the term of 
movement. The twofold habitude [relationship] to the Word as principle and to the divine 
goodness as object, still remains. The difference between a procession which results in a 
similitude by reason of the mode of procession (generatio) and one that does not on this 
account result in a similitude but for another reason, also remains. There seems to be no 
significant loss and a clear gain.165 
As Crowe indicates, the presence of the beloved in the lover as constituted by love (not produced) 
remains. Rather than conceive of such presence as dynamic, we can conceive of it as affective.166 
Both dynamic and affective presence are constituted by the act of love; neither is a term produced 
by love, in other words. Such presence need not be by tendency. To view this from another 
perspective, given that the presence of the beloved is constituted by love, such that the act of love 
is the beloved’s presence, conceiving of this act of love as complacency does not negate the 
presence of the beloved, who is present as perfectly “possessed” rather than as absent. For 
example, in the Prima Secundae when considering the mutual indwelling of the beloved and the 
lover, Thomas considers their affective union according to complacency, which can either be a 
term (delighting in the beloved) or a principle of movement. He writes “As the appetitive power, 
the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of 
complacency: causing him either to take pleasure [delectetur] in it, or in its good, when present; or, 
                                                
165 Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 140. For the twofold habitude, Crowe cites ST Ia, q. 37, a. 1c and ad 2; SCG 
4, c. 19, §8. 
166 See Crowe, Doctrine of the Most Blessed Trinity, 148. 
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in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it [per desiderium tendat…]”167 
Thus presence of the beloved can also be constituted by resting in the possession of the good. 
 One term Crowe suggests in place of complacency is gratitude, which can help us 
appreciate the presence of the beloved according to complacency. The quality of the act of love 
constituting the beloved’s presence can be the quality of gratitude rather than impulse.168 It is 
noteworthy that Lonergan uses “thanksgiving” to conceive of the second procession later in his 
career: 
Oh, my whole theory of the Trinitarian has changed, you know. …According to Aquinas, 
the Son is verbum spirans amorem – the judgment of value, not a judgment of freedom. 
According to Rosemary Haughton (though she doesn’t put it this way), what in Thomas is 
called amor procedens, the Holy Ghost, is thanksgiving. …It is the same sort of relationship, 
only it is the procession of judgment of value from agape; and of thanksgiving from both.169 
For these reasons, it is better to develop a psychological analogy according to an act of love 
named and conceived in line with complacency rather than decision. I would also add, following 
Lawrence’s conception of God as conversational, that “gratitude” and “thanksgiving” correlate 
with how he understands “listening,” insofar as the presence of the beloved in the lover by way of 
complacency is like a restful listening to the value of the beloved. I will return to this when 
considering the imago Dei in order to offer a way of possibly integrating both complacency and 
concern when it comes to trinitarian anthropology and our graced participation in the divine 
processions as viatores. 
                                                
167 ST Ia-IIae,q. 28, a. 2c. 
168 Hefling does flag one difference between Lonergan’s way of construing the procession of love and 
Crowe’s. Hefling speculates that Crowe conceives of the Spirit in some sense as an image or likeness or 
similitude, though not for the same reasons as with the Word. He writes, “For Lonergan the presence of 
the loved, as the presence of an end in tendency to that end, cannot be thought of as likeness or similarity 
to the beloved. The divine Word is an ‘image’; the Spirit is not…Whether this is a serious flaw is a further 
question, but it might be pointed out that the Eastern Trinitarian theology commonly speaks of the Spirit 
as an image of the image which is the Word” (Hefling, “Over Thin Ice, 106-7). 
169 Pierre Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen Going, eds., Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the life of 
Bernard Lonergan, (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982), 61-62 as cited in Hefling, “Over Thin Ice,” 
99. Hefling credits Michael Stebbins with bringing this passage to the front of his mind. 
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4. Conclusion 
We have now attended to the natural analogues for the two divine processions, the intellectual 
emanations of word and love. We have focused on the meaning of intellectual emanation as an 
intellectual rather than merely natural process. In so doing, we have underscored the basic 
rationality of rational consciousness that accompanies the procession of every word and act of 
rational love, as it is this basic rationality of our rational human consciousness that is the reason 
we can search within our minds for a trinitarian analogy. That is, it is the specifically unique 
“because-of-ness” within our intelligent, rational, and deliberative levels of consciousness in which 
we constitute ourselves within a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value that makes 
us most like God, who is eternally constituted as triune: Speaker, Word, Listening. We, too, can 
be meaning-makers, wise judges, and virtuous people, creatively and lovingly constituting 
ourselves precisely because we understand—directly, reflectively, and value-reflectively. We have 
also focused on the relation between the two procession. In focusing on their relation, we have 
specified that it is the procession of a judgment of value from a value-reflective act of 
understanding, and the procession of love from both that is relevant to trinitarian theology. We 
now proceed to apply the natural analogue to trinitarian theology by examining Thomas’s 
psychological analogy in the Summa theologiae.
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CHAPTER 5                                                                                                 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALOGY AND THE IMAGO 
TRINITATIS IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 
1. Analepsis and Prolepsis  
IN THE PREVIOUS TWO CHAPTERS, we inquired after the intellectual emanations of word and 
love that Thomas selects as the natural analogues for the divine processions of Word and Love. 
Specifically, we focused upon the relationship between intelligere and verbum, and subsequently, 
between these and amare. We explored the intellectual emanations in our own experience and in 
Thomas’s writing. When turning to Thomas’s metaphysical expositions of the intellect and will, 
we cut through two confusions that obscured his trinitarian theology. First, an act is not restricted 
to one mode of operating. Intelligere is both the act of understanding and that same act as 
grounding the procession of the verbum. Second, a faculty need not produce its own act. The act of 
love proceeds from the intellect to the will. These two clarifications shed light on the natural 
analogues for the first and second divine processions, respectively. Most importantly, we attended 
to the fact that the analogy for the divine processions lies in the analysis, not of knowledge in 
general, but specifically of intellectual reflection, of rational consciousness. Rational consciousness 
(dicere) is the act of understanding as ground and origin of inner words of conceptualization and 
judgment, and these inner words proceed as act from act, and specifically because intelligence 
itself is in act.1 In fact, both speaking a word and spirating love are operations of rational 
consciousness. This is what it means that both processions—whether of word or of love—are 
intellectual processions or emanations. However, these processions are not parallel. What matters is 
the relationship among these three acts, namely, value-reflective understanding, judgments of 
value, and love. What provides the relevant analogue is that one act proceeds because of the other 
act. Thus, the act of value judgment emerges from the act of value-reflective grasp of the evidence 
                                                
1 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 153-54. 
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because that evidence is known to be grasped. Similarly, the act of love emerges from the act of value 
judgment because the evidence on the goodness of the beloved is understood and affirmed. 
 My consideration of the psychological analogy and the imago Dei in this chapter is aimed 
at exploring their relevance for Dominican preaching and teaching in their cultures (Chapter 6). 
Given this goal, I concentrate my presentation of the analogy and the image upon their shared 
conversational elements of speaking and listening, and the significance of the verbum therein. In 
addition, I focus upon Thomas’s mature coordination of the divine processions with the creation 
of the human person ad imaginem Trinitatis.2 Ultimately, I argue that the very same operations—the 
spiritual processions of word and love—provide (1) the analogical conception of the divine 
processions; (2) the explanation of the mode of divine indwelling and the assimilation of the imago 
to its trinitarian exemplar; and (3) the explanation of the process by which teaching and learning 
occur, both naturally and in the supernatural context of the divine missions. This threefold 
process, in the context of sacra doctrina, is itself embedded within assimilation to the Trinity and is 
central to understanding the human teacher’s participation in the pedagogical aspect of the divine 
missions. The first two parts of this process are the topic of this chapter, and have been argued in 
some combination by, for example, Bernard Lonergan, D. Juvenall Merriell, and Jeremy Wilkins. 
The third will be the topic of the final chapter, and serves as my own contribution to the retrieval 
of Thomas’s trinitarian theology. I argue that we can further appreciate the deeply trinitarian 
elements of Thomas’s theology and in particular, the way trinitarian doctrine permeates the entire 
Summa, by uncovering the trinitarian features of his pedagogy. Thus, not only do the spiritual 
processions connect Thomas’s trinitarian theology and his theological anthropology, but they also 
link those topics to his pedagogy.  
                                                
2 See ST 1 q. 93, esp. aa. 4, 7, and 8. 
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2. Introduction: Analogy, Image, and Trinification 
Where the previous two chapters developed the natural analogues for the divine processions, this 
chapter will apply the analogues to the Trinity. The first section will address the psychological 
analogy and the second will address the imago Dei, including the human person’s ongoing graced 
assimilation to the Trinity and the indwelling of the Trinity. The analogy and the image are 
related. When Augustine sought an analogy in De Trinitate, he sought it in the human person as 
the imago Dei. He insisted that the basis of this inquisitive search was the Catholic faith—the beliefs 
in the Trinity and in God’s generously creating the human person to God’s own image.3 At the 
same time, the analogy and the image address different questions. On the one hand, an analogy 
seeks to help people understand the Trinity. On the other hand, when the imago Dei is considered, 
the question is whether X accurately represents the Trinity. In the Summa theologiae, on account of 
his mature appreciation of De Trinitate, Thomas was able coordinate the analogy and the image. 
Such a coordination is possible because the psychological analogy (unlike other analogies) is 
simply the “reverse side” of the doctrine of the image of the Trinity.4 It is the psychological 
analogy’s turn to the mind’s immanent processions of word and love that can be coordinated with 
the assimilation of the mind-as-image to God through its imitation of and participation in the 
divine processions. 
                                                
3 For example, see Augustine, De Trinitate, 1.1.1 (Hill, 66): “The reader of these reflections of mind on the 
Trinity should bear in mind that my pen is on the watch against the sophistries of those who scorn the 
starting-point of faith, and allow themselves to be deceived through an unseasonable and misguided love 
of reason.” Ibid., 8.4.6 (Hill, 245-46); 15.1.1–15.2.2 (Hill, 395-96): “Faith seeks, understanding finds; 
which is why the prophet says, ‘Unless you believe you shall not understand’ (Is 7:9, Septuagint). And 
again, understanding still goes on seeking the one it has found…” (15.2.2; Hill, 396). Notice that 
Augustine’s explanation of his methodological procedure – faith precedes understanding – occurs at the 
very outset of De Trinitate and then recurs in Book 8 in which he begins searching for a trinitarian 
analogy, and then finally again at the culmination of the journey in Book 15. See also ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 
2: “Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not 
in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive at 
knowledge, and not conversely.” 
4 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 88. Therein, Merriell is explaining why in his commentary on the 
Sentences Thomas failed to see the connection between the image of the Trinity and the procession of the 
divine Persons.  
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 Three notes about the imago are in order. One, following Augustine, Thomas posited that 
the imago Dei was to be found in the human mens. Augustine and Thomas spoke both of the image 
of God and the image of the Trinity. As Merriell explains, “These two phrases refer to one and 
the same reality in the rational creature, although by our power of reason we can distinguish 
aspects in this one reality that justify the use of one or the other phrase.”5 That is, in so far as the 
human person bears the image of God, and given that God is a Trinity of Persons, this image also 
bears the image of the Trinity. Yet, just as we can consider God apart from our consideration of 
the Trinity of Persons in God, so too can we consider the image of God apart from our 
consideration of this image as the image of the Trinity. Two, the Vulgate version of Genesis 1:26-
27 has the phrase on the image of God as “ad imaginem.” Thomas thought this significant and 
incorporated it into his theological exposition by focusing on the progressive imitation the human 
person can undergo. Third, while we know we are created to the image of God by faith, we know 
our souls through reason.  
 With respect to trinification, recent scholarship has been retrieving Thomas’s 
understanding of sanctification as deification.6 This term originates in Frederick Crowe’s work. 
He uses it to “stress the fact that the only God there is a triune God, he communicates himself to 
us as triune, and therefore the deification of the human world is really its ‘trinification.’”7 
According to Dionysius, deification is “the attainment of godlikeness and union with God.”8 In 
the Summa, Thomas first introduces the language of ‘deiformity’ in Question 12.9 Dominic Doyle 
                                                
5 Ibid., 11.  
6 For example, see Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace. 
7 Crowe, The Most Holy Doctrine of the Trinity, 178. 
8 Dionysius, On Divine Names, Celestial Hierarchy, and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, trans. Colm Luibheid as Pseudo-
Dionysius: The Complete Works (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 1.3 PG (3.376A) as quoted in 
Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 1.  
9 See Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 30: “The beatific vision is presented as the goal and perfection of all 
human knowing and loving, which must involve greater participation in the likeness of God.” 
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explains how deification is related to the unique position the human person holds in creation. He 
writes: 
Deification is a key concept in Aquinas’s account of human participation in God. It finds 
its scriptural basis in 2 Peter 1:4’s expression of the hope to ‘become participants of the 
divine nature.’ The transforming light by which this happens reveals a radically new level 
of participation beyond a common participation in God as the source of 
existence…Whereas in metaphysical terms God is present to all creation as the source of 
its being, in theological terms God is present to the person through the operation of their 
distinctive faculties.10 
Notice that Thomas thinks of the process of deification as progressive participation in the divine 
nature.11 This process is a journey of transformation. In the Summa, Thomas presents his mature 
account of the graced movement of the wayfarer toward God. The advancement of the rational 
creature toward God consists in becoming more like God; only then is the creature proportioned 
to eternal life. Spezzano brings together the wayfarer’s transformation with Thomas’s trinitarian 
anthropology. She writes: 
In this journey of transformation, the human creature is both conformed to and moved 
by the Trinitarian exemplar, the source of both its creation in a rational nature, and its 
re-creation by grace through the divine missions…. As participations in the likeness of the 
Spirit and Son, charity and wisdom make the perfection of the imago Dei a true 
conformation to the Trinity of Persons: charity is a created participation of the Holy 
Spirit [IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 2], and by wisdom—especially the Spirit’s gift of wisdom—the 
soul is assimilated to the Son, the ‘Word breathing forth love’ [Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2; IIa-
IIae, q. 45, a. 6].12 
 In addition to facilitating the coordination of the trinitarian analogy with the trinitarian 
image, the psychological analogy also allowed Thomas to relate the order of grace and the order 
of the Trinity such that he was able to illuminate a specifically trinitarian perfection of the imago 
Dei in the soul, a perfection that is also a participation in “triniform” beatitude.13 In light of 
                                                
10 Doyle, The Promise of Christian Humanism, 66. See ST Ia, q. 8, a. 3c; q. 43, a. 3c. See also Spezzano, The 
Glory of God’s Grace, 29-30. 
11 For texts on participation, see ST Ia, q. 3, a. 4, q. 4, a. 2, q. 6, a. 3, q. 8, a. 1, q. 44, a. 1, q. 45, aa. 6-7; Ia-
IIae, q. 62, a. 1 ad 1, q. 112, a. 1; IIIa, q. 62, a. 1. 
12 Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 3-4 (internal citations included) 
13 See Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions and the Order of Grace According to Thomas Aquinas,” in Philosophy 
and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, eds. Kent Emery, Russell Friedman, and 
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Thomas’s efforts to systematically relate these two orders, along with the recent scholarship on 
deification, we can recognize that for Thomas sanctification as deification is also always 
trinification.  
3. The Psychological Analogy  
In order to appreciate Thomas’s advancement of the psychological analogy in the Summa theologiae, 
it will be helpful to first evaluate some of the major differences between this analogy and the other 
prevalent analogy during Thomas’s time, the self-diffusiveness of the good. Further, it is necessary 
to understand precisely what the psychological analogy is an analogy for with respect to the 
Trinity. Is it an analogy for the three Persons? The four relations? The two processions? 
Moreover, what do we mean by the “psychological analogy?”14 What does a good trinitarian 
analogy need to explain?  
                                                                                                                                            
Andreas (Speer. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2011), 708.  
14 With regards to this question, Hefling observes, “There is a much-discussed way of understanding the 
Trinity which would have it that two of the three in God bond with each other, and that the nexus of 
their mutual love is a third. It is commonly called ‘the Augustinian psychological analogy’…In the first 
place, it is not uniquely Augustinian. By one count Augustine has more than twenty analogies for the 
Trinity. In the second place, it is not all that psychological. What it has love uniting is not two other 
psychological states or acts but a lover and a beloved. In the third place, therefore, it is not much of an 
analogy. It assumes that lover and beloved are, and that they are distinct, before their loving unites them. 
There is no explanation of ‘generation,’ which alone distinguishes the Son from the Father. …It would be 
more accurate to say, on this analogy, that God is like a psychosocial community of two individuals. 
Hence the binitarianism so prevalent in Western theology” (Hefling, “Grace and Gratitude,” 480). For 
the true meaning of the “Augustinian psychological analogy,” see below, §3.2 The Psychological Analogy 
for the Trinity in the Summa theologiae. See also Augustine, De trinitate, 15.10.19-15.11.20, 15.12.22, and 
15.27.50 (Hill, 409-11, 413-15, 434-35).  
 Crowe makes a similar point, from which perhaps Hefling is drawing. Crowe writes, “A rough count runs 
up 23 [analogies for the Trinity] (it has to be a rough count – in Augustine’s flowing style, you hardly know 
sometimes when one analogy stops and another begins). However, two especially have had better fortune 
than others. One finds three elements in charity itself: ‘amans, et quod amatur, et amor (VIII, ch. 10; see 
Augustine’s summary in XV, ch. 3), and this analogy found favor with Richard of St. Victor, is still 
popular, and is sometimes taken (mistakenly, in my view) to be the Catholic analogy (v.g., in A. Nygren’s Agape and 
Eros, 1953, pp. 541-42). The real analogy, it seems to me, comes a little later in the work. …[Augustine 
writes,] ‘In the ninth book, the subject of the image of God which found in the spirit (mens) of man was 
broached; and here there is found a certain ‘trinity’, that is, the spirit, and the knowledge by which it 
knows itself, and the love by which it loves itself and its knowledge; and these three are equal among 
themselves, and are demonstrated to be of one essence’” (Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 124, 
emphasis added). 
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3.1 Refining the Theory of the Divine Processions and the Trinitarian Analogy 
Thomas refined his theory of the divine processions and the trinitarian analogy over the course of 
his life in at least two significant ways. These refinements are related to the need to evaluate 
competing analogies and determine exactly what the psychological analogy illuminates. In the 
first place, regarding his conception of the divine procession, Thomas increasingly favored the 
hypothesis of spiritual processions over the Dionysian model of the analogy of the self-
diffusiveness of the good. With the former, the Good remained important because the divine 
processions were conceived on the analogy of a “conversation” about the divine Good in which 
the Good is known and loved in the processions of word and love.15 In the second place, as 
Thomas came to understand the Augustinian psychological analogy better, it became more and 
more prominent in his thought. Most significantly, he realized that what were relevant were the 
acts according to which we find the two processions of word and love rather than the 
corresponding triad of faculties (memoria, intelligentia, voluntas).16 Thus, Thomas began to reject “any 
conception of the image that sacrifices the reality of Augustine’s triads to a fondness for facile 
symmetry.”17 Previously, Thomas assumed Augustine’s doctrine of the image was that to each 
divine Person there corresponded one member of the triad of the human mens.18 This three-to-
three symmetry was what Thomas came to reject, in favor of a deeper understanding of 
Augustine’s triad, which actually focused on the activity of the triad according to which there are 
                                                
15 See Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 51.  
16  See Merriell, “Trinitarian Anthropology,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, eds. Rik Van Nieuwenhove 
and Joseph P. Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 126-132; ibid., To the 
Image of the Trinity, 29-35 and 110-32 Augustine, De trinitate , esp. Books 14-15; Walter H Principe, “The 
Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person,” in 
Studia Patristica , vol. 18, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1982). 
17 Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 110. 
18 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 58, 91. See Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 1. Article 1 is 
on the parts of the image. However, Merriell suggests that even at this stage, Thomas “had already begun 
to realize the image of God in man is connected to the operations by which man reaches his perfection” 
(Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 64, emphasis added). Nevertheless, Thomas had not yet come to 
understand the image in terms of the divine processions, which Merriell suggests reflected Thomas’s lack 
of fully appreciating Augustine’s De Trinitate at the time (ibid., 79). 
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two processions. Thus, Thomas came to understand that the starting point for systematic 
trinitarian theology was an analogous understanding of the two divine processions, which in turn 
would lead to an understanding of the relations and persons. According to Wilkins, the net effect 
of these developments was: 
a shift away from the divine nature (goodness, beatitude) and toward the divine 
operations (knowing, loving) as the basis for conceiving the processions, and, inasmuch as 
‘personal’ denotes what is proper to subsistents in an intellectual nature, this same shift 
may be characterized as a move away from generically metaphysical and toward 
specifically personal terms for conceiving the processions.19  
By “specifically personal,” Wilkins means that the processions—unlike the essential divine acts of 
knowing and loving—are acts that belong to specific divine Persons, which we will see below. 
 Bonaventure exemplified the Dionysian model in his trinitarian theology,20 which 
reflected the achievements Alexander of Hales had made, who himself was indebted to Richard of 
St. Victor. Alexander, like Richard, used the categories of natural and voluntary to explain the 
reason of number in God. There is procession by the mode of nature, which is the reason for the 
distinction of Father and Son, as well as procession by the mode of will, which is the reason for 
the distinction of the Father and Son from the Holy Spirit.21 This model asserts a likeness between 
the dual principles of intellect (procession “per modum naturae”) and will (procession “per modum 
voluntatis”) with the two divine processions. That is, the procession per modum naturae is analogous to 
the first divine procession, while the procession per modum voluntatis is analogous to the second 
divine procession. Further, these two processions are parallel—one from the intellect and another 
                                                
19 Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 52. Wilkins identifies two other 
developments that contributed to this net effect (1) Thomas’s increasing differentiation between potentia 
generandi and potentia creandi; and (2) the clear distinction of the processions from notional acts, and the 
processions are assigned a key role in the seriation and resolution of trinitarian questions. I will not 
consider the first, but the second will play a part in Chapter 6.  
20 See Bonaventure, Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, Works of St. Bonaventure, Volume III, 
trans. and intro. Zachary Hayes (Mansfield: Bookmasters, 2002). 
21 See Alexander of Hales, Summa Halensis, Book I, p. 1, inq. 2, tract. un., q.3, c. 5 (p. 465). 
  Chapter 5 – Page 286 
from the will, which is what differentiates them—rather than connected, as the processions of 
word and love (in which the second procession is from intellect to will). 
 Gilles Emery explains how for Bonaventure, the analogy of the self-diffusiveness of the 
good illuminates the Trinity, creation, and their relationship. Emery writes, “By virtue of his 
sovereign bounty, God spreads within himself through natural diffusion; causing his bounty to 
burst out beyond himself, he spreads ad extra through volitional diffusion.”22 This model of 
procession draws an analogy between the divine processions and the procession of all creatures 
from God, rather than the particular processions of word and love within the human person’s 
soul.23 Further, Emery explains that the concept of ‘primacy’ (primitas) is closely related to the 
concept of the good in Bonaventure’s trinitarian theology.24 He writes: 
In terms of the persons, the primacy of the Father designates that ultimate perfection 
which is the conclusion of the Franciscan theologian’s quest into the mystery of divine 
communication: This primacy supplies the fundamental reason for the fecundity of the 
Father, who, as the principle of all divinity (fullness as source), produces other persons.25 
For Bonaventure, the Father is conceptually prior to both the procession of generation and the 
relation of paternity. Further, the Father must be conceived before the Son and Spirit if we are to 
understand them in terms of the Father’s self-diffusiveness as the font, the source, the principle of 
the other persons.  
 Thomas also made use of this analogy in his earlier works. Even when he did use the 
psychological analogy, it was with less clarity and precision than that of his later works. In his first 
commentary on the Sentences, Thomas used two analogues for the first divine procession: the 
procession of nature and the procession of the intellect, which corresponded to the analogy of the 
self-diffusiveness and the psychological analogy (though at this point, a less refined version), 
                                                
22 Emery, Trinity in Aquinas, 47. 
23 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 89. 
24 In his Scriptum super I Sententiarium, Bonaventure offers two other concepts, which he counts as reasons for 
the number of Persons in God. The other two are the perfection and simplicity. Bonaventure, Sent., 1 d. 2 
a. 1 q. 2. 
25 Emery, Trinity in Aquinas, 47-8. 
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respectively. However, he used the former more frequently. As Merriell writes, “The primary 
analogy for the divine processions in the Scriptum is the procession of all creatures from God 
according to nature and will rather than the processions of word and love in the image of God, 
which only rational creatures bear.”26 Merriell underscores that Thomas’s use of the Dionysian 
model for the processions obstructed his ability to integrate the imago Dei with the divine 
processions, as well as the missions by which the Trinity dwells within the human person.27 The 
reason is because the inferior analogy compares the divine processions to the procession of all 
creatures from God, which poses difficulties because it likens the Word and Spirit to creatures. By 
contrast, the psychological analogy and its focus on spiritual processions lent itself to recognizing 
the similarity between the image and the indwelling of the Trinity,28 as well as their dynamic 
relationship. In moving away from the self-diffusiveness of the good, Thomas not only came to 
favor the hypothesis of spiritual processions, but he also (as will be argued in Chapter 6), 
transcended what was at time the vexing problem in trinitarian theology, 29 i.e., about asserting 
the primacy of the Father when in God, nothing is prior or posterior, or to put it more 
specifically, whether the Father generates because he is Father, or whether he is Father because 
he generates.30 
 The second significant refinement in Thomas’s trinitarian theology occurs within the 
context of the psychological analogy, itself—what the best available analogy is and what it 
                                                
26 Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 89. 
27 The reason for this difficulty will become clearer as we go. 
28 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 89. 
29 Emery does not appear to grasp this second point, which seems due at least in part to his oversight of 
some of the key developments that occurred between Thomas’s Sentences commentary on the Summa 
theologiae. He writes, “We find here, at the heart of St. Bonaventure’s thinking on the Father, a principle 
which was to be used by Thomas in his commentary in order to explain the connection between Trinity 
and Creation…” (Emery, Trinity in Aquinas, 48). 
30 The question can be understood as one about the relative priority of person and relation in God. Recall 
also that the analogy of the self-diffusiveness of the good also carried a tendency to explain the Trinity of 
Persons in God in terms of necessary reasons, which for Thomas was methodologically problematic. See 
Chapter 2. 
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explains that makes it valuable. Thomas abandoned the more familiar yet facile association of the 
Trinity with the triad of faculties in the soul. Instead, he developed the two processions of the 
immanent operations of knowing and loving that Augustine introduced in Book 9 and to which he 
returned in Book 15 in De Trinitate. Thus, he focused on a pair of acts rather than a triad of 
faculties. Book 14 is often considered the climax of the text, in which Augustine returns to the 
triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas. It is easy to presume Augustine has settled on this triad as the 
analogy for the Trinity because he writes, for example, “The trinity of the mind is not really the 
image of God because the mind remembers and understands and loves itself, but because it is also 
able to remember and understand and love him by whom it was made. And when it does this it becomes 
wise itself.”31 Furthermore, the end of Book 14 is a meditation on recreation of the imago Dei 
through grace to glory.32 This sense of culminating meditation seems to indicate that Book 14 is 
the climax, while Book 15 is more of an epilogue, recounting what the previous books set forth.  
 However, while Book 14 may be the “dramatic culmination” of De Trinitate, its proper 
ending is Book 15.33 Here, Augustine’s preference for the analogy of inner word and love over 
and against the triads comes to the fore. Given Thomas’s indebtedness to Augustine and his 
retrieval of Augustine’s psychological analogy through careful and prolonged engagement with De 
Trinitate—which set him apart from his contemporaries34—it will be instructive to turn to 
Augustine’s text regarding this selection of two processions rather than three faculties and the 
reason for this selection. 
                                                
31 Augustine, De trinitate, 14.12.15 (Hill, 383; emphasis added to draw attention to the triad of memory, 
understanding, and will. However, notice that Augustine speaks of these in the active sense). This passage 
remains important for both Augustine and Thomas, but not because of the triad. Rather, it is because of 
the significance for the imago Dei of the mind’s attention on God rather than on itself. I will return to this 
point in the section on the imago and trinification. 
32 See Augustine, De trinitate, 14.16.22 – 14.19.26 (Hill, 388-92). 
33 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 28. See also Neil Ormerod, “Augustine and the Trinity,” 28. 
34 With Michael Schmaus, Merriell contends that no theologian prior to Thomas “appreciated and used 
Augustine’s analogical examination of the processions of word and love” (Merriell, To the Image of the 
Trinity, 243 and fn. 3). 
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 In examining Augustine’s text on this point, it is helpful to keep in mind the main 
trinitarian questions he is considering. One, he is searching for a way to understand the equality 
of the three Persons who are yet one God. Two, he is eager to find a way to intelligently 
distinguish the two eternal processions, which is ultimately about how to understand the second 
procession.35 With respect to this first procession, as Crowe writes, “[Augustine’s] problem was to 
find in the created universe some analogy that will endow this name, ‘Word,’ with some meaning 
for our human minds.”36 The first procession was readily understood by analogy with begetting or 
generating, and so the second Person was fittingly called the Son or Word.37 It is more difficult to 
name the third Person. In Book 5, Augustine introduces the challenge of personally naming the 
third Person, which sets the itinerary of Books 6 and 7 in which he considers the problem of 
essential versus personal predication.38 For example, he asks “why the Holy Spirit too is not a son, 
seeing that he too comes forth from the Father, as it says in the gospel[?]”39  Augustine explores 
“Gift” as a personal name for the Holy Spirit, but finds “Love” more fitting. According to 
Merriell, while there was some precedent among the Church Fathers to name Holy Spirit “Love,” 
Augustine was the first to make significant use of this notion.40  
 The name of Love for the Holy Spirit shapes Augustine’s search for an analogy for the 
Trinity. For example, in Book 6, Augustine writes, “And therefore there are not more than three; 
one loving him who is from him, and one loving him from whom he is, and love itself.”41 In Book 
8, in which Augustine considers the relationship between knowledge and love, he introduces his 
                                                
35 See Augustine, De triniate, 1.4.7–1.7.13 (69-73). 
36 Crowe, The Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, 120. 
37 See, for example, Augustine, De trinitate, 5.7.8 (Hil, 193-94). Beginning in Book 5 and continuing in Books 
6 and 7, Augustine considers the “grammar” proper to speaking about the triune God. It is within this 
book that he settles on speaking of the “three what” in God as “persons,” “no in order to say that 
precisely, but in order not to be reduced to silence” (5.8.10; Hill, 196). Also, Augustine notes that it is of 
faith that the Son is the Word. 
38 See Augustine, De trinitate, 5.11.12–5.15.16 (Hill, 197-200).  
39 Augustine, De trinitate, 5.14.15 (Hill, 199). 
40 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 23.  
41 Augustine, De trinitate, 6.5.7 (Hill, 209-10). 
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first trinitarian analogy: “Now love means someone loving and something loved with love. There 
you are with three, the lover, what is being loved, and love.”42 The first of Augustine’s two triads 
emerges from this initial analogy and the relationship between knowledge and love: mens, notia sui, 
and amor sui (the mind, its self-knowledge, and its self-love).43 In Book 10, he introduces another 
triad: memoria, intelligentia, voluntas (memory, understanding, and will).44 As Walter Principe 
highlights, Augustine usually provided verb forms of this triad, while medieval theologians and 
contemporary scholars usually spoke in terms of “abstract noun forms.”45 Augustine’s decision is 
indicative of his recognition of the importance of the mind’s actually remembering, understanding, 
and willing, which intimates his preference of the processions of word and love. 
 Between his articulation of these two triads, in the second half of Book 9, Augustine 
introduces the two processions of word and love: 
Thus it is that in that eternal truth according to which all temporal things were made we 
observe with the eye of the mind the form according to which we are and according to 
which we do anything with true and right reason, either in ourselves or in bodies. And by 
this form we conceive true knowledge of things, which we have with us as a kind of word that we beget by 
uttering inwardly, and that does not depart from us when it is born. When we speak to others we put 
our voice or some bodily gesture at the disposal of the word that abides within, in order 
that by a kind of perceptible reminder the same sort of thing might happen in the mind of 
the listener as exists in and does not depart from the mind of the speaker.46 
Further on, Augustine specifies the kind of word of which he is speaking. Not only is it not a word 
“spoken aloud or merely thought”—i.e., an outer word—but neither is it a word conceived about 
something we dislike or to which we are indifferent. Rather, “The kind of word then that we are 
now wishing to distinguish and propose is ‘knowledge with love.’ So when the mind knows and loves 
                                                
42 Augustine, De trinitate, 8.10.14 (Hill, 255). 
43 See Augustine, De trinitate, 9.4.4–9.5.8 (Hill, 273-75) 
44 See Augustine, De trinitate, 10.11.17 (Hill, 298). 
45 See Walter H. Principe, “The Dynamism of Augustine’s,” 1292. 
46 Augustine, De trinitate, 9.7.12 (Hill, 277-78; emphasis added). 
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itself, its word is joined to it with love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, the word is in 
the love and the love in the word and both in the lover and the utterer.”47 
 Augustine’s selection of the two processions over either of the triads as his trinitarian 
analogy involved an intermediary step in which he came to recognize a difference between what 
Merriell calls the habitual and active levels of the triad.48 In Book 14, Augustine writes: 
For if we refer to the inner memory of the mind with which it remembers itself and the inner 
understanding with which it understands itself and the inner will with which it loves itself, 
where these three are simultaneously together and always have been simultaneously together 
from the moment they began to be, whether they were being thought about or not, it will 
indeed seem that the image of that other trinity belongs only to the memory.49 
Thus, three are reduced to one in the mind’s habitual state. The active level of the triad is 
different. Augustine continues: 
But because there can be no word in it without thought – we think everything we say, 
including what we say with that inner word that is not part of any people’s language – it is 
rather in these three that this image is to be recognized, namely, memory, understanding, 
and will. And here I mean the understanding we understand with as we think, that is when things are 
brought up that were to hand in the memory but were not being thought about, and our 
thought is formed from them; and the will or love or esteem I mean is the one that joins this 
offspring to its parent and is in a certain measure common to them both…The truth of 
course is that from the moment [the mind] began to be it never stopped remembering 
itself, never stopped understanding itself, never stopped loving itself, as we have already 
shown [see Book 10]. And therefore when it turns to itself in thought, a trinity is formed in which a 
word too can be perceived. It is formed of course out of the very act of thought, with the will joining the two 
together. It is here more than anywhere that we should recognize the image we are looking for.50 
Thus, the active level of the triad includes intelligentia actually thinking and generating a word. 
According to Merriell it was during the course of De veritate that Thomas came to understand that 
“the best image is constituted by the acts of memory, understanding, and love, rather than by the 
                                                
47 Augustine, De trinitate, 9.10.15 (Hill 279; emphasis added). Augustine notes that even we rightly dislike 
things, “we like and approve of our disapproval of them, and this is a word” (ibid.). 
48 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 28-30. These are terms Thomas uses, not Augustine. However, 
both authors mean the same thing – that there are two levels of the triad, and this affects the analogy. 
49 Augustine, De trinitate,14.7.10 (Hill, 377-78). 
50 Augustine, De trinitate, 14.7.10; 14.10.13 (Hill, 377-78; 381-82; emphasis added). 
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corresponding faculties.”51 In fact, Thomas quotes this very passage (14.7.10) from Augustine 
when he emphasizes the importance of the active level of the image.52  
 While it may appear at first glance in the above passage that Augustine is highlighting the 
second triad as the best analogy, his point is to draw attention to the active level of the triad, 
which itself discloses the significance of the utterance of a word with love. He reserves his 
judgment of trinitarian analogies for the final book. It is noteworthy that Augustine critiques this 
triad (memoria, intelligentia, voluntas) at the beginning of Book 15 when he is reconsidering the 
journey taken in Books 8-14.53 Those three—memoria, intelligentia, voluntas—are really essential 
attributes in God and therefore are not helpful for distinguishing the Persons.54 However, 
Augustine presses forward and continues his search for a trinitarian analogy in the mind of the 
human person. At this point, Book 15 ceases to be a summary and instead becomes a thorough 
discussion of the processions of Word and Love, providing the proper ending to De Trinitate.  
 In the final sections of Book 15, Augustine does not completely leave behind the highest 
triad (memoria, intelligentia, voluntas). Rather, he concentrates on the procession of the word in 
particular rather than the act of understanding in general. The act of understanding is an essential 
attribute in God, which is why it does not suffice as an analogy for the procession of the Word, 
which is a strictly personal name in God. The act of speaking a word, however, is a notional act in 
God, meaning it is properly attributed to a specific divine Person.55 The triad, then, is only 
                                                
51 Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 148. 
52 De ver., q. 10, a. 3. Thomas doesn’t give an explanation of the existence of the inner word in this passage – 
he has already addressed this in question 4. Here, he loosely identifies the act of thinking with the 
procession of the inner word. See De ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 1. Merriell notes that other scholars, including 
Chenu, “have concluded that the De veritate reflects a profound and painstaking reading of Augustine’s 
works” (Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 104. See note 21). More specifically, “The number of citations 
from the De Trinitate in question 10 is nearly twice the number from all the other works of Augustine put 
together. …Several articles, especially article 3, reveal that [Thomas] had mastered this section of 
Augustine’s work. It seems, however, that he had not yet realized the significance of book 15, which he 
rarely cites” (ibid., 110). 
53 See Augustine, De trinitate, 15.6.10-15.7.13 (Hill, 401-05). 
54 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 31.  
55 See ST Ia, q. 32, aa. 2-4;  q. 41, a. 1c. 
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relevant if we understand it in terms of the processions of word and love. Augustine considers 
these processions at length in this book. For example, he writes: 
If anyone then can understand how a word can be, not only before it is spoken aloud but even 
before the images of its sounds are turned over in thought…if anyone, I say, can understand this, he 
can already see through this mirror and in this enigma some likeness of that Word of which it is said, ‘In the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God (Jn: 1:1). For 
when we utter something true, that is when we utter what we know, a word is necessarily born from the 
knowledge which we hold in the memory, a word which is absolutely the same kind of thing as the 
knowledge it is born from. It is the thought formed from the thing we know that is the word we utter in the 
heart, a word that is neither Greek nor Latin nor any other language…56 
He continues exploring the nature of the procession of the word for a number of pages. The 
following section on the inner word is perhaps one of the most illuminating in the course of the 
psychological analogy’s history. It captures what, for Augustine, Thomas, and Lonergan, is the 
true meaning and the centerpiece of the psychological analogy because it accentuates the total, 
intelligible, conscious dependence of the word on understanding: 
All these things then that the human consciousness knows by perceiving them through 
itself or through the senses of its body or through the testimony of others, it holds onto 
where they are stacked away in the treasury of memory. From them is begotten [gignitur] a 
true word when we utter what we know, but a word before any sound, before any 
thought of sound [quod scimus loquimur; de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur; qui quod scit 
loquitur]. For it is then that the word is most like the thing known [verbum simillium rei notae], 
and most its image [imago eius], because the seeing which is thought springs [exoritur] direct 
from the seeing which is knowledge, and it is a word of no language [linguae nullius], a true 
word from a true thing [verbum verum de re vera], having nothing from itself, but everything from that 
knowledge from which it is born [nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur]. And it 
makes no difference when the man who utters what he knows learnt it – sometimes he 
utters it as soon as he learns it – provided it is a true word, that is one that has arisen from 
things known [dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de notis rebus exortum].57  
 Thomas makes similar observations in the Summa. For example, in the question on the 
name of “Word,” after quoting from Book 15 of De Trinitate, he writes, “The concept itself of the 
heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself – namely, from the 
                                                
56 Augustine, De trinitate, 15.10.19-15.11.20 (Hill, 409-11; emphasis added). 
57 Augustine, De trinitate, 15.12.22 (Hill, 413-14; emphasis added).  
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knowledge of the one conceiving.”58 Lonergan summarizes the significance of this passage and 
what it tells us about the inner word in the introduction to Verbum: 
In this passage, then, the Augustinian verbum is a nonlinguistic utterance of truth. It differs 
from expression in any language for it is linguae nullius. It is not primitive but derived: 
gignitur, exoritur, nascitur. Its dependence is total: nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de 
qua nascitur. This total dependence is, not blind or automatic, but conscious and cognitive: 
quod scimus loquimur; de vision scientiae visio cognitationis exoritur; qui quod scit loquitur. Finally, this 
total dependence as conscious and known is the essential point. It makes no difference 
whether the verbum has its ground in memory or in recently acquired knowledge. What 
counts is its truth, its correspondence with things as known: verbum simillium rei notae; imago 
eius; verbum verum de re vera; nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur; dum tamen 
verbum sit verum, id est, de notis rebus exortum.59 
 Finally, at the very end of Book 15, just before Augustine offers his closing prayer, he 
gestures at an analogous understanding of the procession of the Holy Spirit that helps to 
intelligibly differentiate it from the procession of the Son. While Augustine is modest in his 
explanation, it is a significant contribution the trinitarian theology, for he “gives us the only 
analogy for the Holy Spirit that has made much headway in theology, namely, the analogy of 
proceeding love.”60 Augustine writes: 
So then, you [o my soul] have seen many true things, and distinguished between them 
and the light by which you have seen them. Lift up your eyes to that light and fix them on 
that if you can. Thus you will see how the birth of the Word of God differs from the procession of the 
gift of God. …But you are unable to fix your gaze there in order to observe this clearly and 
distinctly. …I am telling [the truth] to myself, I know what I cannot do. However, this 
same light has shown you those three things in yourself, in which you can recognize 
yourself as the image of that supreme trinity on which you are not yet capable of fixing 
your eyes in contemplation. It has shown you that there is a true word in you when it is 
begotten of your knowledge, that is when we utter what we know…provided our thought 
is formed from what we know, and the image in thinking [is most similar to that thought] 
already contained in memory [sitque in acie cogitantis imago simillima cognitionis eius quam 
memoria continebat], with will or love as the third element joining these two together as 
parent and offspring. That this will proceeds from [thought] [Quam quidem uoluntatem de 
cognitione procedere] – for no one wants anything if he is totally unaware of what it is, or 
what sort of thing it is – and yet that it is not itself an image of [the thought] [non tamen esse 
cognitionis imaginem], and that thus in this intelligible case there is suggested a certain difference between 
                                                
58 ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1c. Thomas is quoting Augustine, De trinitate, 15.10.19. 
59 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 7-8. 
60 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 122. Crowe continues, “One can hardly even speak of 
forerunners in this question.” 
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birth and procession, because to observe by thought is not the same thing as to desire or even to enjoy by 
will…61 
While many scholars overlook Augustine’s final return to the question of the Holy Spirit’s 
procession62, Thomas takes up this distinction between the processions of word and love, in which 
the former involves the production of an image, but the latter does not. Instead, the latter involves 
desire or even enjoyment.  
 In closing, developments in Thomas’s thinking on these two fronts – from conceiving the 
divine processions in terms of the self-diffusiveness of the good to conceiving them in terms of 
Augustine’s analogy, and from understanding that Augustine’s analogy was based on the two 
processions – helped him recognize that the decisive issue was to bring together the analogical 
relationship of word and love with conformation of the mind to God.	63 The reason, as we will see, 
is because the same operations that provide the analogy for the processions are the very same 
operations that can make us more like God.  
3.2 The Psychological Analogy for the Trinity in the Summa Theologiae 
We have now explored the natural analogues of word and love as well as the development of 
Thomas’s trinitarian theology. This latter element included a more detailed account of 
Augustine’s De Trinitate. It is now time examine how Thomas applied the natural analogues to 
trinitarian theology.  
 The first trinitarian question Thomas asks in the Summa is whether there is procession in 
God – not, importantly, whether the Son proceeds from the Father. This is because he has 
realized that we must first form a concept of procession in order to form a concept of relation, 
                                                
61 Augustine, De trinitate, 15.27.50 (Hill, 434-35; emphasis added). I have altered Hill’s translation slightly. 
He uses “awareness” where I have used “thought,” by which I mean thought in relation to knowledge or 
understanding. See the brackets. 
62 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 34. See also Ormerod, “Augustine and the Trinity: Whose Crisis?” 
63 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 132-40, 147 (on these developments as occurring in De veritate) and 
157-58, 184-88, 208-09, and esp. 217-221 (on these development maturing in the Summa theologiae). 
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which in turn is necessary in order to form a concept of person. I will discuss concept formation 
further in Chapter 6 when considering Thomas’s pedagogy in relation to his trinitarian theology. 
For now, keep in mind that Chapters 3 and 4 considered the processions of word and love in 
detail, which included considering the relations between the act of understanding, the word, and 
the act of love in terms of principles and terms/dependents. Thus, we considered the relation of 
the speaker to the word, and vice versa, as well as the relation of the speaker and word to the act 
of love, and vice versa. Those chapters also attended to why, specifically, spiritual processions are 
relevant to understanding the trinitarian processions. In this way, we have already sufficiently 
considered the question, Whether there is procession in God? We are now applying those 
concepts analogically to understand the Father, Son, and Spirit. Thus, while I do not follow 
Questions 27-43 in precise order in what follows, I have attempted to present in an orderly 
fashion the concepts necessary to draw the following conclusions.  
3.2.1 The Analogues for the Father and Son 
The analogue for the Father is Dicere (or Intelligere Dicens, Intelligere ut Dicere), which denotes 
intelligere’s specific ordination to the word. Recall that the act of understanding has a twofold 
ordering: to its object and to its word. Thomas distinguishes these two aspects of understanding in 
terms of “intelligere” and “dicere,” respectively. Lamenting the lack of suitable language to express 
the procession of the Holy Spirit, Thomas explains how fitting the language regarding 
“understanding” is for expressing the first procession: 
As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of 
the one who understands the object understood, as appears in the word ‘to understand’ 
[intelligere]; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception—
namely, ‘to speak’ [dicere], and ‘word’ [verbum]. Hence in God, ‘to understand’ is applied only 
to the essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas ‘Word’ 
is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term ‘to speak’ is a notional term 
as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself.64  
                                                
64 ST Ia, q. 37, a. 1c. 
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The analogue “dicere” is appropriate for the Father because the Father is really identical with the 
divine essence, which is really identical with the unrestricted act of understanding65 (as are all the 
divine Persons), and at the same time he is really distinct from the divine Word. In other words, 
the two aspects of the act of understanding correspond to the distinction in trinitarian theology 
between intelligere as an essential act and dicere as a notional, proper act.66 Essential understanding 
is the divine act of understanding (Ipsum Intelligere) ordered to its object (divine goodness), in which 
all the Persons share equally. Notional understanding is the act of understanding ordered to its 
word (Dicere), and belongs only to the Father.67  
 Of the Father’s identity with Ipsum Intelligere as Dicens, Crowe offers a helpful analogy: 
The Dicens is God for he is the divine intelligere. …Think of a great orator, someone 
speaking with the resources of full understanding; think of a grave judge handing down a 
decision with all the weight of a secure grasp of the evidence. …Then you will have a 
meaningful analogy for the God who, as Dicens in eternity, utters a Word from the infinite 
depths of understanding.68 
If we look at Question 33 on the Person of the Father, we find that with Augustine, Thomas refers 
to the Father as the “principle” of the whole Deity. This term is meant only to signify whence 
another proceeds, and “as the Father then is the one whence another proceeds, it follows that the 
Father is a principle.”69 Thomas explains that “principle” is a wider term than “cause,” which is 
important because as was discussed in Chapter 3, what is significant in the psychological analogy 
is that the word is because of the act of understanding, not that the act of understanding is the 
efficient cause of the word. The term “principle” captures the fact that the word is because of 
understanding – that the word proceeds from understanding.70 Thomas writes: 
                                                
65 See ST Ia, q. 14, a. 4c. 
66 See ST Ia, q. 41. See also Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 118-
19. 
67 On all that is spoken in the eternal Word, see ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3. I will return to this passage below. 
68 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 147. 
69 ST Ia, q. 33, a. 1c.  
70 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 133-48 and 205-07. 
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Hence this term ‘cause’ seems to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one 
from another; which is not implied in the word ‘principle.’ For in all kinds of causes there 
is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or power: 
whereas we use the term ‘principle’ even in things which have no such difference, but 
have only a certain order to each other.71 
Furthermore, principle does not signify priority—either with respect to existence in time (as if the 
Father existed before the Son and Spirit) which would imply subordinationism, or logically (as if 
we have to conceive the Father before we conceive the Son and Spirit) which would be to 
conceive the persons apart from their relations, or in terms of honor—as if the Father is superior 
or more important. Rather, principle signifies origin.72 Thus, the Father is not prior to the Son or 
the Spirit, but is the origin of the Son and the co-principle (origin) of the Spirit.  
 The analogue for the Son is “Verbum,” which denotes the word’s dependence on intelligere 
ut dicere / intelligere dicens. Thomas expresses this dependence in one of the questions on the name 
of the second Person, quoting from Book 15 of De Trinitate before providing his own explanation: 
The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other 
than itself – namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence ‘Word,’ according 
as we use the term strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which 
belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are 
distinguished by origin. Hence the term ‘Word,’ according as we use the term strictly of 
God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally.73 
As with the Father, the Word is also really identical with the divine essence and thus, the divine 
act of understanding. Thomas writes of the identity of the Word and the divine essence in the 
Contra Gentiles: 
Since in God, therefore, being and understanding are identical, the intention understood 
in Him is His very intellect. And because understanding in Him is the thing understood (for by 
understanding Himself He understands all other things, as was shown in Book I), it follows that in 
                                                
71 ST Ia, q. 33, a. 1c (emphasis added). See also ad. 1. 
72 ST Ia, q. 33, a. 1 ad 3. This is significant for Thomas’s approach to the crux trinitatis, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
73 ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1c (emphasis added). Thomas is quoting De trinitate, 15.10.19. See also ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 
2: “Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone, for word 
alone signifies that which emanates from another…when we say that the word is knowledge, the term 
knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the 
intellect conceives by knowing…in the same way it can be called ‘begotten knowledge.’” 
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God, because He understands Himself, the intellect, the thing understood, and the 
intention understood are all identical….the being of the Word interiorly conceived, or intention 
understood, is the very act of being understood. Therefore, the being of the divine Word is identical with 
that of the divine intellect and, consequently, with that of God, who is His own intellect.74  
In the Summa, Thomas explains the way in which the Word is intelligent: 
[T]o be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, 
since to understand is said of God essentially, as was stated above. Now the Son is God 
begotten, and not God begetting; and hence he is intelligent, not as producing a word, but as the 
Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the 
divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.75  
Where the Father is intelligent as speaking the Word, the Word is intelligent as proceeding 
because of understanding (in other words, as emanating intellectually from understanding). Crowe 
again offers a helpful analogy for the Son’s identity with Ipsum Intelligere as Verbum. He writes: 
The Verbum is God. …God’s thought about God is not merely about God, it is God. When 
you think of the Word in God, therefore, begin with some great book that has swept you 
off your feet so that you had to say, ‘Here is truth, deep, penetrating, thrilling truth.’ 
…Then think of Christ as he in whom ‘lie hidden all God’s treasures of wisdom and 
knowledge’ (Col. 2:3), not now as the one speaking but as the Word containing this wisdom spoken 
into the world…Then you will have an analogy for the Word uttered eternally by God as 
Dicens, the Word of infinite Truth who is himself God.76 
 However, this same identity is not true of us because our word and the second act 
(concipere/iudicare) are distinct from the act of understanding from which they proceed. In other 
words, “In us, there are two acts, first, an act of understanding, secondly, a really distinct act of 
defining or judging.”77 (What Lonergan here calls “defining” is not the same as what he calls 
“dicrere”; it is, rather, what I have called “concipere.”) Even though our word is a similitude of the 
thing known and the self-expression of understanding, it is still distinct from both. Herein lies one 
of the ways in which the analogy falls short—the distinction of acts (intelligere and concipere) is not 
                                                
74 SCG 4, c. 11, §§7, 11 (emphasis added). See also De Pot., q. 8, a. 1c. 
75 ST Ia, q. 34, a. 2 ad 4. See also SCG 4, c. 26 §5. 
76 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 147-48 (internal citations omitted, emphasis original). 
77 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 206.  
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relevant since in God there is but one infinite act. Thomas explains this shortcoming in the Summa 
Contra Gentiles and in the De potentia.78 
 However, despite this dissimilarity, Thomas came to understand that “the ‘content’ (so to 
speak) of the inner word is increasingly perfectly identical to the ‘content’ of the act of 
understanding so that, in the limit, there is a coincidence between principle and term.”79 Thus, in 
Question 27, Thomas assigns the reason for this difference between conception in us and 
conception in God:  
[W]hatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, 
the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it 
proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the 
intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the 
very act of understanding is made one with the object understood.80 
 Distinction of acts is not necessary to intellectual emanation. If the act of understanding 
from which the inner word proceeds is perfect (as it is in God), then Speaker and the Word are 
perfectly one, while remaining distinct because one originates from the other. As Lonergan 
explains, “[I]n perfect intellectual reflection principle and term are identical without an 
elimination of the reflection and so without an elimination of the procession.”81 Thus, Thomas 
does not mean Speaker and Word are absolutely identical—they are still two distinct Persons. 
Rather, Thomas means “that there can be processio intelligibilis without absolute diversity, indeed 
that the more perfect the processio intelligibilis is, the greater the approach to identity.”82  
In us, this closeness in identity occurs most perfectly when we are reflecting upon our own 
mind. In that case, not only is the content of our word (the proceeding term) close to the content 
of our act of understanding (the principle) since the former is always a reflection upon the act of 
                                                
78 See SCG 4, c. 11, §11; De Pot., q. 8, a. 1c. Cf. the more succinct treatment in the Summa: ST Ia, q. 34, a. 2 
ad 1.  
79 Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 113. 
80 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1 ad 2. 
81 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 206.  
82 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 207. 
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understanding itself83, but the content of our word is also most like its source in this particular case 
because it is a word about the very mind from which it proceeds. However, this reflection never 
reaches the perfect identity that belongs to God alone because our intellect and its act (and 
therefore its proceeding word) are irreducibly distinct.84 
 What the foregoing amounts to is that while in us there are two aspects to the procession 
of an inner word—the productive aspect (dicere produces a verbum, which is the procession of the 
word as a processio operati) and the intelligible aspect (the verbum is because of dicere, which is the 
procession of the word as a processio intelligibilis)—only the latter is relevant to trinitarian theology 
because the productive aspect does not apply to God; the procession of the Word in God is 
different. It is not a processio operati, but per modum processio operati.85 It cannot be a processio operati per 
se because God is one infinite act. Therefore, the procession of an act from an act becomes 
irrelevant. As Lonergan writes,  
In us inner word proceeds from act of understanding by a processio intelligibilis that is also a 
processio operati, for our inner word and act of understanding are two absolute entities really 
distinct. In God inner word proceeds from act of understanding as uttering by a processio 
intelligibilis that is not a processio operati, at least inasmuch as divine understanding and 
divine Word are not two absolute entities really distinct.86 
To summarize, in the analogy as predicated of God, the Word is identical to the divine essence 
but distinct from the Father (Dicere) [who is also identical to the divine essence] because of the 
Word’s real relation of conscious, intelligible dependence on the Speaking. Even though the 
Speaking and Word are both identical to the divine essence, Thomas argues they are not 
therefore identical to each other. Responding to the argument, “It would seem that the divine 
relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the 
                                                
83 This closeness is the reason we have such difficulty differentiate the two acts (understanding and 
conceptualization judgment) in our consciousness.  
84 See SCG 4, c. 11, §5. 
85 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 145-179. 
86 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 207-08. 
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same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine 
essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other,” Thomas writes: 
According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are 
identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and 
logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. 
Hence…although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; 
nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. 
Hence they are distinguished from each other.87 
In other words, while paternity and filiation (the Father and the Son, respectively) are really 
identical to the divine essence, they are “logically” different from one another, and therefore not 
identical to one another. Their logical difference is that they are mutually opposed relations of 
origin.88 In other words, the Father and the Son are relative realities, unlike the tunic and 
garment which are the same piece of cloth and therefore identical with each other, differing only 
in name. Relative realities are really distinct from one another when they are mutually opposed. 
3.2.2 The Analogue for the Holy Spirit 
Turning to the second procession, the analogue for the Holy Spirit is Amor procedens, which denotes 
love’s dependence on intelligere ut dicere and the verbum. Amor procedens is notionally distinct from 
divine essential love and really distinct from the divine Dicere and Verbum. The relation of 
proceeding love to essential love is approximately parallel to the relation of Dicere (speaking) to 
essential Intelligere (understanding). However, the order is reversed. As Wilkins explains: 
The act of understanding and the act of love both regard an object, and in this respect 
both are considered essential acts in God. But the act of understanding also is the principle 
of the (in God notionally distinct) act of conception, and in this respect it provides the 
analogue for the Father, dicens. In its relevant aspect, the act of love, conversely, is 
intelligibly dependent on the apprehension and affirmation of the good – that is, on intelligere 
ut dicere and verbum. It is in this latter respect that the act of love provides an analogue for 
the Holy Spirit, amor procedens.89 
                                                
87 ST Ia, q. 28, a. 3 arg. 1 and ad. 1 (emphasis added). 
88 See Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 152-53. 
89 Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 119-20. 
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Whereas with the first procession, the two aspects of the act of understanding are readily 
distinguished through the vocabulary of intelligere and dicere, the same is not true of the two aspects 
of the act of love. Given the “poverty of vocabulary” Thomas distinguishes these two aspects by 
naming them “to love” (diligere) and “love proceeding” (amor procedens). He writes: 
It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, ‘love’ 
and ‘to love’ [amor et diligere] are said of the essence, as ‘understanding’ and ‘to 
understand’; but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the relation 
to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love, and ‘vice versa,’ so that by ‘love’ 
[amorem] is understood the ‘love proceeding’ [amor procedens], and by ‘to love’ [diligere] is 
understood ‘the spiration of the love proceeding’ [spirare amorem procedentem] in that sense 
‘love’ is the name of the person and ‘to love’ is a notional term, as ‘to speak’ and ‘to 
beget.’90 
Thus, with respect to the analogues for the Father and the Holy Spirit in relation to essential acts: 
Intelligere : Dicere :: Diligere/Amare : Amor Procedens 
 
However, whereas Intelligere ut Dicere is the principle of the Verbum, Diligere ut Amor Procedens is 
dependent on Intelligere ut Dicere and Verbum: 
Table 13 
Further, what matters with respect to both of these acts (Intelligere and Diligere/Amare) is that they 
each have a precise relational aspect, and it is their relational aspect that makes them relevant to 
trinitarian theology.92 As Wilkins explains: 
                                                
90 ST Ia, q. 37, a. 1. 
91 I have reversed the direction of this arrow to emphasize the dependence of Amor procedences on Intelligere ut 
Dicere and Verbum. Ultimately, the reversal of the arrow foreshadows one of the main points of Chapter 6, 
in which I argue for a transposition of passive spiration as “Holy Listening,” following Lonergan. See 
Chapter 6, §5.1 The Holy Spirit as Divine Personal Listening and God as Conversational. 
92 Technically, intelligere is related both to the intelligible species from which it proceeds and the word it 
speaks, and amare is related both to the word and understanding from which it proceeds and the actions 
that follow. With respect to intelligere only the relation to the word is relevant because the other relation is 
a processio operationis. With respect to amare, only the relation to the word and understanding is relevant 
because the other relation is one that proceeds to an exterior effect (it does not remain within).  
Intelligere ut Dicere à Verbum 
& 
Diligere/Amare ut Amor Procedens ß Intelligere ut Dicere and Verbum91 
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Just as the Father is conceived as ‘intelligere’ only in its precise relational aspect of grounding as 
‘dicere’, that is, as grounding the procession of the Word, so too the Spirit is conceived as 
‘amare’, ‘actus amandi’, only in its precise relational sense as proceeding from the intellectual 
apprehension and affirmation of the good. As ‘dicere’ is really identical to ‘intelligere’ but really 
distinct from ‘verbum’, so ‘amor procedens’ is really identical to ‘amare’ but really distinct from the 
intellectual apprehension and affirmation of the good on which it is intelligibly dependent.93 
In symbolic- and picture-form: 
 
Dicere = Intelligere as ground but Dicere ≠ Verbum 
 
 
 
(Dicere is Intelligere as the principle of Verbum) 
& 
Amor Procedens ≠ Intelligere ut Dicere and Verbum but Amor Procedens = Diligere/Amare as 
principled 
 
(Amor Procedens is Amare as dependent on Intelligere ut Dicere and Verbum) 
Table 14 
To put this in traditional trinitarian terms, the Father conceived as Dicere is notionally 
distinguished from essential understanding (Ipsum Intelligere), and really distinguished from the 
Verbum and Amor Procedens.94  Similarly, the Holy Spirit conceived as Amor Procedens is notionally 
distinguished from essential love (Ipsum Diligere/Amare), and really distinguished from Dicere and the 
Verbum. As Thomas writes: 
[W]e must say that since in God ‘to love’ [diligere] is taken in two ways, essentially and 
notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each 
other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence. …But when the term Love [diligere] is 
taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than ‘to spirate love’ [spirare amorem]; just as 
to speak [dicere] is to produce a word [verbum], and to flower is to produce flowers. As 
therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the 
Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son 
love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding.95 
 We have seen that it is not just any word that proceeds that is relevant for the analogical 
conception of the divine processions. It is only the word that spirates love. This brings us back to a 
                                                
93 Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 120 (emphasis added). 
94 See ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3. 
95 See ST Ia, 37, a. 2.  
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point made in the previous section on Thomas’s development. While Thomas gradually 
eliminated the model of the self-diffusiveness of the good from his conception of the divine 
processions, the Good remained important because the divine processions were conceived on the 
analogy of a “conversation” about the divine Good in which the Good is known and loved in the 
processions of word and love. Given that it is only “the word that breaks forth into love” that is 
relevant to trinitarian theology, which means that it is a word that expresses the affirmation of the 
good, the psychological analogy “is really based on the dynamic apprehension of divine goodness. 
…It is the divine being as true and lovable which constitutes the formal object of the processions 
as conceived on the hypothesis of intelligible emanations.”96 Of this divine conversation about the 
divine Good, Thomas writes: 
As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, 
unless considered as the object of the will. Thus, as the divine processions must be 
denominated from certain actions; no other processions can be understood in God 
according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love, 
according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and goodness.97 
Further, this conversation is ordered – love proceeds from the word and understanding as 
speaking – and this ordering is what provides, as we have seen, the relational aspect of 
diligere/amare.  
 Before proceeding to synthesize the foregoing, Crowe helpfully brings together the three 
analogues for the divine Persons, specifying where the analogy works and where it falls short: 
[T]he intelligere, verbum, and amor in us become ipsum intelligere divinum, ipse veritas divina, and 
ipse amor divinus in God. But the three acts in us are not just three acts, they are joined to 
one another by rationality, by processions, by origins; the intelligere is intelligere dicens verbum, 
the verbum is veritas dicta, the amor is amor procedens. …So in God too the intelligere is not 
simply Intelligere, but Intelligere dicens Verbum, the Verbum is not simply Veritas but Veritas dicta, 
the Amor is not simply Amor but Amor procedens, spiratus. There is an Amor that is because of 
a Verbum, and a Verbum that is because of an Intelligere dicens, and a Dicens that is the ground 
of the Verbum and the resulting Amor. …Although the three acts of understanding, word, 
and love in us become infinite in the transfer to God and so become identically one with 
the divine essence and with one another, still the distinction of principle and term 
                                                
96 Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 118.  
97 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 5 ad 2. See also ST Ia, q. 14, aa. 1-4; q. 19, a. 2 ad 1; q. 20, a. 1 ad 3. 
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remains. …the higher the nature, the nearer identity the principle and term are, though 
the procession remains real; what we project to is the divine procession where principle 
and term, Dicens and Verbum are one God, one essence, one eternity, and yet the 
procession is real, ‘realer’ we might say than any procession on earth. Our three acts as 
acts become on Act in God, but the emanatio intelligibilis remains.98 
Here, Crowe is making the same point (and extending it to the third Person) made above when 
we distinguished between a processio operati and a processio intelligibilis. What is relevant for the 
psychological analogy is (1) that our intelligent speaking, word, and loving are related by spiritual 
processions; and (2) in God, the identity of principle and term does not amount to absolute 
identity of the three Persons (as is the case in modalism) because this identity is present without 
the elimination of reflection, and so without the elimination of spiritual processions. The identity 
is in the essence, and again, while each Person is identical to the divine essence, each person is 
also a “relative reality” such that each is really distinct from the other according to relations of 
mutual opposition. 
 To bring the foregoing together in terms of the psychological analogy that conceives the 
divine processions in terms of a “conversation” about the divine Good, we can say that the Father 
is God in a manner analogous to the grasp of sufficient evidence that necessitates one to judge. 
The Son is God in the same divine act of loving understanding, but he is the act of loving 
understanding in a manner analogous to the dependence of the judgment on the grasp of 
sufficient evidence. The Spirit is the same act of loving understanding in a third manner, but as 
the dependence of the act of love on the grasp of sufficient evidence and the rational affirmation. 
The same act of loving understanding is had differently by three Persons.99 I will now draw 
together what we have considered regarding the analogues for the three Persons together with the 
traditional vocabulary used in trinitarian theology.  
                                                
98 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 147, 149. 
99 See Bernard Lonergan, “Consciousness and the Trinity,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964. 
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 6, eds. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and 
Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 135. 
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3.2.3 Processions, Relations, and Persons 
‘Procession’ signifies the origin of one thing from another.100 Explaining specifically what kind of 
procession we understand to exist in God, Thomas writes: 
Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to 
local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for 
instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by 
way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds 
from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands 
procession as existing in God.101 
Thus, we must conceive procession in God as intellectual emanations. We cannot know with 
certainty that the processions in God are intellectual emanations, but we find that intellectual 
emanations—which we experience in ourselves—are the best analogy we have for divine 
processions for the reasons already discussed in Chapter 3 and reviewed in this chapter. Again, we 
cannot confirm that divine processions are intellectual emanations because that would require 
understanding the divine essence, which in this life is unknowable.  
 There are two processions in God: generation and spiration.102 Generation signifies the 
origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle when that being proceeds by way of 
similitude in the same specific nature.103 As a concept proceeds as likeness of the thing understood 
from an act of understanding (and understanding is a vital operation),104 the procession of the 
Word from the Speaker is generation. There is also another related, yet distinct procession. 
Thomas writes, “The operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession, that 
of love, whereby the [beloved – amatum] is in the lover; as, by the conception of the word, the 
object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent.”105 Further, as “the will is made actual, 
                                                
100 See ST Ia, q. 27, prol. 
101 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1c. 
102 See ST Ia, q. 27, a. 4 ad 3.  
103 See ST Ia, q. 27, a. 2c. 
104 See ST Ia, q. 18, a. 2. 
105 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 3c. See also Comp. theol., c. 49: “We should recall that the act of understanding proceeds 
from the intellectual power of the mind. When the intellect actually understands, the object it 
understands is in it. The presence of the object known in the knower results from the intellectual power of 
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not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the 
thing willed…by way of impulse and movement toward an object,”106 the procession of Love from 
the Speaker and the Word is spiration, a term Thomas settles on due to “poverty of our 
vocabulary.”107 As Thomas explains, we need not go on to infinitude in the divine processions, 
“for the procession which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in 
the procession of the will.”108 Instead, there are two and only two processions, which are 
intelligible based on the analogy of spiritual processions.  
 We have already seen that these two processions are ordered to one another in us. The 
same is true of God, even though in God “will and intellect are not diverse.”109 The processions 
still occur in due order. As Thomas writes, “so, although in God the will and the intellect are the 
same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of 
the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of 
the Word in God.”110 As was explained in Chapter 4, even when the priority of love over 
knowledge is recognized and a transposition from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis is 
made, the explanation of the processions and their order according to the psychological analogy 
does not change. The reason, as Wilkins explains, is that the analogical conception of the divine 
Persons does not depend on the metaphysical distinction of intellect and will.111 All that is relevant 
                                                                                                                                            
the mind, and is its word, as we said above. Likewise, what is loved is in the lover, when it is actually 
loved. The fact that an object is actually loved, results from the lover’s power to love and from the lovable 
good as actually known. Accordingly the presence of the beloved object in the lover is brought about by 
two factors: the appetitive principle and the intelligible object as apprehended, that is, the word 
conceived about the lovable object. Therefore, since the Word in God who knows and loves Himself is 
the Son, and since He to whom the Word belongs is the Father of the Word, as is clear from our 
exposition, the necessary consequence is that the Holy Spirit, who pertains to the love whereby God is in 
Himself as beloved in lover, proceeds from the Father and the Son. And so we say in the Creed: ‘Who 
proceeds from the Father and the Son.’” 
106 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 4c. 
107 ST Ia, q. 37, a. 1. See also ST Ia, q. 27, a. 4 ad 3.  
108 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 3c. See also SCG 4, c. 26, §§2-3. 
109 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 3 ad 3. 
110 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 3 ad 3. See also ST Ia, q. 27, a. 4 ad 1.  
111 See Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 108-09. Note that the 
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is the conscious, intelligible dependence of love on word and understanding, and of word on 
understanding.  
 These two processions establish four real relations, three of which are really distinct. In 
the order of our concepts as they develop, relations are consequent upon processions.112 For 
example, when arguing that there are four and only four real relations in God, Thomas writes, 
“According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double 
and half; or on action and passion. 
…Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions 
according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in God.”113 The relevant 
feature of this passage is that Thomas is explaining that we understand relations based on one of 
three things, and since in God, only one particular kind of these things exists—internal 
processions, which are “actions”—we conceive relations based on our conception of these internal 
processions. Just as the processions of word and love are conscious, so too are the relations they 
establish. Thus, we conceive relations as the conscious order one thing has to another. Thomas 
continues, “In respect of each of these processions [generation and spiration], two opposite 
relations arise; one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other 
is the relation of the principle Himself.”114  
 Intelligere is really ordered to the utterance of an inner word; it is really oriented to its own 
self-expression. Further, the verbum really proceeds from intelligere ut dicere. As Crowe writes, “as 
                                                                                                                                            
distinction between intellect and will in God is only rational, not real. As Thomas writes, “It may be that 
this different mode of procession whereby the Son is said to proceed by way of intellect, and the Holy 
Spirit by way of will, does not suffice for a personal distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son, since 
in God will and intellect are not really distinct. If, however, it be granted that this suffices to make a 
distinction between them, it is clear that each is distinct from the Father by a relation, in that one of them 
proceeds from the Father by generation, the other by spiration, and these relations constitute their 
Persons” (De pot., q. 9, a. 4 ad 15). 
112 As will be discussed in the next chapter, this is exclusively an ordering of our ideas, as processions and 
relations in God are simultaneous and identical, as there is no priority or posteriority in God.  
113 ST Ia, q. 28, a. 4c. 
114 ST Ia, q. 28, a. 4c. 
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both the orientation and the procession are real, hence the principle and the term of the 
procession (Dicens and Verbum in God) are really related to one another.”115 The case is similar for 
the relations that follow upon our conception of the second procession. The spoken Verbum is 
really oriented to Love – “the will is a rational appetite, it embraces the good that is rationally 
affirmed and, by the same token, the rational affirmation looks towards the love that will proceed 
from it.”116 Again, since both the orientation and procession are real, Amor Procedens (on the one 
side) and the Verbum and Dicens (on the other side) are really related to one another. 
 Thomas argues that relations really exist in God, basing his argument on the previous 
question in which processions were conceived: 
[R]elation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to 
another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature 
are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations. 
…Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in 
the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation 
only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. 
But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the 
source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as 
the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained, these relations, 
according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.117 
The relation between the word and its source is real in us too: 
Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist 
between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not 
logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are 
real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly.118 
Further, as long as these real relations are mutually opposed, they are distinct from one 
another.119  
 Conceiving relations in the context of the psychological analogy means that just as it was 
not enough to conceive of processions as processio operati but we had to press forward to conceive of 
                                                
115 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 149. 
116 Ibid. 
117 ST Ia, q. 28, a. 1. 
118 ST Ia, q. 28, a. 1 ad 4. 
119 ST Ia, q. 28, a. 3c. 
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them as processio intelligibilis (i.e., as the procession of something consciously, intelligently, and 
intelligibly dependent on its principle), so too we must conceive of processions not simply as the 
relation of one thing to another, but as “the conscious order we experience in psychological acts.”120 
Thus, in the previous two chapters, we found that we cannot help but utter a word once we 
understand the value of something. This is a relation of conscious obligation insofar as the value 
cannot but be affirmed once the evidence for it is grasped.121 This relation is analogous to 
paternity. Second, the word of affirmation is absolutely dependent upon its origin, namely, the 
grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence. This relation is analogous to filiation. We also found that 
when the speaker spoke a word affirming the value of something, this word could not help but 
burst forth into love. This relation of the speaker and word to love is traditionally called “active 
spiration” (though Thomas usually refers to it as “common spiration” or sometimes simply 
“spiration”).122  
 It is this third relation that is not really distinct. Specifically, it is not really distinct from 
paternity and filiation. Dicens is ordered to the inner word, and it is also ordered to love when it is 
speaking a word affirming the value of something, as is the case in the divine “conversation” 
about the eternal Good. Similarly, the uttered affirmation of value (the Verbum) not only depends 
on its source, but it is also not some abstract concept. Rather, it is the “full expression” of that 
Goodness, and thus it is a Verbum oriented toward Love.123  In other words, in speaking, the 
                                                
120 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 150 (emphasis original).  
121 As an example to help the reader understand relation in terms of conscious intellectual activity, Crowe 
turns to the struggle between conscience and desire, which yields an analogy for the relation of the Word 
toward Love. He writes, “For the orientation of conscience is towards a certain conduct, towards an act 
of will (which basically is love) that should follow from the word (voice) of conscience, and in the struggle 
against desire does not so follow, at least not immediately. That orientation is real, vividly experienced, 
not a metaphysical abstraction, and gives us some idea of what it means to the eternal Word to be related 
to eternal Love” (Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 150). See also, Charles Hefling, “Quaestio 
Disputata on the (Economic) Trinity: An Argument in Conversation with Robert Doran,” Theological 
Studies 68, no. 3 (2007), 658. 
122 See ST Ia, q. 27, a. 4 ad 3 (herein, he simply refers to it as “spiration”). For his use of “common 
spiration,” see ST Ia, q. 32, a. 3; q. 33, a. 4; q. 40, a. 1.  
123 See Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 150-51. 
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Father is related to both the Son and the Spirit. Similarly, in being spoken, the Son is related to 
both the Father and the Spirit. Together, then, the Father and the Son (being ordered not only to 
one another but also to the Spirit by one and the same procession—generation) operate as one 
principle of the Spirit, which is presumably why Thomas selects the term “common spiration” to 
refer to the real (but not distinct) relation of the Father and the Son to the Spirit. The Father’s 
relation of paternity is not really distinct from his relation of active spiration, and the Son’s 
relation of filiation is not really distinct from his relation of active spiration. However, this does 
not make paternity and filiation equal to one another. The Father is related to the Spirit as the 
Speaking of the Word that breaks forth to the Love, while the Son is related to the Spirit as that 
very Word breaking forth into Love. 
 There is also a fourth relation, namely, the relation of consciousness of dependence of the 
act of love on the grasping and the affirming that acknowledge the value. This is the real and 
distinct relation of the Spirit to the Father and Son, and it is traditionally called “passive 
spiration” (though Thomas usually refers to it as “procession”). The paucity of vocabulary for the 
second procession and consequently, the two relations to which it gives rise, can be seen here. As 
Thomas writes: 
But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own; and so neither have the 
ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of the principle of this 
procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called 
procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and 
not to the relations.124 
 Notice that the third relation (active/common spiration) is a real relation, but it is not 
really distinct from paternity and filiation. It is real because the Father and the Son are really 
related to the Spirit. However, it is not distinct because their relation to the Spirit is only 
conceptually distinguishable from their mutual relations to one another. Active spiration is not 
really distinct from paternity in the Father nor from filiation in the Son because one and the same 
                                                
124 ST Ia, q. 28, a. 4c. 
  Chapter 5 – Page 313 
Speaking gives rise to the Word and Love.125 However, the Spirit’s relation to the Father and Son 
(passive spiration) is really distinct from paternity and filiation. As Lonergan explains, that there 
are four real relations, three of which are really distinct, is best understood if we understand that 
“[i]nasmuch as speaker, word, and love regard the same object, each one is really related to the 
other two by a single real relation.”126 The one object they regard is the divine Good. The one 
Speaking understands the sufficiency of the evidence for affirming the divine Good and therefore 
also for loving the divine Good. Because of the evidence understood, the Word is spoken that 
expresses the divine Good to be loved. Lastly, because of the evident goodness understood by the 
one Speaking and affirmed in the Word, Love is spirated. As Lonergan writes, “From this it is 
clear that speaker, word, and love, inasmuch as they regard one object, are related to one another 
in a single system of relations; and therefore speaker is related to both word and love by a single 
real relation, word is related to both speaker and love by a single real relation, and love is related 
to both speaker and word by a single real relation.”127 For example, the one Speaking speaks “a 
truth that is concrete and good, so that it is impossible to speak the word without by the same 
token spirating love.”128 In light of the foregoing, paternity and active spiration, while real 
relations of the one Speaking to the Word and to Love, respectively, are only conceptually distinct 
from each other because they are one by ordering. That is, paternity and active spiration 
constitute a single order and a single real relation because “the relations of speaker to word and to 
love are made one by ordering, since the one who in on word utters a true good speaks the word 
and at the same time, through the mediation of the word, spirates love.”129 Similarly, filiation and 
active spiration, while real relations of the Word to the one Speaking and to Love, are only 
conceptually distinct from each other. Again, it is because the relations of the Word to the one 
                                                
125 See Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Blessed Trinity, 151-52. 
126 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 250-51. 
127 Ibid., 250-53. 
128 Ibid., 252-53. 
129 Ibid. 
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Speaking and of the Word to Love are made one by ordering, “since in the one word there is 
spoken a true good, which as true arises from the speaker and as good is ordered to the spiration 
of love.”130 Before moving forward to discuss persons, the following diagrams developed by 
Jeremy Blackwood will help to illustrate the movement of processions and relations in the 
psychological analogy131: 
  
Figure 2  
 These three real and distinct relations are the three Persons of the divine nature. That is, 
because each relation is eternal and eternally distinct, there are three Persons sharing the one 
divine nature. Thomas’s preferred definition of “person” is taken from Boethius, “the individual 
substance [substantia] of a rational nature.”132 However, Thomas has actually implicitly substituted 
his own preferred definition of person as the term of a relation grounded in an eternal intelligent 
emanation/procession. Recall that in De Trinitate, Augustine settled on “persons” to answer the 
question, “Three what? or Three who?”133 The names “person” or “substance” were meant to 
convey not any idea of diversity, but rather, “it wished to avoid any idea of singleness; so that as 
                                                
130 Ibid. 
131 See Jeremy Blackwood, “The Trinitarian Theology of Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J. A Summary,” paper 
written for a course at Sacred Heart Seminary and School of Theology, Hales Corners, Wisconsin, 9-10. 
132 ST Ia, q. 29, a. 1. See also a. 2 in which Thomas clarifies that by “substance” he means “subsistence,” 
namely, that which exists in itself and not in another. He substitutes “subsistence” for “substance” in 
Article 3. 
133 Augustine, De trinitate, 7.4.7 (Hill, 224-26). 
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well as understanding unity in God, whereby there is said to be one being, we might also 
understand trinity, whereby there also said to be three substances or three persons.”134 Further, as 
Thomas argues, this name is fittingly applied to God—in a way more excellent than it is applied 
to creatures—because it “signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent 
individual of a rational nature.”135 More specifically, Lonergan observes, “the supreme perfection 
of a person consists in the intellectual emanations in the realms of truth and goodness…”136  
 Applied to God, the word “person” signifies “a relation as subsisting in the divine 
nature.”137 Whereas human persons are distinguished as individuals by their signate matter – e.g., 
these bones, this flesh – (as distinct from their common matter, which belongs to the definition of 
the human person), divine persons are distinguished as individuals by their subsistent relations of 
origin.138 Thomas argues that there can be only three Persons because there are only three 
mutually opposed relations of origin in God.139 Thus, paternity is the Father, filiation is the Son, 
and passive spiration (or procession, as Thomas has it) is the Holy Spirit.140 The name “Trinity” 
in God signifies this determinate number of persons.141 Strictly speaking, the word “Trinity” does 
not signify the one essence of the three persons, but rather, the number of persons of one essence. 
For this reason, we do not call the Father (or the Son, or the Spirit) the Trinity, as the Father is 
not three persons. Furthermore, “Trinity” does not express regard to another – that is, “it does 
not means the relations themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to 
each other.”142 
                                                
134 Augustine, De trinitate, 7.4.9 (Hill, 227). Cf. ST Ia, q. 29, a. 2; q. 30, a. 3. 
135 ST Ia, q. 29, a. 3c.  
136 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 320-21. 
137 ST Ia, q. 30, a. 1c. 
138 See ST Ia, q. 29, a. 4c 
139 ST Ia, q. 30, a. 2c. 
140 See ST Ia, q. 29, a. 4c; q. 30, a. 2 ad 1. 
141 See ST Ia, q. 31, a. 1c.  
142 ST Ia, q. 31, a. 1 ad 1. 
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 These Persons, as Persons, have attributes, properties, and notional acts.143 The attributes 
are divided into common (or essential), proper (or notional), and appropriated. Common 
attributes are those said of God by reason of essence, and thus are also said of each Person 
because each Person is God. Proper attributes are those that belong to one or the other divine 
Person, but not to all three. Notice that two Persons can share a proper attribute. The proper 
names of the Persons are also proper attributes. Appropriated attributes are those that are 
transferred from essential to proper attributes, but without excluding the other Persons. For 
example, we call the Son “Truth” because truth proceeds from the grasp of the sufficiency of 
evidence, even though “Truth” is an essential term in God.144 
 Personal properties are the relations reconsidered as properties (i.e., as properties of 
persons) and so conceived differently.145 As Lonergan explains, “In God, a personal property is 
that proper attribute which constitutes and distinguishes a person. But…the real divine relations 
constitute the persons and distinguish the persons constituted. Therefore, the real divine relations 
as constitutive and distinctive of the persons are personal properties.”146 We can conceive of 
relation as constitutive of a person, but we can also conceive of relation as relation (i.e., personal 
property).147 The difference is has to do with the order of our concepts, which can be either in a 
state of becoming or in a state of being. I will explore this difference in the conclusion. 
 Notional acts are the processions, but reconsidered (as acts of persons) and so conceived 
differently. The reason they are called “notional acts” is because these are the acts that designate 
the origin of one Person from another Person, and the notions, themselves, of the persons are the 
                                                
143 For the following, I rely on Lonergan’s summary in The Triune God: Systematics. He is a faithful interpreter 
of Thomas. He presents this particular material more succinctly and clearly than can be done by turning 
to Questions 33-41 of the Summa. 
144 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 350-55. 
145 See Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 31. 
146 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 366-67. 
147 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 374-75. 
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mutual relations of the Persons.148 We can conceive procession as constituting relations (and 
thereby persons) or we can conceive procession as procession (i.e., notional act). Again, the 
difference has to do with the order of our concepts. Notice that personal properties and notional 
acts are personal attributes. The personal properties are the proper divine attributes that 
constitute and distinguish a person. With respect to notional acts, as Lonergan explains, “[they] 
are the proper divine attributes expressed not by nouns but by verbs: for example, to generate, to 
be generated, to speak, to be spoken, to spirate, to be spirated, to love notionally, and to proceed 
as love.”149 The notional acts are nearly the last thing Thomas considers in the cluster of questions 
on the persons as regards each other (qq. 39-43). Questions 42 and 43 compare the persons to one 
another with regard to equality and likeness (q. 42) and to mission (q. 43). The previous three 
questions compared them to each other by way of the essence, properties, and notional acts, 
respectively (qq. 39-41). We have considered their equality and likeness to some extent in these 
sections insofar as we have considered how each person is the divine essence, even while they 
share in it distinctly. Before proceeding to consider the divine missions, it will be helpful to bring 
together in the chart below the various terms used in this section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
148 ST Ia, q. 41, a. 1 ad 2. 
149 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 368-69. 
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Procession 
R
elation 
Person 
Essential 
A
ttribute 
Proper 
A
ttribute 
A
ppropriated 
A
ttribute 
 Essential A
ct 
Personal 
Property 
N
otional A
ct 
Father 
Son 
Spirit 
To 
understand 
(Intelligere) 
      ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
To speak 
(Dicere) 
        ✓ ✓   
To be 
spoken 
(Dici) 
        ✓  ✓  
To love 
(Amare/ 
Diligere) 
      ✓150   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
To love as 
spirating 
(Spirare) 
        ✓ ✓ ✓  
To love as 
Amor 
procedens 
        ✓   ✓ 
Generation ✓            
Procession 
(Spiration) 
✓            
Innascibility     ✓     ✓   
Paternity  ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓  ✓   
Filiation  ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓   ✓  
Active 
Spiration 
 ✓   ✓   ✓  ✓ ✓  
(Passive) 
Spiration 
 ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓    ✓ 
Father   ✓          
Son   ✓          
Spirit   ✓          
Unbegotten     ✓     ✓   
Truth    ✓  ✓     ✓  
Image     ✓      ✓  
Word     ✓      ✓  
Holy     ✓       ✓ 
Love     ✓       ✓ 
Gift     ✓       ✓ 
Table 15 
                                                
150 Technically, intelligere and amare are one in the same act in God, and so it is better to speak of God as the 
infinite act of Understanding Love. Thus, intelligere and amare are different ways of speaking about the 
same reality; they are conceptually distinct, but not really distinct. I do not mean to imply that there are 
two essential acts in God. I include both intelligere and amare in order to express that dicere and amor 
procedens are distinct from them, respectively.   
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4. The Divine Missions and the Indwelling of the Trinity: The Cause of the 
Trinification of the Imago 
We now arrive at the point of considering the trinification of the human person and 
understanding how Thomas came to present the very same operations as providing both the 
analogy for the divine conception of the processions and the explanation for the mode of divine 
indwelling in the human person. The focus will be on the connection between questions 43 and 
93, as well as a few other related texts, namely, Questions 8, 12, 33, 35, and 38. The process of 
trinification is linked to the indwelling of the Trinity brought about by the divine missions.  
 Recall that recent scholarship has been retrieving Thomas’s understanding of 
sanctification as deification.151 As Spezzano explains, “Thomas’ primary definition of grace in the 
Summa – as a created habitus that is a ‘participation in the divine nature’ (cf. 2 Pet. 1:4) – is one 
indication that he thinks of this process as deification.”152 Our understanding of this process is 
enriched when we understand that since God is triune, God communicates Godself to the human 
person as triune, and so the deification of the human person is really her trinification. This 
suggestion is consistent with the closing articles of Question 93 in which Thomas discusses 
specifically the perfection of the image of the Trinity.  The progressive perfection of the image of 
the Trinity is the trinification of the human person.  
 Thomas emphasizes the trinitarian order of grace. As Wilkins explains, “When Thomas 
says that ‘grace is the effect of God’s love in us’ [Super Ioannem, c. 15, lect. 2, n. 1998], his meaning 
is trinitarian, because divine love is ordered in a trinitarian way: gratia gratum faciens [the grace that 
makes one pleasing] is the effect of the indwelling Spirit who proceeds as love from the Word,”153 
and who proceeds from the Father. Thomas’s understanding of grace connects the Trinity, the 
divine missions, and the perfection of the imago Trinitatis in us: the divine missions communicate to 
                                                
151 See above, §2. Introduction: Analogy, Image, and Trinification. 
152 Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 3. 
153 Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions,” 693. 
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us a share in the trinitarian life of God, and it is because the human mind is a mirror reflecting the 
Trinity that we can come to fruitfully yet imperfectly understand the Trinity in which we believe 
but do not see.154 Thomas’s integrative account was made possible by the developments in his 
theory of the divine processions.  
 It will be helpful to add a few preliminary notes about the relationship between Question 
43 and Question 93. As Merriell underscores, Thomas “does not mention the image in his 
treatment of the indwelling, and vice verse,”155 and Merriell therefore argues that Thomas does 
not explicitly connect these two doctrines. However, an explicit connection between his teachings 
on the missions (q. 43) and on the image (q. 93) does not have to depend on the use of the same 
terms.156 Spezzano offers an insightful analysis of their connection. She begins with what we have 
identified as the trinitarian order of grace: 
Question 43, on the missions, is the Trinitarian foundation of Thomas’s treatment of the 
sanctification of the rational creature, by the grace of the Holy Spirit given through the 
Son in his visible mission. In q43 this sanctification is treated from the perspective of the 
divine cause; later in the Summa Thomas examines the sanctification of the rational 
creature from the perspective of the effect in the creature, both in terms of the ontological 
states produced in the perfection of the created image (treated in q93) and the 
transformation of the creature’s nature and activities that brings it to the end of beatitude, 
treated in later questions on grace, the virtues, and gifts in the IIa pars.157 
 Thus, the two questions can be viewed as connected insofar as the former treats the cause 
of the human person’s sanctification—which is the objective presence of God in the soul – and the 
latter treats the effect of this sanctification—which is the resulting assimilation of the creature to 
God.158 
 Additionally, while in the trinitarian questions Thomas generally uses “rational creature” 
to refer to the human person rather than “image,” these two terms are synonymous. For example, 
                                                
154 See Augustine, De trinitate, 15.4.6 (Hill, 399); ST Ia, q. 93, a. 5c. 
155 Merriell, “Trinitarian Anthropology,” 142, n. 66. 
156 See Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 98. 
157 Ibid., 99 (emphasis added).  
158 See ibid.. 
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in Question 3, Thomas established that “it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are 
incorporeal, that man [homo] is said to be according to the image of God.”159 Furthermore, in the 
earlier trinitarian questions, Thomas identifies the rational creature or “man [homo]” as the image 
of God.160 For example, he writes: 
Of some [creatures], namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), by reason of the 
likeness of his image, according to Deut. 32:6…And of others He is the Father by 
similitude of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of 
eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received, according to Rom. 8:16-
17…Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have 
obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according to Rom. 5:2.161 
In order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in man [homo], man is not 
simply called the image, but to the image, whereby is expressed a certain movement of 
tendency to perfection.162 
Thus, while Thomas does not use “image” to refer to the human person in the questions on the 
indwelling (Questions 38 and 43), he does use the equivalent term, “rational creature,” which he 
has earlier argued is the image of God, and which he again uses in the prologue to the Secunda 
pars. As Spezzano observes, “It is not remarkable that in q43 he would use the former term 
[rational creature] because he had not yet treated the image ex professo, yet he might expect his 
readers to make the connection between the two questions.”163  
 Lastly, there are at least two important textual links between Questions 43 and 93. First, 
Thomas speaks in both questions of the renewal of the mind. In Question 43,Thomas argues that 
“mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a 
certain renewal by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be found these two 
conditions.”164 In Question 93, Article 6, Thomas quotes Eph. 4:23-24 and Col. 3:10 in the sed 
                                                
159 ST Ia, q. 3, a. 1 ad 2. 
160 See ST Ia, q. 33, a. 3 and q. 35, a. 2 ad 3, respectively. See also ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2; q. 33, a. 3 obj. 3, 
c, ad 1 and 2; q. 35, a. 1 ad 1, a. 2 ad 3; q. 39, aa. 7-8; and q. 41, a. 3. 
161 ST Ia, q. 33, a. 3c. 
162 ST Ia, q. 35, a. 2 ad 3.  
163 Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 98-9. 
164 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 6c. 
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contra to argue that the image belongs to the human person’s mind not only because it is 
intellectual but also because it is the mind that is capable of renewal.165 If we turn to Thomas’s 
commentary on Colossians, we find that he attributes this renewal of the mind (which is the 
renewal of the image) to grace.166 More specifically, he attributes it to the faith resulting from 
grace’s renewal of the mind. Thomas writes: 
Then when Paul says, ‘and have put on the new nature’ [v. 10], he describes the new self. 
First, he shows how this renewal takes place; secondly, where it takes place. He shows that 
the inner self, having become old by its ignorance of God, is made new by faith and the knowledge of God: 
‘We are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another’ (2 Cor 3:18). 
And where is this renewal taking place? It is taking place where the image of God is, and this is not 
in the sense faculties, but in the mind…In other words, the image of God in us is being 
renewed.167 
In light of Thomas’s commentary on Colossians, we can suggest a textual link between Questions 
43 and 93 through the phrase “renewal by grace.”168 The renewal by grace we can find in people 
is the same renewal of the mind according to which it can be said that the mind – and the mind 
only – is the image of God. It is the image of God (Question 93) that is renewed by grace through 
the divine missions (Question 43). 
 Second, a more direct textual link is found in the phrase “prorumpere in amorem” (from our 
inner word we “break forth into love”). Question 43, Article 5 and Question 93, Article 7 are the 
only places in the Summa in which Thomas uses this phrase.169 In Question 43, it is used to explain 
“the causal exemplarity of the Son…to whom the soul is assimilated by wisdom”170 Notice that 
                                                
165 See ST Ia, q. 93, a. 6 sc and c. Cf. Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 85. 
166 See Thomas Aquinas, Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Colossenses lectura, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P., html-
formatted by Joseph Kenny, O.P., http://dhspriory.org/thomas/SSColossians.htm, accessed August 18, 
2017: “We are to put off this old self with its practices: ‘Put off your old nature which belongs to your 
former manner of life and is corrupt through deceitful lusts’ (Eph 4:22). The new nature or self is the mind, 
renewed from within, because before grace our mind is subject within to sin, and when it is renewed by grace it becomes new: 
‘Your youth is renewed like the eagle’s’ (Ps 103:5); ‘For neither circumcision counts for anything, nor 
uncircumcision, but a new creation’ (Gal 6:15). This new creation is renewing grace” (c. 3, lect. 2, n. 154; 
emphasis added). Henceforth, In Col.. 
167 In Col.. c. 3, lect. 2, n. 155 (emphasis added). 
168 See Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 85, fn. 41. 
169 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 231. The Index Thomisticus confirms Merriell’s observation.  
170 Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 101. 
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Thomas is likening the Son—the Word that breathes forth love (spirans amorem)—to the 
intellectual illumination his invisible mission causes in us, which is the kind of intellectual 
perfection that breaks forth into love. Thomas writes: 
Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. 
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): ‘The Word we speak of is knowledge with love.’ 
Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, 
but according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love 
[qua prorumpat in affectum amoris], as is said (Jn. 6:45): ‘Everyone that hath heard from the 
Father and hath learned, cometh to Me’…171 
In Question 93, the phrase is used to express the way in which the mind chiefly represents the 
Trinity, namely, according to its acts.  
As above explained, a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an 
image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look 
for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the 
Divine Persons…first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that 
is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and 
thence break forth into love [et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus].172 
 The word breaking forth into love is expressing the same intellectual perfection of 
Question 43 – that is, an effect appropriated to the Son’s invisible mission, namely, wisdom or the 
illumination of the intellect. Even Merriell submits that Thomas’s repetition of this phrase in these 
two questions suggests that Thomas was aware of the connection between his notions of the 
indwelling of the Trinity and the image.173 These links seem to make it clear that Thomas 
understood the connections between his doctrines on the indwelling and the image, and that he 
even connected them implicitly through devices such as the repetition of phrases. The link 
between the two questions is also substantive, as we will see as we progress. 
                                                
171 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2 (emphasis added). See also ad 3: “If we consider mission as regards the effect of 
grace, in this sense the two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are distinguished in the 
effects of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection.” The 
former is an effect appropriated to the Son’s invisible mission and the latter is an effect appropriated to 
the Spirit’s invisible mission. 
172 ST Ia, q. 93, a. 7c (emphasis added). 
173 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 231. 
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4.1 The Divine Missions of the Son and the Spirit 
In terms of the place of Question 43 on the divine missions within the overall context of the 
Summa, it is the last of Thomas’s trinitarian questions, as well as the final question on God in se. 
Having compared the divine Persons according to likeness and equality in Question 42, Thomas 
proceeds to compare them to one another according to their missions, and so, in relation to 
creation.174 Recall that in Question 32 on our knowledge of the divine Persons, Thomas explained 
that the primary purpose of trinitarian doctrine is to help us “have the right idea about creation” 
and to “think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate 
Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.”175 This right thinking includes understanding that God 
created with utter freedom and that our salvation – which God likewise bestows upon us freely – 
is accomplished through the divine missions of the Word and Spirit. Moreover, it is only through 
the divine missions that humanity came to affirm that God is a Trinity of Persons, for it is through 
visible things that the invisible things of God are made known to creatures.176 In this light, we can 
observe that Question 43, while the culmination of the trinitarian questions and Thomas’s 
doctrine of God in se, is also the introduction as well as the link and pivot to his consideration of 
creation and salvation, and so, of God as the alpha and omega. As Spezzano comments, “We are 
alerted by the organization of the questions on the Trinity that God’s work in creation will 
culminate in the gift of grace, given through the Incarnation for the sanctification of human 
beings.”177  
 Furthermore, the missions are a means to an end, and therefore, their intelligibility is 
related to their purpose. As Wilkins writes, “The result is a complex intelligibility, because the 
human situation is complex. This is why Thomas introduces the missions in the context of his 
                                                
174 See ST Ia, q. 42, prol.. 
175 ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 3. 
176 See, for example, ST Ia-IIae, q. 102, a. 2; IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 3 ad 3; IIa-IIae, q. 81, a. 7; q. IIIa, q. 1, a. 1 
sc; IIIa, q. 60, a. 4; IIIa, q. 61, a. 3. 
177 Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 62. See also Wilkins, “Two Missions,” 51. 
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treatise on the Trinity, but unfolds their significance only gradually as he gives fuller consideration 
to the human good and how it is realized.”178 That is, the fittingness of the missions of the Son 
and the Spirit is appreciated more and more as the Summa progresses because the consideration of 
the human person, which begins in the Prima pars and continues throughout the Secunda pars, 
illuminates the situation into which the Son and the Spirit are sent. Further, the Secunda pars 
includes the consideration of the human person in relation to sanctifying grace, the effect of the 
Spirit’s invisible mission. The Tertia pars considers the Son’s visible mission, as well as the effects 
his mission has on his disciples, the dispensation of grace in the Sacraments, and humanity as a 
whole. For example, Thomas regularly explores elements of the Son’s visible mission in terms of 
its fittingness in relation to us, that is, in relation to our humanity and our situation.179 
 Lastly, the Trinitarian questions re-introduce the distinction between operations 
remaining in God (God’s operations of intellect and will) and operations that proceed to an 
exterior effect (God’s power). The consideration of the Persons (27-42) enriches the understanding 
of divine intellect and will, while the consideration of the divine missions enriches the 
understanding of divine power. Thomas then treats the procession of creatures from God. For the 
remainder of the Prima Pars, Thomas treats God’s power insofar as God creates and governs. In 
the Secunda and Tertia Pars, we can see a continuation of Thomas’s treatment of God’s operations – 
especially God’s power – and God’s giving of God’s very self in the missions of the Spirit and the 
Son. In other words, Question 43 of the Prima Pars on the divine missions is only the beginning of 
Thomas’s treatment of the missions. 
 Thomas defines the divine missions in Articles 1 and 2 of Question 43. The concept of a 
divine mission has two component elements “the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that 
                                                
178 Wilkins, “Two Divine Missions,” 51. 
179 See, for example, his questions on the Incarnation (ST IIIa, q. 1) and the Passion (ST IIIa, q. 46). He also 
speaks in terms of fittingness with regard to, for example, Christ’s life and teaching (ST IIIa, qq. 40, 42). 
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of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent.”180 With respect to the relation of the sent to the 
sender, the divine missions are grounded on their eternal processions. As Thomas puts it, the 
mission of a divine person is “in one way the procession of origin from the sender.”181 With 
respect to the relation of the sent to the end, the divine Persons become present in a new way in 
creation, in salvation history. As Thomas writes, the mission of a divine person also means “a new 
way of existing in another.”182 This new existence is not a change in the divine Person, but in the 
creature to whom the Person is sent.183 In other words, the divine missions are the eternal 
processions with created, external, temporal terms.184 Further, while the processions (generation 
and spiration) are eternal, the missions are temporal.185 Of the three divine Persons, it is fittingly 
said that two have divine missions. As Thomas writes, “The very idea of mission means 
procession from another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above 
expounded. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent; 
but this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from 
another.”186 Nevertheless, while the Father is not said to be sent, he does freely give himself to the 
human person to be enjoyed. As Thomas explains, “to give [dare],” as freely bestowing something 
is fittingly said of the Father, while “to be given [dari]” is not fittingly said of the Father because 
the Father is unoriginate.187 In the former sense, the Father is rightly said to dwell in the human 
person along with the Son and the Spirit.188   
                                                
180 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 1c. 
181 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 1c.  
182 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 1c. 
183 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 2 ad 2.  
184 See ST Ia, q. 43, a. 2 ad 3.  
185 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 2.  
186 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 4c. 
187 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 4 ad 1. 
188 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 1 ad 2. Note that just as procession does not imply inferiority of the Person who 
proceeds, neither does mission imply inferiority of the Person sent. See ST Ia, q. 43, a. 1 ad 1. 
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 The effects of the missions are invisible and visible. An invisible mission entails a created 
effect that “operates directly on the human person’s mind and heart.”189 A visible mission entails a 
created effect that “operates through the mediation of the senses.”190 As Thomas writes: 
God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man 
requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things, as explained above. Wherefore 
the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible. 
As God, therefore, in a certain way has demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions 
to men by visible creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the invisible 
missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures.191 
Thomas maintains that the Son and the Spirit each have visible and invisible missions.192 
However, the Spirit’s mission is principally invisible and the Son’s is principally visible. The effect 
of the Spirit’s invisible mission is gratia gratum faciens (the grace that makes one pleasing, which 
Thomas calls “sanctifying grace” later in the Summa)193 and the Spirit’s visible mission is indicated 
by signs such as the dove and fire.194 The effect of the Son’s visible mission is his taking on of 
human nature195 (i.e., the created hypostatic union196) and the effects of his invisible mission are 
the effects of grace on the intellect, namely, intellectual illumination or wisdom.197  
 The last important feature to understand about the divine missions is that they are 
coordinated for a twofold end, namely, our “withdrawal from evil” and our “furtherance in the 
good,” that is, the promotion of a supernatural good.198 Importantly, the fittingness of the 
                                                
189 Wilkins, “Two Divine Missions,” 50-51. See ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5.  
190 Wilkins, “Two Divine Missions,” 51.  
191 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 7c. 
192 Interestingly, Thomas notes a certain order with respect to the visible missions of the Son and the Spirit: 
“The visible mission of the Holy Spirit was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the 
visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the Holy Spirit; since the Holy Spirit manifests the 
Son, as the Son manifests the Father” (ST Ia, q. 43, a. 7 ad 6).  
193 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 3c. 
194 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 7c. 
195 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 1c: “thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began 
to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas ‘He was’ previously ‘in the world’ (Jn. 1:1).” 
See also ST Ia, q. 43, a. 7 obj. 2 and 4, ad 4. 
196 ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7c. See Wilkins, “Two Divine Missions,” 51. 
197 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2-3. 
198 ST IIIa, q. 1, a. 2c. See also ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5; Ia, q. 43, a. 7; Ia-IIae, q. 111, a. 3 ad 1; IIIa, q. 3, a. 8 ad 
3;; IIIa, q. 8, aa. 1 & 5; IIIa, q. 64, a. 3; Ia, q. 38; Super Ioan., c. 14, lect. 6, n. 1958; ., c. 15, lect. 2, n. 
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Incarnation with respect to the promotion of a supernatural good includes our “full participation 
of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us 
by Christ’s humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): ‘God was made man, that 
man might be made God.’”199  
 Recall from Chapter 2 that the human person has a supernatural end – the beatific vision 
– to which her nature and natural powers are disproportionate.200 Therefore, in order to reach 
her end, her nature must be elevated. This elevation occurs through the indwelling of the Spirit, 
which effects a change in the human person (for God’s love is causal201 and the Spirit is Love, 
which is the first gift202). This change in us is gratia gratum faciens, and it is a transformation of our 
entire nature.203 Thus, God not only creates the human person to his image through the bestowal 
of the form of her rational nature, but God also recreates the human to his image through the 
bestowal of a new form204 and habits205 by which the image newly participates in the divine 
likeness in grace and, ultimately, in glory.206 In short, this sanctification of human nature is the 
beginning of her deification, and so, her trinification. The Son’s visible mission is coordinated 
                                                                                                                                            
1998. 
199 ST IIIa, q. 1, a. 2c.  
200 See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 1; Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 5; Ia-IIa, q. 109, aa. 2, 3, 5. 
201 See ST Ia, q. 19, a. 5c. 
202 See ST Ia, q. 38, aa. 1-2c. 
203 See Wilkins, “Two Missions,” 52. See ST Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 4 (grace is rooted in the essence of the soul). 
204 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 110 in which Thomas explains that grace is an accident in the essence of the human 
soul 
205 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 62 on the theological virtues, in which Thomas refers again to 2 Pet. 1:4, his primary 
text for deification: “Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as 
was explained above. Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above. One is proportionate to 
human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a 
happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the 
Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pt. 1:4) that by Christ we are made ‘partakers of the Divine nature.’ And because 
such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s natural principles which enable him to act well according to 
his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some 
additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural 
end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are 
called ‘theological virtues’ first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: 
secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known 
to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.” 
206 See Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 80. 
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with the Spirit’s invisible mission, for he is the author of sanctification while the Holy Spirit is the 
gift of sanctification.207 That is, the inner operation of grace is coordinate with the Word’s visible 
mission such that we can hear the Word spoken in history. Furthermore, Christ’s work, in his 
passion and cross, is coordinated with the Holy Spirit’s invisible work of charity within the human 
person.208 The promotion of the supernatural good and the sanctification (as deification) of the 
rational creature involves considering the indwelling of the Trinity, which we will soon examine 
in greater detail. 
 Thomas had considered the sanctification of the human person in the questions on the 
divine essence, namely, in Question 12 on our knowledge of God. Returning to this question 
helps accentuate Thomas’s understanding of the progressive nature of sanctification, which 
further illuminates the connection between the divine indwelling and the perfection of the imago as 
the cause and effect of sanctification, respectively.209 In Chapters 2 and 3, we discussed Thomas’s 
affirmation of a fundamental proportion of rational creatures to God according to their 
participation in the divine light.210 This participation is natural to the rational creature, brought 
about by her creation. Beyond her natural likeness to the divine intellect, Thomas maintains that 
God can raise the rational creature to a supernatural likeness according to the supernatural 
perfections of grace and glory.211 We can observe, therefore, varying degrees of participation of 
the rational creature’s intellectual light in the divine light, namely, natural, graced, and glorified 
participation. In this way, Thomas anticipates his later teaching on the perfection of the imago in 
grace and glory. Notice that it is the process of deification that proportions the human person to 
know and love God. For example, Thomas quotes 1 John 3:2 (his primary scripture reference for 
the deification of the image), which speaks of the similitude of the rational creature to the divine 
                                                
207 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 7c. 
208 See Wilkins, “Two Missions,” 55. See also ST IIIa, q. 48, a. 2. 
209 See Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 36 
210 ST Ia, q. 12, a.1 ad 4. 
211 See ST Ia, q. 12, a. 2c. 
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likeness caused by participation in the light of glory.212 This scripture passage reads, “Beloved, we 
are God’s children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he 
appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.” It is this transformation that makes the 
human intellect proportionate to the beatific vision.213 Of this progressive participation unto 
perfection, Spezzano writes: 
Thomas’s larger vision in the Summa of God as ‘the source of things and their end, and 
especially of rational creatures,’ made in the divine image is in evidence here. It is precisely 
by a process of increasing similitude to God that the intellect is disposed to receive the vision. Thomas 
draws a larger picture of continuity between the vision proper to nature, grace, and glory 
as increasingly perfect participations of the creature in the light of the divine intellect, 
resulting in a more and more perfect likeness to God.214 
Thus, participation and likeness to God express the same process from different angles. As we 
participate more perfectly in the divine light (caused by God’s grace), we become more like God 
(effect of God’s grace). Furthermore, by the close Question 12, Thomas has actually outlined the 
rational creature’s advance toward God by this progressive participation, and he has also 
established that “the goal and substance of the rational creature’s perfection are the perfect 
knowledge and love of God.”215 However, “the teaching on the Trinity allows us to begin to 
understand more clearly how this perfection comes about, by the conformation of the image to its 
Trinitarian exemplar…”216 This “beginning to understand more clearly” is itself part of the 
process of perfection. In the final chapter, we will explore how that ties in with the role of the 
preacher. Briefly, the more one contemplates these teachings on the Trinity, the deeper one 
enters into the Trinity, since the being of the Trinity is self-understanding, self-expression, and 
                                                
212 ST Ia, q. 12, a. 2 ad 1. 
213 See ST Ia, q. 12, a. 2 ad 3. 
214 Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 37. 
215 Ibid., 61, 40. See also ibid., 40. 
216 Ibid., 61. 
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self-love as intellectual (contemplative) emanations.217  Given this, let us now consider the Spirit’s 
invisible mission in greater depth, focusing specifically on the indwelling of the Trinity. 
4.2 The Indwelling of the Trinity 
With respect to the indwelling of the Trinity, we must understand two things. One, what it means 
for the human person to enjoy the divine Persons. Two, what the primary effect of the Spirit’s 
mission is, namely, gratia gratum faciens. First, the Spirit is personally called “Gift.”218 The Spirit 
proceeds as love, and love has the nature of a first gift.219 However, with respect to us and to the 
Spirit’s mission, we must ask whether the gift we receive is a created gift or whether the Spirit, in 
se, is given to us.220 Primarily, the gift is God, in se. It is God’s special love, given specifically to the 
rational creature, “whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a 
participation of the Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since 
it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature.”221 
Further, of the meaning of “gift” in relation to the divine Persons, Thomas writes: 
The word ‘gift’ imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has an aptitude or 
relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by 
anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person 
is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as 
possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use [uti] or enjoy [frui] as we 
please: and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. 
Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be 
able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does 
sometimes attain thereto…Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, 
its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above; for that is said to be 
given to us which we have from another source. Thus a divine person can ‘be given,’ and 
can be a ‘gift.’222 
                                                
217 I owe this formulation of the “being of the Trinity…” to Patrick Byrne. 
218 See ST Ia, q. 38, a. 1 ad. 1, a. 2. 
219 ST Ia, q. 38, a. 2. 
220 See Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions,” 694. 
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As Wilkins comments, Thomas uses Augustine’s distinction between uti (things to be used) and frui 
(things to be enjoyed) in order to explain that with the indwelling of the Spirit, we receive both 
created gifts (uti) and the divine persons, themselves, as gifts (frui).223 Corresponding to the former, 
created grace is a gift from God that is other than God. These gifts are not primary but derivative. 
Their purpose is to help us to know and love God as God knows and loves Godself, for example, 
sanctifying grace, faith, wisdom, and charity. Corresponding to things to be enjoyed, uncreated 
grace is a divine self-gift. Such are the divine missions, which, among other things, constitute 
humanity in a new relationship to God. Thus, when the Spirit is given to us, it is principally the 
Spirit in se—an uncreated gift—who is given to us in order that we may enjoy the divine Persons. 
Before expanding on the joyful situation this divine indwelling establishes, we must return to gratia 
gratum faciens and the fact that not only the Spirit, but the entire Trinity dwells within us through 
the gift of the Spirit. 
 Gratia gratum faciens is the source of the indwelling of the entire Trinity in the human 
person, and it is the reason the human person is said to have a special mode of participation in 
God. As Thomas writes: 
For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according to His one 
common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which participate in His goodness. 
Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging to 
the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the 
knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of 
knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode God is said 
not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So 
no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational 
creature in a new mode, except [the grace that makes one pleasing—gratia gratum faciens]. 
Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to [gratiam 
gratum facientem].224  
                                                
223 See Wilkins, “Two Missions,” 53. 
224 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 3c. I have altered the translation here to reflect the Latin. The Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province translate “gratia gratum faciens” as sanctifying grace, but Thomas has a distinct phrase 
for sanctifying grace, namely “gratia sanctificationis.” As I will explain below, the former accentuates the 
change in relationship between God and the human person that the gift of the Spirit causes—we are 
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Gratia gratum faciens is the created term of the Spirit’s invisible mission. However, the Spirit does 
not personally assume this term (as the Son does assume a human nature), which is why it can be 
said that the entire Trinity—not just the Spirit—dwells in us through gratia gratum faciens.225 That 
is, because the Spirit does not assume gratia gratum faciens, this means the Spirit, in being sent, 
brings the entire Trinity, whereas we do not say that the entire Trinity assumed a human nature. 
Notice the distinction between dwelling and being sent: 
The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by [gratiam gratum facientem], according to Jn. 14:23: 
‘We will come to him, and will make Our abode with him.’ But that a divine person be 
sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within 
him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the Son and to the 
Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore 
belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by 
grace, still it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently He is not 
sent.226 
Thus, “in giving their love, their Spirit, the Father and the Son give themselves.”227 This means 
that not only is the Spirit in se given to us, but the entire Trinity in se is given to us as our gift so 
that we may enjoy the divine Persons, themselves.  
 The effect of the indwelling of the Trinity is the elevation of human nature, enabling it to 
participate in the divine nature. This participation is above and beyond the natural participation 
the human person has in God on account of her created participation in the uncreated light—that 
is, on account of her intellect. In the following two articles on the essence of grace, Thomas 
indicates that through grace (gratia gratum faciens) we participate in divine nature, which makes us 
the adopted children of God. Recall that earlier in the trinitarian questions, Thomas linked the 
image of God in the human person according to grace with her divine adoption.228 That is, not 
only are we by nature created to the image of God, but through grace, the image is perfected (but 
                                                
225 See Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions,” 692.  
226 ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5c.  
227 Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions,” 692. 
228 See ST Ia, q. 33, a. 3.  
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not completely) such that like the Image (the Son), we can also call God our Father. Further, in 
the second article, Thomas intimates the trinitarian pattern of this participation. He writes: 
[I]nfused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and 
consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the 
Divine Nature, according to 2 Pt. 1:4: ‘He hath given us most great and most precious 
promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.’ And it is in 
respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God. And thus, 
even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are 
ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a participation of the 
Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are 
ordained to this light…229 
For as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge through the 
virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the Divine love through the virtue 
of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after 
the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.230  
In light of the latter passage, Wilkins observes, “Gratia gratum faciens is a participation in the divine 
nature, and faith and love are participations in the processions of Word and Spirit.”231  
 Thus, beyond participation in the divine nature, the effect of indwelling of the Trinity 
bestows upon the human person a share in the fellowship of the divine Persons. It is this “divine-
human interpersonal situation” that is the primary reality of grace, according to Thomas.232 
Wilkins draws our attention to the fact that Thomas uses “gratia gratum faciens” rather than “gratia 
sanctificationis” in these trinitarian questions for speaking about the effect of the Spirit’s invisible 
mission. The former, in speaking of the human person as “pleasing” to God on account of the 
Spirit’s mission, “emphasizes how grace constitutes a created person in a new relationship to God, 
rather than how grace is immanently perfective of the creature.”233 Further, Thomas’s definition 
of charity as amicitia Dei was innovative and even bold because he based it on an analogy with 
Aristotle’s definition of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics in which lasting friendship is between 
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equals, who are “alike in dignity and excellence or virtue.”234 Together, Thomas’s decision to 
express grace as  gratia gratum faciens (the Spirit’s effect) and his definition of charity as friendship 
reflect the primacy of the interpersonal situation in Thomas’s theology of grace.235  
 In order to attend to the human person’s participation in the fellowship of the divine 
persons in more detail, I bring together two coordinated texts, Questions 38 and 43. Insofar as the 
indwelling of the Trinity makes us participants in the fellowship of divine persons, it is the cause of 
the human person’s trinification. Recall that in Question 38, Thomas explained the divine 
Persons can be enjoyed, but only by rational creatures united to God. As we know, this occurs 
through the gift of the Spirit. However, in this question, Thomas specifies that the rational 
creature sometimes attains to enjoyment of the divine Persons, not through generally being made 
partakers in the divine nature, but rather, through particularly being made “partaker[s] of the divine 
Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the 
rational creature alone can possess the divine person…”236 In Question 43, Thomas recalls this 
significant comment: 
Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and to have the power 
of enjoying the divine person can only be according to [gratia gratum faciens]. And yet the 
Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself [gratiae gratum 
facientis]. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.237 
Being made partakers of the divine Word and of proceeding Love is the trinification of the human 
person—it is what makes us partakers not only of the divine nature, but also of the divine 
processions, themselves. The trinitarian indwelling means that the soul participates in God’s own 
self-presence, as the known in the knower in the procession of the divine Word and as the beloved in 
lover in the procession of the divine Love. Thus, not only do we naturally image the Trinity insofar as in 
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our minds is found the principle of the word, the word, and love but we also supernaturally image 
the Trinity because we participate in the divine Word and Love proceeding.238 That is, our words 
breaking forth into love—spoken interiorly in our contemplation about God and all of creation in 
relation to God, in our contemplation of divinely revealed truths—participate in the eternal Word 
breaking forth into Love that the Father utters by understanding himself. This is the Word in 
which the entire Trinity and all of creation are spoken.239 This is the Love in which the entire 
Trinity and all of creation is loved.240  
  We can now appreciate the connection between the indwelling of the Trinity and the 
perfection of the imago Trinitatis. As Wilkins writes, drawing from the above quote from Question 
110 (Ia-IIae): “This participation in trinitarian life is also the perfection of the imago, which is 
dynamically ordered to its realization in the immanent operations of knowing and loving, and 
specifically in knowing and loving God. Gratia gratum faciens is a participation in the divine nature, 
and faith and love are participations in the processions of Word and Spirit.”241 
 This notion of participation in the divine processions, themselves, significantly changes 
the analogy between our knowledge and love and God’s knowledge and love, and so how we 
understand the perfection of the imago, to which we now turn. Keep in mind that we have just 
considered the human person’s participation in the divine nature and processions, caused by the gift 
of the Spirit who comes to dwell within us together with the Father and Son. We now proceed to 
consider the human person’s perfection in likeness to the divine nature and processions, which is 
the effect of the indwelling. In both cases, we can observe progress—progressive participation and 
                                                
238 Cf. Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 72: “The deiform perfection of the rational creature is the 
knowledge and love (and so the possession and enjoyment of God as object). This is a level of 
participation in the divine goodness that begins with, but goes far beyond, the participation in being and 
divine perfection possible to those creatures that bear only a trace of the Trinitarian likeness; it is the 
intentional participation of a personal being in the life of the Persons of the Trinity.” 
239 See ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3. 
240 See ST Ia, q. 37, a. 2c and ad. 3. 
241 Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions,” 696. See also Wilkins, “Two Missions,” 53. See Ia, q. 93, aa. 4, 7-8; Ia-
IIae, q. 110, a. 4; q. 112, a. 1. 
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progressive likeness. The difference between participation and likeness is that the former extends 
and moves beyond the former. Not only do we imitate the trinitarian processions, but we also 
participate in the trinitarian processions. That is, the human person not only manifests the Trinity 
in some way (beyond a mere trace), but she is also invited to creatively and actively participate in 
the life of the Trinity and the divine missions. To put it dramatically, not only is the human 
person a still painting “of” the Trinity, but she is also an actor in the play about the Trinity. 
Furthermore, this participation also makes the image more like the exemplar. We can observe 
here the active understanding of the imago in which a relationship—particularly a relation of 
participation—exists between image and exemplar. 
5. The Imago Trinitatis and its Perfection: The Effect of the Divine Indwelling 
The refinements in Thomas’s theory of divine processions correlate with refinements in his 
conception of the human person as created to the imago Dei. We have already seen the move from 
three faculties corresponding to three persons to two operations corresponding to two processions. 
This development—precipitated by the focus upon the acts of remembering, understanding, and 
willing—was significant for Thomas’s theological anthropology, too, as it helped Thomas 
gradually come to appreciate the more dynamic aspect of the imago Dei. A static understanding of 
the image emphasizes the relationship of proportionality, “in which the likeness of image to 
exemplar is seen as the similarity of the relations among the parts of the image to the relations 
among the parts of the exemplar.”242 A dynamic understanding of the image emphasizes actual 
imitation of exemplar in which the soul is conformed to God through its activity, and so it focuses 
upon the relationship between the image and exemplar.243 In the latter case, the image functions 
                                                
242 Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 56-57. 
243 See ibid., 69. 
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dynamically to lead (ducere in) one to the exemplar through actual imitation in which one re-
presents the original (the exemplar).244  
 By the time Thomas is composing the Summa theologiae and reconsidering the imago Dei in 
his mature effort to hand on sacra doctrina according to the ordo disciplinae, he defines the image 
primarily in terms of the two processions of inner word and love, having begun to “realize the 
power of this simplest and final form of Augustine’s psychological analogy for the Trinity.”245  
Merriell notes that in particular, Articles 5-8 of Question 93 disclose the shift in Thomas’s thought 
toward this more dynamic account of the imago Trinitatis and that these Articles are “saturated” 
with lines from De Trinitate.246  
 In the Summa, Thomas brought these developments (focus on acts and on a dynamic 
understanding of the image) to bear on the organization of the text, more closely coordinating 
trinitarian theology with theological anthropology, such that both topics draw on the theory of 
spiritual processions.  
 While Thomas never completely separated the anthropological and trinitarian aspects of 
the image, he brings them together more synthetically in the Summa. Therein, he relates the 
doctrine of the image to other theological topics, giving it an important role in his own scientific 
and pedagogical organization of the Summa.247 We already observed in Chapter 2 that the theme 
of the imago Dei is a key concept in the structure of the Summa, as Thomas refers to it at key points 
throughout the text, including the prologues. With respect to the question on the imago Dei 
(Question 93, Ia) in the Summa, it comes after Thomas has considered the nature of the human 
soul and its intellectual capacity (qq. 75-89). This is a new arrangement compared to De Veritate. 
                                                
244 See ibid., 57, 70. Merriell cites Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., 3, q. 4, a. 4 sol.: “Servatur etiam ibi actualis 
imitation ipsius Trinitatis, inquantum scilicet ipsa anima est imago expresse ducens in Deum” (The actual 
imitation of the Trinity is preserved insofar as the soul itself is an image that leads expressly to God).  
245 Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 154. 
246 See ibid., 190, 192. For example, Thomas quotes Augustine, De trinitate, 14.4.6 (twice), 14.6.9, 14.7.10 
(twice), 14.8.11, 14.12.15, 14.15.20. 
247 Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 157-58. 
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With the Church Fathers, Thomas included the theme of the imago Dei as a central component of 
theological anthropology, but how he organized his anthropological considerations changed. In 
the prologue to his theological anthropology (qq. 75-102), Thomas expresses how the theologian 
enriches anthropological scholarship. He writes, “Having treated of the spiritual and of the 
corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man [homo], who is composed of a spiritual and 
corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin 
[productione]. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, 
except in so far as the body has relation to the soul…”248 
 Two things are noteworthy in this passage. One, Thomas’s placement of his theological 
anthropology after his consideration of angels and of corporeal creatures is governed by the ordo 
disciplinae because it is pedagogically expedient to consider exclusively spiritual creatures and 
exclusively corporeal creatures prior to considering the human person, who is a composite 
creature. Two, Thomas’s consideration of the production of the human person (qq. 90-102),249 
which follows his consideration of human nature (qq. 75-89), occurs in a theocentric context and 
is included within Thomas’s theological anthropology as a central element of anthropology (qq. 
75-102). Looking back on the general prologue further confirms that the theologian considers the 
human person’s production insofar as God is her beginning and end, and therefore, in terms of 
the human person’s relationship to God. As Question 93 makes clear, this relationship is primarily 
in terms of the dynamic image–exemplar relationship.  
 What is different about Thomas’s arrangement in the Summa with respect to the imago Dei 
is that previously—for example, in De veritate—Thomas had included his discussion of the human 
mens within the question on the imago Dei. In the Summa, he relocates the discussion of psychology 
                                                
248 ST Ia, q. 75, prol.  
249 Within the production of the human person, Thomas includes “the production of man himself (qq. 90-
92); the end of this production (q. 93); the state and condition of the first man (qq. 94-101); the place of 
his abode (q. 102)” (ST Ia, q. 90, prol.). 
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to the questions on the nature of soul (i.e., qq. 75-89, especially q. 79, a. 1).250 Thomas’s separates 
psychology and the imago because the problems of psychology pertain to the nature of the human 
person’s soul, whereas the doctrine of the image of God pertains to the human person’s 
production.251 In the Summa he can therefore treat as separate questions topics that were once 
included in the question on the imago itself. This separation and relocation is a more systematic 
organization, and it allows Thomas to treat the questions about the imago more freely and 
succinctly. It is pedagogically more expedient, allowing for more concentrated treatment of each 
topic and an orderly movement from one element of theological anthropology to another. For 
example, of De veritate compared to the Summa, Merriell writes: “[I]n spite of the theological 
character of question 10, the epistemological focus necessarily keeps it from being a proper, 
systematic exposition of the image of God itself. It was left to the Summa theologiae to set the 
treatment of the image in its proper place and to give it a scientific order and completeness.”252  
5.1 The Ontological Status of the Imago Dei and its Assimilation to the Trinity: 
Constants and Developments 
Thomas’s definition of the imago entails some features that remained constant throughout his 
thought and others that changed as he developed. Merriell notes two important constants. One, 
Thomas always made a connection between the image of God and the intellectual species or 
nature of man, which was related to his definition of “image” in terms of the concept “species.”253 
In the Scriptum, Thomas adopts a definition of image from St. Hilary of Poitier: “every image is 
similar in species to that of which it is an image.”254 Earlier in the Scriptum, Thomas had offered an 
                                                
250 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 202, 217. 
251 Merriell explains this relocation in terms of formal and final causality. The soul as soul is the formal 
cause of the human person’s being, while the soul as the imago is the final cause of the human person’s 
creation. See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 182, 188-89. 
252 Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 238. 
253 Ibid., 238-39. 
254 See St. Hilary of Poitier, De synodis, trans. E.W. Watson and L. Pullan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 
Second Series, Vol. 9. Eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. (Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing 
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initial definition of image that differentiated it from vestige simply by degrees. Now, at this later 
point in the Scriptum, he defines the image as follows: “Now that in respect of which there is 
imitation is some quality, or form signified by way of quality. Hence, likeness (similitudo) belongs to 
the notion of image. This is not sufficient, however, for it is necessary that there be some 
approach to equality (adaequatio) in that quality, whether according to equality or according to 
proportion…”255 
 In this later definition adopted from Hilary, we find a more scientific definition, as 
Thomas now defines image in terms of the relation of imitation by which the image imitates the 
exemplar.256 This relation has its ground in the species, which is similar in both image and 
exemplar, and for the image to approach equality, it must do so with respect to this species. 
Further, in this definition, Thomas affirms that the image is truly related to its exemplar, thereby 
confirming the ontological status of the image.257 Thomas’s teaching on this point remains 
constant henceforth – the image of God in the human person is on account of her intellectual 
nature, which is the express sign of the divine nature.258 
 Two, Thomas consistently affirmed that the image of God is permanent in the human 
person. This permanence is affirmed in two ways. First, the image is not lost due to sin. The 
reason is that the image is in the human person’s nature; the image does not depend on grace. 
Second, the image remains even when the image is not actively imitating the exemplar. Thomas 
distinguishes between habitual and actual knowledge and love, both of oneself and of God. With 
                                                                                                                                            
Company,1899.), I.13. See also Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. D. 28, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 1; Merriell, To The Image 
of the Trinity, 44. 
255 In I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, a. 1 sol. (“Illud autem respect cujus est imitation, est aliqua qualitas, vel forma per 
modum qualitatis significata. Unde de ratione imagines est similitude. Nect hoc sufficit, sed oportet quod 
sit aliqua adaequatio in illa qualitate vel secundum qualitatem vel secundum proportionem”). The 
translation is Merriell’s. See To the Image of the Trinity, 46.  
256 Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 45. 
257 Ibid., 49. 
258 See ibid., 51.  
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Augustine, he affirms that the soul always habitually knows and loves itself.259 These habitual 
operations suffice for the permanence of the image. 
 There are also noteworthy differences in Thomas’s treatment of the image. In his 
commentary on the Sentences, following Lombard, Thomas identifies a set of characteristics 
according to which the psychological image in the human person represents the Trinity.260 
Thomas proposes five such characteristics: distinction, consubstantiality, equality, order, and 
actual imitation, noting that the last three are related directly to their objects and so vary in 
relation to different objects.261 As there are three distinct Persons ordered to one another by way 
of origin, who are yet consubstantial and equal, so must the image exhibit similar characteristics. 
Focus on these four characteristics lent itself to a static understanding of the image, suggesting 
that the image proportionately represents the Trinity—the parts and their arrangement are 
similar in both image and exemplar. This is a mirror-like representation, in other words.262 The 
fifth characteristic, actual imitation, brings a more dynamic aspect to the image. Actual imitation 
occurs in the act of re-presenting the original.  
 In De veritate, Thomas no longer speaks in terms of the five characteristics of the image. 
Instead, he prefers to speak in terms of two kinds of likeness between the image and exemplar, 
either likeness according to analogy or likeness according to conformation. In this way, Thomas 
begins to focus on the perfection of the image, in addition to its ontological status (that is, the fact 
that the human person really is the image of God). As Merriell explains, where the Scriptum was 
concerned with the permanence of the image, De veritate was concerned with the assimilation to 
God necessary for the actualization of the image.263 The Augustinian theme of ascent to knowledge 
and love of God begins to take hold of Thomas, revealing the effect his new understanding of De 
                                                
259 See, for example, ST Ia, q. 93, a. 7 ad 4. Therein, Thomas refers to Augustine, De trinitate, 15.6. 
260 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 55-57. 
261 In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 4 sol. 
262 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 55-69. 
263 See ibid., 132-33. 
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Trinitate has on his thought. The human mind’s objects determine the conditions of the image’s 
perfection and ascent. With Augustine, Thomas understands there is a hierarchy among the 
objects we can understand and love. In Article 7, Question 10 of De veritate, Thomas identifies 
three classes of such objects, namely, God, oneself, and temporal things.264  
 Next, Thomas introduces the distinction between likeness of analogy (secundum or per 
analogiam) and likeness of conformation (secundum conformationem or per conformationem). Only when 
the mind is knowing and loving either God or itself is there an expressed likeness of the Trinity. 
Likeness according to analogy refers to the proportionality by which the structure of the image 
mirrors to some degree the relations within the divine Trinity. Here, the mind has itself as its 
object, such that like the Trinity, the mind and its object are consubstantial. As Merriell 
comments, it is the common features and the relations among them that is significant in this kind 
of likeness, not any kind of causal relationship between the image and exemplar.265 This likeness 
accentuates a parallel rather than communion between image and exemplar.  
 Likeness according to conformation, by contrast, refers to the process by which the mind 
becomes more like its object. The mind is informed by the knowledge of its object. Here, the 
mind has God as its object, such that it becomes more like God. As Merriell observes, 
conformation “introduces to our consideration the special operational relationship by which the 
exemplar acts on its image to assimilate it to itself.”266 In De veritate, Thomas argues that the 
likeness according to conformation is greater than that according to analogy. However, these two 
likenesses are related. He writes: 
Therefore, properly speaking, the image of the Trinity is in the mind primarily and 
mainly, in so far as the mind knows God, and it is there in a certain manner and 
secondarily, in so far as the mind knows itself, especially when it considers itself in so far 
                                                
264 See De ver., q. 10, a. 7c. 
265 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 138. 
266 ibid. 
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as it is the image of God. As a result, its consideration does not stop with itself, but goes 
on to God.267  
 In the Summa, Thomas continues his preference for speaking in terms of the assimilation 
of the image to the Trinity rather than in terms of the image’s characteristics. However, he makes 
a significant development with respect to his consideration of assimilation. Let us now proceed to 
Question 93 of the Prima Pars of the Summa to examine its structure and meaning.  
5.2 Question 93: The End or Term of the Human Person’s Production 
We now turn to Question 93, having prepared for it through examining Thomas’s consideration 
of the divine missions and the indwelling of the Trinity. Again, in turning to Question 93, we are 
investigating Thomas’s explanation of the wayfarer’s journey from the perspective of the effect 
produced. That is, we are considering the image’s assimilation – its increasing likeness – to the 
exemplar. Thus, I will return to the aforementioned distinction between the assimilation of the 
imago according to analogy and according to confirmation. I build upon Merriell’s work to argue 
that in the Summa Thomas brings together these two assimilations, and that the key to their 
integration is Thomas’s mature understanding of spiritual processions and their connection to the 
participation of the human person in the divine processions of Word and Love. This notion of 
participation is the centerpiece of sanctification as trinification. 
 Let us begin with an overview of Question 93 and its structure. Articles 1-3 examine the 
likeness to God found in humans, irrational creatures, and angels, respectively. More specifically, 
article 1 demonstrates the existence of the image. Articles 2 and 3 clarify the nature of the image 
(by comparing the image in the human person with other creatures). Article 4 considers the 
progressive perfection of the image by the increasing likeness to God according to the immanent 
activities of the essence, that is, the divine operations of knowing and loving. Further, this article 
focuses on the object of these acts. These first four articles consider the image insofar as it reflects 
                                                
267 De ver., q. 10, a. 7c. 
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the divine essence. Article 4 also serves as an introduction to Articles 5-8, which examine the image 
of the Trinity. Therein, Articles 5-7 establish that the image exists as trinitarian and consider how it 
exists. Article 8 examines the degrees of perfection of the image of the Trinity, which, as 
explained in Article 4, depend on the extent to which God is the object of one’s knowing and 
loving.268 Article 9 considers the distinction between image and likeness, in which likeness is the 
expression and perfection of the image.269 Notice that the notion of perfection is the culmination 
of Thomas’s consideration of the imago. Therein, Thomas draws on the same text from John of 
Damascus (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) with which he opens the Secunda Pars, which itself can be 
understood in part as a prolongation of the consideration of the perfection of the imago Trinitatis.270 
Merriell rightly observes that the arrangement of Question 93 roughly follows the traditional 
division of a subject under investigation: an sit? (a. 1), quid sit? (aa. 2-8), and quomodo? (a. 9).271 
 As other scholars have noted, the development of this question basically follows the 
development of Thomas’s entire treatment of God, in which he first considers the unity of the 
divine essence and then the Trinity of Persons.272 The following table illustrates these parallels: 
  
                                                
268 See Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 83. 
269 This understanding of likeness is a development from the Scriptum, as Spezzano notes. See Spezzano, The 
Glory of God’s Grace, 97. 
270 See ibid. 
271 See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 171.  
272 See ibid. 
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Question 93: The Imago Questions 2-43: God in se 
Articles 1-4: the image as it reflects the 
essence of God 
Questions 2-26: the divine essence 
 Article 1: the existence of the image  Question 2: the existence of God 
Articles 2-3: the nature of the image Questions 3-13: the nature of God 
Article 4: the operations of the image Questions 14-26: the divine operations273 
Articles 5-9: the image as it reflects the 
Trinity of Divine Persons 
Questions 27-43: the Trinity of Divine 
Persons 
 Articles 5-8: the image as it reflects the 
intratrinitarian life 
 Questions 27-42: the intratrinitarian life 
Article 9: the perfection of the image 
according to the likeness of virtue that 
belongs to the higher levels of the image 
in grace and glory. Focuses on activities 
of knowing and loving God in grace and 
glory 
Question 43: the divine missions – the 
Persons in relation to us, including their 
indwelling according to which God is 
present in the human person as the known 
and beloved in the knower and lover, 
respectively 
Table 16 
Notice three things. One, I suggest that Article 9 treats the assimilation of the image to the Trinity 
according to the likeness of virtue, which belongs (as we will see below) to the higher levels of the 
image in grace and glory. Question 43 involves a similar consideration, except it does so in terms 
of the indwelling accomplished by the divine missions and the special mode of presence of God to 
the human person this indwelling bestows. Two, as Questions 14-20 are essential to the trinitarian 
questions, preparing the student for what is to come, so is Article 4 pivotal to Question 93 and its 
argument that the human person is not only created to the imago Dei but also to the imago Trinitatis 
and further, that the image can be progressively assimilated to the Trinity. Three, just as there is a 
progressive movement from Question 2 to Question 43, as the student journeys further into the 
“deep things of God” along a well-devised path, there is also a progressive movement within 
Question 93. Specifically, both movements pertain to a progressive development of knowledge 
and love of God. Questions 2-43 consider God’s own self-understanding and self-love, first in 
                                                
273 Merriell makes an interesting point. While technically it is the immanent operations of knowing and loving 
(and not the transitive operation of power) by which the human person imitates the divine nature, 
Thomas does, in Article 4, refer to the image of glory, which is proper to beatitude. In fact, the image of 
glory (and so the state of beatitude) is the culmination of the article. As Merriell writes, Thomas “thus 
completes the parallel between article 4 and the section of the Summa on the divine operations, which 
concludes with a short question on God’s beatitude” (Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 190). 
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terms of the divine nature and then notionally in terms of the divine Persons. Question 93 is a 
reflection upon the image’s self-knowledge and self-love, and more importantly, on the image’s 
knowledge and love of God – and specifically, of the image’s processions of word and love. Within 
this question, the progressive movement is in terms of the image’s increasing assimilation to the 
divine trinitarian exemplar.274 In this light, Question 93 can be understood as an explanation of 
the graced journey that will actually unfold—and has already begun—throughout the remainder 
of the Summa, as the student grows in understanding and love of the triune God (including divine 
providence and the divine economy), learning to speak words about God and all of creation in 
relation to God that break forth into love.275  
 Now we turn to Question 93 in greater detail. Having already treated the meaning of 
“image” in Question 35 on Image as a personal name belonging to the Son, Thomas sets out in 
the initial article of Question 93 to demonstrate that this concept is also meaningfully applied to 
the human person. He emphasizes the relation of exemplarity between God and human persons, 
insisting that it is origin, not equality, that is required for every image. Insofar as the human 
person is the image of God, she proceeds from God as from an exemplar cause. Further, in 
reflecting on Genesis 1:26,276 Thomas draws the reader’s attention to the fact that Genesis says 
the human person, unlike the divine Son, is created “to the image of God” (ad imaginem Dei).277 By 
contrast, the language used in Genesis indicates that the human person is an imperfect image. 
Additionally, “the preposition ‘to’ signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.”278 
Earlier in Question 35, Thomas argued the same point, explaining that this language signifies “a 
                                                
274 Cf. Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 84. 
275 In a further connection between Question 93 and Questions 2-43, the former builds upon Question 12, 
which also considered the perfection of the rational creature, but did so prior to the enriching context of 
the imago. 
276 See ST Ia, q. 93, a. 1 sc. 
277 See ST Ia, q. 93, a. 1 ad 2; q. 35, a 2 ad 3. 
278 ST Ia, q. 93, a. 1c and ad 2. 
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certain movement of tendency to perfection.”279 Thus, we can observe in the human image both 
separation from and dynamism toward union with the exemplar. Article 1 anticipates the 
progressive perfection of the imago Dei. Lastly, Thomas reaffirms the definition he draws from 
Hilary in which the image is defined in terms of likeness in species. Humans are said to share a 
species with God “according to a certain analogy or proportion.”280  
 In Article 2, Thomas specifies that the human person shares a likeness in species with 
God according to her intellectual nature, by which she knows or understands. Thus, the ground 
of likeness between the human person and God is the former’s mind, that is, the soul as 
intellectual. 281 Spezzano connects this with the exemplar causality of Article 1, and rightly does so 
in terms of participation: “God causes an analogical likeness to himself in the image by granting 
to it a participation in his own highest perfection, an intellectual nature.”282 Article 3 compares 
the image in the human person to the image in angelic persons, arguing that absolutely speaking, 
angelic persons are more to the image of God than human persons.  
 Article 4 begins Thomas’s consideration of the perfection of the image according to its 
imitation of the immanent divine operations by which God knows and loves Godself. He is 
considering the operations of the human person’s intellectual nature, which are like God’s own 
operations. According to these immanent operations, we can observe the image in the human 
person in three ways:  
First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; 
and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. 
                                                
279 ST Ia, q. 35, a. 2 ad 3. 
280 ST Ia, q. 93, a. 1 ad 3.  
281 Recall that it is the theologian’s province, according to Thomas, to consider the human person’s soul, 
both as the formal cause of the human person (and so the soul as soul, which Thomas treats in his 
psychological questions, 75-89) and as the final cause of her creation (and so the soul as imago, which 
Thomas treats in the context of the production of the human person, qq. 90-102). In these later 
questions, and specifically in Question 93, Thomas is studying the soul in relation to God, its origin and 
destination. See Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 182, 188-89. See also ST Ia, q. 75, prol. 
282 Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 76. Notice that Thomas has made the same point earlier in Question 
12, but here he does so in the context of affirming the human person as the image of God.  
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Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though 
imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man 
knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory.283 
Notice that in each of these three instances, the object of the acts is God. We will return to this 
when considering trinification. Further, Article 4 represents a significant development in 
Thomas’s thought. It does not have a parallel in the Scriptum, and Merriell suggests that its 
argument is a synthesis of elements from at least two earlier works, De veritate, q. 10 and De potentia, 
q. 9.284 This is the first time Thomas associated the levels of the image with the three states of the 
human person.285 In De potentia, for example, he spoke of three likenesses, instead: the vestige, the 
image of creation, and image of re-creation.286 Lastly, this article is still within the context of the 
imago Dei, not the imago Trinitatis. Yet at the same time, in considering these immanent acts of the 
human person’s intellectual nature (and therefore harkening back to questions 75-89), he sets the 
stage for the next three articles. These latter articles consider the imago Trinitatis in terms of the 
processions of word and love.  
 By the end of Article 4, we can see that the rational creatures’ likeness to God is truly 
deification. Their likeness to God is because of their intellectual nature, and so their perfection 
consists in reaching a likeness to God according to God’s self-understanding and self-loving. Thus, 
as Spezzano writes, “This kind of likeness to God sets rational creatures above everything else in 
creation. It is truly deification, for God’s self-understanding and loving are God’s primary 
activities, identical with the divine essence and existence: God, in his one essence, is his own act of 
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self-understanding and loving.”287 Furthermore, Question 93 is on the end or term of the human 
person’s production, and this “finis productionis” refers, as Merriell argues, to the image as form of 
the human being (which is her final cause) rather than the end of beatitude. However, as 
Spezzano remarks, this Article demonstrates that “the production of ‘the form of man as the 
terminus of God’s communication of his likeness’ not only includes the bestowal of the form of the rational 
nature but also extends to the bestowal of the new forms or perfection dispositions (i.e., habitus) of grace and 
glory.”288 These new forms and dispositions enable the image to be the principle of new and higher 
activities of knowing and loving God. Thus, while Question 93 refers to the “end” in terms of 
form and not beatitude, it nevertheless considers both the natural and supernatural forms of the 
imago. In this way, we can understand the prologue to Question 93 to include not only the 
creation of the image but also its perfection with respect to its nature because the recreated, 
elevated image is the end (finis) of a new divine work (operis).289 Both considerations are important 
because Thomas proceeds from there to consider the unique role of the human person within 
divine providence and the divine economy, respectively. 
 Article 5 establishes that the image of God exists in the human person both with regard to 
the unity of the divine nature and to the Trinity of Persons, and that in fact, one follows from the 
other given that in God, the divine nature and the divine Persons are inseparable (though this 
does not mean that we can prove the Trinity on account of the image in the human person also 
being of the Trinity).290 In this article, Thomas also draws upon the trinitarian questions wherein 
he argues that the divine Persons are distinguished by relations of origin, which themselves arise 
from the processions. Thus, Thomas is arguing that the primary way in which the human person 
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represents the Trinity must be found in the reflection of divine processions that occurs within the 
human mens.291 Articles 6-7 consider how the image exists as Trinitarian, namely, in the mind and 
especially in its acts. Article 6 argues that the image exists only in the human person’s mind. It is 
in this Article that we find one of Thomas’s most succinct renditions of the psychological analogy, 
as well as his connection between the analogy and the image: 
[A]s the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by procession of the Word from the Speaker 
and of Love from both of these, as we have seen; so we may say that in rational creatures 
wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect and a procession of love in the 
will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the 
species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and 
love [principium verbi, et verbum, et amor].292 
This is Thomas’s own triad – the principle of the word, the word, and love. 
 Article 7 focuses on the acts of the soul, according to which there are these immanent 
processions according to which the human person is the image of the Trinity. Merriell suggests 
that “this article reveals Thomas’s profound understanding of the movement of Augustine’s 
search in the De Trinitate.”293 The reason for his suggestion is clear if we turn to Thomas’s respondeo. 
Herein, Thomas succinctly expresses Augustine’s final instance of the psychological analogy and 
its true meaning: 
If the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the 
soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now 
the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word 
from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting both. But in our soul the word 
‘cannot exist without actual thinking,’ as Augustine says (De trin., 14.7). Therefore, first and chiefly 
the image of the Trinity is to be found in the mind according to its acts, that is, that is, inasmuch as from 
the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an inner word; and thence break forth 
[prorumpimus] into love.294 
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Thus, because we cannot form a word and break forth into love without actual thought, the 
image of the Trinity in us is according to the mind’s activities, just as Augustine taught. Merriell 
makes an astute observation regarding this point: 
In the Summa, however, the image of the Trinity is not found in the acts of the mind, but 
according to these acts. In the De veritate it is the acts of thinking and willing that best 
represent the second and third Persons, whereas here it is the terms that proceed in these 
acts, the inner word and love, that come closest to representing the Persons adequately. 
For this highest representation the acts are necessary, because without the acts the two 
terms would not proceed.295 
 If we compare Articles 4 and 7, we can notice that Article 4 treats the human acts of 
knowing and loving according to which the human person imitates the same essential acts in 
God.296 Article 7 treats these acts in their specific aspects of grounding a word (understanding as 
speaking) and dependence on the word and understanding (the act of love as proceeding), 
respectively. In this way, Article 7 treats these acts insofar as they represent the notional acts of 
knowing and loving in God. Thus, where Article 4 emphasizes nature, Article 7 emphasizes 
processions. 
 Before proceeding to Articles 8 and 9 in order to consider trinification—the effect of the 
indwelling in the imago—it will be helpful to note a few new features of Thomas’s treatment of the 
imago Trinitatis that emerged during this question. First, the word “processio” is the central term of 
Articles 5-8, as the two processions of word and love assume center stage. Thomas’s own triad is 
the one we observed in Article 6, namely, the principle of the word, the word, and love. His triad 
is inherently expressive of the active condition of the mind required for the image to exist in the 
fullest sense of the term because it includes the concept of procession within it.  
 Second, Thomas explains the image of the Trinity in terms of “a certain representation of 
the species” in Articles 6 and 7 (and in Articles 8 and 9, as we will see). We have already seen that 
the human person is the image of God at a distance; she is not equal with the exemplar. Thus, she 
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does not share the same species with God perfectly. However, she does participate in God, which 
establishes a relationship of proportion (i.e., an analogical relationship). As Spezzano remarks, “In 
q13, on analogy, Thomas describes God as a kind of universal analogical agent, producing his 
own likeness in all creatures so that names apply to them according to their relationship of 
proportion to God.”297  The human person is appropriately named “rational creature” and 
“image” because of her particular relationship of proportion to God, namely, her proportioning 
to know and love God (capax Dei). “Representation by species” is a special proportioning to God, 
which is related to the rational creature’s special participation in the divine intellect. Through 
grace and glory, according to which the human person participates more perfectly in the divine 
intellect, this special proportioning enables her to know and love God more deeply and explicitly. 
Spezzano explains further what “representation of species” means: 
God’s knowledge of his own essence as participable in a certain way, ‘according to some 
degree of likeness,’ constitutes the proper species of each creature [ST Ia, q. 14, a. 8; q. 
15, a. 3]. If rational creatures participate in the divine essence ‘according to the 
representation of species,’ it means that God causally knows them as being capable of 
some degree of participation in his own self-knowledge and love – in the activities of the 
divine intellect and will that have God as their object and the divine essence itself as 
intelligible species.298 
The fact that “representation by species” involves proportioning means that the assimilation 
according to analogy (or proportion) is at least implicit in Question 93. This feature is important 
because it helps to bring together the two ways the human person can be assimilated to the 
Trinity – according to analogy and to conformation – which we now consider. 
5.3 Question 93 and Trinification: The Effect of the Indwelling of the Trinity 
We have seen that in De veritate, Thomas distinguished between two kinds of assimilation of the 
image to the exemplar, assimilation according to analogy and to conformation. Again, the former 
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refers to the proportionality by which the structure of the image mirrors to some degree the 
relations within the divine Trinity. Assimilation according to conformation refers to the process 
by which the mind becomes more like its object. In other words, it is the difference between 
proportion and union, respectively. At times, there is a tension in Thomas’s work concerning 
which of these assimilations is better. In the Summa, he transcends the need to decide between 
them because, as Merriell argues, “he refuses to consider the two likenesses as independent.”299 
Rather, the image of the Trinity involves elements of both analogy and conformation. 
Furthermore, Thomas no longer uses this language of assimilation according to analogy or 
conformation to express the assimilation of the image to the exemplar. Instead, he ignores in a 
way his earlier distinction and focuses upon the presence of both likenesses occurring through the 
image’s progressive assimilation. It is Thomas’s selection of the “representation of the species” as 
the sole criterion for the image that allows him to simplify his teaching and unite these aspects of 
assimilation.300 The key to the image’s representation of the species of the exemplar pertains to 
the object of the image’s acts. In order to understand Thomas’s mature position on the 
assimilation of the image, and its connection to the indwelling, I will consider Articles 8 and 9, 
focusing on these two elements, namely, the representation of species and the object. 
 Let me begin with Article 9, which considers the difference between image and likeness 
(similitudo), because the theme of likeness—of assimilation—is the centerpiece of what follows. At 
first glance, this article may seem routine, as though Thomas is simply considering a traditional 
question. However, as Spezzano observes, “on closer examination, his treatment shows evidence 
of his mature reflection on the progressive perfection of the image, specifically in terms of its 
activity.”301 He explains that likeness can be  “a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something 
more general than image…and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as 
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it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it 
represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect.”302 Likeness, therefore, 
includes the concept of the image’s perfection, and it is with the concept of perfection that Thomas 
concludes his consideration of the human person’s creation to the image. He continues:  
Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and 
existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common 
than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. …But likeness 
may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense 
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies ‘an intelligent being, endowed 
with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as 
this may be possible in man.’ In the same sense ‘likeness’ is said to belong to ‘the love of 
virtue’: for there is no virtue without love of virtue.303 
Here, Thomas connects likeness to habit and virtue, which will be considered concretely in the 
Secunda Secundae pars, under the conformity of grace established by sanctifying grace and the 
theological virtues.304 Furthermore, recall that Thomas identified a threefold image in the human 
person: that according to nature, grace, and glory. It is found in everyone according to the first, in 
the just according to the second, and in the blessed according to the third. The division of the 
image into image and likeness helps Thomas express the difference among the threefold image. 
The image is in everyone according to nature whereas the likeness is the expression and 
perfection of the image in grace and glory.305 While some virtues naturally exist in the soul, the 
likeness that is the love of virtue signifies perfection, which belongs to the higher levels of the 
image in grace and glory.306 
 In Question 43, Thomas argued that the Son and Spirit are invisibly sent to people by 
grace, and insofar as they are sent, “there is a likening of soul to the divine person Who is sent, by 
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some gift of grace.”307 The soul is likened to the Son by the gift of wisdom, and to the Spirit by the 
gift of charity. Here, wisdom is one of the gifts of the Spirit that accompanies charity, and which is 
appropriated to the Son. With respect to the gift of wisdom likened to the Son, Thomas quotes 
Augustine, writing, “Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20): ‘The Son is sent, whenever He is 
known and perceived by anyone.’ Now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge; and this is 
properly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge [sapida scientia]…”308 Notice that 
Thomas is here considering the likeness that is the expression and perfection of image, and that 
this assimilation is the consequence of the missions—of divine self-gift. In the next article, Thomas 
considers increase in virtue, quoting the same passage from Augustine and therefore bringing to 
mind the assimilation of the soul to the Son according to wisdom: 
The invisible mission takes place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of grace. 
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that ‘the Son is sent to each one when He is known 
and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according to the 
capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him.’ Such 
invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the 
performance of a new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace…309 
As an example of a new act, Thomas includes the undertaking of “any arduous work,” which we 
can surmise includes both the corporeal and spiritual works of mercy, and therefore teaching and 
the contemplative study necessary to it. In this way, the love of virtue according to which the 
image is assimilated to the Trinity includes the love of wisdom and charity proper to sacra doctrina. 
With this distinction between image and likeness, as well as the link between the latter and the 
invisible missions, let us proceed. 
 In Article 4, we observed that at each level of the image, it was insofar as the human 
person had God in some way as the object of her knowing and loving that she, in her intellectual 
nature, was said to chiefly imitate God. Similarly, in Article 8 (when Thomas has shifted to 
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considering the imago Trinitatis), he restricts—more strongly than in De veritate—the range of object 
that suffice to establish the image of the Trinity. The object must be God, or the mind as the 
image of God as long as this self-contemplation leads to the contemplation of God, which 
Augustine also taught. As Thomas writes: 
As above explained image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains 
to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine 
Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as 
this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated, are distinguished 
from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the 
procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the 
knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it 
is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of 
a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is 
specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of 
God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul 
turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God.310  
Recall the previous section in which we saw that God knows the rational creature as capable of 
knowing and loving him. In this article, Thomas goes further, moving beyond the acts of knowing 
and loving to the processions of word and love. He maintains that the mind represents the species 
of the Divine Persons when it utters a word about God that breaks forth into love. Notice that to 
truly represent the species, the word breaking forth into love must be about God; it is not enough 
simply to utter loving words about anything whatsoever. More specifically, God knows the 
rational creature as capable of speaking words about him that break forth into love—as truly 
capable of representing the way God knows and loves Godself, i.e., according to the procession of 
word and love.311 Just as in the divine conversation, it is God in se (the divine Good) that is the 
object specifying the divine notional acts by which the Word and Love proceed, so, too, in our 
participation in the divine conversation brought about by the divine indwelling, our loving words 
are about God. The mind represents the species of the Divine species when it, like God, has God 
as its object and when it, like God, utters loving words about this divine object. 
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 We can put the foregoing about objects in terms of self-presence. The quality of our self-
presence changes with the kind of operations we are performing, and these operations typically 
have different objects. Thus, when I am considering something like a stone (or better, a circle) or a 
horse, I am likely present to be myself on the levels of understanding and of judgment of fact. The 
words I conceive about them are not words that break forth into love (unless perhaps it is my own 
horse and I have a relationship with it, in which case, I may become present to myself on the level 
of value). When I am considering divine things, the quality of my self-presence is at its peak. I am 
uttering words about God that break forth into love, as I consider the value of who God is and of 
what God has done for me. Here, my self-presence is most like God’s—I am considering the same 
object (God, the divine Good), and am also present to myself at the level at which my mind and 
heart are most closely one, namely, the level of existential self-constitution. More specifically, I am 
considering God’s own constitution—how God, in se, is eternally constituted as Triune; the value 
of this divine self-constitution.312 God’s self-constitution is conversational—it is a conversation 
about the Good, about the value of the infinite act of Understanding Love. In God, mind and 
heart are perfectly one—the infinite act of understanding is the infinite act of love (essential acts), 
and the uttered word eternally breaks forth into love (notional acts).313 Furthermore, such self-
presence is the presence to oneself as the imago Dei. That is, it involves affirming and loving oneself 
as the imago—as taking a stand about what it means to be human, and what it means that humans 
participate in the divine life and conversation.314 In the very same process by which one become 
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more like God, one also becomes more human, such that one can more “truly image God in the 
world.”315 
 It is this focus on God as the object of our acts of knowing and loving, thereby specifying 
our processions of word and love, that is the key to Thomas’s integration of the assimilation 
according to both analogy and conformation. When God is the object of our acts, our word 
breaking forth into love is like God’s Word breaking forth into love. Further, our words breaking 
forth into love participate in the divine Word breaking forth into Love on account of the gift of 
the Holy Spirit, as Thomas argued in Question 38. At the same time, our participated words 
breaking forth into love further assimilate us to the very Trinity we are contemplating lovingly.  
 The mind is conformed to the Trinity because it has the Trinity as its object. We become 
like and are drawn toward that which we know and love. The triune God assimilates the mind to 
Himself by His objective presence as the known and beloved through the divine indwelling. Yet 
Thomas also sees the analogical aspect in this assimilation because there is an analogy between 
the procession of the Word in God and the procession of the inner word in us conceived from the 
knowledge about God, precisely because they are specified by the same object.316 The proportion 
is now between the divine Word and Love proceeding and our graced word and love 
proceeding.317 The principle of this analogical assimilation is our participation of God’s 
knowledge and love.318 Notice that conformity has to do with the objective presence of God in the 
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soul (God as object), and analogy has to do with the acts of proceeding word and love 
(participation of our processions in the divine processions). Yet, it is this very word breaking forth 
into love in us that also conforms us to the Trinity because this word and its love proceed on 
account of contemplating God, according to which God is objectively present in the soul as the 
known and beloved.  
 As Wilkins observes, in the Summa, Thomas has come to understand that “the decisive 
issue was to bring together the analogical relationship of word and love in the mind to the 
procession of Word and Spirit in God, with the conformation of the mind to God in its operations 
of knowing and loving.”319 He does so by showing that a proportionality holds between the divine 
processions and the processions in the human mind, such that there is a representation of the 
species (because the divine and human processions are both specified by the same object, God). 
However, as Merriell underscores, this representation species also includes an element of 
conformation because “at its highest level God acts directly on the mind as the object specifying 
its act of understanding and love, perfecting the proportionality between the mind and the Trinity 
by conforming the acts of the mind to the inner activity of the divine Trinity.”320 In other words, 
not only can you and I focus our conscious acts on God, but God can also act directly on our 
minds, which occurs, for example, through the divine indwelling consequent upon the gift of the 
Spirit. This same divine indwelling by which God is objectively present in us as the known and 
beloved is also the cause of our active participation in the divine processions. With respect to the 
latter, the human mind participates in the procession of the eternal Word such that the Word of 
God can be said to proceed in the human mind through the assimilation made possible by the 
objective presence of God as the known to the human mind.321 Similarly, the human mind 
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participates in the procession of eternal Love such that Proceeding Love can be said to proceed in 
the human mind through the assimilation made possible by the objective presence of God as the 
beloved to the human mind.  
 This notion of participation in the divine processions significantly changes the analogy 
between our knowledge and love, on the one hand, and God’s knowledge and love, on the other. 
The analogy is no longer according to consubstantiality, but rather, according to the acts 
themselves. 322 Therefore, in the Summa, the highest analogy is the analogy of acts, not 
consubstantiality. That is, our graced acts of knowing and loving are proportioned to the divine 
acts. This proportionality is made possible by our gifted participation in the divine nature and 
processions: “The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of 
the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God 
rightly.”323  
 The highest analogy of proportion is not when the mind knows and loves itself as God 
knows and loves himself, but when the mind knows and loves God as God knows and loves Godself 
—that is, insofar as the mind imitates God’s knowing and loving by having a proceeding word 
and proceeding love that are proportionate to God’s Word and Love. But it is precisely insofar as 
these acts are specified by the same object (God) that assimilation according to analogy exists 
(because recall, Thomas has now connected proportionality to the representation of species). That 
is, for our spiritual processions to be proportionate to the divine processions, they must likewise 
have the same object. This means that the relevant proportion (between our processions and 
God’s) is interwoven with conformation. When my proceeding word and love imitate God’s 
because I am contemplating God, there is both a proportion between our words and proceeding 
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loves, as well as a conformation of me to God. I speak loving words proportionate to God’s, and 
insofar as I do, God becomes even more deeply present in me as the known and beloved (which is 
to say, I am more deeply conformed to God). There is somewhat of a circle with respect to 
conformation here. Through the divine indwelling, the Trinity becomes present in us as the 
known and the beloved. It is this very presence that allows us to utter loving words about the 
Trinity, which in turn deepens the divine presence as known and beloved within us. Nevertheless, 
notice that now the conformation includes not only conformation to the object, but also to the 
acts, which for us remain distinct (my acts of knowing and loving God are distinct from God, even 
while they draw me closer to God). In short, through gratia gratum faciens, we come to know and 
love (acts) God (object) as God knows and loves himself, truly and rightly in freedom, which 
includes thinking rightly about creation and redemption. This is our perfection in salvation. This 
is our trinification. 
  Chapter 6 – Page 363 
CHAPTER 6                                                                                   
CONTEMPLATA ALIIS TRADERE: THE TRINITY, FRIENDSHIP, 
AND CONVERSATION 
1. Analepsis and Prolepsis 
IN CHAPTER 5, I EXPLORED the psychological analogy, the imago Trinitatis, and the assimilation of 
the human image to the divine exemplar. Therein, I emphasized the fact that in Thomas’s mature 
trinitarian theology, we find that the very same operations and their terms provide the analogy for 
the conception of the divine processions as well as the explanation for the mode of divine 
indwelling in the human person. The immanent operations of knowing and loving have the 
processions of word and love as their immanent terms. As Wilkins explains, these immanent terms 
“constitute an intersubjective field: intellectum in intelligente in the procession of the Word and 
amatum in amante in the procession of the Spirit.”1 Insofar as the known is in the knower, the 
known is an inner word.2 Insofar as the beloved is in the lover, the beloved is proceeding love.3 
Through the divine missions, which communicate a share in the divine life, the human person is 
brought to imitate and participate in the divine intersubjective field. This means that through 
graced operations of knowing and loving, God becomes present to the human person as the 
known in the knower and as the beloved in the lover. Furthermore, on account of the divine 
indwelling, the triune God is also present to the human person according to the divine processions 
constituting this intersubjective field.4 In other words, the human person participates in the divine 
processions of Word and Love, themselves—the immanent terms of God’s self-knowledge and 
self-love that constitute the divine intersubjective field. 
                                                
1 Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions,” 697. See also Thomas Aquinas, Comp. theol., c. 46. 
2 See Comp. theol., c. 37. 
3 See Comp. theol., c. 45. 
4 ST Ia, q. 38, a. 1c. 
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 In this chapter and the conclusion that follows, I will continue to explore this divine 
intersubjective field and the human person’s participation in it. Specifically, I will do so in the 
context of friendship (an intersubjective field) and one of its primary activities, conversation.5 In 
turning to friendship, it will become clearer that ‘knowing God’ does not mean solely gaining 
knowledge or information about God. Rather, it means knowing God personally, as a friend. It is 
knowing God in this latter sense that leads us to salvation. Herein, the focus turns toward the 
relationship between trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology, on the one hand, and 
preaching and teaching in the context of the divine missions, on the other. Where the previous 
chapter discussed how the psychological analogy illuminates the process by which the human 
person becomes more like God, this chapter will consider how the psychological analogy 
illuminates the process by which a person becomes a preacher and teacher. (According to Torrell, 
“Thomas uses the terms praedicatio and doctrina interchangeably.”6) In the conclusion, I will 
consider how the Summa is written to support this process. I argue that the processes of becoming 
more like God and of becoming a preacher/teacher are closely linked because they entail the 
same operations—knowing and loving God—and because both processes take place in the 
context of friendship with God. These are, in fact, the same operations by which any Christian is 
assimilated to the triune God. However, for Thomas, the preacher and teacher have a special role 
in the divine economy for the sake of the common good.7 For example, Thomas observes that “if 
one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these 
gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pt. 4:10, ‘As every man hath received grace, 
                                                
5 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 28, a. 1 ad 2. 
6 Torrell, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2011), 161. 
7 ST II-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c. See also ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 2. The persons to whom one preaches or whom 
one teaches may not be able to devote their time to contemplative study on account of the roles they, in 
turn, have within divine providence and the divine economy, and other commitments they have, for 
example, as lay persons. 
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ministering the same one to another.’”8 Furthermore, to help others to know and love God, one 
must first be knowing and loving God, himself. Or to put it in terms of friendship, fostering one’s 
own friendship with God through a contemplative knowing and loving of God helps one 
encourage others in their friendship with God. 
 In order to support this argument, I will return to the emphases on contemplata aliis 
tradere—handing on to others the fruits one has gained in contemplation—(Chapter 1) and the ordo 
disciplinae (Chapter 2). Returning to these emphases will situate the Dominican’s vocation to 
preach and teach within the setting of the Summa theologiae. I aim to recover Thomas’s idiom 
(contemplata aliis tradere) to argue that trinification—and therefore a contemplative study of the 
triune God and of oneself as the image of the triune God—is relevant to preaching and teaching, 
and conclude by suggesting how the Summa supports this process as a performative text supporting 
a transformative encounter with sacra doctrina. 
2. The Vetula and Wisdom 
Two preliminary notes in order. The first regards a person Thomas refers to as the “uetula” (old 
lady) who is not educated, and yet knows more about God and leading a good life than the 
greatest philosopher. The second regards Thomas’s distinction among types of wisdom. In raising 
these preliminary notes, I hope to communicate Thomas’s own awareness of the profound 
limitations of speculative theology, even while he dedicates much of his life to developing sacra 
doctrina as a science that is also wisdom, and to thinking through the place of speculative theology 
in the divine economy and its relation to the works of the active life.  
 With respect to the uetula, as Thomas remarks in one of his sermon-conferences, “None of 
the philosophers before the advent of Christ with all of their striving were able to know so much 
of God and of those things necessary for [eternal] life as an old woman [uetula] knows through 
                                                
8 ST Ia, q. 96, a. 4c. 
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faith after the coming of Christ.”9 Thomas then proceeds to argue that believing what we cannot 
see is not foolish; it would only be foolish “if we were able to know perfectly all things visible and 
invisible.”10 However, “our knowledge is weak to such a point that no philosopher would be able 
to investigate perfectly the nature of a single fly.”11 Thomas then turns the objection on its head: 
real foolishness is to forsake believing anything but that which one can know with certitude on 
one’s own.  
 What makes the uetula and the teacher or preacher similar is that they both value 
believing, and see the foolishness of withholding their assent from things they cannot establish 
with certainty on their own. They have an attitude of receptivity, of listening to God. Where a 
theologian or preacher can help the uetula is in supporting her desire to consider whether any 
reasons can be found for the truth she believes and loves.12 As Marshall observes, “In beings who 
think discursively—who cannot, like God, apprehend everything at once but must move from 
thought to thought—the believing mind’s yearning to share in the inherent luminosity of divine 
truth naturally takes the form of a desire to see the rational connections among the truths of faith, 
and indeed among all the believes we hold true.”13 To apprehend things at once is to have 
wisdom, which is a single and simple knowledge of everything. As rational creatures, we must 
approach this view discursively, for which the ordo disciplinae of scientia is most useful. Insofar as 
sacra doctrina is a science that approaches wisdom, one of the primary contemplative fruits is to 
understand the connections among the mysteries of faith, the coherence of revelation.14 Handing 
                                                
9 The Sermon-Conferences, 20-21. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 ST IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c. 
13 Bruce Marshall, “Quod Scit Una Uetula,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 8. 
14 See James A. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I, q. 1,” The Thomist 38 
(1974). 
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on this fruit in preaching or teaching can provide consolation to believers because these 
connections help disclose the intelligibility of the Christian faith.15 
 The second preliminary note regards the distinction between the intellectual virtue of 
wisdom, which can be acquired, and the infused gift of wisdom, which is from the Holy Spirit.16 
As an intellectual virtue, wisdom is acquired through study and attained by the natural light of the 
intellect. It perfects “the intellect for the ‘consideration of truth.’”17 Wisdom considers the highest 
causes and accordingly judges all things and sets them in order.18 The intellectual virtue of 
wisdom involves the use of reason, such that judgment (the act proper to wisdom) occurs after 
reason has made its inquiry, beginning with experience and the questions that arise therefrom, 
and passing through understanding and conceptualizing. Wisdom can also be attained through 
the supernatural light of faith. This wisdom is supernatural and involves one humbly surrendering 
her own light to the self-revealing uncreated Light.  
 Lonergan explains that this supernatural wisdom, rooted in the light of faith, has a 
twofold expansion. The light of faith can be in contact with reason and with God. When the light 
of faith is in contact with reason, it is the science of theology (sacra doctrina), “which orders the data 
of revelation and passes judgment on all other science.”19 In response to the objection that sacra 
doctrina cannot be wisdom because wisdom is a gift whereas sacra doctrina requires study, Thomas 
explains that sacra doctrina is “acquired by study, though its principles are attained by revelation.”20 
Here we can observe the relationship between acquired wisdom and grace, recalling that grace 
does not destroy, but rather, perfects nature.21 In this way, the wisdom of sacra doctrina surpasses 
                                                
15 SCG I, c. 9, §2. 
16 See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 6c; Ia-IIae, q. 57, a. 2c. 
17 R.J. Snell, “Connaturality in Aquinas: The Ground of Wisdom,” Online Journal of Christian Theology and 
Philosophy 5, no. 4 (2003), http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/snell-aquinas.shtml, accessed July 18, 2017. 
18 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 57, a. 2c. 
19 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 101. Here, Lonergan is citing ST Ia, q. 1, a. 6c and ad 2; a. 8. 
20 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 6 ad 3. 
21 See ST q. 1, a. 8 ad 2. 
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the wisdom of metaphysics (which is not supernatural in any way) while maintaining an affinity 
with it because sacra doctrina does require study. Besides contact with reason, faith also involves 
contact with God. This is what is usually called “infused wisdom,” which is one of the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit each of which “enable the person who possesses faith formed by charity to respond to 
the special prompting of the Holy Spirit.”22  Specifically, “it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the 
Holy Ghost to judge aright about [divine things] on account of connaturality with them: thus 
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that ‘Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he not only learns, 
but is patient of, Divine things (non solum discens, sed et patiens divina).’”23 However, both the wisdom 
that is sacra doctrina and the wisdom that is a gift of the Spirit are supernatural insofar as they 
involve faith. As Wilkins explains, “Both the wisdom that is theology and the wisdom that is 
docility are supernatural: both are involved with matters too high for us, and both are grounded 
in a single, otherworldly love that is for us the basis for our listening, the loved law of our assent, 
the source and measure of the questions that follow upon it.”24  
 The wisdom of sacra doctrina is a sort of hybrid wisdom. It is supernatural insofar as it is 
attained by the light of faith, but it is also acquired insofar as reason is operative under this light. 
Notice that Thomas distinguishes sacra doctrina as wisdom from the intellectual virtue of wisdom. 
Sacra doctrina as wisdom that is acquired does not merely complement and extend the ordering 
achieved by wisdom as an intellectual virtue. If that were the case, it would be limited to adding 
knowledge that is beyond human reason. Yet, as Levering writes, “In fact, sacra doctrina both adds 
this supernatural knowledge and reorders all that can be known naturally in light of the triune God as 
our beginning and supernatural end.”25 Sacra doctrina as wisdom reorders everything according to 
God’s self-knowledge as revealed in Jesus Christ. Specifically, it does so according to knowledge of 
                                                
22 Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 29. 
23 ST IIa-IIae, q. 45, a. 2c. 
24 Wilkins, “A Wisdom on the Concrete,” 11 (draft of a chapter for an unpublished manuscript; cited with 
permission of the author). 
25 Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 31 (emphasis added). 
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the divine persons, which Thomas counts as a saving truth we need to know in order to think 
rightly about creation and redemption.26 This reordering provides consolation to the uetula, even 
amidst her gift of wisdom, because it discloses the connections among the mysteries of the faith, 
and so the coherence of revelation. 
 The gift of wisdom explains why Christians do not need to be philosophers—or 
theologians, for that matter—to be contemplatives. The baptized are connaturalized to 
knowledge of the first truth by charity through the gift of wisdom, which is both contemplative 
and practical because the gift of the Holy Spirit directs all aspects of the human person.27 At the 
same time, “because study is necessary for sacra doctrina, the wisdom attained by natural reason 
(the intellectual virtue of wisdom) remains necessary even for the theologian possessing the gift of 
the Holy Spirit.”28 The theologian (or the teacher/preacher) studies precisely because he is called 
to “have fuller knowledge of matters of faith and to believe them more explicitly” for the sake of 
the common good.29 The gift of wisdom and the wisdom of sacra doctrina acquired through the 
study each has a place within the divine economy. Thus, while these wisdoms are distinct, in the 
concrete unfolding of the Christian’s life, they are harmonious and work together toward the 
graced perfection of the human person and the entire human community on the way to eternal 
friendship with the triune God. As Wilkins writes, “As grace perfects nature, as infused virtue 
perfects acquired, as the love of God transforms human loving, so the wisdom of docility to the 
Spirit draws up and transforms the human love of wisdom and its pursuit through study. But this 
transformation is not to the exclusion of cooperation but rather makes cooperation possible.”30  
 This excursus on wisdom helps to clarify what I mean by claiming that the Summa is 
written as a contemplative study to support the trinification of the student for the sake of his 
                                                
26 ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 3. 
27 Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 31. 
28 Ibid., 33. 
29 ST IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c. See also IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 3. 
30 Wilkins, “A ‘Wisdom of the Concrete,” 15 (Chapter 3 of an unpublished manuscript).  
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becoming a better teacher or preacher. I do not mean to suggest that reading the Summa somehow 
guarantees or bestows the divine gift of wisdom. What I do argue is that when the wisely ordered 
path of the Summa is traveled, the journey can be a transformative encounter with sacra doctrina for 
the traveler—and particularly with the saving truths about the Trinity, both in itself and in the 
trinitarian missions. The Summa is offered, in other words, as cooperative aid in support of the 
reader’s assimilation to the triune God, which in turn supports his ability to speak meaningfully to 
others about the God he has come to know and love as a friend. Just as an encounter with a 
teacher can transform a student, so can an encounter with a text. Teachers and texts alike are 
secondary or ministerial causes within divine providence. The secondary cause never replaces the 
primary cause of the transformation that occurs in the process of teaching and learning, wherein 
the primary cause is God as the author of our intellectual light. Nor does the secondary cause 
negate the divine initiative that alone is capable of healing and elevating our nature and all that 
follows. Rather, these secondary causes are given the dignity of participating in God’s providence 
and economy.  
3. Recalling the Earlier Chapters: Thomas as Preacher and Teacher 
In order to start illuminating Thomas’s theology of teaching and preaching in relation to his 
trinitarian theology, I will review some of the most salient points from the first two chapters. 
Chapter 1 emphasized the ways in which the Dominicans were a unique religious order in 
thirteenth century Europe. It also situated Thomas Aquinas’s decision to become a Dominican, 
and his pedagogical and pastoral roles within the order, in the context of the unique character of 
the Dominicans’ mission and interpretation of the vita apostolica. Chapter 2 aimed to enliven the 
Summa theologiae by retrieving it as a pedagogically- and pastorally-minded performative text that 
can be fruitfully engaged as a series of contemplative questions for the intellectual and spiritual 
formation of the Dominican. Specifically, Chapter 2 turned to Thomas’s generalized and 
analogical application of the Aristotelian ordo disciplinae to sacra doctrina, as well as to the main 
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prologues of the Summa and its creedal plan. When brought together, these three elements help to 
demonstrate that the form and the content of the Summa belong together. Only when form and 
content are kept together does the true pedagogical nature and pastoral orientation of the Summa 
come to life. 
3.1 Friar Thomas Aquinas: A Pastorally-Minded Theologian 
The Order of Preachers was founded with an outwardly directed mission in which the 
Dominicans’ primary concern was the salvation of others, not their own personal holiness. Recall 
the following passage from the Dominicans’ constitution during their establishment in 1220: “Our 
order is recognized as having been especially instituted from the beginning for preaching and the 
salvation of souls, and our study should be principally and ardently directed to this end with the 
greatest industry, so that we can be useful to the souls of our neighbors.”31 Thomas says 
something similar in Contra Impugnantes:  
For their own sake, [holy men] would prefer to adhere to Christ by contemplation, either 
in this world, in so far as human infirmity will permit them so to do, or in the next world, 
where contemplation is made perfect. For the sake of others, however, charity urges them 
at times to interrupt their much-loved contemplation, and to expose themselves to the 
stress of active life. Hence while by desire they enjoy the quiet of contemplation, for the 
sake of their neighbor’s salvation they patiently endure the toil of action.32 
Throughout this polemical text, Thomas articulates the mutually supportive relationship between 
contemplation, study, teaching, and ministry.  
 As Tugwell notes, this apostolic quality imbued every aspect of Dominican spirituality: 
“The all-absorbing ambition of the friars was to be ‘useful to the souls of others.’ Their own 
spiritual exercises were designed to make them better preachers, and their own spiritual progress 
was not sought as a goal in its own right, but rather as a kind of spin-off from their service of 
                                                
31 The Primitive Constitutions of the Order of Friars Preachers, prologue. 
32 Contra Imp., c. 38, reply. 
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others.”33 This mission set them apart from many of their contemporaries. Their entire lives were 
structured around their vocation as preachers.34 Prior to the Dominicans, no religious order 
existed that was adequately fitted to the particular demands of a preaching ministry, especially 
doctrinal preaching.  
 Humbert of Romans commented on the aforementioned constitution. He explained that 
the order has two ends, preaching and the salvation of souls. However, while preaching is the 
immediate aim of the order, it is subordinate to its ultimate aim, the salvation of souls. He then 
linked the work of saving souls to serious study, for study is what would make the Dominicans 
serviceable.35 Further, as Wendlinder comments, “Dominic discerned that this [ultimate] end 
could be better achieved through ‘learned preaching’ than simply through moral exhortation.”36 
In other words, Dominic recognized the value of helping believers come to understand the 
theological reasons for Christian behavior, as well as the value of understanding what one 
believes. Similarly, when considering whether it is meritorious for believers to seek understanding 
by using their reason, Thomas writes: “[H]uman reasons may be consequent to the will of the 
believer. For when a man’s will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out and 
takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason does not 
exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit.”37 Such an understanding exercises and 
consoles the believer: “There are certain likely arguments that should be brought forth in order to 
make divine truth known. This should be done for the exercise and consolation of the faithful [ad 
fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium], and not with any idea of refuting those who are adversaries.”38 
                                                
33 Tugwell, introduction to Early Dominicans: Selected Writings, 4. 
34 Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas, 173. 
35 See Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’, 5. 
36 Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 29. The reason, as we will see, pertains to 
the understanding of sacra doctrina as necessary for salvation. 
37 ST IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c. 
38 SCG I, c. 9, §2. Thomas continues, “For the very inadequacy of the arguments would rather strengthen 
them in their error, since they would imagine that our acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such 
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Lastly, Thomas echoes the Dominican ministry of saving souls through learned preaching in the 
first question of the Summa when arguing for the necessity of sacra doctrina on account of the 
necessary knowledge it hands on.39 In the divine economy, God uses human teachers to help 
hand on this necessary knowledge. In the opening prologue, Thomas acknowledges that he has 
taken up this task.40  
 Beyond forming a novel relationship between study and preaching, the Dominicans also 
gave contemplation a radically new orientation by seeking contemplation as study. Contemplative 
study was for the sake of preaching to others, on behalf of their souls. This serious study of sacred 
teaching was part of the transformation the monastic lectio divina taking place at the time.41 
Dominicans sought to preach and teach from the scientia they gained from this transformed 
contemplation. In other words, the source of Dominican contemplation was study, namely, the 
study of sacra doctrina. The Dominicans also reordered the end of contemplation by putting it at 
the service of their outwardly directed mission. Lastly, in addition to their transformation of 
contemplation according to both its source and end, the Dominicans also focused the active life 
upon the specific activity of preaching.  
 These unique elements setting the Order of Preachers apart from their contemporaries 
were reflected in their adoption and adaptation of the vita apostolica. In their efforts to return to the 
lives of the apostles, the Dominicans embraced the evangelical model, which sought to imitate the 
apostolate of the apostles (rather than their communal way of life).42 Based on historical research, 
as well as the increasing significance given not only to Thomas’s scripture commentaries, but also 
to his sermons, scholars now believe the apostolate of the Dominicans was the primary motivation 
of Thomas’s vocational decision, not their connection to the university. Similarly, more recent 
                                                                                                                                            
weak arguments.” 
39 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 1c. 
40 See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 9 ad 2; IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c. 
41 See Aumann, Christian Spirituality in the Catholic Tradition, 127. 
42 See Tugwell, The Way of the Preacher, 111-116.  
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scholarship convincingly argues that Thomas’s Dominican life was the real focus of his intellectual 
labors. Furthermore, not only was Thomas himself a member of the Order of Preachers, but he 
was also one of its most prized teachers and he was appointed a preacher-general. 
 Lastly, the Dominican educational structure and Thomas’s role therein highlighted his 
pedagogical concerns and skills. The first level of education, the schola (conventual school), 
provided the friars with the education they needed in order to become learned preachers. 
Thomas’s own work as a teacher was focused at the second tier of Dominican education. These 
schools were called studia provinciala, and they included provincial schools of theology. Thomas’s 
studium personale at Santa Sabina in Rome (1265-1268) was the first such school. He composed the 
Summa theologiae at Santa Sabina specifically for his Dominican students in response to the 
pedagogical deficiencies in the current texts. Many of these students would go on to become 
lectors at the conventual schools (scholae). Thus, Thomas was teaching students who would 
become the teachers of those Dominicans preparing to become preachers.43  
 At the close of Chapter 1, I called to mind that the contemplative study by which 
preachers hand on sacra doctrina for the sake of the salvation of souls is one kind of speaking about 
God. Here, I follow Wendlinder in conceiving preaching as “speaking about God.”44 As this 
current chapter proceeds, I will consider speaking, itself, in the context of the conversations of 
friendship, conversations which may include preaching and teaching as ways of helping others 
develop friendship with God. I will do so by way of the verbum qua prorumpat in affectum amoris. I aim 
to argue that Thomas understands there to be an important relationship between knowing God 
and speaking about God, and that the verbum illucidates this relationship.  
                                                
43 See ST Ia, q. 103, a. 4. See below §6. Conclusion: Contemplata Aliis Tradere, Friendship, and Trinification. 
44 See Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 64. 
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3.2 Thomas Aquinas: The Wise Pedagogue 
Essential to the endeavor to enliven the Summa as a pedagogical and pastoral text was the 
demonstration that the form and content of the Summa belong together, and cannot be separated 
without detriment to the text, as well as to the reader’s experience of the text. Separating the form 
and content neglects the pedagogical intention Thomas set for the Summa. This separation also 
fails to perceive the synthetic element undergirding the moving viewpoint of the text.45 In 
particular, I focused on Thomas’s generalized and analogical application of the Aristotelian ordo 
disciplinae to sacra doctrina, paying careful attention to the opening prologue to the Summa and the 
major prologues to each of the parts. I argued that the ordo disciplinae, as a pedagogical order, was 
the primary motivation behind Thomas’s organization of the Summa. For example, the ordo 
disciplinae is the reason the questions on the Trinity of Persons follow the questions on the divine 
essence, not a preference for metaphysics or the “one God.” Furthermore, the goal of the ordo 
disciplinae—and of the Summa—is understanding, not certainty. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
separations of form and content often betrayed a misunderstanding of this goal, assuming instead 
that Thomas intended to provide, for example, an encyclopedia of answers to theological 
questions. 
 The true depth of Thomas’s wise pedagogy came to the fore when considering how he 
integrated the ordo disciplinae with the Articles of Faith so as to enliven the Summa with the 
movement of salvation history. He ordered the material pedagogically, selecting a universal 
starting point and proceeding according to the needs of the student—that is, he chose the ordo 
disciplinae as his method. Yet, Thomas also gave voice to God’s involvement with human history, 
                                                
45 “Moving viewpoint” is a phrase taken over from Lonergan, which he uses in the introduction of Insight to 
explain his method of proceeding: “For the single book may be written from a moving viewpoint, and 
then it will contain, not a single set of coherent statements, but a sequence of related sets of coherent 
statements. Moreover, as is clear, a book designed to aid a development must be written from a moving 
viewpoint” (Insight, CWL 3, 18). This means that things worked out and developed earlier in the text are 
intended to aid the reader in her own personal development later in the text. As the text moves along, so 
one’s viewpoint or horizon develops and matures, which allows the reader to enter in to new contexts.  
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not by proceeding chronologically, but by accentuating the divine wisdom and goodness holding 
creation and redemption together in one single and simple view. In fact, he argued in the 
trinitarian questions that knowledge of the Trinity is necessary precisely so that we may correctly 
understand creation and redemption. He unfolded the Articles of Faith in a way commensurate 
with salvation history by using the neo-Platonic exitus-reditus structure to facilitate an expression of 
a fundamental scriptural pattern in which God is freely and providentially the beginning and end 
of all things.46 At the same time, Thomas also systematically reordered the Articles of Faith into a 
more scientific pattern that wisely brings the nexus of these mysteries of faith into relief.47 Having 
recalled the unique features of the early Dominicans, as well as the method, structure, and goal of 
the Summa, let us now turn to the relationship between trinitarian theology and trinitarian 
anthropology, on the one hand, and the mixed life on the other.   
4. The Verbum, Teaching, and Preaching 
Thomas’s account of the procession of the word that breaks forth into love draws together (1) 
trinitarian theology, (2) theological anthropology and the assimilation of the created image to the 
divine exemplar, and (3) the process of teaching and learning—which, like preaching, is an 
instance of contemplata aliis tradere—within the divine economy. In order to draw out this 
connection between trinitarian theology, anthropology, and contemplata aliis tradere according to the 
shared operations and terms that illuminate each of these in Thomas’s work, I explore the role of 
the verbum in teaching and contemplation. I will then turn to the mixed life, itself, and the role 
Thomas assigns it within the divine economy. 
                                                
46 See Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas Aquinas, 306-20. Also see ST Ia, q. 1, a. 3 ad. 1; a. 7c. 
47 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, aa. 7-8. 
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4.1 The Role of the Inner Word in Teaching and Contemplation 
Thomas’s general theory of teaching highlights the dependence of the student or learner on 
someone or something other than herself:  
All our knowledge of the truth is from another: either from instruction [disciplinae], as 
from a teacher; or from revelation, as from God; or by a process of discovery, as from 
things themselves, for ‘the invisible things of God are clearly known by the things that 
have been made’ (Rom 1:20). Consequently, in whatever way a person acquires his 
knowledge, he does not acquire it on his own.48  
Michael Sherwin explains the meaning of “disciplina”: “A disciplina is any demonstrative science in 
which we acquire knowledge from demonstrations offered by a teacher (magister).”49 Furthermore, 
the knowledge acquired from a disciplina is knowledge acquired interpersonally, by way of a 
student-teacher relationship. Thomas adverts to this relationship in a question on the religious life 
in the Summa. Therein, he focuses on the importance of the student giving himself over to the 
teacher’s care:  
[T]he religious state is a school and exercise [disciplina vel exercitium] for tending to 
perfection. Now those who are being instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain 
end must needs follow the direction of someone under whose control they are instructed 
or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master. Hence religious need to 
be placed under the instruction and command of someone as regards things pertaining to 
the religious life.50 
 Thomas considers teaching in three distinct parts and contexts of the Summa. Moreover, 
when he considers teaching, the verbum of understanding usually plays a significant role.51 This is 
important because it explicitly links Thomas’s theory of teaching to Thomas’s trinitarian theology 
and trinitarian anthropology. He first considers teaching in the Prima pars in the context of his 
                                                
48 In Ioan. 7, lect. 2, n. 1040.  
49 Sherwin, “Christ the Teacher,” 182. Sherwin references In Boethii De Hebdomadibus, 1. Patrick Byrne 
further clarifies Sherwin’s explanation. Byrne comments that from Thomas’s study of Aristotle, he would 
have likely known that the kind of knowledge acquired through demonstrations is not knowledge of 
truths, but knowledge of the reason(s) for the truths. As Byrne observes, in the present context of 
trinitarian theology, this would mean demonstrations that reveals the trinitarian reasons, so to speak, for 
truths about creation and redemption. 
50 ST IIa-IIae, q. 186, a. 5c. 
51 The exception in the passages I cite is the question on the spiritual works of mercy. 
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metaphysics of creation, and in particular, in his consideration of divine providence.52 Next, he 
considers teaching in the Secunda Secundae, first its place within the divine economy for the 
common good, then as a spiritual work of mercy, and lastly when discussing the virtues pertaining 
to certain individuals, which he considers in the context of grace, and particularly, of gratuitous 
grace.53 It is also in these latter questions that Thomas references the ordo doctrinae, specifically in 
the question on religious life, the final question of the Secunda Secundae.54 Finally, Thomas considers 
teaching in the Tertia Pars when discussing the life Christ chose, whether Christ learned, and 
Christ’s own doctrine or teaching.55  
 The process of human teaching and learning is a genuine instance of one human causing 
spiritual (as in incorporeal) development in another. As such, it is part of God’s providential 
ordering of creation. The question is how a teacher (master) teaches a discipline to a student. In 
Question 117 of the Prima pars, Thomas explains that teaching does not occur because all humans 
have one passive intellect, as Averroes taught, nor because the teacher rouses the student to 
remember what he already knew, as Plato taught. Rather, “We must therefore decide the 
question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him 
from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4).”56 The teacher is a helping or 
ministerial cause to the student’s natural ability to know the previously unknown. The teacher is 
secondary to the principal cause, God, who bestows on all human persons the interior intellectual 
                                                
52 ST Ia, q. 117. 
53 On teaching within the divine economy, see ST Ia-IIae, qq. 1-2. On teaching as a spiritual work of 
mercy, see ST IIa-IIae, q. 32, a. 2. On teaching in relation to gratuitous graces, see ST IIa-IIae, q. 171, 
prol.; q. 177, a. 1. 
54 Recall that the ordo doctrinae (the order of teaching) is the corresponding element of the ordo disciplinae. 
They refer to the same reality—the order of teaching and learning—but from the two perspectives of 
those involved, i.e., the teacher and the student, respectively. 
55 There are numerous other places in Thomas’s corpus in which he considers teaching, especially his 
commentary on John’s gospel and a number of Pauline Epistles, as well as De veritate. 
56 ST Ia, q. 117, a. 1c. 
  Chapter 6 – Page 379 
light (as a participation in divine uncreated light) by which they know anything.57 Furthermore, 
“anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of 
things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): ‘All 
teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge.’”58 Thus, the teacher is a helping 
cause who cooperates with the student’s own natural capacity and wisely helps the student move 
from known to unknown. This movement, as we have seen, is the pedagogical movement of the 
ordo disciplinae.  
 It is in specifying exactly what the teacher’s role is with respect to the student that we find 
the importance of the inner word: “The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, 
nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that 
the [disciple], by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts [i.e., inner words], the signs 
of which are proposed to him from without.”59 Thus, for the process of teaching and learning to 
take place, both teacher and student must conceive inner words about the matter at hand. A good 
teacher is one who is able, based on her own understanding and conceptualizing, to propose 
appropriate “signs”—to speak intelligently and coherently, to come up with good examples, to 
have a variety of ways of explaining something, to provide diverse phantasms, etc.—so that the 
student can in turn have an insight and form concepts about what she has understood.  
 Earlier, in an article on the speech of angels, Thomas differentiates between speaking to 
oneself and speaking to another. In this distinction, a connection begins to emerge between 
contemplation (consideration of truth) and action (concern with external works). The connection 
hinges on the inner word, which can be considered within or spoken outwardly. In this article, 
Thomas explains that speaking to oneself involves consideration of the inner word (“conceptus mentis 
                                                
57 See ST Ia, q. 117, a. 1. See also Ia, q. 12, a. 2; Ia, q. 84, a. 5. 
58 ST Ia, q. 117, a. 1c. 
59 ST Ia, q. 117, a. 1 ad 3. 
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interius verbum”), whereas “to speak [loqui] to another only means to make known the mental 
concept [conceptum mentis] to another.”60 Again, “to speak is to order the mental concept to 
another…”61 Speaking is a “sensible sign,” which we must use since we cannot make our inner 
words known to another directly.62 Teaching, then, is one way of speaking to another. In 
particular, teaching has as its end not simply making one’s inner life known to another, but 
helping a student form her own inner words. In the same question on the speech of angels, 
Thomas likens teaching to communicating or sharing: 
Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of 
giving [communicet] one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the 
patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner. …In another way one thing is 
ordered to another to receive [accipiat] something, as in natural things the passive is 
ordered to the agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master.63  
This question not only underscores the importance of the inner word in the process of teaching 
and learning. It also points ahead to the importance of conversation (speaking and listening) as an 
activity of friendship, and friendship between God and humanity as made possible by a certain 
communicatio. Further, it highlights the significance of contemplation and role of listening in 
conversation. For example, when considering the second way in which speaking an inner word is 
ordered to another (that is, in receiving—e.g., listening), Thomas offers contemplation as an 
example: “Gergory says (Moral. Ii) that ‘the angels speak to God, when by contemplating 
[respiciunt] what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration.”64 
                                                
60 ST Ia, q. 107, a. 1c. Thomas here uses “loquor” (not dico) because he is discussing the outer words used to 
communicate inner words. Thus, as outer words are distinct from inner words, so is loquor from dico. This 
analogy does not hold exclusively, but it is helpful (i.e., Thomas does use “dicere” in the sense of speaking 
outer words. See, e.g., ST IIa-IIae, q. 76, a. 1).  
61 ST Ia, q. 107, a. 3 obj. 2. 
62 ST Ia, q. 107, a. 1 ad 1. God, however, can know our minds directly. As Thomas writes, “…it belongs to 
God alone to know the heart’s secrets” (ST Ia, q. 117, a. 2c). As a “sensible sign,” the speaking to which 
Thomas refers here is distinct from the dicere of the previous chapters, which is a “spiritual,” not physical, 
speaking.  
63 ST Ia, q. 107, a. 3c. 
64 ST Ia, q. 107, a. 3c. In this quotation, “respiciunt” is a synonym for contemplating. While this Article 
technically considers the speech of angels, most of what Thomas expresses is also true of humans—which 
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 Thomas also considers teaching and the role of the inner word therein in his questions on 
the contemplative and active lives at the close of the Secunda pars. While these two types of life are 
distinguished according to their operations, and according to what the people living these lives 
spend their time in and orient themselves toward, there is an operation they have in common, 
namely teaching. According to Thomas, teaching belongs to both the contemplative and active 
lives because the act of teaching has two objects: the inner word and the hearer.65 As he writes, 
picking up on the theme we just discussed (that speaking is ordered to communicating the inner 
word to another): 
The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the 
audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of 
the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, 
sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a 
truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the 
contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and 
love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): ‘Let them 
choose for themselves the better part,’ namely the contemplative life, ‘let them be busy 
with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary 
knowledge,’ thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life. The other 
object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the 
hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions 
pertain.66 
Teaching, then, has two objects, the inner word and the student. As we saw in Question 117, the 
goal is to help the student understand and conceive an inner word for himself. Sometimes, we 
conceive inner words with a practical intention—this is when the first object of teaching (the inner 
word) belongs to the active life. For example, a mother thinks something over in order to direct 
her child toward good behavior. It may be easier to conceive of teaching, with respect to both 
objects, as part of the active life. However, Thomas insists that the inner word of teaching also 
belongs to the contemplative life. This way of life clearly involves the inner word, but it does not 
                                                                                                                                            
Thomas, himself, attested to when using the example of human teachers and human speech.  
65 ST IIa-IIae, q. 181, a. 3c. 
66 ST IIa-IIae, q. 181, a. 3c. 
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seem to involve teaching given that Thomas underscores the practical (rather than speculative) 
ramifications of conceiving inner words. To understand how contemplation and teaching belong 
together, we must turn to contemplation in relation to complacency and concern, which brings us 
also to considering the mixed life and contemplata aliis tradere. First, however, there is more to be 
understood regarding the relationship of contemplation and the inner word. 
4.1.1 Contemplation, the Inner Word, and the Divine Word 
I begin with elaborating upon the role that the act that proceeds from understanding (whether 
direct, reflective, or value-reflective understanding) and the content of the act, the inner word, 
plays in contemplation. In the realm of intelligibility, by the act of understanding (intelligere), the 
person becomes one with the understood, whereas by the act of conceptualizing (concipere) and 
through the inner word, the person is able to contemplate the thing understood. That is, once the 
inner word is spoken (dicere) and received (concipere—the act of conceptualizing, which is the act of 
receiving the inner word), on account of having understood, we are able to contemplate the thing. 
Recall that the inner word is both the product of thought as well as the object of thought. As 
Lonergan writes, “It is not merely a product but also a known product; and as known, it is an 
object.”67 It is as object of thought that we contemplate the inner word, which is our expression of 
the thing understood. For example, when commenting on the inner word in the context of John’s 
gospel, Thomas writes, “in our mind there is both a ‘cogitation,’ meaning the discourse involved 
in an investigation, and a word, which is formed according to a perfect contemplation of the 
truth.”68 It is the latter—the contemplation of the reality to be known and loved—and not 
discursive reasoning, itself, that is the goal of human life.69 
                                                
67 Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 18. 
68 In Ioan. c. 1, lect. 1, n. 26. Thomas is comparing our word to the divine Word. He continues, “So our 
word is first in potency before it is in act. But the Word of God is always in act. In consequence, the term 
“cogitation” does not properly speaking apply to the Word of God.” Notice that contemplation remains 
when we are talking about the divine Word; it is discursive reasoning that is not applicable. See also De 
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 The same applies in the realms of truth and value, and even more so, because concepts 
are only possibilities; we must go on to affirm that they are true or valuable. For example, 
Lonergan writes, “in the second operation we ask, ‘Is it?’ or ‘Is it so?’ and we weigh the evidence, 
and because of the evidence we utter a true judgment, and through the true as through a medium 
we contemplate being.”70  Again, he writes (comparing God’s knowledge to ours), “since we 
progress from understanding in potency to understanding in act, we know insofar as through 
inquiry we understand, and through understanding we speak inner words, and through [true] 
words spoken interiorly as through means-in-which we contemplate beings.”71 It is through true 
words that we contemplate the reality of our knowledge. Similarly, by the act of value-reflective 
understanding (intelligere), we grasp the sufficiency of the evidence for the value of something we 
have been considering (whether that something exists or should exist). By the act of value 
judgment, we affirm the value of something and are able to contemplate the things valued. 
 Next, let us turn to contemplation, itself. Again, contemplation is “the consideration of 
truth, which is the object of the intellect.”72 This consideration of truth, and specifically, the 
consideration of God, who is the First Truth, is the ultimate beatitude of the human person.73 
Torrell calls to mind that philosophical and theological contemplation differ in Thomas’s 
estimation—much as the intellectual virtue of wisdom and supernatural wisdom differ. 
Philosophers, insofar as they are “limited to seeking a contemplation of God starting from the 
created world” on account of their appeal to reason alone, can only attain an imperfect 
beatitude.74 Christians, however, led as they are by faith, can pursue another contemplation, 
                                                                                                                                            
ver., q. 3, a. 2c; Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 18, 22-23. 
69 Torrell, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, 14. 
70 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 10-11. Here, Lonergan is referring to contemplation in 
general, not the contemplation of the divine, in particular. 
71 Ibid., 788-89.  
72 ST Ia-IIae, q. 35, a. 5 ad 3; IIa-IIae, q. 179; q. 181,  a. 1c. 
73 See SCG IIIa, c. 38; ST IIa-IIae, q. 180, a. 4. 
74 Torrell, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, 9. 
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which is also incomplete but only temporarily because it “will blossom into the perfect 
contemplation by which God will be seen in his essence in the everlasting fatherland.”75 Jordan 
Aumann makes a similar distinction, though more differentiated. He distinguishes among types of 
contemplation according to the aspect of truth contemplated: 
[The aspects] of truth contemplated may be the beautiful (aesthetic contemplation), the 
truth as such (philosophical or scientific contemplation), God as known through reason 
alone (also philosophical contemplation), God as known through reason enlightened by 
faith (theological contemplation), God as intimately experienced through faith and the 
intellectual Gifts of the Holy Spirit (infused supernatural or mystical contemplation).76  
Aumann also refers to theological contemplation as “acquired supernatural contemplation,” 
which is linked to the aforementioned special type of “hybrid wisdom” that is supernatural and 
acquired because it involves faith’s contact with reason. In speaking of the Summa as a 
contemplative study, I am referring to Christian contemplation or theological contemplation 
(acquired supernatural contemplation).  
 According to Thomas, study directly helps contemplation because studying helps 
enlighten the intellect. 77 Studying also indirectly helps contemplation by “removing the obstacles 
to contemplation, namely the errors which in the contemplation of divine things frequently beset 
those who are ignorant of the scriptures.”78 Recall that in the question on sacra doctrina, when 
considering whether scripture should use metaphors, Thomas explains that metaphors are useful 
because they exercise the minds of the studious.79 Here we see that studying the scriptures 
indirectly helps contemplation (and is a prerequisite) because it requires exercising one’s mind 
                                                
75 Ibid. See also ST IIa-IIae, q. 180, a. 4. Therein, Thomas distinguishes between the imperfect 
contemplation of the wayfarer and the perfect contemplation of the blessed. 
76 Jordan Aumann, “Appendix 3: Contemplation” in Summa theologiae, Volume 46: Action and Contemplation 
(2a2ae. 179-182), Latin text, Englishs trans., intro., notes, appendices and glossary, Jordan Aumann, O.P. 
(New York and London: Blackfriars, McGraw-Hill Book Company, and Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1996), 
104.  
77 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 5c. 
78 ST IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 5c. 
79 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 9 ad 2.  
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with respect to difficult passages. That is, it prepares the mind for a consideration of the truth, 
which requires that the mind rise above, for example thinking of God as a body:  
Thus we read in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Serapion 
through simplicity fell into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who thought that God 
had a human shape. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi) that ‘some through seeking in 
contemplation more than they are able to grasp, fall away into perverse doctrines, and by 
failing to be the humble disciples of truth become the masters of error.’ Hence it is written 
(Eccles. 2:3): ‘I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my 
mind to wisdom and might avoid folly.’ 80  
 Augustine makes a similar observation at the beginning of De trinitate regarding the 
usefulness of Scripture in overcoming the obstacles to contemplating the Trinity. He identifies 
three major errors and impediments:  
There are those who conceive of God in bodily terms, those who do so in terms of created 
spirit such as soul, and those who think of him neither as body nor as created spirit, but 
still have false ideas about him, ideas which are all the further from the truth in that they 
have no place either in the world of body, or in that of derived and created spirit, or in 
the Creator himself.81 
All three classes of errors share a disease, but also a cure. He uses St. Paul’s passage about the 
difference between milk (which is for the babes in Christ) and meat (which is for the mature) in 
order to explain this cure (1 Cor. 3:1-3). According to Augustine, scripture allows for the human 
mind to be purged or purified (humanus animus purgaretur) of these falsities. It does so by adapting 
itself to babes.82 In so doing, scripture uses words taken from corporeal things and from spiritual 
creatures, but it never uses words taken from things that do not exist at all. This purification is 
necessary “before that inexpressible reality can be inexpressibly seen by [our minds], and in order 
to make us fit and capable of grasping it, we are led along more endurable routes, nurtured on 
faith as long as we have not yet been endowed with that necessary purification.”83 
                                                
80 ST IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 5c. 
81 Augustine, De trinitate, 1.1.1. (Hill, 65). 
82 Augustine, De trinitate, 1.1.2 (Hill, 66). 
83 Ibid. 
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 It is significant that Thomas uses the same passage from St. Paul to begin the Summa. 
Early on in the Summa, he also uses a passage from Book 2 of Augustine’s De trinitate that touches 
on the same theme of the purification of the mind in relation to trinitarian theology. I will discuss 
the Pauline passage below. Regarding the relevant passage from Book 2, asking whether God is 
the supreme good, Thomas uses Augustine as the authority in the sed contra: “Augustine says (De 
Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is ‘the supreme good, discerned by purified 
minds.’”84As we will see in Section 5, the conversation about the divine good—the Trinity of 
persons—is the ultimate imitation of and participation in the triune exemplar. This conversation 
requires grace as well as purified minds, formed and exercised by a skilled teacher such as 
Thomas. As numerous scholars have argued, this exercising purification is part of what takes 
place in the initial questions of the Summa, especially questions 2-13.85 
 Lastly, let us turn to the relationship between contemplation and speculation, which will 
also provide an occasion to return to the relationship between sacra doctrina as wisdom and wisdom 
as a gift of the Spirit. Though contemplation is not technically the same as speculation, Thomas 
generally uses speculativivus and contemplativus as basically equivalent.86 This is why Torrell suggests 
considering sacra doctrina as scientia as “contemplative knowing.”87 However, there is an important 
distinction between speculation and contemplation that sometimes surfaces in the Summa. In the 
question on contemplation, Thomas distinguishes between the activities that lead to 
contemplation and the activity in which contemplation culminates.88 Speculation is an activity 
leading to contemplation, whereas the culmination of contemplation is the consideration of truth. 
                                                
84 ST Ia, q. 6, a. 2 sc. 
85 For example, see David Burrell, Exercises in Religious Understanding (Notre Dame IN:  University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1975); Wendlinder, Speaking about God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart; Mongeau, 
Embracing Wisdom. 
86 Emery summarizes Pinckaers, explaining that Thomas usually uses speculativus in his works inspired by 
Aristotle, while he reserves contemplativus for his works that draw on Christian sources. See Emery, 
“Trinitarian Theology as Spiritual Exercise,” 18, fn. 107. 
87 Torrell, “Le savoir théologique chez saint Thomas,” 369. 
88 ST IIa-IIae, q. 180, a. 3c. 
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As Aumann observes, “The final and perfecting act of speculative knowledge is the contemplation 
of truth.”89 Speculation involves the discursive process of reasoning, whereas contemplation is 
related to the act of understanding and its inner word because the mind rests once it has 
understood. Recall that all reasoning begins and ends with understanding. Reason is to 
understanding as motion is to rest. We can extend this analogy, keeping in mind that 
understanding includes the uttering of the inner word, which is the object of thought: 
        reason            ::       speculation            :: motion 
         understanding       contemplation       rest 
 
 Given the relationship between speculation and theological contemplation, we can 
appreciate how a text dedicated to handing on sacra doctrina according to the ordo disciplinae can 
support theological contemplation (under the impetus of charity) and even support (but not force 
or guarantee) assimilation to the triune God. In the Summa, Thomas helps the student reason from 
the known to the unknown and develop an understanding of the connections among the mysteries 
of faith, such that the student can rest along the way in the understanding he is gradually 
developing. As Aumann puts it: 
For Thomas…theology is predominantly speculative, theology is wisdom, theology is 
therefore contemplative activity. …The contemplation of the theologian is consequently 
an acquired contemplation, the result of the study or discursive reasoning concerning 
revealed truths. It is contemplation because it is the vision of one simple truth—God and 
all things seen in relation to God; it is wisdom because it sees into the ultimate cause of 
truth, which again is God.90 
It is only under the impetus of charity that the student traveling the path of the Summa can hope 
for his contemplative study to flower into the scientia sapida (sweet knowledge) or sapientia (wisdom) 
to which Thomas likens the Son’s invisible mission. Only then can his faith seeking understanding 
utter a word that bursts forth into love as a participation of the divine processions, themselves. 
                                                
89 Aumann, “Appendix 4: Theology and Contemplation,” in Summa theologiae, Volume 46: Action and 
Contemplation (2a2ae. 179-182), Latin text, Englishs trans., intro., notes, appendices and glossary, Jordan 
Aumann, O.P. (New York and London: Blackfriars, McGraw-Hill Book Company, and Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1996),110. 
90 Aumann, “Appendix 4: Theology and Contemplation,”110-11 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, while the Summa may be written to cultivate an analogical understanding of the mysteries 
and their relationship such that one can know and love God more deeply, it is only charity that 
can make this journey trinifying. Without charity (which Thomas maintains we lose when we sin 
mortally), faith is unformed and so the understanding we gain does not increase our knowing God 
in a meaningful way. It may increase what we know about God, but it does not increase our 
personal knowledge of God as friend. It is because of the importance of charity and its informing 
of faith seeking understanding that Thomas proposes, the religious life—and specifically, the 
mixed life—as a “exercise and school [exercitium et disciplina] for attaining charity.”91 He 
encourages his students, who are already Dominicans, to commit themselves to this school 
because it will help them overcome the obstacles to God in their lives. Thus, when proposing the 
Summa as a transformative encounter that supports the process of trinification for the sake of 
ministry, we must never forget that Thomas is teaching Dominican students whom he considers 
to be undergoing exercises in charity. In other words, the Summa’s path is only meaningfully 
traveled if we commit ourselves to  charitable practices, for only then can it support our ongoing 
transformation to becoming more and more like the triune God. 
 Our inner word and contemplation, while related to each other, are also related to the 
divine Word. These three are intimately interwoven in Thomas’s manuductio of sacra doctrina. At the 
outset of the Summa, in the opening prologue, Thomas quotes 1 Cor. 3: 1-2: “As unto little ones in 
Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat.” This is, in fact, the same passage Augustine quotes at 
the opening of De trinitate when considering the obstacles to trinitarian theology and their remedy, 
as explained above. In general, Thomas takes milk and meat to mean simple and difficult 
doctrine, respectively. In the last question of the Secunda pars, in which Thomas is considering 
entrance into the religious life, he uses a gloss on Psalm 130:2, which also references the symbols 
                                                
91 ST IIa-IIae, q. 186, a. 1 ad 4; q. 187, a. 2; 188, a. 1; q. 189, a. 1 
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of milk and meat. The gloss interprets milk and meat as the “the Word made flesh” and “the 
Word that was in the beginning with God,” respectively.92 The former makes the invisible things 
of God visible, while the latter pertains to those invisible things. In Thomas’s commentary on the 
Gospel of John, we find that this movement from one Word to the other is related to our 
knowledge of the incarnate Word as human and the incarnate Word as divine. For example, 
when commenting of John’s portrayal of the disciples’ knowledge of Christ, Thomas writes: 
Christ could be known in a twofold way. He could be known in his human nature, and every 
one knew him this way. With this in mind he says, ‘Where I am going you know, and the 
way you know.’ He could also be known as being of a divine nature, but they did not yet 
perfectly know him in this way. In reference to this, he says, ‘If you had known me, you 
would without doubt have known my Father also.’ This is clear from the fact that he 
adds, Philip, he who has seen me has seen the Father also.93 
To know the Word in his divine nature is to know the Incarnate Word as equal with yet distinct 
from the Father. That is, it is to grasp the meaning of belief in the Trinity.  
 Furthermore in both capacities—as human and as divine—the Word has a particular role 
in our learning the things of God. For example, when reflecting on the meaning of ‘in the 
beginning’ (principium) in John’s prologue, Thomas explains that ‘principium’ refers to a certain 
order of things. In learning, order is found in two ways. He writes, “As to nature, in Christian 
doctrine [in disciplina Christiana] the beginning and principle of our wisdom is Christ, inasmuch as 
he is the Wisdom and Word of God, i.e., in his divinity. But as to ourselves, the beginning is 
                                                
92 ST IIa-IIae, q. 189, a. 1 obj. 4, ad 4: “Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, ‘As a child that is weaned is towards 
his mother,’ says: ‘First we are conceived in the womb of Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments 
of faith. Then we are nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same elements. 
Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us 
as it were in her hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in good works and 
are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while we progress; until having grown out of infancy we 
leave our mother’s milk for a father’s control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine, by which we 
are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word that was in the beginning with God.’” Notice the Johannine 
imagery. The gloss on Psalm 130:2 is used to explain the progress those newly initiated into the Catholic 
faith make as they advance. They are taught the rudiments of faith, then they are baptized, culminating 
in confirmation. See also IIIa, q. 68, a. 5 ad 2 
93 In Ioan., c. 14, ect 3, n. 1886. 
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Christ himself inasmuch as the Word has become flesh, i.e., by his incarnation.”94 With respect to 
the latter, Christ, himself, helps us to progress from milk to meat by teaching us as the incarnate 
Word. As Mongeau writes, “Christ revealed in the flesh is the very knowledge which leads us to 
the contemplation of the Word which is our wisdom.”95 Christ is the way and Christ is the end. 
Here, Mongeau is referencing Augustine’s distinction between knowledge and wisdom. Thomas 
alludes to this distinction in the second article of the Summa when using Augustine in the sed contra 
(“to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and 
strengthened”).96 He is considering whether sacra doctrina is science. As Mongeau writes, 
“Augustine discusses this scientia [knowledge] fully in book thirteen: it consists of ‘all these things 
that the Word made flesh did and suffered for us in space and time...’ This knowledge is in us by 
grace, and it leads us to a contemplation of the truth which is the eternal Word…”97 He continues, 
“sacra doctrina, insofar as it is wisdom and therefore contemplation of eternal things, is 
contemplation of the Word as end.”98 Ultimately, the movement from milk to meat heads toward 
the contemplation of this Word eternally proceeding from the Father and bursting forth into 
Love.  
 In the Summa, Thomas explicitly states that the movement from milk to meat “is chiefly a 
question of the order of doctrine [ordine doctrinae], in so far as one has to pass from [an] easy matter 
to that which is more difficult.”99 This is the third time Thomas uses this phrase (the order of 
teaching and learning) in the Summa.100 The first was the opening prologue, the second was the 
prologue to the trinitarian questions. Thus, we can observe that in the opening prologue, with its 
use of the symbolism of milk and meat and its explicit reference to the ordo disciplinae, Thomas has 
                                                
94 In Joan., c. 1, lect. 1, n. 34. 
95 Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 122. 
96 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 2c. 
97 Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 122. 
98 Ibid., 123. 
99 ST IIa-IIae, q. 189, a. 1 ad 4. 
100 He uses a version of it in the Tertia pars when considering Christ’s teaching. See ST IIIa, q. 42, a. 4c. 
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in mind the movement from simple doctrine to more difficult doctrine, which he connects to the 
Word of God as the Word made flesh and the Word that was in the beginning with God (the 
eternal Word). In the trinitarian questions, Thomas brings the reader to consider the divine Word 
in its eternal relations with the Father and the Spirit. Prior to the explicit consideration of the 
Trinity and the eternal Word, Thomas had introduced the incarnate Word as our teacher in 
some of the initial questions of the Summa. That is, as Mongeau expresses it, “Rhetorically, the 
Incarnate Word himself speaks directly to the student in the first person and teaches a truth about 
God.”101 For example, in Question 16 of the Prima pars, Thomas uses John 14:6 (“I am the way, 
the truth, and the life”) in the sed contra of Article 5 to affirm that God is truth. Thus, “the Word 
who speaks in his humanity in John’s Gospel teaches something about the Word in his 
divinity.”102 Similarly, the first trinitarian question opens with the incarnate Word again teaching 
the student. This time, he teaches the student that he proceeds from God: “On the contrary, our 
Lord says, ‘From God I proceeded’ (Jn. 8:42).”103 In the article on whether there is another 
procession in God besides that of the Word, Thomas quotes John 14:16 in the sed contra: “I will ask 
my Father, and he will give you another Paraclete.”104 
 Recall that as to ourselves, the beginning of our learning is the Word made flesh. Recall 
also that speaking outer words is the means of making one’s inner word known to another. In this 
case, the incarnate Word is making himself, as the eternal Word of the Father, known to us. Thus, 
the Word speaking in his humanity teaches us something about the Word in his divinity, leading 
us to the contemplation of eternal truth according to our mode of learning, which is discursive 
and gradual. Lastly, recall that, “in our mind there is both a ‘cogitation,’ meaning the discourse 
involved in an investigation, and a word, which is formed according to a perfect contemplation of 
                                                
101 Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 124. 
102 Ibid. Mongeau cites three other questions in which the incarnate Word is rhetorically present as the 
teacher of divine things, Ia, q. 14, a. 6; Ia, q. 18, a. 4; Ia, q. 25, a. 5. 
103 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1 sc. 
104 ST Ia, q. 27, a. 3 sc. 
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the truth.”105 It is the latter that is the goal of human life, which Thomas supports by leading the 
reader from milk to meat, even using the incarnate Word, himself, as a teacher throughout the 
Summa. 
 In light of the symbolism of the Pauline scripture passage (1 Cor. 3:1-2) and Thomas’s 
selection of it for the opening prologue, I argue that Thomas offers himself as a teacher and the 
offers the Summa as a performative text that together aim to support the progression from 
knowledge of the incarnate Word to contemplation of the eternal Word.106 Thomas does so 
according to the ordo disciplinae, which imitates the divine manuductio that leads from milk to meat, 
and which includes the orderly development necessary for speaking meaningfully about God as 
one, as triune, as exemplar, as friend. He facilitates the student’s process of discursive reasoning in 
order that the student may understand and form inner words according to the perfect 
contemplation of the truth (which will only really be perfected in the life to come). Thus, we can 
understand Thomas’s manuductio of sacra doctrina as a use of the ordo disciplinae to help students 
progress from milk to meat, from the incarnate to the eternal Word in their contemplative study, 
all for the sake of their ministry to be of service to others. Having considered both our inner word 
and the divine Word in relation to contemplation, let us now turn to the relationship among 
contemplation, complacency, and concern in order to understand how teaching belongs not only 
of the active life, but also to the contemplative life.  
                                                
105 In Ioan. c. 1, lect. 1, n. 26. Thomas is comparing our word to the divine Word. He continues, “So our 
word is first in potency before it is in act. But the Word of God is always in act. In consequence, the term 
“cogitation” does not properly speaking apply to the Word of God.” Notice that contemplation remains 
when we are talking about the divine Word; it is discursive reasoning that is not applicable. See also De 
ver., q. 3, a. 2c; Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 18, 22-23. 
106 For more on Thomas offering himself as a teacher in the prologue by way of the art of rhetoric, see 
Kevin White, “St. Thomas on Prologues,” Archivum franciscanum historicum 98 (2005). 
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4.1.2 Contemplation, Complacency, and Concern 
When we are contemplating God (the divine good), oneself as the image of God, and/or 
everything insofar as it has God as its beginning and end, our contemplation involves not simply 
acts of understanding, but acts of value-reflective understanding that give rise to value judgments 
that in turn give rise to love, that is, to complacency—a resting in the beloved.107 With regard to 
why contemplation gives rise to complacency, we can turn to Thomas’s consideration of whether 
eternal happiness is an operation of the practical or speculative intellect. Therein, he argues that it 
is an operation of the latter.108 One of the reasons Thomas gives is because the speculative 
intellect, in contemplating truth, has the good within itself; it does not need to go outside of itself 
to attain the good (as is the case with the practical intellect).109 This reason is related to the fact 
that contemplation is sought for its own sake. In this way, we see the connection between 
contemplation and complacency. That is, in considering truth, the speculative intellect has the 
good within itself and so it can rest. With regard to the relationship between contemplation and 
love as complacency, the following passage is illuminating: 
As stated above good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of 
the appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension of 
the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily 
sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual 
beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the cause 
of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.110 
                                                
107 Torrell also discusses contemplation in relation to love, speaking in terms of affectivity. As he writes, “In 
speaking of ‘contemplation of the first truth,’ we must therefore not allow ourselves to be drawn into 
error, as though we were dealing with a purely intellectual activity. Thomas speaks more precisely: ‘The 
end of contemplation as contemplation is nothing else than truth; but when contemplation becomes a 
way of life it also takes account of affectivity and the good.’” See Torrell, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas 
Aquinas, 12. Torrell is quoting In Sent. III, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 1, ad 1. 
108 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 5c. 
109 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2. 
110 ST Ia-IIae, q. 27, a. 2c. See also Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, wherein he discusses the relationship 
between contemplation and complacency in Thomas’s trinitarian theology. Contemplation regards the 
word and complacency regards love: “In the Trinity, the basic character of Love [complacency] is not to 
be a principle, or to tend to anything, or to unite, but to proceed in virtue of an Understanding uttering 
the Truth of what God is. In the imago Dei, the same holds true: this is clearest in the perfect beatitude of 
the vision of God, where we have the fulness of truth that is due to understanding in the lumen gloriae what 
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In this case, both the object of contemplation and the act of contemplation cause pleasure.111 This 
calls to mind Question 93 of the Prima pars, and the interpretation I gave of it in relation to 
Question 43 in the previous chapter. In knowing and loving God (through grace), we are 
assimilated not only to God as object, but also to the divine processions as acts. Accordingly, we 
participate both in the divine nature and in the divine processions. 
 While contemplation gives rise to complacency, when it comes to contemplating the 
divine good in this life, we do not remain in complacency. Rather, complacency becomes 
concern, the object of which is the good that is not-yet. This concern includes God, not because 
God is a good that is not-yet, but because, as Crowe writes, “our understanding of God is a not-
yet and so our possession of Him by understanding is a concern, as likewise are all those things or 
artifacts or operations which are involved in coming to understand what He is.”112 What Crowe is 
discussing pertains to the imperfect beatitude of this life.113 Recall, for example, that Thomas 
remarks in his prologue to Question 3 in the Prima pars that since we cannot know God’s essence, 
he will instead lead his readers to understand what God is not. Yet, even this negative knowledge 
is rewarding: “the more perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He 
surpasses all that the mind comprehends.”114 That is, coming to terms with divine transcendence 
in relation to our ability to understand God is a meaningful development in our journey to know 
                                                                                                                                            
God is, and the consequent procession of perfected human love for God. Love no longer needs to pursue 
the good or to be a principle of its pursuit; its function is to rest in the good now possessed by 
understanding. In the imperfect beatitude that it is possible to enjoy on earth there is the truth that comes from 
contemplation of what is and can be known in this state, and there is in the will the procession of a love that corresponds in a 
simple affective relation to this good that is already in some measure possessed” (152, emphasis added).  
 Crowe continues: “Man is made for the contemplation of truth, which is a short way of saying that he is 
made for the contemplation through truth of being, and love is the natural complement of the truth” 
(154). 
111 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 35, a. 5c. 
112 Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 133. 
113 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 8. 
114 ST IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c. 
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and love God. It is this loving concern to understand God more that initiates the journey of the 
Summa. 
 Notice that concern does not pertain exclusively to the practical intellect; it also pertains 
to the speculative intellect insofar as our knowledge of anything (even a fly, as Thomas remarks) in 
this life is imperfect. In order to understand any one thing fully, we must understand how it is 
related to everything else, including how it fits in to the world order, itself (which also means 
understanding world order).115 On account of the imperfection of our speculative knowledge, we 
do concern ourselves with continually seeking to know more—this is the infinite desire to know, 
which manifests our created participation in uncreated light. Furthermore, we may begin to act in 
service of the divine good and out of a desire to share it with others, which again may include 
coming to know and love God more deeply (God as a not-yet) so we can help others do the same. 
The following is illuminating for understanding the necessity, in this life, of moving from the 
complacency of contemplation to the concern of action: 
[O]ne’s neighbor is loved insofar as she is referred to God. ‘The reason for loving the 
neighbor is God, for what we ought to love in the neighbor is this: that he be in God.’ 
Consequently, one loves one’s neighbor not as a final end, but propter Deum. This is not to 
say that love of neighbor and love of God are two different loves. To the contrary, it is 
‘with the same love of charity that we love all neighbors, insofar as they are referred to the 
one common good, which is God.’ But it is to say that God must be loved more than our 
neighbor. For friendship mainly pertains to that which causes the good that grounds the 
fellowship. The friendship of charity, therefore, principally pertains to God, who is the 
cause of happiness, but extends to the neighbor who participates in the same happiness. 
Thus, when one loves a neighbor, one participates in God’s love: ‘The charity by which 
formally we love our neighbor is a certain participation in divine charity.’ And while 
neighbor love ranks after love of God, a neighbor, because more visible, is the first thing 
to demand love—which is why someone who claims to love God, but fails to love his 
neighbor, is lying.116 
                                                
115 While we can come to understand the world order, why God chose this particular world order and not 
another remains a mystery to us. 
116 Doyle, The Promise of Christian Humanism. Doyle is quoting ST IIa-IIae, q. 25, a. 1; q. 25, a. 1 ad 2; and q. 
23, a. 2 ad 1, respectively.  
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As love of God can and should give rise to love of neighbor, so can contemplation, which gives 
rise to complacency, in turn give rise to concern. It is in this way that contemplating the inner 
word is integral to teaching, for one may contemplate divine things for the sake of handing them 
on to others. That is, consideration of the inner word with respect to teaching need not only be on 
account of directing one’s outward action but can also be on account of concern for others who 
also need the saving truth of sacra doctrina. This brings us to the mixed life and contemplata aliis 
tradere. 
4.2 The Mixed Life of Contemplation and Action 
We have already seen what contemplation means according to Thomas. As for the active life, it is 
“engagement with others, the outward practice of the moral virtues under the direction of 
prudence.”117 Where some people are intent on the contemplation of truth, others are intent on 
external actions. According to these diverse intentions, human life (with respect to the intellect) is 
fittingly divided into contemplative and active.118 While strictly speaking, the contemplative life is 
more excellent than the active life, it is fitting to sometimes prefer the active life because of the 
needs of the present life.119 In cases of necessity, these works (e.g., feeding the hungry, clothing the 
naked, etc.) are more excellent than those of the contemplative life. Thomas considers turning to 
the active life in matters of necessity a kind of “addition to” rather than a “subtraction from” the 
                                                
117 Mark D. Jordan, “Thomas Aquinas on Bernard and the Life of Contemplation,” in Bernardus Magister: 
papers Presented at the Nonacentenary Celebration of the Birth of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, Cistercian Studies Series, 
n. 135, ed. John R Sommerfeldt (Kalamazoo; Spencer: Cistercian Studies, 1992), 455. 
118 ST IIa-IIae, q. 179, a. 1c. See also a. 2c: “this division applies to the human life as derived from the 
intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective 
knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some 
external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately divided 
into active and contemplative.” 
119 ST IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 1c. 
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contemplative life because it is charity that asks us to engage in the works of the active life, and 
charity always enriches us. Yet, even then, we must not neglect returning to contemplation.120  
 The two types of lives are interdependent and mutually supportive of one another. The 
moral virtues acquired in the active life prepare one for contemplation:  
For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists, is 
hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul’s intention 
from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues 
curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations. 
Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the contemplative life.121 
In this way, the works of the active life serve and conduce to the contemplative life.122 These 
works “exercise” one for contemplation.123 Conversely, some works of the active life proceed from 
the fullness of contemplation. This is distinct from the temporary cessation of the contemplative 
life and the taking up of the active life to minister to the necessities of this life out of charity. Here, 
contemplation is preparing one for certain works of the active life, namely, preaching and 
teaching. That is, contemplation can anticipate and be ordered to a certain type of action. Of this 
relationship, Thomas writes: 
And yet there was no inconsistency in Christ’s returning to the common manner of living, 
after fasting and (retiring into the) desert. For it is becoming to that kind of life, which we 
hold Christ to have embraced, wherein a man delivers to others the fruits of his 
contemplation, that he devote himself first of all to contemplation, and that he afterwards 
come down to the publicity of active life by associating with other men.124 
 While the two lives are mutually supportive, most people seem to live the majority of their 
lives in active works. The active life is critical for the journey onto salvation because without good 
works, we cannot enter the kingdom of heaven.125 However, Thomas maintains that the most 
complete Christian is the one who can be both active and contemplative; that is, one who can 
                                                
120 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 1 ad 3. 
121 ST IIa-IIae, q. 180, a. 2c. See also q. 181, a. 1 sc. 
122 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 1 ad 2 and a. 3c. 
123 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 3 sc: “Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): ‘Those who wish to hold the fortress of 
contemplation, must first of all train [exercitium] in the camp of action.’” 
124 ST IIIa, q. 40, a. 2 ad 3. 
125 ST IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 4 ad 1. 
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lead a mixed life. As Thomas writes, “that form of active life in which a man, by preaching and 
teaching, delivers to others the fruits of his contemplation [et vita activa secundum quam aliquis 
praedicando et docendo contemplata aliis tradit], is more perfect than the life that stops at contemplation, 
because such a life is built on an abundance of contemplation, and consequently such was the life 
chosen by Christ.”126 Thus, while absolutely speaking, contemplation is more perfect than action, 
to hand on the fruits of one’s contemplation—and so to engage in the active works of preaching 
and teaching out of loving concern for one’s neighbor—is more perfect than contemplation on its 
own. In other words, the mixed life is more perfect than either the contemplative life or the active 
life.   
 As we have just seen, Thomas argues that the mixed life is the life Christ chose. He also 
suggests that we can observe both contemplative and active aspects of the divine life. For example, 
in the question on divine beatitude, Thomas writes, “Whatever is desirable in whatsoever 
beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine 
beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain 
contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the 
governance of the whole universe.”127 Unsurprisingly, Thomas also maintains that a religious 
order dedicated to the mixed life is more perfect than one directed exclusively to the active life or 
to the contemplative life. Religious orders are compared as to their excellence chiefly according to 
their ends (which are sought for their own sake), and secondarily according to their respective 
exercises (which are performed for the sake of the ends). As Thomas writes: 
Hence, a religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end that is 
absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good or because it is directed to 
more goods. If, however, the end be the same, the excellence of one religious order over 
                                                
126 ST IIIa, q. 40, a. 1 ad 2. 
127 ST Ia, q. 26, a. 4c 
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another depends secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of the 
exercise to the end in view.128  
Given that contemplation is directed to the ultimate end, our greatest good, it is more excellent 
than action. Based on these ways of measuring the lives against one another, Thomas also 
differentiates the active life into two types. The first amounts to the mixed life, and the second is 
the active life, strictly speaking. As Thomas writes: 
Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold. One proceeds from the 
fullness of contemplation, such as teaching and preaching. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in 
Ezech.) that the words of Ps. 144:7, ‘They shall publish the memory of... Thy sweetness,’ 
refer ‘to perfect men returning from their contemplation.’ And this work is more excellent than 
simple contemplation. For even as it is better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to 
others the fruits of one’s contemplation than merely to contemplate. The other work of the active life 
consists entirely in outward occupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the 
like, which are less excellent than the works of contemplation, except in cases of necessity, as 
stated above. Accordingly the highest place in religious orders is held by those which are directed to 
teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the episcopal perfection, even as in 
other things ‘the end of that which is first is in conjunction with the beginning of that 
which is second,’ as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place belongs to those 
which are directed to contemplation, and the third to those which are occupied with 
external actions.129 
Thus, there is the mixed life in which one proceeds from the fullness of contemplation. This is the 
most excellent life—even more perfect than simple contemplation. There is also the 
contemplative life, which is the next most perfect. It can and should be interrupted, however, 
when charity demands we tend to the needs of our neighbors. Next comes the active life, which in 
general is less perfect than the contemplative, but is more perfect than the latter when it is dealing 
with matters of necessity (which is the same reason contemplation must cease for the sake of 
action in this life). We can observe in Thomas’s account of the perfections of lives and of religious 
orders the outwardly directed mission of the Dominicans, in which their primary concern is to be 
useful to the souls of others by way of a contemplative study that prepares them to preach and 
teach. Such was their interpretation of the vita apostolica.  
                                                
128 ST IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 6c. 
129 ST IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 6c. 
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 Dominican education exemplified the value of seeking to know God in order to speak 
about God. Thomas is even more radical in this regard than his fellow Dominicans. Where his 
contemporaries construed sacra doctrina primarily in terms of a practical rather than speculative 
science, Thomas framed the Dominican pastoral and practical curriculum within the whole of 
theology.130 Torrell underscores how unique Thomas was in maintaining that sacra doctrina was 
primarily a speculative science: “Starting with his Sentences Commentary, Thomas is the first to 
affirm…that ‘the ultimate end of this doctrina is the contemplation of the first truth in the 
fatherland (contemplatio primae veritatis in patria).’”131 Thomas’s placement of the practical within the 
overall context of the speculative corresponded to his privileging of the mixed life. 
 We can observe a detour and return in Thomas’s construal of holy teaching as both 
speculative and practical, and of the most perfect life as the mixed life of preaching and teaching 
that does not stop at contemplation.132  The ultimate finality of sacra doctrina is the beatific vision. 
And yet, for this very reason, sacra doctrina also has a practical and pastoral finality.133 That is, 
there is a detour from the practical to the speculative—the fratres communes at Santa Sabina with 
Thomas spending the majority their time learning—in order to once again return to the practical. 
And at the same time, insofar as the ultimate finality is the beatific vision, the practical is for the 
sake of return to speculation. It is perhaps this detour from the practical to the speculative, and 
then from speculative back to the practical, all for the ultimate return to the speculative that 
exemplifies why the most perfect life was the mixed life for Thomas. The Dominicans, in handing 
on the fruits of their contemplation, do so in order that others may contemplate the truth in the 
                                                
130 Jordan, “The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching,” 43. Also see Ignatius Eschmann, “Saint Thomas 
Aquinas O.P., the Summary of Theology,” 3-6. 
131 Torrell, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, 6.  
132 See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 4. Fidelity to Thomas’s understanding of the mutual relationship between speculative 
and practical sacra doctrina is critical to discerning in what ways the psychological analogy—speculative—
can help to express the trinitarian doctrine so as to make the doctrine relevant to Christians’ decisions 
about the right way to life—practical.  
133 See Wilkins, “Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology,” 576. 
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trinifying preparation for the beatific vision. Note the resonance Thomas’s specification of the 
mixed life has with the Opening Prologue—both reference tradere. In this way, the Dominicans 
study for the sake of the common good in the divine economy of salvation.134 
4.3 Thomas’s Reflections on Contemplata Aliis Tradere: Sermons and Scripture 
Commentary 
First, I turn to a sermon that is especially noteworthy for the trinitarian orientation of this project. 
My argument is not that the Summa prepares one to teach and preach specifically on the Trinity. 
Instead, in turning to this sermon, we find an example of how a preacher hands on the fruits of his 
contemplation, even when that contemplation has been a rigorous and thoroughgoing 
contemplative study like the one found in the Summa. That is, Thomas’s sermon helps to 
concretely link together the kind of contemplative study he pursued with the type of preaching he 
practiced. That we have an example of him doing so specifically with respect to the Trinity and 
the psychological analogy accentuates the link between serious study and meaningful preaching 
because Thomas’s trinitarian theology is one of the more difficult moments of the Summa. It also 
suggests just how central a fruitful understanding of the trinitarian mystery is to preaching and 
teaching, as it enlivens this core Christian mystery. And further, it suggests just how central 
Thomas thought understanding and contemplating this mystery was to living one’s life as a 
Christian. 
 Thomas gave a series of sermons on the Apostles’ Creed during Lent of 1273. These were 
not modern sermons given in his capacity as a magister, but rather, what Nicholas Ayo calls 
“sermon conferences.” They were more like the talks we hear at retreats. These were given in the 
vernacular in Thomas’s capacity as a Dominican preacher, and they are part of a series of adult 
catechism.135 When preaching on the article of faith, “and in Jesus Christ, his only Son,” Thomas 
                                                
134 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 3. 
135 Ayo, introduction to Sermon-Conferences, 2. 
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explains that we know the Trinity now by faith, but we will know it with perfect vision once we 
pass from this life. However, he speaks of the Trinity in this life for our consolation and 
edification.136 He then proceeds to actually walk his listeners through the first moment of the 
psychological analogy, the procession of the inner word, as the best analogy for the generation of 
the Son, the Word of God:  
We are not able to grasp the generation of God except through the generation of 
whatever in created things suggests a comparison with God. But nothing is so like God as 
the soul of a human being, as the saying goes. The way of generation in the soul is as follows. 
Through the soul a human being thinks something, which is called a concept of the 
intellect. A concept of this sort issues from the soul as from a father and is called an intellectual or human 
word [verbum intellectus seu hominis]. The soul, therefore, by thinking generates its own word. 
Thus it is that the Son of God is nothing other than the Word of God, not a word 
expressed exteriorly, because such a word does not endure, but a word conceived 
interiorly.137  
It is exceedingly significant that Thomas chooses to make use of the psychological analogy in his 
preaching, though without the technical terminology (e.g., emanatio intelligibilis) and scholastic 
distinctions (e.g., transitive and intransitive operations, processio operati versus processio operationis) to 
be found, for example, in question 27 of the Prima pars.138  After challenging the retreatants 
intellectually, he then proceeds to enjoin them to make the following commitments to the Word of 
God, now analogically illuminated by way of an accessible interior experience: (1) to willingly 
hear God’s words; (2) to believe God’s words—for then God’s Word dwells in us; (3) to meditate 
upon this Word (which guards against sin); (4) to manifest this Word to others and; (5) to be doers 
of the Word. When considering the manifestation of the Word, Thomas’s Dominican orientation 
                                                
136 Sermon-Conferences, 49. Herein, Thomas is speaking specifically about the Father and the Son, affirming 
the belief that they are two persons who share one nature. 
137 Sermon-Conferences, 48-51.  
138 See Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, vol. 1, 72. While Thomas’s sermon-
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comes to the fore: “When one’s heart is full of the word of God, then it ought to overflow in 
preaching, counseling, and enkindling others.”139  
 In these five commitments to the Word of God, we see at work Thomas’s thoughts about 
the relationship between contemplation and preaching. Specifically, we witness the pastoral 
relevance of the psychological analogy in Thomas’s own preaching ministry. For Thomas, the 
psychological analogy for the Trinity is, as Mongeau expresses it, “a lived spiritual reality.”140 It is 
a reality to which the faithful can turn to engender their commitment to the Word of God. 
Thomas, himself, did not shy away from helping believers penetrate the trinitarian mystery 
according to psychological analogy. In this way, he leaves us perhaps a model of what he expected 
from the preachers he was forming—what kind of fruits he hoped they would hand on.  
 Next, let us consider an academic Thomas gave a sermon on Luke 8:5 (“A sower went 
out to so his seed”) during the mendicant controversy at the University of Paris. Recall that “not 
only was preaching part of Thomas’s life as a Dominican friar, but it was also one of his three 
tasks as a Magister in Sacra Pagina,” which also included legere (reading) and disputare (discussing).141 
One of the main themes of these academic sermons was “the contemplation of God’s love for us, 
and our love for God as a response to it” as well as “a strong emphasis on active love of the 
neighbor.”142 As Mark-Robin Hoogland explains, these sermons reveal—even more perhaps than 
his theological works—that Thomas maintains that “a believer, and especially a preacher, must 
live in accordance with what he or she knows.”143 Furthermore, in addition to sharing what one 
has (with the newly emerging urban poor of the thirteenth century, for example), one was also 
supposed to share what one knew (with, for example, the faithful who desired to understand what 
they believed).  
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 This particular sermon echoes the Dominican understanding of the relationship between 
contemplation, study, and preaching. The sower is Christ. Christ, a preacher, went out, and 
therefore so must other preachers. As to when preachers should go out, Thomas explains that 
going out (becoming a preacher) in one’s youth is fitting. Regarding the meaning of “go out,” 
Thomas assigns it a threefold interpretation. It means the sower must leave the state of guilt and 
leave the world. Yet, it also means that the sower must preach; going out is preaching. As he 
writes 
[A] preacher goes out from hidden contemplation and goes to the public [field] of 
preaching, for a preacher first ought to draw in contemplation what he will pour out later 
on in preaching…This going out is very similar to the Savior’s going out from the secret 
dwelling place of the Father to the public area of what is visible. Therefore, it says in Song 
7.11: ‘I am (here) for my beloved (dilectus), and he is turned toward me,’ namely, in the 
hidden realm of contemplation.144 
Once again we can observe the dynamic relationship between contemplation, on the one hand, 
and preaching as a work of the active life, on the other.  
 Thomas continues, explaining that contemplation, along with prayer, turns the soul 
toward God, “and through internal speech God is turned to the soul. Hence the soul says: ‘My 
beloved (dilectus) is mine, and I am his’ [Song 2.16].”145 Contemplation, then, is a form of 
conversation with God, in which the soul and God turn to one another, speaking and listening. 
Listening is especially crucial for contemplation and the subsequent active works of preaching or 
teaching. In another academic sermon, Thomas explains that progress in wisdom is shown in 
contemplation.146 Such progress requires that a person “listen open-heartedly, because wisdom is 
so profound that no one is by himself sufficient to contemplate it.”147 This conversation between 
God and the preacher continues in the preacher’s preaching, for he goes out with God. 
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Continuing to comment on the book of Songs, chapter 2 (“Come, my beloved, let us go out in the 
field”), Thomas explains that “let us go out,” discloses a particular familiarity of God with the 
preacher, indicating that together God and the preacher go out, God by inspiring the preacher, 
and the preacher by preaching.148 
 In Thomas’s prologue to his commentary on the Gospel of John, we find further 
reflections on contemplation and its relation to some of the works of the active life. According to 
Levering, for Thomas, “The production of John’s Gospel cannot be understood without grasping 
the influence of its author’s contemplation and preaching.”149 Thomas considers John one of the 
supreme contemplatives: “[A]s Augustine says in his work, On the Agreement of the Evangelists: ‘The 
other Evangelists instruct us in their Gospels on the active life; but John in his Gospel instructs us 
also on the contemplative life.’”150 Specifically, John’s contemplation pertained to the meat of the 
eternal Word: “John the Evangelist was raised up to the contemplation of the nature of the divine 
Word and of his essence when he said, ‘In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with 
God’…”151 In John the Evangelist, we see someone who has handed on his contemplation to 
others. As Thomas writes, “John has [handed] on [tradidit] this contemplation to us in his 
Gospel.”152 Again, “so John the Evangelist, who had drawn the truth about the divinity of the 
Word from the very fountain-head of the divine breast, wrote this Gospel at the request of the 
faithful. And in it he gives us the doctrine of the divinity of Christ and refutes all heresies.”153  
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 Notice that as in the academic sermon on Luke 8, the works of teaching and preaching 
arise from drawing in the truth during contemplation. Where in the sermon Thomas spoke of the 
Son’s going out from the secret dwelling place of his Father, here we see Thomas speaking of the 
contemplative’s participating in the Son’s presence with the Father through his closeness to the 
incarnate Word. For example, John writes, “One of his disciples, whom Jesus loved, was lying 
close to the breast of Jesus” (John 13:23). Commenting on this passage, Thomas writes: 
John here mentions three things about himself. First, the love he had for Christ as he 
rested on him. John said that he was lying, that is resting. …Secondly, he intimates his 
knowledge of mysteries, which were made known to him by Christ, and especially for the 
writing of this Gospel. He says he was lying close to the lap of Jesus, for the lap signifies 
things that are hidden: ‘The only Son, who is in the lap of the Father, he has made him 
known’ [1:18]. Thirdly, he mentions the special love Christ had for him, saying, whom 
Jesus loved, not exclusively, but in a way above others. Exactly how Christ loved him 
more than others will be stated more clearly at the end of this book.154 
Again, contemplation is related to rest. Further, John’s knowledge pertains to the mysteries of 
faith, which are the hidden things—the secrets, the deep things—of God, which the Father makes 
known. As for Christ’s great love for John, Thomas maintains that it is due to John’s purity of 
heart, the depth of his wisdom, and John’s own love for Christ. In the following section, I will 
revisit Thomas’s commentary on John’s gospel, and on John the evangelist, himself, in the context 
of friendship.  
5. The Trinity and the Conversations of Friendship 
In what has preceded, we have considered the meaning of Thomas’s idiom, contemplata aliis tradere. 
We will next consider this idiom in the context of the Trinity and the conversations of friendship. 
Conversation is one of the primary activities of friendship. In this section, I will relate friendship 
and conversation to Trinitarian theology. In so doing, I will practice what Norris Clarke calls a 
“creative retrieval” of Thomas.155 Specifically, I will draw upon Lonergan’s analogical conception 
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of the Holy Spirit as divine personal Listening and Lawrence’s advance of this conception in 
terms of “God as conversational.”156 While Thomas teaches the dependence of the Holy Spirit on 
the Father and the Son, he did not explicitly speak of this dependence in terms of proceeding 
Listening, but instead spoke of it in terms of Love. Yet, a similar order obtains between knowledge 
and love as between the event of speaking and listening.157 As Thomas understands love to follow 
the conception of something understood, so we can understand listening to follow the speaking of 
a word. Furthermore, the notion of the Holy Spirit and hearing/listening are deeply intertwined 
in the Christian tradition and especially in Scripture, as it is the Holy Spirit who gives us ears to 
hear the Word. It is in keeping with this tradition and with the psychological analogy that 
Lonergan conceives the Spirit as divine personal Listening. Where Clarke attempts to integrate 
Thomas’s dynamic understanding of being with his philosophical notion of the person, I attempt 
to integrate Thomas’s understanding of the dependence of love on the word and its principle158 
with his understanding of the relationship between the Spirit, Son, and Father in his commentary 
on the Gospel of John.  
 I recognize Thomas’s trinitarian theology to be, as Lonergan puts it, “a genuine 
achievement of the human spirit,” which has a permanence of its own but can be improved upon 
and inserted in larger and richer contexts.159 The notion of conversation is one such context in 
which Thomas’s trinitarian theology can be inserted. Lonergan’s and Lawrence’s advancements 
are consistent with Thomas’s psychological analogy for the Trinity—there are even elements in 
Thomas’s work that are suggestive of conceiving the Trinity in these conversational terms—and 
have the advantage of further clarifying the relationship between contemplative study, on the one 
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hand, and preaching and teaching, on the other. This creative retrieval will involve turning to the 
meaning of conversation in relation to contemplata aliis tradere and its role in Thomas’s conception 
of charity as friendship. I will then return to teaching in the context of friendship with Christ. 
5.1 The Holy Spirit as Divine Personal Listening and God as Conversational 
After drawing out the thematic ways in which John’s gospel considers the word as a word to be 
preached and heard, Lonergan proceeds to demonstrate how the divine persons are to be placed 
in the same context of “true speaking and holy hearing.”160 He next considers “whether according 
to the scriptures it is true that in God there exists a Word that is spoken in truth and is heard and 
accepted in holiness.”161 I am using both of these together because I will use Thomas’s 
commentary on the Gospel of John, which does not differentiate as carefully between the gospel, 
on the one hand, and the trinitarian doctrine and trinitarian theology that later develop, on the 
other. 
 I begin with “true speaking.” The mission of the Son in John’s gospel is to bear witness to 
his Father’s heart. As Thomas comments, “in order for us to hear the divine Word directly, the 
Word assumed flesh, and spoke to us with a mouth of flesh. Thus he says, who is also speaking to 
you, that is, I, who was humbled for your sakes, have come down to speak these words.”162 
Furthermore, the Son is from the Father and so his teaching is his Father’s teaching. Commenting 
on John’s passage, “The word that you hear is not mine, but is from the Father who sent me” 
(John 14:24), Thomas writes: 
[I]t is not mine as coming from myself, but it is mine as coming from another, from the 
Father, who sent me. It is like saying: One who does not hear this word does not love only 
me, he also does not love the Father. And therefore, one who loves both Christ and the 
Father deserves a manifestation of each. So he says: and the word which you hear, spoken by me, 
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as a human being, is indeed mine insofar as I speak it, and yet it is not mine, insofar as it is mine from 
another: ‘My teaching is not mine’ (7:16); ‘The words that I say to you I do not speak of my 
self’ [14:10]. 
It is on account of being the Father’s eternal Word that Christ receives words from his Father to 
speak to the disciples.163  
 With respect to whether according to the scriptures it is true that in God there exists a 
Word that is spoken in truth, Lonergan answers in the affirmative. While some critics of the 
psychological analogy “might say the Son is eternal but is only proleptically called ‘Word’ on 
account of his temporal work of revealing or of creating,” Lonergan suggests that this opinion 
derives more from “the difficulty of explaining in what sense an eternal function of a word can be 
acknowledged,” a difficulty I faced in Chapter 3.164 With respect to John’s gospel, Lonergan notes 
the twofold status John assigns to a word: it is heard exteriorly when uttered and it is heard well 
when it abides in us to be contemplated and observed.165 While the sounds of words are fleeting, 
the words that abide within are “spirit and life” (John 6:63), the “words of eternal life” (6:68). 
Lonergan concludes, “But if in us our spiritual life consists in keeping and observing the words of 
eternal life, we can surely imagine something similar in God. For God is spirit (John 4.24); his life 
is certainly eternal; hence we should not in the least be surprised that there is in that eternal and 
living spirit a Word that is eternal, the word of life (1 John 1.1), eternal life (1 John. 1.2).”166 
 Regarding the mission of the Spirit, “we find the same context of holy listening and true 
speaking.”167 For example, commenting on John 14:26 (“But the [Paraclete] Counselor, the Holy 
Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your 
remembrance all that I have said to you”), Thomas writes: 
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Next he mentions the effect of the Holy Spirit, saying, he will teach you all things. Just as 
the effect of the mission of the Son was to lead us to the Father, so the effect of the 
mission of the Holy Spirit is to lead the faithful to the Son. Now the Son, once he is 
begotten Wisdom, is Truth itself: ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life’ (14:6). And so 
the effect of this kind of mission [of the Spirit] is to make us sharers in the divine wisdom 
and knowers of the truth. The Son, since he is the Word, gives teaching to us; but the 
Holy Spirit enables us to grasp it.168 
Here we observe coordination of the divine missions in relation to teaching and as grounded in 
their eternal processions. As Sherwin writes, “Thomas holds that the Spirit’s role in the Son’s 
teaching mission is fitting because of the way the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.”169 
According to Thomas, John calls the Holy Spirit the “Spirit of truth” (John 14:17) “because this 
Spirit proceeds from the Truth and speaks the truth, for the Holy Spirit is nothing else than 
Love.”170 Unlike the spirit of the world, which impels us to love earthly things, “the Holy Spirit 
leads to the knowledge of the truth, because he proceeds from the Truth, who says, ‘I am the way, 
and the truth, and the life’ (14:6). In us, love of the truth arises when we have conceived and considered truth. 
So also in God, Love proceeds from conceived Truth, which is the Son. And just as Love 
proceeds from the Truth, so Love leads to knowledge of the truth.”171 The Spirit is teacher by 
making us sharers in divine wisdom and knowers of the truth, while the Son is teacher as Wisdom 
and Truth itself.172  
 While Sherwin and Thomas are here speaking of the Spirit in terms of Love, I would like 
to recall an important point from Chapter 5 that can relate the foregoing to the Spirit as 
proceeding Listening. According to Thomas, the analogue for the Holy Spirit is Amor procedens, 
which denotes love’s dependence on Intelligere ut Dicere and the Verbum. In God, Amor procedens is 
notionally distinct from divine essential love and really distinct from the divine Dicere and Verbum. 
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The relation of proceeding love to essential love is approximately parallel to the relation of Dicere 
(speaking) to essential Intelligere (understanding). However, the order is reversed. As Wilkins 
explains: 
The act of understanding and the act of love both regard an object, and in this respect 
both are considered essential acts in God. But the act of understanding also is the principle 
of the (in God notionally distinct) act of conception, and in this respect it provides the 
analogue for the Father, dicens. In its relevant aspect, the act of love, conversely, is 
intelligibly dependent on the apprehension and affirmation of the good—that is, on intelligere 
ut dicere and verbum. It is in this latter respect that the act of love provides an analogue for 
the Holy Spirit, amor procedens.173 
Whereas with the first procession, the two aspects of the act of understanding are readily 
distinguished through the vocabulary of intelligere and dicere, the same is not true of the two aspects 
of the act of love on account of the poverty of vocabulary Thomas laments.174 It is love in its 
dependence on the apprehension and affirmation of the good that I would like us to recall, for this 
dependence is what helps to make the transition from the Holy Spirit as Amor Procedens (which 
remains a helpful analogue) to the Holy Spirit as divine personal Listening. It is in light of this 
dependence that we should take Lonergan’s following statements:  
[A]s the Son depends upon the Father, so does the Spirit of truth depend upon the Father 
and the Son. …Therefore, the truth that the Spirit of truth teaches is not his own, but that 
which he has heard and received from the Father and Son.175  
[i]f the Holy Spirit has any real and true dependence, such dependence is necessarily total 
by reason of simplicity and eternal by reason of eternal immutability. From all eternity, 
therefore, the Spirit of truth hears and accepts truth from the Father and the Son.176 
Thus, a similar “principle” and “dependence” can be observed in true speaking (the act of 
understanding as the principle of the word, and so it is called dicere) and in holy listening (the act of 
love as dependent on apprehension and affirmation, and so it is called listening). This hearing is a 
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spiritual openness.177 The acceptance of the word is also a spiritual openness. Lonergan 
concludes, “The sort of hearing and acceptance we have found in Christ and in his disciples we 
must conjecture to be found in some way in the Spirit of truth, who hears and accepts from the 
Father and the Son the truth that he teaches.”178 Thus, when Thomas writes, “The Son, since he 
is the Word, gives teaching to us; but the Holy Spirit enables us to grasp it,”179 we can understand 
the Spirit’s enabling us to grasp the Word as the Spirit’s enabling us to hear to the Word. Further, 
we can understand that the Spirit’s enabling is grounded in the Spirit’s eternally proceeding as 
Listening/Hearing. As the Son proceeds eternally as Word, and therefore in his temporal mission 
fittingly gives us teaching, so the Spirit proceeds eternally as Listening, and therefore in its 
temporal mission fittingly gives us ears to hear this teaching. 
 While it is true that both the Son and the Spirit receive, only the Spirit is said to receive as 
hearing—the Son receives as spoken—because until there is a Word, there is nothing to hear. 
John does frequently speak of the Son listening to the Father, but this is in the context of his 
temporal mission, which is led by the Spirit. Thomas argues something similar when he objects to 
the claim that the Spirit is greater than Christ because the Spirit will teach the disciples the truth 
(John 16:13). He writes: 
This is not true, because the Spirit will teach them by the power of the Father and the 
Son, for he will not speak from himself, but from me [Christ], because he will be from 
me. Just as the Son does not act from himself but from the Father, so the Holy Spirit, 
because he is from another, that is, from the Father and the Son, will not speak from 
himself, but whatever he will hear by receiving knowledge as well as his essence from 
eternity, he will speak, not in a bodily way but by enlightening your mind’s from 
within.180  
Notice that this last sentence aligns with Lonergan’s understanding of hearing as spiritual. 
Thomas continues, explaining that the Holy Spirit hears from eternity, enabling us to hear the 
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Word, too. Similarly, commenting on the Spirit’s reception from the Son, Thomas writes, “For 
just as the Son is from (de) the substance of the Father, because he receives the entire substance of 
the Father, so also the Holy Spirit is from (de) the substance of the Son because the Spirit receives 
the whole substance of the Son. Thus, because he will receive from me, and I am the Word of 
God, therefore he will declare it to you.”181 It is insofar as the Son is dependent on the Father as a 
word is dependent on understanding that we analogically conceive of the Son as an inner word. It 
is insofar as the Spirit is dependent on the Father and the Son as hearing is dependent on 
intelligently, wisely, or virtuously spoken words that we analogically conceive of the Spirit as 
hearing/listening. 
 From the foregoing, Lonergan concludes to a psychological analogy that conceives the 
Holy Spirit on the analogy of divine personal listening. He connects the “true speaking and holy 
hearing” of scripture with the eternal Word spoken in truth and heard in holiness: 
The Father is light and love (1 John 1.5; 4.8, 16). The Son is the eternal Word (John 1.1-
2), not as sounding outwardly but as abiding within, the word of life and eternal life (1 
John 1.1-2). The Holy Spirit hears and accepts truth from the Father and the Son (John 16.13-15). 
These conclusions lead to a further conclusion. The Word is the same as the Son. Hence, 
as the Son is from the Father, so also the Word is from eternal light and love. Because he 
is from the light, the Word is true; and because the light is also love, this true Word is a 
word of goodness, of life, of eternal life. But the Holy Spirit hears and accepts truth from 
the Father and the Son, which he certainly does if he hears and accepts the Word of the 
Father.182 
[T]he Word is the Son. But the Son is from the Father, and the Father is light and love; 
therefore the Word is from light and love. Again, the Holy Spirit hears and accepts from the 
Father and the Son; this he cannot do without hearing and accepting the Word emanating from light and 
love, for God is simple.183  
In other words, just as we saw in Thomas’s psychological analogy, there are two conscious 
activities that are internally ordered to one another. There is an affirming that “inwardly and 
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soundlessly ‘pronounces the affirming, evaluative judgment which expresses the good.”184 This is 
the Father, who is the infinite act of understanding as uttering, as principle of the Word. There is 
also a hearing, listening, accepting that rests content, for it is a hearing and accepting of the 
goodness understood and affirmed. This is the Spirit, who is the infinite act of love as dependent 
on the Word and the apprehension of the good. Where the Father is the infinite act of 
understanding as speaking, the Spirit is the infinite act of love as listening. Thus, in this context, 
listening is another way of conceiving the infinite act of love as proceeding love (that is, the way in 
which the Holy Spirit is notionally the act of love). The Holy Spirit proceeds by way of 
listening/hearing/accepting. In this reconceived analogy, there are still three real relations. There 
is the relation of the one speaking to the spoken. There is the relation of the spoken word to the 
speaking that speaks it. There is the relation of holy and spiritual listening, of holy and spiritual 
acceptance to the event of speaking, i.e., to the speaker and the spoken. 
 Earlier in the text, Lonergan explains something we have seen him mention, namely, that 
the hearing/listening we are speaking of is a spiritual hearing/listening, rather than a physical 
hearing with the ears. In this way, hearing/listening is like understanding, speaking, 
conceptualizing, judging, deciding, loving, etc. That is, it is an immanent act. More specifically, 
like conceptualizing, like affirming, like loving, spiritual hearing is a rational act. In the following 
passage, Lonergan expresses the way in which hearing is holy and spiritual, and in these ways, an 
appropriate analogue for the Holy Spirit: 
[B]etween the speaker and the hearer there is the utterance, which of course is the Word 
with God, God (John 1.1.), full of truth (1.14)…The one who is the perfect hearer of divine truth is 
holy; and the one who spiritually hears the one speaking spiritually is the Spirit. From both, therefore, 
from the Father speaking and the Word spoken, there proceeds, as from a single 
principle, the Holy Spirit of truth, the Spirit of the Father and the Son, the Paraclete sent 
and given to us.185 
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Thus, “hearing” or “listening” is an appropriate analogical conception of the Spirit’s procession. 
Like proceeding love, listening expresses the eternal dependence of the Spirit on the Father 
(Speaker) and the Son (Word), as well as the Spirit’s temporal mission to make us capable of 
hearing the Word. Further, this kind of hearing/listening is spiritual and holy. 
 One perhaps has only to advert to the experience of being in love to understand how love 
is like listening, for listening to the beloved suddenly takes over our desire to speak and be heard 
ourselves. Listening in this way is like love as complacency because both entail resting in the 
beloved. Becoming listeners because we have understood and affirmed the goodness of the 
beloved is an important moment in our lives and in the furtherance of good in the world, which is 
all too often bursting with the sounds of distractions, lies, and even hatred—sounds that make it 
difficult to understand and conceive genuine words or make true judgments about what is true 
and good. This is why, in our own lives, listening takes priority over speaking, just as questions 
take priority over answers. Starting with listening entails starting with questions insofar as 
questions occur to us, and therefore, in a way, we have to listen to our own inquiry. We also have 
to listen to others’ questions, and do so with a spiritual openness. This starting point can lead to 
thoughtful words, which in turn can be heard by others.186  Notice how in us, as compared to 
God, there is a sense in which the reverse is true: we begin with hearing, and end with knowing 
whereas God begins with knowing: the Father is uttering, the Word is uttered, the Spirit is 
hearing. The missions reverse the order: the Holy Spirit gives ears to hear, we adhere to the Son, 
are led to the vision of Father.187  
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 With regard to ‘God as conversational,” we have to conceive of conversation analogically. 
We can conceive analogically of the Trinity as a conversation about the divine Good; that is, the 
divine good is the formal object of the divine processions.188 
 We can also conceive of the divine conversation as the divine Good because it is this 
divine conversation that constitutes God as triune—God in se, which is the divine Good. It is the 
divine conversation—true Speaking of, and holy Listening to, the Word—that constitutes the 
intersubjective, interpersonal field in which God is present as the known in the knower in the 
procession of the Word and as the beloved in the lover in the procession of the Spirit. In Speaking 
the Word (Father as principle of the Word), God is present to Godself as known, and in Hearing 
the Word (Spirit as dependent on the apprehension and affirmation of the Good), God is present 
as beloved. Similarly, we are constituted in conversation—we become ourselves through our 
conversational acts of speaking and listening, as acts of knowing and loving, and we do so 
primarily in the context of friendship.  
 Recall that insofar as the Word bursts forth into Love, the Word is analogous to a 
judgment of value. Further, since the Word is infinite, it is an expression of infinite value. The 
Love to which the Word gives rise is likewise infinite, and is the Love of infinite value. With this in 
mind, Wilkins explains the analogy of conversation in relation to the Trinity, which also alludes to 
friendship: 
We have to ‘work back,’ so to speak, to the ‘conversation’ by thinking about conversation 
from the end or purpose, which is communion of mind and heart. In us this purpose is gradually 
achieved through a long series of expressions and the gradual development of mutual 
understanding, common judgment, common commitment. But in God it is the perfect 
community and in that sense the perfect conversation, one simple expression and love for 
infinite value.189 
                                                
188 See Wilkins, “The Trinitarian Missions and the Order of Grace,” 697-98. See also ST Ia, q. 26, aa. 1-2; 
q. 19, a. 2; q. 45, a. 6 ad 3; Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 1; IIIa, q. 1, a. 1; “the general principle is introduced at Ia, 
q. 5, a. 4 ad 2.” Thomas writes, “Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to 
move.” 
189 This formulation is from an e-mail correspondence with Jeremy Wilkins on July 2, 2017 (emphasis 
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That is, the divine conversation is a perfect conversation in which infinite value is eternally spoken 
in an expression of infinite value and eternally heard and accepted in love for the infinite value. 
Friendship, as we will see, is about working toward this communion of mind and heart by way of 
conversations, which may require self-transcendence and conversion. Let us now turn to 
conversation in general and its role in friendship. 
5.2 Conversatio and Charity as Friendship 
It is helpful to begin with the etymology of the word “conversation.” As Wilkins writes: 
Conversatio, in Latin Christian literature, is semantically more expansive than its English 
cognate. It is often used (also in classical literature) to mean a ‘way of life,’ and in 
particular frequently translates the Greek askêsis to denote ‘the ascetic way of life’. 
Benedict’s Rule uses it in something like this sense ten times.190 Etymologically it is related 
to conversion, a turning about. It can also convey intimacy, intercourse, mutual 
exchange, keeping company together.191 In English it is this last meaning, with the special 
sense of mutual exchange, which predominates.”192  
Along similar lines, Jennifer Constantine-Jackson observes, “[W]hile the English word conversation 
properly denotes a discussion between two or more persons in a particular place and time, the 
Latin term conversation denotes also an existential orientation of one’s life, thereby connoting 
something of its related term, conversion, as an ever-present invitation of orienting that life to God 
as working in and through the social engagement of discourse.”193 She also underscores that 
conversatio is associated with “the civic and domestic life, and moreover, with formation of 
character and community within that life.”194  
                                                                                                                                            
added). 
190 RB 1980: The Rule of St Benedict, ed. Timothy Fry (Collegeville, Minn: Liturgical Press, 1980), 459. 
191 See Odon Lottin, “Le voeu de ‘conversatio morum’ dans la Règle de sain Benoît,” Recherches de théologie 
ancienne et médiévale 26 (1959), 5-16. 
192 Wilkins, “‘Our Conversation is in Heaven’,” 319. 
193 Constantine-Jackson, Conversation, Friendship and Transformation, 12. See A Latin-English Dictionary of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, ed. Roy J. Defarrari (Boston, MA: Daughters of St. Paul, 1960), 240: “conversatio, onis, f., 
(1) social intercourse, association… (2) conduct, way of life.” 
194 Jennifer Constantine Jackson, Conversation, Friendship and Transformation: Contemporary and Medieval Voices in a 
Theology of Discourse (New York: Routledge, 2017), 126. See also Roy Defarrari, (ed.) A Latin-English 
Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1960), 178.   
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 Conversation, then, includes the elements of speaking and listening emphasized 
throughout this project. It also underscores that by the performance of these activities—especially 
by a commitment to authentic speaking and listening as a way of life that imitates the divine 
trinitarian life—promotes conversion. Furthermore, conversation and conversion go together 
because conversion takes place in the context of relationships, especially friendships, which have 
conversation as their central activity. In other words, conversion is interpersonal. Conversation 
also illuminates both contemplation and teaching/preaching, i.e., contemplata aliis tradere, which 
belongs to friendship within the context of the divine economy. We can understand 
contemplation as conversation with God. For example, Thomas writes, “It is written (Wis. 8:16): 
‘Her,’ i.e. wisdom’s, ‘conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy 
and gladness.’ Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation. 
Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.”195 Similarly, in Contra 
Gentiles, Thomas writes:  
First, indeed, this appears to be especially proper to friendship: really to converse with the 
friend. Now, the conversation of man with God is by contemplation of Him, just as the Apostle used 
to say: ‘Our conversation is in heaven’ (Phil. 3:20). Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit makes 
us lovers of God, we are in consequence established by the Holy Spirit as contemplators 
of God. Hence, the Apostle says: ‘But we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open 
face, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the 
Lord’ (2 Cor. 3:18).196 
In his commentary on this passage from the Corinthians, Thomas draws together contemplation 
and trinification. Notice his recollection of something we observed in Chapter 5, namely, that 
contemplating ourselves as the image of God can lead to the personally transformative 
contemplation of God. Also note the connection between knowing and loving God “by the mirror 
of reason” and our trinification: 
                                                
195 ST Ia-IIae, q. 35, a. 5 sc (emphasis added). 
196 SCG 4, c. 22, §2. 
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Beholding, i.e., speculating, which is not taken from the word which means ‘watch tower’ 
(specula), but from ‘mirror’ (speculum), i.e., knowing the glorious God himself by the mirror 
of reason, in which there is an image of God. We behold him when we rise from a consideration of 
ourselves to some knowledge of God, and we are transformed. For since all knowledge involves the knower’s 
being assimilated to the thing known, it is necessary that those who see be in some way transformed into 
God. If they see perfectly, they are perfectly transformed, as the blessed in heaven by the 
union of enjoyment: ‘When he appears we shall be like him’ (1 Jn. 3:2); but if we see 
imperfectly, then we are transformed imperfectly, as here by faith: ‘Now we see in a 
mirror dimly’ (1 Cor. 13:12).197 
 We can also understand teaching and preaching as conversations with others about God 
so that they may more readily converse with God as their friend, coming to know and love their 
friend more deeply. However, even though preaching and teaching may seem to primarily 
involve speaking, it is a speaking that is (a) dependent on the listening involved in the “drawing 
in” that takes place during contemplative study and (b) dependent on listening to those to whom 
one is called to minister, so as to discover how their faith can be best nourished. Notice, also, that 
the form of the Summa actually performs this listening, as it includes questions and objections, 
which precede the replies.  
 Turning now to charity as friendship, recall that gratia gratum faciens constitutes a new 
interpersonal situation “in which we come to enjoy, to know, to love the divine Persons and, in 
that way, to participate in the intimacy of their own eternal mutuality.”198 That is, gratia gratum 
faciens not only elevates the human soul but also gives to it the capacity to enjoy the divine 
Persons. As Wilkins observes, Thomas’s definition of charity as friendship between divine and 
human persons reflects the primacy of this interpersonal situation in Thomas’s conception of the 
order of grace.199 Lawrence remarks that Thomas’s explanation of charity as friendship with God 
is “an audacious move” because it is a definition that uses “the analogy of friendship drawn from 
Books VIII and IX of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. No one before him had attempted this because 
                                                
197 In 2 Cor. 3, lect. 3, n. 114 (emphasis added). Herein, Thomas also explains that we are glorified by 
speaking with God. The example he gives is Moses, but his is an imperfect glorification. 
198 Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions,” 695. See ST Ia, q. 38, a. 1; q. 43, a. 3 ad 1. 
199 Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions,” 695. See ST IIa–IIae, q. 23, a. 1c. 
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of Aristotle’s insistence that true friendship can only occur between equals; even those who 
celebrated the divinization of humankind were hesitant to say that graced human beings were on 
a plane of equality with God.”200 In fact, as Paul Wadell writes of Thomas, in contradistinction 
from Aristotle, “without friendship with God we cannot truly be human at all. …God is not only 
the most fitting (conveniens) Being for us to love, but also…friendship with God (caritas) is our most 
perfecting possibility and key to our beatitude.”201 Just how radical Thomas’s explanation is 
comes to the fore when he argues that even our enemies are our friends because they are God’s 
friends, and friends love one another’s friends.202 
 Doyle summarizes Thomas’s understanding of charity and friendship: “Charity is first 
and foremost a friendship (amicitia) in which we dwell with (convivere) God in fellowship 
(conversatio).”203 Dwelling with God and being in fellowship—conversation—with God characterize 
Thomas’s understanding of this divine-human interpersonal situation, that is, friendship. 
According to Aristotle, any love that is benevolent, mutual, and founded on a communicatio is 
friendship.204 Benevolence is to wish good to the beloved. However, “neither does well-wishing 
suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and 
friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication (communicatio),” that is, on 
                                                
200 Lawrence, “Grace and Friendship,” 795-96. For example, Aristotle writes, “Many people believe that a 
sort of friendship [philia] could exist between man and God, but this is false: Friendship is only possible if 
the possibility of reciprocity exists. But loving God will always remain unreciprocated. It would be really 
absurd to say: ‘I love Zeus’” (Magna Mralia II.11, 1208b, 27-31). I owe this quotation to Hans Christian 
Schmidbaur. See Hans Christian Schmidbaur, “Can Transcendence be Revealed in Immanence? 
Thomas Aquinas on Friendship of God and Image of God,” in Divine transcendence and immanence in the work 
of Thomas Aquinas: a collection of studies presented at the Third Conference of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, eds. 
Gabriela Besler and Harm. Goris (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 210. 
 True friendship here is Aristotle’s friendship of virtue, rather than friendships of utility or pleasure. 
Friendships of virtue “are formed around the best of all goods and the most perfecting of activities, 
namely, a love of virtue and a desire to seek a life of virtue in company with others.” See Paul J. Wadell, 
C.P., “The Role of Charity in the Moral Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” in Aquinas and Empowerment: 
Classical Ethics for Ordinary Lives, ed. G. Simon Harak, S.J. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 1996), 141. 
201 Wadell, “The Role of Charity,” 148. 
202 ST IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 8. 
203 Doyle, The Promise of Christian Humanism, 88.  
204 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VIII. 
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some kind of shared good.205 Thus, as Joseph Bobik argues, the question is what “communicatio” 
means because Thomas’s primary point in this article is that God and the human person have a 
certain communicatio and that the love founded upon it is caritas, which is some sort of friendship.206 
What is this communication that establishes mutuality and supports benevolence that makes it 
possible for the human person and God to be friends? Thomas identifies it as God’s sharing of 
God’s own beatitude with us, a beatitude that is eternally shared between the Father, Son, and 
Spirit:  
Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He 
communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this 
same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): ‘God is faithful: by Whom you 
are called unto the fellowship of His Son.’ The love which is based on this 
communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for 
God.207 
The goodness God shares with us—the shared good that establishes friendship—is in fact God, in 
se. God shares God’s own self with us. As Wadell writes, for Thomas, “goodness and happiness 
are inseparable because goodness alone can fulfill our quest for happiness and achieve the utmost 
possible development of our humanity. …Goodness is God and human beings are happy in the 
measure that they share in, imitate, and are transformed by the goodness of God.”208 
Furthermore, the key to human happiness is identifying what activities are unique to us as 
intellectual creatures, and perfecting these activities.209 What sets us apart is that we can know and 
love God. The questions remain how this communication of beatitude takes place and what it sets 
in motion. 
                                                
205 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 1. 
206 Joseph Bobik, “Aquinas on Communicatio, the Foundation of Friendship and Caritas,” The Modern Schoolman 
LXIV (November, 1986), 1-2. 
207 ST IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 1c. 
208 Wadell, “The Role of Charity,” 150 (emphasis added). 
209 Ibid. 
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 According to Bobik, the communicatio that makes friendship possible entails the 
following.210 First, God (superior) has offered God’s beatitude (something God makes sharable) to 
humankind (inferior). This offering makes friendship between human persons and God possible. 
Next, it is fitting that we respond to this offer by accepting the gift of beatitude and its invitation to 
friendship, and work at becoming God’s friend, and at helping others do so, too, by engaging in 
the activities of friendship, e.g., conversatio. God initiates and causes the friendship between divine 
and human persons, and God does so in order that his friends will go forth and bear fruit.211  
 Bobik summarizes this communicatio in the following terms: “God has decided to share with 
man His eternal beatitude, His endless and blessed life. And so, man and God do have something 
in common, do have a communicatio. By His decision to share, God has offered to man the 
possibility of citizenship (membership) in a divine society, in a divine social group.”212 That is, 
God has created a new interpersonal situation in which human persons do share something in 
common with God. This new interpersonal situation and communicatio are the context in which we 
can perfect, with God’s help, our activities of knowing and loving God that set us apart from all 
other creature and constitute us as the imago Dei. Friendship with God is the key to becoming 
more like God, for it is in friendship that we enter into conversation with God and others, and 
these conversations perfect our activities of knowing and loving God, to the extent that they 
involve true speaking and holy listening. The divine eternal beatitude in which we now begin to 
share, in fact, is nothing other than the divine conversation that constitutes the divine 
intersubjective field (what Bobik calls “the divine society”).  
 The divine conversation is about the divine Good. It is an eternal affirmation of the 
goodness of divine being, of divine self-constitution. To put it somewhat differently, the divine 
                                                
210 Bobik, “Aquinas on Communicatio,” 16-18. 
211 In Ioan., c. 15, lect. 3, n. 2019. 
212 Bobik, “Aquinas on Communicatio,” 18. 
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friendship of the three Persons consists in conversation. The effect of the indwelling of the Trinity 
bestows upon the human person a share in the fellowship of the divine Persons. Specifically, it 
makes her a partaker of the divine Word and of proceeding Love through the indwelling of the 
Trinity. This partaking is the trinification of the human person—it is what makes us partakers not 
only of the divine nature, but also of the divine processions, themselves. Being partakers in this 
way is what allows us to participate in the divine conversation, elevating the human conversation 
beyond its natural capacity. In other words, the trinitarian indwelling means that the soul 
participates in God’s own self-presence, as the known in the knower in the procession of the 
divine Word and as the beloved in lover in the procession of the divine Love. Thus, not only do 
we naturally image the Trinity insofar as in our minds is found the principle of the word, the 
word, and love but we also supernaturally image the Trinity and participate in the trinitarian 
conversation because we participate in the divine Word and Love proceeding.213 That is, our 
words breaking forth into love—spoken interiorly in our contemplation about God and all of 
creation in relation to God, in our contemplation of divinely revealed truths—participate in the 
eternal Word breaking forth into Love that the Father utters by understanding himself. This is the 
Word in which the entire Trinity and all of creation are spoken.214 This is the Love in which the 
entire Trinity and all of creation is loved.215 And through the indwelling of the Trinity, we 
become the friends of God partaking in this divine and loving conversation, such that we speak 
true words and love rightly. That is, these conversations can be about God (as in preaching), they 
can be with God (as in prayer and worship), or they can be conversations that raise the human 
conversation to the divine conversation. With respect to the third of these conversations, they are 
                                                
213 See Spezzano, The Glory of God’s Grace, 72: “The deiform perfection of the rational creature is the 
knowledge and love (and so the possession and enjoyment of God as object). This is a level of 
participation in the divine goodness that begins with, but goes far beyond, the participation in being and 
divine perfection possible to those creatures that bear only a trace of the Trinitarian likeness; it is the 
intentional participation of a personal being in the life of the Persons of the Trinity.” 
214 See ST Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3. 
215 See ST Ia, q. 37, a. 2c and ad. 3. 
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conversations in which we speak truly and love rightly, and in which we discuss, most 
importantly, the best way to live in light of divine revelation about who God is and who we are. 
Let us turn now to the conversations of teaching and preaching. 
5.3 Conversation, Friendship, and Teaching: Participation in Christ’s Teaching 
In the earlier consideration of teaching, I noted that the human teacher is only ever a secondary 
or ministerial cause of the student’s learning because it is God that bestows on all human persons 
the interior intellectual light (as a participation in divine uncreated light) by which they know 
anything at all.216 Nevertheless, teachers play a significant and special role in divine providence 
and the divine economy. To begin, it is helpful to note that in general, intellectual creatures have 
a special place in divine providence. The reason is twofold: they can move themselves and the 
dignity of their end is higher. Through their own operations, intellectual creatures reach “the very 
ultimate end of the whole of things…which is the knowing and loving of God.”217 Not only is the 
ultimate end knowledge and love of God according to which God is attained in se. Moreover, 
intellectual creatures aid one another in reaching this end through mutual service. Thomas 
expresses this mutual aid in terms of friendship: friends help each other attain the end by helping 
one another know and love God.218 
 Thomas considers the role of teaching in the divine economy both in the Secunda and the 
Tertia Pars. Teachers of the faith and preachers, as people dedicated to knowing and loving God 
and handing on these fruits, have a special role in the divine economy. The economy, itself, has 
an educational dimension because it involves God’s self-communication in which God teaches us 
                                                
216 See ST Ia, q. 117, a. 1. See also Ia, q. 12, a. 2; Ia, q. 84, a. 5. 
217 SCG 3, c. 111, §2 (emphasis added).  
218 See SCG 3, c. 128, §2: “Again, the end of divine law is for man to cling to God. But one man may be 
aided to this end by another man, both in regard to knowledge and to love. For men are of mutual 
assistance to each other in the knowing of truth, and one man may stimulate another toward the good, 
and also restrain him from evil. Hence it is said: ‘Iron sharpens iron, so a man sharpens the countenance 
of his friend’ (Prov. 27:17)….Therefore, it was necessary for the society of men, in their mutual 
interrelations, to be ordered by divine law.’ 
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about Godself. Furthermore, the divine manuductio has its own pedagogy. For example, divine 
revelation was gradual so that humanity could progress little by little in knowledge of God.219 
Additionally, God uses visible things to teach us about invisible things, in accordance with our 
human way of knowing.  
 In the Secunda pars, Thomas first considers teaching in relation to the Articles of Faith and 
for the sake of the common good. For example, Thomas explains that “[those] whose business it is 
to teach others, are under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to believe 
them more explicitly.”220 Fuller knowledge requires long study and exercise, which is precisely 
what those traveling the path of the Summa are engaged in doing.221 In so doing, they seek to 
ready themselves to assist those believers who desire to understand what they believe.222 Next, he 
considers teaching in relation to the works of mercy. Teaching is a spiritual work of mercy that 
helps people understand important speculative matters.223 In the final section of the Secunda 
Secundae Pars, Thomas engages in a concrete moral discourse, as these concrete conversations are 
the only useful ones when it comes to morality and discerning how to live a good life.224 Teaching 
is a concrete virtue that can be integrated into a virtuous way of life. Teaching another person is 
an instance of gratuitous grace, whereby one person cooperates with another in order to lead him 
back to God.225 As such, teaching is part of God’s plan for salvation. In the context of divine 
providence, the teacher in general is a ministerial cause helping another to learn anything 
whatsoever. In the context of the divine economy, the teacher of faith is an instrument of God’s 
                                                
219 ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7. 
220 ST IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c. See also IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 3. 
221 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad 3; q. 1, a. 8 ad 1; q. 2, a. 3; q. 2, a. 6. 
222 ST IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c. 
223 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 32, a. 2 ad. 4. 
224 See ST IIa-IIae, prologue. For example, Thomas begins, ‘After a general consideration of virtues, vices, 
and other things pertaining to moral matters, it is necessary to consider each of them in particular. For 
universal moral discourse is less useful, since actions are singulars….’ 
225 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 111, aa. 1, 4. It is gratuitous because it is beyond the person’s natural capabilities and 
merits, but not sanctifying because it is ordered toward the justification of another person. Also cf. Ia-
IIae, q. 1, prol. 
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grace, helping the other know God and the divine mysteries. Teaching is also a virtue pertaining 
to both ways of life—contemplative and active—as well a virtue pertaining to states of perfection. 
 Finally, we learn that Christ is the exception to the aforementioned rule introduced in the 
Prima Pars, namely that the teacher does not cause the intellectual light and principles by which a 
student comes to know, but helps what naturally exists within the student.226 Christ, by contrast, 
imprints his teaching directly on the hearts of his hearers.227 In his divinity, Christ teaches us 
interiorly, as only God can do.228 This interior teaching, according to which Christ imprints his 
teaching directly on his hearers’ hearts, means that he enlightens their minds with the principles 
of wisdom and knowledge.229 This is the “sweet knowledge” Thomas speaks of in Question 43 
when considering the Son’s invisible mission. It is coordinated with the Spirit’s mission, who helps 
us hear the Word to whom it has listened by imprinting love, so to speak, for the Word that is 
enlightening our minds.230  
 Thomas presents Christ’s teaching in a Trinitarian context. The Father draws us to 
himself through the Son’s teachings, and this action of the Father through the Son occurs in and 
through the action of the Spirit, whose love makes Christ’s human words alive and fruitful.231 
Christ impresses his understanding of his Father on the hearts of his listeners with the help of the 
Spirit. This inward stirring of God, this inner teaching, is the sum of all teaching. Yet, while 
Christ is the one true teacher, the first cause of all learning, he can also use creatures as 
instruments and secondary causes of his teaching, by way of his divine power and providential 
care of creation. Thus, the disciples become true teachers by participation. Thomas expresses the 
important ministerial role of teachers in his inaugural lecture, while also acknowledging their 
                                                
226 See Sherwin, “Christ the Teacher,” 183-84. 
227 See ST IIIa, q. 42, a. 4c. 
228 See De ver., q. 11, a. 1 ad 8. 
229 See De ver., q. 11, a. 1c. See also Sherwin, “Christ the Teacher,” 183. 
230 I owe this observation to Patrick Byrne.  
231 See Sherwin, “Christ the Teacher,” 190. 
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limitations, which demands they learn to rely on God. Therein, he reflects upon teaching in light 
of Psalm 103:13, “Watering the earth from his things above, the earth will be filled from the fruit 
of your works.” Wondering who could be capable of this ministerial role, Thomas writes: 
Yet, although no one is adequate for this ministry by himself and from his own resources, 
he can hope that God will make him adequate. ‘Not that we are capable of a single 
thought on our own resources, as if it came from us, but our adequacy is from God’ (2 
Cor. 3:5). So the teacher should ask God for it. ‘If people lack wisdom, they should beg 
for it from God and it will be given them’ (James 1:5). Let us pray that Christ may grant 
this to us.232 
 As Sherwin explains, “Since it is by God’s design that they can become teachers, their 
attitude toward Christ must always be one of prayer. They must ask Christ the teacher for the 
insights they need as the instruments of his instruction.”233 Herein, we can observe the importance 
of listening for the teacher’s development, a listening that can give rise to a contemplative study 
that can in turn be handed on to others. It is according to divine wisdom that people are made 
teachers, and because becoming a participant in Christ’s teaching ministry is a vocation God gives 
someone, teachers must continually approach Christ humbly and prayerfully in order to 
participate in the process of teaching and learning that is at the heart of handing on the sacra 
doctrina necessary for our salvation. Thus, while only God gives us the gift of the wisdom, those 
preparing to teach and preach do well to acquire wisdom through study—a wisdom that is more 
than the wisdom of the philosophers if not the wisdom of the uetula because it is the exercise of 
natural reason in contact with faith. Furthermore, this study exercises their minds, purifying them 
for the contemplation of the supreme good, the Trinity of persons.234 
 Christ’s incorporation of the disciples into his teaching mission, as well as Christ’s own 
teaching, are best understood in the context of friendship. In his commentary on John’s gospel, 
                                                
232 Thomas Aquinas, Inaugural Lecture in Tugwell, Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings, 363. 
233 Sherwin, “Christ the Teacher,” 184. 
234 See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 9 ad 2; q. 6, a. 2cc. 
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Thomas “describes the disciples’ participation in divine wisdom by analogy with human 
friendship.”235  As Thomas writes: 
Now he sets down the true sign of friendship on his own part, which is that all that I have 
heard from my Father I have made know to you. The true sign of friendship is that a 
friend reveals the secrets of his heart to his friend. Since friends have one mind and heart, it does 
not seem that what one friend reveals to another is placed outside of his own heart…Now God reveals 
his secrets to us by letting us share in his wisdom: ‘In every generation she [Wisdom] 
passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God and prophets.’236 
As we have seen, the conversations of friendship help us become of one mind and one heart with 
our friends, allowing us to know one another’s secret depths. John’s use of secrets, as well as 
Thomas’s, does not intend the gnostic meaning of secret knowledge, but rather, indicates the 
“deep things of God.” For example, Thomas writes, “The deep things are those which are hidden 
in Him and not those which are known about Him through creatures, which are, as it were, on 
the surface…”237 These deep things pertain to the divine truths of which we need knowledge in 
order to progress toward life’s ultimate end—to know and love God—truths we could not know 
apart from divine revelation. As Marshall explains, “For that we need access to what God alone 
can tell us about himself…Since salvation ‘is accomplished by the incarnate Son and by the gift of 
the Holy Spirit,’ the truth beyond reason which we most need to know concerns the distinction of 
the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father. The doctrine of the Trinity…is a saving truth for 
Aquinas.”238  
 Thomas explains how it is that one may come to know the secrets of God in his prologue 
to his commentary on John’s gospel. He does this in the context of expanding on the four ways in 
which John is described according to his condition. (These conditions are drawn from a passage 
Thomas chooses from Isaiah—the other person Thomas considered to be a “supreme 
                                                
235 Sherwin, “Christ the Teacher,” 190. On friendship, see In Ioan., c. 14, lect. 7, n. 1837-38.  
236 Super Ioan., c.15, lect. 3, n. 2016 (emphasis added). See also In Ioan., c. 13, lect. 4, n. 1807.     
237 In 1 Cor., c. 2, lect. 2, n. 102. 
238 Marshall, “Quod Scit Una Uetula,” 5. 
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contemplative”—in order to structure his prologue). I will highlight two of these descriptions. 
Thomas writes: 
The author, John, is described in four ways as to his condition. “He is described as to 
name as John…‘John’ is interpreted as ‘in whom is grace,’ since the secrets of the divinity 
cannot be seen except by those who have the grace of God within themselves: ‘No one knows the deep 
things of God by the Spirit of God’ (1 Cor 2:11). …John is described as to privilege since, 
among the other disciples of the Lord, John was more loved by Christ. Without 
mentioning his own name John refers to himself below (21:20) as ‘the disciple whom Jesus 
loved.’ And because secrets are revealed to friends, “I have called you friends because everything I have 
heard from my father I have made known to you” (below 15:15), Jesus confided his secrets in a special 
way to that disciple who was specially loved…239 
Thus, to come to know the secrets of God, one must have grace and also be a friend of God. It is 
friendship with God that initiates, sustains, and cultivates our knowledge of the depth of God’s 
heart. It is because we are friends of God that we are given to know the mysterious depths of 
God’s heart. Friendship is the context within which we know and love God. This means that our 
knowledge of God is more than mere facts or affirmations; it is personal. It is only in the context 
of an interpersonal relationship with God that knowledge of God is truly meaningful. 
Commenting on these same passages, Levering writes: 
For Aquinas, revelation depends upon the graced interior preparation and prayerful 
contemplation of the disciples who receive and reciprocate Jesus’ love. St. John, Aquinas 
explains, was able to grasp and to present the mystery of Jesus’ divinity in a more 
profound way than were the other evangelists because ‘among the other disciples of the 
Lord, John was more loved by Christ.’ In other words, St. John’s appropriation of sacra 
doctrina depends upon the spiritual exercise that is friendship with Christ. …If the Summa 
Theologiae’s treatise on God (one and three) is a spiritual exercise intended to form as well 
as inform the reader, then this spiritual exercise is necessarily rooted in contemplation of 
the master/friend, Jesus Christ—a contemplation of the Word through the Holy Spirit.240 
 Christ’s friendship with the disciples in which he shares the secrets learned at his Father’s 
bosom, and which he then empowers the disciples to likewise share, has educational aspects. 
Divine friendship is the context within which Christ teaches the disciples, and disciples put this 
                                                
239 In Joan., prol., n. 11. 
240 Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 42-43. 
  Chapter 6 – Page 430 
teaching into practice by teaching others.241 As Sherwin writes of Thomas’s interpretation of these 
educational aspects of the friendship among Christ and his disciples, “one of the reasons Christ 
educates his disciples is to incorporate them into his mission of leading people to himself.”242 In 
the Summa, Thomas observes that this incorporation—which involves the fact that Christ did not 
commit his teaching to writing—is in keeping with the order of teaching, so that his teaching 
might reach all in an orderly manner. Christ taught his disciples immediately and they 
subsequently taught others by preaching and writing.243 This orderly teaching is in keeping with 
the divine economy and its gradual revelation, of which Thomas spoke in the questions on faith in 
the Secunda pars. It is through letting Christ’s words abide in their hearts that the disciples “become 
fit to bear fruit in teaching.”244 His words abide in four ways: “ by your loving them, believing 
them, meditating on them and accomplishing them.”245 As Sherwin observes, “These four 
actually reduce to the twin stages of contemplating and giving the fruits of our contemplation to 
others. We are to contemplate what we believe and love, and then embody it in our actions. 
…Thomas is saying that the good news of Christ remains in the disciples when they make God 
known by the tenor of their lives and the quality of their teaching.”246 In other words, 
contemplation (here understood as meditating on the words of Christ that one loves and believes, 
i.e., considering divine truth) in this life naturally extends to helping others know and love our 
mutual friend, the triune God. The word of God that abides in us is like the Word of God, which 
goes out from the bosom of the Father to share the deep things of God with others; the Word 
remains by being poured forth—by being embodied in our actions; by our manifesting the Word 
                                                
241 As Sherwin explains, ‘[W]hen St. Thomas describes the friendship with Christ that the Spirit establishes 
among the disciples, he focuses on two educational aspects of this friendship: Divine friendship is the 
context within which (1) God teaches the disciples, and (2) the disciples put this teaching into practice by 
teaching others’ (191). 
242 Sherwin, “Christ the Teacher,” 191. See In Ioan. c. 6, lect. 1, n. 864. 
243 ST IIIa, q. 42, a. 4c. 
244 In. Ioan., c. 15, lect. 1, 1996. 
245 In. Ioan., c. 15, lect. 1, 1995. 
246 Sherwin, “Christ the Teacher,” 1992. 
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and becoming doers of the Word, as Thomas expressed it in his Lenten sermon-conference on the 
Creed.    
6. Conclusion: Contemplata Aliis Tradere, Friendship, and Trinification 
Contemplata aliis tradere is best understood as an activity of friendship. It is also one way in which the 
process of trinification can occur. I begin with friendship. In Thomas’s Dominican understanding, 
when a preacher hands on the fruits of his contemplation, his goal is the salvation of others. Given 
that our last end is eternal beatitude (the uninterrupted contemplation of God)247 and that 
beatitude as shared is the foundation of friendship with God, this goal is ultimately about helping 
others in their journey of becoming friends of God. In this way, I argue that contemplata aliis tradere 
is not only emblematic of the mixed life. It is also a facet of the new interpersonal situation 
inaugurated by the coordinated divine missions and the effect of the Spirit’s mission in us—gratia 
gratum faciens.248 It is a facet of this new interpersonal situation because it is encompassed within 
our friendship with God (contemplata as conversatio), our friendship with each other as common 
friends of God, and our efforts in helping others cultivate their friendship with God (aliis tradere as 
conversatio). In other words, contemplata aliis tradere is caught up in the divine conversation and the 
elevated human conversation, conversations that constitute the heart of friendship. Contemplata aliis 
tradere, then, is conversational: it is a drawing in (listening) so as to pour out (speaking). Yet, even 
the pouring out involves ongoing listening, as one must listen to those to whom his preaching in 
order to speak meaningfully, lest his words fall upon deaf ears.249 
                                                
247 See ST Ia-IIae, q. 4, a. 8 sc. 
248 This is most apparent in Thomas’s commentary on the Gospel of John and especially his prologue to his 
commentary in which he considers John one of the supreme contemplatives. 
249 In the Conclusion, which follows this Chapter, I will return to the plan of the Summa in order to 
demonstrate how the trajectory of the Summa is intentionally set forth to promote friendship, 
conversation, preaching, and teaching, all in the context of trinitarian theology and trinification. That is, 
the Summa heads toward the contemplation of God as triune, which is both the end of being human and 
the Dominican’s teaching/preaching.  
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 We are able to converse with God as God’s friends, such that God becomes ever more 
present to us as the known and the beloved. We are also able to converse anew with one another 
because we are now friends on God’s account—our friendship has a new and stronger basis; we 
are brothers and sisters insofar as we are God’s adopted children.250 We can converse with each 
other from this new shared horizon (communicatio) and the new life it entails (the life of grace), 
helping one another cultivate the virtues necessary for this life. These conversations with God and 
with others entail the activities of speaking and listening. These are the very activities that 
constitute us as human persons, as intellectual creatures created to the image of the Trinity. These 
conversations also involve the oneness of mind and heart that is cultivated as friends share their 
interior depths with one another and as they come to know and love each other. Thus, these 
conversations also include the mutual indwelling of friends in one another as the known and the 
beloved. Lastly, conversations are one of the primary means of our ongoing conversion, which is 
interpersonal because we become better imitators of Christ when we follow his own way of 
perfection, a way that included his relationships with his Father and their Spirit, as well as his 
friendships with his disciples. 
 Contemplata aliis tradere is also one way in which the process of trinification can occur, both 
for those handing on their fruits and for those receiving them. In this way, contemplata aliis tradere is 
a participation in the divine plan for salvation. Furthermore, the process of a teacher or preacher 
handing on the fruits of their contemplation is “triniform” insofar as it is based in acts of true 
speaking and holy listening. As we have seen, in coming to know and love God, we are moved to 
help others do the same; in this life, we do not rest in our contemplation, but seeing the needs of 
others, become concerned for their well-being and act. In helping others know and love God, a 
preacher/teacher at once cultivates friendship and assists others in their journey of becoming 
                                                
250 See ST Ia, q. 33, a. 3c. 
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more like God. This is the case precisely because speaking and listening are the acts that deepen 
our friendship with God as well as our likeness to God. Thus, the very same acts constitute our 
friendship with the triune God and our assimilation to the triune exemplar.  
 Furthermore, assimilation to God actually involves two elements, which Thomas 
discusses in the questions on divine providence. One regards God’s goodness: “and so the 
creature becomes like Him by being good…” The second regards God as “the cause of goodness 
in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good.”251 Thomas uses 
teaching as his preferred example for this second type of assimilation. Beyond teaching, an even 
greater good is to teach students to become teachers. It is not surprising that Thomas, who prizes 
the mixed life and its emphasis on teaching, would find this to be the case. In fact, historically, 
teaching others to become teachers is what Thomas was doing in writing the Summa for his studium 
personale at Santa Sabina. In light of this dual path of assimilation to the triune God and our 
ultimate end (knowing and loving God as our friend), we can observe the following in relation to 
contemplata aliis tradere: (1) knowing and loving God (contemplata) and; (2) helping others know and 
love God (aliis tradere). The following image illustrates the relationship between trinification and 
the mixed life of handing on the fruits of one’s contemplation, all in the context of conversation: 
                                                
251 ST Ia, q. 103, a. 4c. 
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Figure 3252 
I suggest that this relation is mutual because in helping others know and love God, we also deepen 
our knowledge and love because we learn from those to whom we are sent. This is a common 
experience of teachers, who often remark that they learn more from their students than their 
students learn from them. One of the reasons is that it is usually only when we have to speak of 
what we have learned to others that we encounter the humbling gaps in our own knowledge.  
 Thomas does not speak in terms of this mutuality, and so my advertence to the listening 
that a good preacher must observe is a creative retrieval of Thomas’s understanding of the mixed 
life and the reasons for its prominence. Nevertheless, we can observe traces of a kind of mutuality 
in his understanding of the order of the universe in which all creatures are interdependent. 
Perhaps, however, the best evidence comes from Thomas’s own teaching and preaching. For 
example, in the opening prologue to the Summa, we have seen Thomas’s attentiveness to the 
                                                
252 It is my observation that helping others know and love God occurs, in part, through a speaking 
grounded in listening. However, I believe Thomas would agree with this point, especially given the 
Dominican vocation to be confessors—a vocation that involves listening, and almost inevitably teaches 
confessors about humanity and grace in all their concreteness.  
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obstacles students have encountered in learning sacra doctrina. As Kevin White notes, Thomas uses 
the opening prologue to offer himself as a trustworthy guide for students precisely because he is 
aware of the difficulties that have obstructed their path.253 He has heard their difficulties. With 
regard to preaching, Thomas sought to orient his words to his audience appropriately. As Torrell 
writes: 
It is said that Thomas always denied himself the use of oratorical tricks to which 
preachers sometimes yield (display of knowledge, big words, and short stories to keep the 
congregations attention, all of which was foreign to him.) …Thomas reminds us that the 
manner of speaking must be adapted to the subject being treated. …the preacher must 
never lose sight of the essential element of Christian teaching, which is the salvation 
brought by the Cross of Christ. Therefore, those who rely on the prestige of their 
eloquence to proclaim the Cross end up emptying it of its substance. Following 
Augustine, Thomas notes that the pulpit from which Christ teaches is the Cross (crux illa 
schola erat).254 
Lastly, while Thomas may not speak in terms of listening to those to whom one preaches, he 
does—as we saw in his sermon on Luke 8—speak in terms of the preachers ongoing cooperation 
with the Father, Son, and Spirit (“let us go”).255 As he writes in his commentary on Jesus’ 
appearance to Peter in John’s gospel: “[P]reachers should have total confidence in the help of 
Christ. All that night they caught nothing, because as long as God’s help and the interior 
Preacher are not there, the words of the preacher have no effect. But when the light comes, 
enlightening hearts, the preacher makes a catch…”256  
 In adverting to God’s help, Thomas calls to mind the purely instrumental role the 
preacher plays in the divine economy. He also calls to mind the continuous listening to God that 
                                                
253 See Kevin White, “St. Thomas on Prologues,” Archivum franciscanum historicum 98 (2005). 
254 Torrell, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, 167. 
255 See above, §4.3 Thomas’s Reflections on Contemplata Aliis Tradere: Sermons and Scripture Commentary. 
Recall that the conversation between God and the preacher continues in the preacher’s preaching, for he 
goes out with God. Commenting on the book of Songs, chapter 2 (“Come, my beloved, let us go out in 
the field”), Thomas explains that “let us go out,” discloses a particular familiarity of God with the 
preacher, indicating that the together God and the preacher go out, God by inspiring the preacher, and 
the preacher by preaching. 
256 In Ioan., c. 21, lect. 1, n. 2582. 
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takes place in good preacher—God who, unlike us, can know the minds and hearts of people 
without their needing to express themselves in words.  
 Not only is contemplata aliis tradere best understood in the context of friendship and 
trinification, but friendship and trinification are intimately linked: the more we come to know and 
love our friends, the more we dwell in one another as the known in the knower and the beloved in 
the lover. When God is the friend, it is God we are becoming more like. As we saw in Chapter 5, 
this likeness occurs both because God is the object of our knowing and loving—God is who we 
are conversing with—and because in knowing and loving God, we are performing the very 
operations that are the reason we are ad imaginem Dei in the first place. Through the gift of the 
Spirit, the performance of these operations in conversation with God are even participations in 
the divine processions that constitute God as triune—as Speaking, Word, Listening. In the 
Conclusion, which follows this chapter, I will explain how the structure of the Summa supports 
friendship, conversation, and preaching/teaching in the context of trinitarian theology and 
trinification.  
 In this light, I conclude with one final observation, which draws a connection between the 
previous chapter and this chapter. We can observe an important connection between Thomas’s 
consideration of beatitude and friendship, on the one hand, and his theology of the trinitarian 
indwelling and our assimilation to the Trinity on the other. In considering our beatitude at the 
beginning of the Secunda pars, Thomas writes: 
As stated above, our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to 
attain. … Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the 
thing desired. … In the first sense, then, man’s last end is the uncreated good, namely, 
God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man’s will. But in the 
second way, man’s last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else 
than the attainment or enjoyment [fruitio] of the last end. Now the last end is called 
happiness. If, therefore, we consider man’s happiness in its cause or object, then it is 
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something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is 
something created.257 
Notice that Thomas maintains that our last end is God in se, and that in this way, our last end is 
an uncreated Good. He also maintains that our last end is our enjoyment of God, our last end, and 
that this enjoyment is a created good. Now recall the following from the trinitarian questions: 
Now a divine person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to 
the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use 
or enjoy [frui] as we please: and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by 
a rational creature united to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, 
however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect 
thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker 
of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love 
God rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person.258  
It is on account of the Holy Spirit being given to us that the entire Trinity dwells within us, 
making it possible for us to enjoy the divine Persons. The Trinity’s indwelling is the uncreated gift. 
This is the uncreated supreme good that is our last end, the cause or object of our beatitude. The 
ability to enjoy the divine persons is the created gift (gratia gratum faciens or sanctifying grace). This 
is the created good that is our last end, the effect in us whereby we are happy. Our ability to enjoy 
the divine persons is our enjoyment of our last end, and it consists in our freely knowing God truly 
and loving God rightly, according to which God is present to us as a friend (as known and 
beloved) with whom we are of one mind and heart. It is the communion of mind and heart that is 
enjoyable. This created ability is made possible by the uncreated gift of partaking of the divine 
processions themselves, for when God dwells in us, God dwells in us as God is, that is, as eternally 
constituted as triune—as Speaking, Word, Love/Listening, as true Speaking of and Holy 
Listening to the Word. We can prepare for this eternal joy, in the light of grace, through a 
contemplative study that includes exercising our minds, purifying them for the supreme good. 
The student who travels the wisely ordered path of the Summa progresses from milk to meat, and 
                                                
257 ST Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 1. 
258 ST Ia, q. 38, a. 1. 
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is thereby prepared to hand on the fruits of his contemplation, speaking to others what he has 
interiorly conceived in his transformative encounter with the Word of God.  
  
 
Conclusion – Page 439 
CONCLUSION                                                                                            
THE TRINITARIAN TELOS OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 
1. The Summa theologiae: The Journey to Becoming a Preacher Speaking about 
God 
Throughout this project, I have been arguing that the Summa theologiae is a contemplative study 
supporting the Dominican student’s trinification and friendship with God. The more the student 
of the Summa comes to know and love his friend, God, the more he becomes like God. 
Consequently, the better able he is to help others develop their friendship with God by speaking 
to them about the God he has come to know and love as a friend through his contemplative 
study. The Summa, then, is an effort to cultivate friendship between God and the human person, 
as well as among human persons. Friendship requires work, especially the work of conversation 
by which we come to know and love our friends more deeply and according to which we develop 
a deeper and deeper communion of mind and heart.  
 This conclusion pulls together the previous chapters’ insights into the particular parts of 
the Summa theologiae to demonstrate how the very structure of the Summa, itself, considered as a 
whole, supports trinification and friendship for the sake of preparing students to speak about God 
to others. This illustration brings us full circle to one of the major claims of this project, which has 
been to argue that the form and content of the Summa belong together. When kept together, 
traveling the wisely ordered path of the Summa can be a transformative encounter with sacra 
doctrina. Integrating form and content also discloses the centrality of trinitarian theology to the 
unfolding of the Summa.  
1.1 The Prima pars 
I will first consider the three main sections of the Prima pars, according to the divisio textus set forth 
in the major prologues of the Prima pars. Questions 2–26 prepare the student for the trinitarian 
theology of Questions 27–43. That the first set of questions is ordered to the second set allays any 
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concerns that the Trinity is an afterthought in Thomas’s theology. Questions 27–43 help the 
student develop concepts for engaging the trinitarian mystery. Questions 44-119 help the student 
develop concepts about creation and about oneself as created ad imaginem Dei. 
1.1.1 The Prima pars: Questions 2-26 
The initial questions on the divine essence (qq. 2-26) prepare the student to raise and address 
questions concerning the divine persons. They do so in a variety of ways. First, they help the 
students develop a true concept of God, which includes helping the student understand what can 
be said of God. Therefore, these questions are the beginning of his learning how to speak about 
God to others. Here, we can observe the relationship between one’s inner words and making 
these inner words known to others through speech discussed in Chapter 6. Second, they help the 
students understand important terms (e.g., potency and act as applied to God, immanent versus 
transitive operations, etc.), relevant to trinitarian theology. Third, they help the student purify his 
mind and thus transcend corporeal thinking. Lastly, the initial questions on the divine essence not 
only prepare the student for the trinitarian questions, but they also call the Trinity to mind at 
important junctures, indicating that the Trinity is not secondary to theology for Thomas, but 
always present, animating the believer’s journey to know and love God. 
 First, I turn to Thomas’s effort to help students develop a true concept of God and a 
suitable “religious language,” as David Burrell puts it, for speaking about God. The goal of 
understanding to which the ordo disciplinae is ordered includes the development of concepts 
because understanding gives rise to concepts. We can observe Thomas helping the student 
develop a true concept of the true God in Questions 3–11. Beginning with developing a concept 
of God is a pedagogically expedient place to start for a beginner on the way to the triune God. 
For example, coming to terms with divine simplicity is indispensable to Questions 27-43. Without 
progressing from dependent realities to independent realities (q. 2), and without coming to terms 
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with what radically differentiates them (qq. 3-11), the student cannot grasp the trinitarian 
problem. Unless the student understands the meaning of divine simplicity, confused responses to 
divine “tri-unity” arise. He will not appreciate the difficulty for understanding how this belief can 
be true, which means that the question will not spontaneously arise for him—and without good 
questions, good answers are lacking. Further, he will be susceptible to compromising divine unity 
at the expense of distinction (or vice versa) or distinguishing persons apart from and prior to their 
relations. Not only is it pedagogically necessary to begin with clarifying the meaning of “God” 
before asking whether there are processions in God1, but it is also pedagogically expedient 
because it avoids repetition, lest Thomas have to consider the divine essence thrice. 
 In Questions12–13, Thomas assists the student in coming to terms with the limits of his 
knowledge and understand how to name God within these limits respectively. These questions 
begin to help the student learn how to speak about God.2 These questions cultivate the 
methodological acuity and humility required for approaching the mysteries of faith.3 Herein, 
Thomas is concerned to teach his students the possibilities and limits of human knowing. They 
learn to differentiate what can be known naturally and what can only be known by the 
supernatural light of faith. They also learn to understand that even when human intelligence is 
enlightened by faith, we cannot provide necessary reasons for revealed truths because the reason 
for these divine mysteries is the divine essence, which in this life is unknown.4 
                                                
1 Notice that Thomas does not begin the trinitarian questions by asking whether the Son proceeds from the 
Father. Such a question presupposes the very things it seeks to illuminate—the distinction of divine 
persons. 
2 For a helpful explanation of these Questions in relation to understanding, concepts, and names, see Rudi 
te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), 95-122. 
Te Velde builds on David Burrell’s work to reinterpret Thomas’s doctrine of God as “grammar of God 
talk” (96). 
3 For the necessity of humility, see SCG I, ch. 5, no. 4. 
4 See ST Ia, q. 12, a. 11. 
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 In addition to helping the student develop a true concept of God, within Questions 2–26, 
Questions 3–13 exercise the student in the use of religious language, preparing him for his 
ministry of speaking about God, who is “the beginning and end of all things and of reasoning 
creatures especially.”5 As Burrell has expertly demonstrated, these questions exercise the student 
in learning what sorts of things can be said of that which remains incomprehensible, and how to 
say them in a way that is intelligible yet respectful of the divine mystery.6 He explains that the 
“exercise” of Questions 3-11 “might be entitled: What, if anything, can be said about the 
beginning and end of all things?”7 According to Timothy McDermott, what we find Thomas 
doing in these questions is turning “our very inability to know God into a fruitful piece of 
information about him.”8 Thomas accomplishes this, as Burrell explains, “by carefully selecting 
the topics for predication, and then by treating each topic in the two ways offered in [Question 
12, Article 12]: first, in asserting what cannot be said of God, and then trying to show how this 
restrictive predication reveals not deficiency but transcendence.”9 Based on this assessment, 
Burrell divides Questions 3-11 as follows: 
                                                
5 ST Ia, q. 2, prol. See Burrell, Exercises in Religious Understanding.  This phrase from the prologue to Question 
2 is what Burrell considers Thomas’s “shorthand” for God. 
6 Burrell, Exercises in Religious Understanding, 81.  
7 Ibid., 82. 
8 Timothy McDermott (ed.), St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Volume 2 (Ia 2-11): Existence and Nature of 
God, 18, note a. 
9 Burrell, Exercises in Religious Understanding, 86. Earlier, Burrell quoted Article 12 of Question 12: “we can be 
led from [divine effects] to know of God (1) that he exists and (2) that he has whatever must belong to the 
first cause of all things which is beyond all that is caused. Thus we know 
 (1) about [God’s] relation to creatures, and  
 (2) about the difference between [God] and them: 
  (a) that nothing created is in [God]; and 
  (b) that [God’s] lack of such things is not a 
deficiency in [God] but due to [God’s] transcendence.”  
 This translation and organization of Ia, q. 12, a. 12c. is Burrell’s. See Burrell, Exercises in Religious 
Understanding, 85. 
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(a)    (b) 
3. God’s simplicity  4. God’s perfection 
 5. General notion of good  6. Goodness of God 
 7. God’s limitlessness  8. God’s existence in things 
9. God’s unchangeableness 10. Eternity of God 
11. Oneness of God10 
 
The questions in column (a) help the student wrestle with the fact that there is nothing created in 
God (God is utterly transcendent), while the questions in column (b) help the student “turn a 
denial into a piece of information,” or as he puts it elsewhere, these questions help the student 
understand “how that denial might spell not poverty but plenitude.”11 In this way, Thomas helps 
the student learn how to speak of God in such a way that preserves both divine transcendence and 
divine immanence. The concept of analogy introduced in Question 13 is what allows us to speak 
of divine transcendence-in-immanence. This is what Kathryn Tanner calls “non-contrastive” 
language because it helps to cultivate an awareness that God is neither in opposition to the world 
nor is God identified with the world.12 Rather, God is the “Other other.”13 Thus, Questions 3-11 
can be understood as “exercise[ing] the reader in non-contrastive language-use,” while 
“Questions 12-13 take the reader beyond non-contrastive language by linking how we attain 
knowledge concerning God [q. 12] to how we speak about God [q. 13]…”14 It is in learning how 
analogical language can be used to deepen one’s awareness of God’s incomprehensibility that is 
                                                
10 Burrell, Exercises in Religious Understanding, 86-87. Burrell summarizes these columns: “In effect, question 
five denies that we call [God] good because he performs good actions…question seven denies that God is 
a definite or predictable object, and question nine says that this thing alone is not in process. The 
companion question in column (b) asks what one might make of each specific denial” (87-88). For an 
alternative way of understanding the relationship of these initial questions, see Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 
83.  
11 Burrell, Exercises in Religious Understanding, 87. “Information” is Burrell’s word. While in the previous 
chapter I contrasted “information” with personal knowledge of God, I do not find Burrell’s 
understanding of these questions inconsistent with my own, which is perhaps exhibited by his later use of 
“plenitude” rather than “information.” See Wendlinder, with whom I am in agreement (Speaking of God in 
Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 102).  
12 See Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1988). 
13 See James Alison, Broken Hearts and New Creations: Intimations of a Great Reversal (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2010), 166. 
14 Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 102-03. 
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the key to Thomas’s dynamic use of analogy.15 This is why I emphasized in Chapters 2 and 5 that 
analogical understanding is always imperfect—because we cannot affirm any of the analogies we 
use to understand God since we cannot know God’s essence—yet fruitful, because it yields a 
positive understanding of revealed truths. 
 While Burrell talks in terms of “exercises in religious language or understanding,” for 
Thomas, these exercises were historically situated in the Dominican’s task to speak to others about 
God for the sake of their salvation. That is, these exercises prepared the students for their 
contemplative study of God, the fruits of which would be handed on. Wendlinder, a student of 
Burrell, expresses this point well: 
The ‘narrative’ [of creation-sanctification-redemption] Aquinas employs in the Summa 
leads the student-readers through their own journey by exercising them in appropriately 
extending human language to the Divine, thus developing in future preachers and 
teachers skills in using language flexibly in order to draw others away from misconstruing 
the articles and doctrines of Christian faith and towards knowing God. …The ultimate 
goal of this narrative is moving the believer from focusing on knowledge about God 
toward knowing God—an awareness that ‘speaking about God’ goes beyond describing 
God to building a relationship with God.16 
Furthermore, in the first thirteen questions, “whatever Aquinas asserts about the existence, 
nature, or attributes of God intends to preserve the unique distinction of the Creator from 
creatures, and in so doing, assists the reader in developing a highly nuanced skill in speaking 
about God that will help others in their faith journey.”17 By the end of the Question 13, the 
student can truly appreciate that God’s incomprehensibility far outweighs anything that can be 
said about God, and yet, appreciating this is in itself significant in the journey of faith seeking 
understanding. It is even a perfection of our knowledge of God: “[T]he more perfectly do we 
know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses all that the mind 
                                                
15 See Ibid., 102. 
16 Ibid., 69 (emphasis original). 
17 Ibid. 
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comprehends.”18 Thus, the via negativa is not devoid of meaning and content, and in fact, 
presupposes positive claims about God. 
 In addition to helping the student recognize the strict limits and modest possibilities of our 
knowledge of God19 and learning how to extend human language to God, Thomas also 
introduces important terms that are necessary for questions that follow. For example, the 
questions on the divine operations are also pedagogically necessary for the questions on the 
distinction of persons and on the procession of creatures from God. The questions on immanent 
operations (qq. 14-21) are integral for understanding the divine processions, for which the 
intelligible emanations of word and love are the principles of analogical understanding (qq. 27-
43). The question on transitive operations (q. 25)—that is, power—is integral for understanding 
the procession of creatures (qq. 44-102). The remaining questions on immanent operations, which 
consider intellect and will together (qq. 22-24), are integral for understanding the divine 
governance of the natural created order (qq. 103-119). This discloses, as Mongeau calls it, a 
“continuity in difference”20 between the first, second, and third tripartite consideration of God in 
the Prima Pars (that is, God in se est—the divine essence and the distinction of persons—and God 
as the beginning of all things—the procession of creatures). Each consideration uses the pairs of 
intellect and will, and of immanent and transitive operations, such that what comes later depends 
upon and enriches what has preceded it. From the foregoing, it is clear that contrary to Rahner’s 
evaluation of Thomas’s starting points and trinitarian theology, Thomas does not prioritize the 
divine essence nor does he neglect the Trinity. Rather, he pedagogically prepares the student to 
engage the Trinity fruitfully. Particularly, his preparation of the student for the terms of the 
                                                
18 ST IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c. 
19 To relate this to the verbum, we can, with Lonergan, call this “a true concept of the true God.” See 
Bernard Lonergan, “Natural Knowledge of God,” in A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. 
Eds. William F.J. Ryan, S.J. and Bernard J. Tyrell, S.J., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 
119 
20 Mongeau, “Spiritual Pedagogy,” 103. 
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psychological analogy through the questions on divine immanent operations, and the clarification 
of terms and relations like potency and act, and especially the concept of simplicity, sets the 
conditions for the student to integrate the mysteries of the Trinity and the divine economy. In this 
way, the psychological analogy is propaedeutic for the divine missions and their subsequent 
unfolding in the remaining two parts. 
 Additionally, we can observe the ordo disciplinae and the orderly development of concepts 
at work in these questions. For example, in the prologue to Question 14 of the Prima Pars, Thomas 
explains that since operation naturally follows substance in the order of being, he now considers 
divine operation.21 Operation and substance are one in God, but according to the development of 
our concepts, it is intelligible to begin with substance and move on to operation. In proceeding 
this way, Thomas is following the ordo disciplinae, which takes into account how the student best 
proceeds from one thing to another, that is, from known to unknown. He is also taking into 
account the unique character of the subject matter of sacra doctrina, God, in whom there is no 
distinction, nor any priority or posteriority, which the student should have grasped by this 
juncture in the Summa.  
 A third thing these initial questions help the student accomplish is that they aid the 
purification of his mind and thus assist him in transcending corporeal thinking. Purification and 
transcendence prepare the student for the trinitarian theology of the next set of questions and for 
the student’s ultimate task of speaking about God to others.22 With Augustine, Thomas found this 
purification to be a necessary propaedeutic to trinitarian theology, though he is less explicit about 
this point than Augustine. As we observed in Chapter 6 when discussing 1 Cor. 3:1-3, which 
                                                
21 ST Ia, q. 14, prol. 
22 See above, §1.1.1. The Prima pars: Questions 2-26. First, these initial questions help the students to 
recognize the strict limits and modest possibilities of our knowledge of God. Second, they help the 
students understand important terms relevant to trinitarian theology. 
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Thomas and Augustine both use at the outset of their texts, the reader of De trinitate must undergo 
a purgation of the mind in order to approach the mystery of the Trinity and seek to understand it, 
although imperfectly, with Augustine. The reader must adopt a posture of humility in order to 
begin the purge because endeavoring to approach the trinitarian mystery is a journey beset with 
great difficulty—even Augustine is ready to admit failure at the end of his journey. Augustine 
demands self-awareness from his readers, humble enough to entertain the possibility that if they 
do not understand, it might not mean Augustine’s analogy is unintelligible, but rather, that they 
might need to purify their minds further, re-read, and try the journey again, just as Thomas had 
to do in his ongoing and developing engagement with De trinitate.23 
 The connection between purifying the mind and overcoming corporeal thinking is 
important, and both are necessary for the practice of trinitarian theology. In Book 10 of De 
trinitate, Augustine considers the meaning and possibility of the oracle’s command, “know thyself.” 
Thomas references this passage in Question 87 of the Prima pars, which occurs in the context of his 
theological consideration of human understanding. He asks how the human mind knows its own 
essence—i.e., he asks about the mind’s self-knowledge.24 According to Augustine, self-knowledge 
is a laborious task because we confuse the mind with the objects it knows and loves, especially 
those objects below it, which come much more easily to it: 
Such is the force of love that when the mind has been thinking about things with love for 
a long time and has got stuck [cogitauerit] to them with the glue of care [curae glutino], it 
drags them along with itself even when it returns after a fashion to thinking about 
itself…But the mind is mistaken when it joins itself to these images with such extravagant 
love [amore] that it even comes to think of itself something of the same sort. Thus it gets 
conformed to them in a certain fashion, not by being what they are but by thinking it 
is…So in short, when the mind thinks of itself like that, it thinks it is a body.25 
                                                
23 See Augustine, De trinitate, 1.1.3 (Hill, 66-67). 
24 See ST Ia, 1. 87, a. 1c 
25 Augustine, De trinitate, 10..5.7 (Hill, 292; emphasis added). 
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Augustine continues shortly afterward, further explaining how this confusion arises: “[T]hose who 
think it is a body do not make their mistake because mind is not available to their knowledge, but 
because they add those things to it without which they cannot think about any nature.”26 These 
things people add to their minds are images or phantasms. Adverting to one’s mind as present 
and developing self-knowledge is hard-won because when the mind confuses itself with the bodies 
it knows and loves, it is also confusing the mind for an object absent from it, just as these bodies are 
absent from it. Thus, the mind overlooks that fact that in knowing anything, it is conscious of 
itself—and so already has the basis of self-knowledge—and instead goes off in search of itself.  
 It is this misleading substitution of bodies (of images, of pictures) for mind that inspires 
both Augustine and Thomas to help their readers overcome such misidentification through 
ongoing exercises that prepare them for the genuine knowledge of the mind that is requisite for 
pursuing the understanding of the psychological analogy for the Trinity. While Augustine and 
Thomas accomplish this with different techniques—one more explicit and phenomenological, the 
other more implicit and systematic, respectively—the common thread running through the 
books/questions prior to those on the psychological analogy is the active disentanglement of the 
real from the bodily. The real is not a body, but rather, the real is what is known.27 And it is the 
mind, which is not a body, that knows reality. Augustine does not shy away from the issue, but in 
the very first book, speaks of the necessity of purifying our minds of the false ideas we have about 
God before “that inexpressible reality can be inexpressibly seen by them.”28 Thomas also makes 
the necessity of purification explicit in the opening prologue of the Summa, but he communicates 
this necessity by using the art of rhetoric in his reference to the same Pauline passage with which 
Augustine begins the De trinitate. Those unfamiliar with the art of rhetoric can miss Thomas’s 
                                                
26 Augustine, De trinitate, 10.7.10 (Hill, 294). 
27 For example, see ST Ia, q. 16, a. 1. 
28 Augustine, De trinitate, 1.1.3 (Hill, 66-67). 
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allusion to the Augustinian concern for purgation in order to authentically and truly pursue an 
understanding of what one believes. Moreover, as we observed above, Questions 3-13 can be read 
as a series of exercises in which the reader is meant to come to terms with the transcendence of 
God, an exercise which de facto requires coming to terms with “the real,” for God is ipsum esse.  
 Lastly, Thomas rhetorically introduces the Verbum and the Trinity in these questions, even 
though according to the ordo disciplinae, the Trinity is treated after the divine essence. Thomas’s 
numerous references to the Trinity in these initial questions demonstrates that his consideration of 
the one God is never really apart from the consideration of the Trinity of persons because they 
are one and the same God; everything that is said of the divine essence is said equally of each 
divine person. In fact, grasping this point is one facet of trinitarian theology. As we saw in 
Chapter 6, Thomas uses the incarnate Word in the sed contra of some articles to teach us 
something about the divine essence and/or the Word in his divinity, e.g., that God is truth.29  
 Thomas also refers to the imago Dei and the Trinity at various points in the questions on 
the divine essence, usually in the sed contra of an article. For example, when arguing that God is 
not a body, Thomas introduces the imago Dei to explain that even though the human person is said 
to be created to the image of God, this does not mean God is a body, for it is not the human body 
that images God:  
Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that 
whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, Let us make man to our image 
and likeness’, it is added, ‘And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea.’ (Gn. 
1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to 
his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the 
image of God.30 
                                                
29 See ST, q. 16, a. 5sc. For other places in the initial question where the Incarnate Word is rhetorically 
present as our teacher of divine things, see q. 14, a. 6; q. 18, a. 4; q. 25, a. 5. 
30 ST Ia, q. 3, a. 1 ad 2. For other references to the imago Dei in these initial questions, see q. 4, a. 3sc and ad 
4; q. 14, a. 2 obj. 3. For references to the imago Dei in the trinitarian questions, prior to Q. 93, see ST  Ia, 
q. 33, a. 1 ad 2; q. 33, a. 3; q. 35, a. 1 ad 1 and a. 2 ad 3; q. 39, a. 7c; q. 38, a. 8c; q. 41, a. 3c. See also q. 
45, a. 7c. 
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In the very first question in which Thomas considers the divine essence, Thomas has already 
introduced the image and Genesis 1:26, which he will eventually give a trinitarian interpretation, 
because to be created to the image of God is to be created in the image of the Trinity, since God 
is triune.31  
 With respect to the Trinity, in Question 10 when considering whether God is eternal, 
Thomas uses Athanasius as his authority in the sed contra: “Athanasius says in his Creed: ‘The 
Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal.’”32 Next, when considering 
whether God is supremely one, Thomas calls the Trinity to mind, preparing the student to 
anticipate difficulties that might arise when trying to understand and conceive how God can be 
one and three: “Bernard says (De Consid. v): ‘Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine 
Trinity holds the first place.’”33 In Question 12 on our knowledge of God, Thomas uses Christ’s 
baptism as an example of one of the two ways grace elevates human reason with respect to our 
knowledge of God (strengthening our intellectual light and forming images): “[S]ometimes 
sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the 
Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard: 
‘This is My beloved Son’ (Mt. 3:17).”34 For Thomas, the revelation of the Trinity is the supreme 
example of our graced knowledge of God; knowledge of the Trinity that teaches us how to think 
rightly about creation and redemption. Lastly, we observed another instance in Chapter 6 when 
Thomas argued that God is the supreme good by way of Augustine’s remark in De trinitate that the 
Trinity of divine persons is the supreme good. In order to contemplate this good, we must purify 
our minds.35  
                                                
31 ST Ia, 1. 93, a. 5c. 
32 ST Ia, q. 10, a. 2 sc. 
33 ST Ia, q. 11, a. 4 sc. 
34 ST Ia, q. 12, a. 13c. 
35 For other references to the Trinity or to the divine persons in the initial questions, see ST Ia, q. 16, a. 5 ad 
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1.1.2 The Prima Pars: Questions 27-43 
In Chapter 5, we saw that Thomas began to realize during his writing of De veritate that the 
relevant trinitarian analogue was really for the two processions, which are acts. By the time 
Thomas came to compose the Summa theologiae, he was able to present Augustine’s achievement 
according to his own application of the ordo disciplinae to sacra doctrina, structuring the trinitarian 
questions in a remarkably different way than in earlier works.36 Where Augustine arrived at the 
two dynamic processions of knowing and loving toward the end of his process of discovery in De 
trinitate (although he first suggests them in Book 9), Thomas begins with these two processions 
because he is proceeding according to the order of teaching and learning. We have just seen the 
pedagogical importance of beginning the consideration of God with the questions on the divine 
essence. There is also the pedagogical significance of beginning the trinitarian questions (which 
are part of Thomas’s consideration of God) with the question on divine processions (rather than 
with the persons, for example). Thomas expresses this in the prologue to Questions 27-43:  
Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of 
what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are 
distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin, the order of the 
doctrine [ordinem doctrinae] leads us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; 
secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.37  
Pedagogically, Thomas begins with the processions because we need to understand procession in 
order to understand relations in order to understand persons.38  
 In these trinitarian questions, Thomas helps the student develop the concepts necessary 
for engaging the trinitarian mystery. He operates according to a twofold way in which concepts 
                                                                                                                                            
2; q. 19, a. 10sc; q. 20, a. 4 ad 2; q. 25, a. 5. 
36 Compare, for example, works as recent as De potentia in which the questions on the divine relations (q. 8) 
and the divine Persons (q. 9) precede the question on the procession of the divine persons (q. 10). See 
Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 95-102. 
37 ST Ia, q. 27, prol. The ordo doctrine is same movement as the ordo disciplinae, but it emphasizes the 
teaching side of the process of teaching and learning. 
38 See ST Ia q. 29, prol. 
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can be ordered. There is (a) the order of our concepts as they originate in our discursive reasoning 
process (the order of our concepts in a state of becoming, which corresponds to the order of 
intelligence)39, and there is also (b) the order of the concepts insofar as they relate to each other in 
reality (the order of our concepts in a state of actual being, which corresponds to the order of 
reality). Both orders belong to the ordo disciplinae/doctrinae.40 In each case, the goal is to understand. 
With regard to the trinitarian questions, the specific goal is to understand either the meaning of 
procession, relation, and person in God (and so, e.g., understand God insofar as God is eternally 
constituted as triune) or the trinitarian mystery, itself (e.g., why the Persons are so named or why 
they have the properties and acts they do have). Thomas expresses this twofold ordering in 
relation to the Father, “The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold sense: 
firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for 
relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as it constitutes the person; and thus 
the notional act presupposes the relation, as an action presupposes a person acting.”41 The former 
regards our concepts in a state of becoming while the latter regards them in a state of being. 
 In this passage from Question 40, Thomas identifies two ways in which we can 
understand and conceive the same reality, in this case, a personal property. The relations (e.g., 
paternity) are the personal properties (e.g., unbegotten, innascibility).42 Similarly, the processions 
are the notional acts. For example, Wilkins explains the relation between processions and notional 
acts in the Summa, “The processions and the notional acts are really identical but conceptually 
distinct; we conceive the former in order to posit relations and persons; we conceive the latter in 
order to think about the processions in terms of personal operations.”43 It is only upon having 
                                                
39 This is the order we observed in the initial questions as the student was led to develop a concept of God. 
40 See Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 214. 
41 ST Ia, q. 40, a. 4c. 
42 See ST Ia, q. 33, a. 4c. 
43 Wilkins, Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology (unpublished manuscript), 100-01.  
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developed the necessary concepts in Questions 27-29 that Thomas then proceeds to apply them 
to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in general, individually, and comparatively. Whereas before 
one concept was leading to the next (procession to relation to person), now Thomas relates the 
concepts to one another. Structurally, this twofold ordering allows Thomas to reconsider relations 
as personal properties, and to reconsider processions as notional acts.44 Notice that we still need to 
conceive “personal property” and “notional act.” However, in the order of reality, properties are 
properties of persons, and acts are acts of persons and so the concepts in a state of actual being 
move from person to property to act. In other words, our concepts “in a state of actual being” still 
need to be conceived (they are not simply “there”). The point is that in reality persons are what 
have properties and it is persons that act. Again, both orders of concepts belong to the ordo 
disciplinae because in both orders, we are proceeding from what we must understand first before 
we can understand what comes next; understanding is the goal in both cases. The difference is 
that the order of concepts is reversed depending on whether we are operating according to the 
order of intelligence or the other of reality. 
 Thomas anticipated this reconsideration through the twofold ordering of our concepts in 
the prologue to Question 29, which he further clarifies in the prologue to Question 39: “First, we 
shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other”45 and 
“Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what 
concerns the person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of 
the comparison of these with each other.”46 He now reverses the order of concepts developed in 
Questions 27-29 and reconsiders them.47 Thus, he begins with the persons in relation to the 
                                                
44 On the structure of the treatise, see Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 213-214. 
45 ST Ia, q. 29, prol. 
46 ST Ia, q. 39, prol. 
47 By proceeding in this way, Thomas is able to address a further and related theological issue through the 
very structure of the trinitarian questions. The issue is whether the Father is Father because he generates, 
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essence (q. 39), proceeds to their relation to personal properties (q. 40), then to their relations to 
notional acts (q. 41) and lastly, to their relations with one another as regards their equality (q. 42) 
and their missions to humanity (q. 43). The semblance of a chiastic structure can thus be 
observed: 
          Development of our Concepts  Deployment of our Concepts 
(in a state of becoming—order of intelligence)             (in a state of being—order of reality) 
      
  3. Questions 29: Persons 31. Questions 30-32: Persons in general  
             Question 33-38: Persons individually  
               Question 39: Persons compared to divine  
            essence  
 
  2. Question 28: Relations   21. Question 40: Personal properties 
 
1. Question 27: Processions 11. Question 41: Notional acts 
          Question 42: Persons in  
                   relation to one another (equality) 
             Question 43: Persons in  
             relation to us 
 
Figure 4 
 Thus, in these trinitarian questions, we can observe Thomas continuing his pedagogical 
program of proceeding in a way conducive to leading the student by the hand from the known to 
the unknown. Recall that the ordo disciplinae (which Thomas says he is following in the trinitarian 
questions) “begins with concepts that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a 
                                                                                                                                            
or whether he generates because he is Father. This is a question about whether the Father can be 
conceived apart from generation. In the Summa, Thomas answers this question negatively (though as 
recently as De potentia, he answered it positively). In Question 40, Thomas indicates his reasoning behind 
the Summa’s structuring of these trinitarian questions, which, insofar as it pertains to how we understand 
things, is related to the trinitarian prologue’s ordo doctrinae: “If, however, the personal property be mentally 
abstracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not to be 
understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject: but they carry 
with them their own supposita, inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the 
Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual 
substance. So, as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as explained above, it follows that if the personal 
relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain” (ST Ia, q. 40, a. 3c (emphasis added)).  
 For more on the theological implications of Thomas’s twofold ordering of our concepts in the trinitarian 
questions, see Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, 213-22.  
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step at a time it may proceed in an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science.”48 
Herein, the student develops the concepts necessary to speak about God as triune, and then learns 
how to use these concepts with respect to the Trinity, thereby continuing the project of teaching 
the student how to speak about God. While the student may not use the technical terminology of 
these questions in his preaching, undergoing the rigorous journey of Questions 27-43 is central to 
speaking meaningfully about the Trinity, as we observed in Thomas’s own Lenten sermons on the 
Apostles’ Creed. Further, we can observe the connection between conceiving inner words, 
according to which one contemplates the object understood, and then speaking outwardly in 
order to communicate the fruits of one’s understanding, conceiving, and contemplating.    
1.1.3 Prima pars: Questions 44-119 
In the final section of the Prima pars, in which Thomas considers the “procession of creatures from 
God,” the student is led to form true concepts about creation and about oneself specifically as 
created ad imaginem Dei.49 Recall what Augustine writes, and what Thomas echoes in Question 93: 
This trinity of the mind is not really the image of God because the mind remembers and 
understand and loves itself, but because it is also able to remember him by whom it was 
made. And when it does this, it becomes wise. If it does not do it, then even though it 
remembers and understands and loves itself, it is foolish. Let it then remember its God to 
whose image it was made, and understand and love him. To put it in a word, let it 
worship the uncreated God, by whom it was created with a capacity for him and able to 
share in him. In this way it will be wise not with its own light but by sharing in that 
supreme light, and it will reign in happiness where it reigns eternal.50 
It is after having been purified so as to rise above corporeal things that the mind is able to begin 
understanding the Trinity in which it believes. And it is in remembering the Trinity as its Creator 
that the mind becomes wise. Such is the journey Thomas takes the student on in the Prima pars—
from the purification of the mind and engagement with the God who is at once transcendent and 
                                                
48 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 60-61. 
49 See ST Ia, q. 44, prol. 
50 Augustine, De trinitate, 15.4.15 (Hill, 406-07). 
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immanent in order to form a true concept of the true God, to engagement with this same God as 
triune in order to develop concepts relevant to the trinitarian mystery, and then lastly to 
understanding oneself as a creature made by and like this triune God, and so as a creature who 
has a special role within divine providence.  
1.2 The Secunda pars 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the opening prologue to the Secunda pars introduces the image-exemplar 
relationship into the division of the text: 
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God’s image, in 
so far as the image implies ‘an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-
movement’: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things 
which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to 
treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having 
free-will and control of his actions.51 
Introducing this relationship was made possible because in the Prima Pars, Thomas developed the 
terms “image” and “exemplar,” along with their relationship.52 Thomas now expands on the 
rational creature’s advance toward God because as the imago Dei, this advance will be a free 
advance, just as every act of God is free. In this way, the prologue to the Secunda Pars is a more 
particular elaboration of the earlier division found in the prologue to Question 2 of the Prima Pars. 
This elaboration includes the human person’s natural and supernatural movement toward God, 
who helps her through instruction and grace. In this way, the Secunda Pars begins to unfold the 
coordinated divine missions of Question 43 of the Prima Pars. The self-understanding in relation to 
the Triune Creator that was sought during the Prima pars now spurs on the inquiry of the 
remainder of the Summa, in which the assimilation of the image to the Exemplar is explored in 
relation to the perfection of knowing and loving through grace—that is, through the coordinated 
missions of the Son and the Spirit. 
                                                
51 ST Ia-IIae, prol. 
52 See ST Ia, qq. 35, 93. 
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 While the Secunda pars continues the trinitarian theme of the Prima pars that I have 
accentuated, it also gives primacy of place to the mixed life and handing on the fruits of one’s 
contemplation. As I argued in Chapter 6, Thomas’s trinitarian theology and trinitarian 
anthropology are intimately connected to his theology of the mixed life. Mark Jordan has 
convincingly proposed that at the close of the Secunda Pars, Thomas exhorts his readers to choose 
the mixed life and imitate Christ.53 He does so by drawing out the rhetorical motives of this final 
section of the Summa, asking, for example, what effect does Thomas want the text to have on its 
readers? How does the text intend to move them? Into what way of life will the text call its 
readers?54 Jordan’s argument hinges on the organization of the final questions of this part of the 
Summa (qq. 171-189), which is about the “concrete integration of virtues into virtuous ways of 
life.”55 These questions are divided in to three sections. The first division considers prophecy and 
gifts of speech (including teaching) as gratuitous graces. The second compares the active and 
contemplative lives. The third division considers the states of perfection, which include the 
episcopacy and the religious life. What Jordan highlights in terms of Thomas’s ordering of these 
questions and divisions is that Thomas does not end this part with prophecy, which seems like a 
fitting end, for it is “a culminating description of human nature elevated beyond itself into the 
rapturous anticipation of the life to come.”56 Instead, Thomas concludes with the comparisons of 
lives and a description of the states of perfection. Why? Because, as Jordan argues, “these are not 
so much comparisons or descriptions as exhortations. He is here exhorting the reader to take up a 
way of life that will lead to beatitude.”57 
                                                
53 See Jordan, “Thomas Aquinas on Bernard,” 457. See also Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 139. 
54 See Jordan, “Thomas Aquinas on Bernard,” 456. 
55 Ibid., 457. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
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 As we saw in Chapter 6, Thomas considers religious life a “school or exercise” for the 
attainment of the perfection of Christian life, charity, which is the universal precept for all 
Christians.58 In this way, religious life “offers itself as just that education in the best human life,” 
which helps its student come to human completion.59 The evangelical counsels (poverty, chastity, 
and obedience) and religious rules of the various orders are all ways of learning charity.60 
However, as Jordan argues, “Thomas is not describing religious life as an education; he is 
proposing religious life as a response to the reader’s desire for contemplative beatitude. Do you 
want to learn how to enact the coherent human life described in the Summa’s second Part? Take 
up a way of life that is a school for charity.”61 Thomas considers the religious life to be the best 
opportunity for being taught how to attain God—and by extension, the best opportunity to help 
others do likewise. The last two articles of the final question of the Secunda pars “place the choice of 
religious life squarely before the reader.”62 Thomas inquires, “Whether one ought to induce 
others to enter religion?” and “Whether serious deliberation with one’s relations and friends is 
requisite for entrance into religion?”63 He maintains that it is a great good to persuade someone 
and that, in fact, it is not wrong to enter religious life without serious deliberation and counseling 
because “religion is something certainly from God, [and] because it offers so sure a way to learn 
charity.”64 Therefore, one should proceed with haste to enter religious life.65 
                                                
58 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 186, a. 2c; q. 184, aa. 1, 3. 
59 Jordan, “Thomas Aquinas on Bernard,” 458. See ST IIa-IIae, q. 186, a. 1c. 
60 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 1: “As stated above, the religious state is a training school wherein one aims by 
practice at the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to which a man may devote 
himself; and there are also various kinds of exercise.” 
61 Jordan, “Thomas Aquinas on Bernard,” 458. 
62 Ibid. 
63 ST IIa-IIae, q. 189, prol. 
64 Jordan, “Thomas Aquinas on Bernard,” 458. 
65 We saw Thomas argue the same point in his sermon on Luke 8. The sower ought to go out in the 
morning, meaning, according to Thomas, that people ought to enter religious life in their youth. 
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 This exhortation is significant for my argument that the Summa is a contemplative study 
that supports the student’s trinification, which prepares him for his ministry of speaking about 
God. The reason is because it contextualizes Thomas’s efforts within the exercises of religious life 
that help one learn to lead a life of charity. Charity is essential to the journey of the Summa; 
without it, one gains only mere information. Just as the form and content of the Summa should not 
be separated, neither should the text be separated from the initiating and sustaining role charity 
plays in the student’s integral formation. Leading a life charity is essential to becoming a good 
theologian, teacher, or preacher, in other words.  
1.3 The Tertia pars 
Lastly, Thomas considers the Image of God66 Incarnate, providing the student with the most 
concrete example of the life of virtue. Specifically, the Incarnate Word is the example for how to 
know God truly and love God rightly, which includes for some believers (for Christ chose the 
mixed life) handing on the fruits of their contemplation to others so they, too, can join the Son in 
knowing and loving the Father through the Spirit. The Christology of the Tertia pars also provides 
the student with the opportunity to know and love God in the flesh so he may know and love 
more personally the eternal Word he first contemplated in the Trinitarian questions.67  
 While we do not have the privilege of knowing how the Summa ended, we at least know 
that Thomas placed the questions on the sacraments after the questions on the resurrection and 
ascension. That is, he placed the sacramental questions after the questions on the mysteries of 
faith that begin Easter and the life of the Church in the age of the Spirit.68 Thus, we can conclude 
                                                
66 See ST Ia, q. 35. 
67 Notice that just because the Tertia Pars deals with the Incarnation, this does not mean that it deals only 
with the Incarnate Word. For Thomas, Christology and soteriology necessitate knowing Christ both in 
his human nature and as a being of divine nature (see In Ioan., c. 14, lect. 2, n. 1886), as well as coming to 
terms with the mode of union of these natures, and the effects and consequences that follow. 
68 ST IIIa, q. 60, prol. 
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that the Christian’s ongoing instruction and formation in the mysteries through the sacramental 
life of the Church, to which the Dominicans as priests are called to minister, is placed after 
considering the mysteries of faith. In light of this organization, where the Secunda Secundae ends 
with an exhortation to the religious life, we might surmise that the Tertia Pars was heading toward 
an exhortation for these Dominicans to share the fruits of their contemplation and be useful to the 
souls of their neighbors in their teaching, preaching, and sacramental ministries.  
 Yet, it is important to note that Thomas did not intend to end with the Sacraments. 
Rather, he planned to return to his consideration of the Incarnation and then the majesty of the 
Godhead, considering the Last Judgment and the work of glory, respectively. As he writes in the 
prologue to the question on Christ’s judiciary power (the last question before the questions on the 
Sacraments): “It will be more suitable to consider the execution of the Last Judgment when we 
treat of things pertaining to the end of the world.”69 However, this need not change the potential 
exhortation toward which the Tertia pars may have been heading because the entire reason the 
Dominicans embarked on contemplative studies and preached was the sake for their neighbors 
salvation, such that their neighbors may reach the glory of eternal life. Thus, it is fitting that a text 
written for Dominican teachers and preachers culminate in the work of glory because the 
salvation of souls is their vocation, to which all their other practices and tasks are ordered. I will 
return to this below. 
2. The Summa theologiae, Complacency and Concern, and Salvation History 
The journey of the Summa can also be understood in terms of the transition from complacency—
from the rest that proceeds from contemplating the good that is—to concern about the good that 
is not yet. As we saw in Chapter 6, the transition from complacency to concern is related to the 
                                                
69 ST IIIa, q. 59, prol. 
  
 
Conclusion – Page 461 
transition from contemplation to action. In this way, we can understand the movement of the 
Summa to be illuminated by the spiritual processions of word and love, and to be oriented to the 
preparation of teachers and preachers who must contemplate in order to effectively speak about 
God to others (and so leave their complacent contemplation for the sake of concerned action). As 
Crowe observes: 
And so, following the ontological division of St. Thomas, one would say that for God the 
transition occurs at q. 44 of the Pars prima, where the theme shifts from the divine being 
(the object of His complacency) to the processio creaturarum a Deo (the object of His concern). 
For man, the transition occurs with the Pars secunda, where having studied the world that 
is and has come to be without our intervention, we begin to consider the world of 
becoming and especially our becoming, where events are at least partially subject to our 
own dominion.70 
It is in the context of this concern and the transition that occurs for the human person in the 
Secunda pars, that Thomas exhorts the reader to join the religious life. The religious life is a sure 
way to learn charity, which includes imitating Christ in his loving concern for his friends, and so 
his decision to lead a mixed life rather than a purely contemplative life. 
 Before concluding, let me return to the true depth of Thomas’s wise pedagogy, which 
came to the fore when considering how he integrated the ordo disciplinae with the Articles of Faith 
so as to enliven the Summa with the movement of salvation history. He ordered the material 
pedagogically, selecting a universal starting point and proceeding according to the needs of the 
student—that is, he chose the ordo disciplinae as his method. Yet, Thomas also gave voice to God’s 
involvement with human history, not by proceeding chronologically, but by accentuating the 
divine wisdom and goodness holding creation and redemption together in one single and simple 
view. He unfolded the Articles of Faith in a way commensurate with salvation history by using the 
neo-Platonic exitus-reditus structure to facilitate an expression of a fundamental scriptural pattern in 
                                                
70 Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, 155-56. 
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which God is freely and providentially the beginning and end of all things.71 At the same time, 
Thomas also systematically reordered the Articles of Faith into a more scientific pattern that 
wisely brought the nexus of these mysteries of faith into relief.72 Thomas makes two important 
points in his enumeration of the Articles of Faith. One, the Articles fit together harmoniously as 
do the parts of a whole.73 Two, a certain order obtains among the Articles of Faith, just like in the 
sciences, and so some Articles implicitly contain the others.74 Recall the following chart from 
Chapter 2, which expresses how Thomas systematically re-ordered the creedal proposition75: 
Majesty of the Godhead Mystery of Christ’s Incarnation 
Unity of Godhead (1 Article) Incarnation/Conception 
Trinity of Persons (3 Articles) Virginal birth 
Works proper to Godhead: Passion, death, and burial 
- order of nature (Article on creation) Descent into hell 
- order of grace (Article on sanctification) Resurrection 
- order of glory (Article on resurrection and life 
everlasting, or in other words, reward) 
Ascension 
Judgment 
Table 17 
Thomas plans the Summa around these two creedal principles (the majesty of the Godhead and 
the mystery of the incarnation).  
 As Laporte underscores, Thomas deviates from the narrative of the Creed in the 
systematic reordering of the Articles with one exception: he intended to conclude the Summa with 
the work of glory instead of following the systematic order he enumerated, which would have 
treated all the mysteries of the Godhead—including the work of glory—and then proceed to the 
mysteries of the Incarnation—ending with Judgment. That is, the narrative of the Creed ends 
with the work of glory, as its final article pertains to the resurrection of the body and life ever 
lasting. However, when Thomas proposed how the Articles should be systematically reordered, he 
                                                
71 See Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas Aquinas, 306-20. Also see ST Ia, q. 1, a. 3 ad. 1; a. 7c. 
72 See ST IIa-IIa, q. 1, aa. 7-8. 
73 ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 6c. 
74 ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7c. 
75 See ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 8c. 
  
 
Conclusion – Page 463 
included this final article as the last principle under the general principle, “the majesty of the 
Godhead.” Yet, as we saw above in the prologue to the question on Christ’s judiciary power (q. 
59), we find that not only did Thomas intend to delay the questions on the Last Judgment until 
after the Sacraments, but he also intended to return to the work of glory, which has to do with the 
end of the world.76 Thomas planned to return to “the majesty of the Godhead” and conclude with 
glory rather than with the final moment of “the mystery of Christ’s incarnation,” judgment.77  
 Pedagogically, it would seem intelligible to follow the work of grace with the work of 
glory, especially because the Secunda Pars opens with a reflection on the human person’s last end. 
However, Thomas moved from considering particular states of life to considering the mystery of 
the Incarnation, and so delays bringing the work of grace to its consummation in the work of 
glory. As Laporte writes, “The Summa maintains the humanity of Christ as a block to be dealt with 
in its final part, but subsumes it into the overall exitus-reditus pattern identified by Chenu by 
making it precede the consummation of all things.”78 This departure is significant for my effort to 
accentuate the trinitarian dynamism of the text and its performative dimension. Why? Because 
the imago Trinitatis is treated according to the narrative pattern of salvation history in which we 
find God’s works of nature, grace, and glory. There is a progressive movement from the natural 
image in the human person, to its graced assimilation in this life through sanctifying grace, and 
finally to its glorified consummation in the next life through the resurrection. This movement is 
not just theological; it is performative—the human person grows in likeness to the triune God the 
more he comes to actually know and love God in grace. And it is coming to know and love God 
more and more that the pedagogy and contemplative study the Summa offers is meant to support. 
                                                
76 He explains the connection between glory and the end of the world in the first question of the Tertia pars: 
“the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the 
end of the world” (ST IIIa, q. 1, a. 6c). See also Comp. theol., c. 242. 
77 In the Compendium, Thomas did follow the systematic ordering, treating the work of glory first and then 
Christ.  
78 Laporte, “Christ in the Summa,” 238. 
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 Rhetorically, to end (at least intentionally) the Summa with the work of glory can be 
understood as an exhortation to continue the work God has begun in oneself until God brings it 
to completion (Phil 1:6), and to help others do likewise. Thomas not only follows the ordo disciplinae 
by gradually developing the student’s understanding so that he has the tools to grasp what is at 
hand and moves spontaneously from one question to the next. He also integrates it with the 
movement of salvation history by treating the imago Dei in increasing depth and illuminating how 
the divine missions are coordinated to concretely bring about our trinification, individually and 
for the common good. As the head of the Church, Christ completes the work of glory that belongs 
to the majesty of the Godhead. 79 It is through Christ that the human person, created ad imaginem 
Dei, completes her journey to the glorified life with the triune God.   
3. Conclusion 
I have aimed to recover Thomas’s idiom (contemplata aliis tradere) to argue that trinification is 
fundamental to preaching and teaching, and that the Summa supports this process as a 
performative text facilitating a transformative encounter with sacra doctrina. It is this contemplative 
study, by which the student comes to know and love God, his friend, more deeply, that prepares 
him to teach and preach. I have also argued that trinification is connected to friendship and 
conversation, which connects it to teaching and preaching. That is, God graciously makes us 
God’s friends by communicating divine beatitude to us. We respond to and deepen this friendship 
through conversation. In the Summa, this takes place through an orderly contemplative study that 
promotes a transformative encounter with God as well as with oneself and others as created ad 
imaginem Dei and as friends of God. That conversation assimilates the image to the exemplar is 
fitting because conversation, itself, provides an analogy for the Trinity: Speaker, Word, Listening. 
                                                
79 See ST IIIa, qq. 7-8. 
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Thus, conversation is at once a means for deepening our friendship as well as an imitation of and 
participation in the conversation that God is. Making this argument involved a creative retrieval 
of Thomas’s trinitarian theology and his commentary on the gospel of John with respect to the 
trinitarian missions. 
 Those who travel the wisely ordered path of the Summa theologiae come to know and love 
God as someone who has invited them into a deep friendship. As friends, they are part of the 
same community because they share a communion of mind and heart, and are even alike in 
virtue to the extent that via grace, the human person as the imago Dei can grow in wisdom and 
charity. They also come to know and love God as someone who invites them to help extend this 
divine friendship to others by helping them to know the secrets of God’s heart—the deep things 
pertaining to the majesty of the Godhead and the mystery of the Incarnation. In this way, 
Thomas helps his students to prepare for a mixed life of orienting their contemplation toward the 
active works of preaching and teaching.  
 Lastly, I have attempted to accentuate the trinitarian dynamism and trinitarian telos of the 
Summa theologiae. By “trinitarian dynamism” I mean that the Summa is an ongoing transformative 
encounter with the triune God, with oneself as created ad imaginem Dei, and with all of creation 
insofar as the triune God is its beginning and end. That is, the mystery of the Trinity animates the 
entire text; the Trinity is not an afterthought in Thomas’s theology. By “trinitarian telos” I mean 
that those who travel the path (ductus) of the Summa—and who are practiced in the life of charity—
arrive at the Summa’s goal (skopos), trinification. Yet, this goal is not about the student’s personal 
holiness. Rather, assimilation to the Trinity and friendship with the triune God are for the sake of 
helping other wanderers on the journey to salvation. In arguing these two points, I have tried to 
demonstrate the centrality of Trinity to Thomas’s summa theologiae, both in terms of content and 
form. We have seen that Thomas’s analogical understanding of the Trinity informs his pedagogy, 
which prioritizes understanding and concept formation over certainty and memorization. We 
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have also seen that his trinitarian anthropology informs the transformative goal of the Summa. 
Thus, I have aimed to contribute to the retrieval of Thomas’s trinitarian theology and the 
psychological analogy as invaluable contributions to the Christian tradition. In so doing, I have 
attempted to contribute to Lonergan’s scholarship, which inaugurated an authentic interpretation 
of Thomas’s trinitarian theology in the 20th century, focusing upon the intellectual emanations of 
word and love. I have also attempted a creative retrieval of Thomas’s rendition of the 
psychological analogy by way of the theme of “conversation,” which ultimately will help to make 
this tradition of trinitarian theology more relevant to contemporary concerns regarding 
interpersonal relations. In this way, I have aimed to demonstrate that the psychological analogy, 
far from making the Trinity irrelevant to the Christian life, helps to situate this core Christian 
mystery within the very heart of human living. 
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